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Planning in Cold War Europe: Introduction¹
There exists no alternative to economic planning. There is, therefore, no case to be made for
or against economic planning, for or against free enterprise or free trade. Ever more State
intervention and economic planning is part of the historical trends. . . . In reality, it was
never, and is certainly not now, a choice. It is a destiny.² (Gunnar Myrdal)
The conclusion of Gunnar Myrdal’s Ludwig Mond lecture in Manchester in 1950
makes clear that the concept of economic planning was firmly impressed on the
mental maps of an influential segment of the European intellectual elite in the
early postwar years. The charismatic economist (a Nobel Prize laureate in
1974), sociologist, politician and international civil servant was part of a trans-
national milieu of publicly engaged academicians, mainly from Europe. As faith-
ful followers of the Enlightenment ethos, they believed in (social) science as the
key tool for the improvement of society. Myrdal and his wife Alva appropriated
the post-World War Two infrastructure of international organizations, consider-
ing it to be an excellent springboard for bringing their reformist ambitions closer
to reality. The husband and wife team became transnational symbols of this con-
viction and were portrayed as the “most popular Swedes, downright charged by
the United Nations with the task of saving the world.”³ The principle of rational
planning was a cornerstone of their thought and action.
Recent, and widely acclaimed, historical works have confirmed the extent of
the influence that leaders like the Myrdals (and their ideas on planning) had on
the continental and global level. Tony Judt described it in eloquent terms in his
magisterial Postwar: A History of Europe since 1945 where he labelled economic
planning as the “political religion” of European elites after 1945.⁴ Similarly, Marc
Mazower, in his Dark Continent (with reference to Karl Mannheim), elaborated on
the “striking fact” of the broad consensus among postwar European political
elites for whom “there [was] no longer any choice between planning and lais-
 This entire volume has been made possible by a generous grant from the the Swiss National
Fund and is part of a four-year project entitled “Shared modernities or competing modernities?
Europe between West and East (1920s-1970s)”. We are also grateful for the support of the
PRVOUK research funding scheme (Charles University, Prague).
 Gunnar Myrdal, “The Trend toward Economic Planning,” The Manchester School of Economic
and Social Studies 19 (1951): 40.
 Thomas Etzemüller, Die Romantik der Rationalität. Alva & Gunnar Myrdal. Social Engineering
in Schweden (Bielefeld: Transcript, 2010), 43.
 Tony Judt, Postwar: A History of Europe Since 1945 (London: Vintage, 2010), 67.
https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110534696-002
sez-faire, but only between good planning and bad.”⁵ Eric Hobsbawm in his Age
of Extremes explored how plans and planning became “buzzwords” in European
politics in the interwar period. Economic planning was embraced by “the politi-
cians, officials and even many of the businessmen of the postwar West, who
were convinced that the return of laissez-faire and the unrestricted free market
was out of the question.”⁶ More recently, David Engerman, in his contribution
to The Cambridge History of the Second World War, emphasized the rise of “plan-
ning euphoria” and “planning phobia,” two sides of a postwar “planning
boom.”⁷ Engerman, however, convincingly argued that both its opponents and
proponents overestimated “the power of planning.”⁸
These works confirm the centrality of planning thought in the postwar peri-
od. However, the widespread appeal of faith in planning must not hide the fact
that there were many conceptions of planning and that the notion was and still is
both ambiguous and malleable. Planning had a long history and contained
many layers. Its earliest use dates to the eighteenth century and the building
of cities and roads. It expanded to bureaucratic settings, and the coordination
or control of individuals’ actions. “Planning authorities”, “planning committees”
and “planning consultants” became everyday expressions at the turn of the
twentieth century.⁹ Their emergence reflected a range of new practices, actors
and social relations, all subject to planning. Historians have now begun to ana-
lyze the many manifestations of planning, in studies of “social planning” and
various forms of “scientific” social engineering. For example, historians and so-
cial scientists have examined how, starting in the mid-nineteenth century, state
officials and experts, searched for instruments of social improvement in order to
prevent or contain social conflict. Researchers subsequently showed that be-
cause social planning depended on knowledge about how specific societies
functioned, this led to the professionalization of the production of such applica-
ble knowledge. Within a wider process known as the “scientification of the so-
cial,”¹⁰ social planning became the ultimate goal of the social sciences. Planning
 Mark Mazower, Dark Continent: Europe’s Twentieth Century (New York: Vintage, 2000), 203–
204.
 Eric Hobsbawm, Age of Extremes: The Short Twentieth Century: 1914– 1991 (London: Abacus,
1995), 96, 272.
 David C. Engerman, “The Rise and Fall of Central Planning,” in The Cambridge History of the
Second World War. Volume III: Total War: Economy, Society and Culture, ed. Michael Geyer (Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 575, 576, 593.
 Engerman, “The Rise and Fall,” 598.
 See “planning” in the Oxford English Dictionary, www.oed.com
 Raphael Lutz, “Embedding the Human and Social Sciences in Western Societies, 1880– 1980:
Reflections on Trends and Methods of Current Research,” in Engineering Society: The Role of the
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emerged as a way of dealing with changing political situations. Its intellectual
aspirations have usually included a desire to “contribute to making the social
world predictable in the face of modern uncertainties, or in the stronger version,
to reshape it according to a master plan for improvement.”¹¹ By the mid-1980s,
critical thinkers already saw planning as an endeavor aimed at controlling and
dominating individuals in society. They argued that the various forms of plan-
ning that blossomed in the twentieth century originated in a nineteenth century
matrix for which urban, industrialized Europe was the experimental ground.¹² In
recent years, the production of histories of social scientific knowledge (including
planning) from a European or trans-European perspective has gained momen-
tum.¹³ The focus has expanded to urban planning¹⁴ and to colonial and post-col-
onial fields of study.¹⁵
Economic planning represents a particularly important sub-field of this type
of research. It was in the 1930s when “planning” began to be widely used in re-
lation to national economic activity. By the early 1960s, the rise of economic
planning thought and practice in the economic field had been identified by
economists such as Myrdal and Jan Tinbergen as a secular trend, which had or-
iginated at the end of the nineteenth century and which was reinforced by spe-
cific historical circumstances like wars, crises, and revolutions.¹⁶ Economic plan-
ning brought new technical meanings to the initial notion of planning. It
Human and Social Sciences in Modern Societies, 1880– 1980, ed. Kerstin Brückweh, Dirk Schu-
mann, Richard F. Wetzell and Benjamin Ziemann (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2012), 41–58. See
also Stefan Couperus, Liesbeth van de Grift, and Vincent Lagendijk, “Experimental Spaces – Plan-
ning in High Modernity,” Journal of Modern European History 13 (2015): special issue, no. 4.
 Peter Wagner, “Social Science and Social Planning during the Twentieth Century,” in Cam-
bridge History of Science, vol. 7: The Modern Social Sciences, ed. Theodore M. Porter and Dorothy
Ross (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 591.
 Arturo Escobar, “Planning” in The Development Dictionary. A Guide to Knowledge as Power,
ed. Wolfgang Sachs (London and New York: Zed Books, 2007), 132–145.
 See for example Brückweh, Engineering Society; Christiane Reinecke and Thomas Mergel,
Das Soziale ordnen: Sozialwissenschaften und gesellschaftliche Ungleichheit im 20. Jahrhundert
(Frankfurt am Main: Campus, 2012); Kiran Klaus Patel and Sven Reichardt, “The Dark Sides
of Transnationalism: Social Engineering and Nazism, 1930s–1940s,” Journal of Contemporary
History, 51 (2016): 3–21; Thomas Etzemüller, Die Ordnung der Moderne: Social Engineering im
20. Jahrhundert (Bielefeld: Transcript, 2009).
 Stefan Couperus and Harm Kaal, “In Search of the Social: Languages of Neighborhood and
Community in Urban Planning in Europe and Beyond, 1920–1960,” special section in the Jour-
nal of Urban History 42 (2016): 978–91.
 Valeska Huber, “Introduction: Global Histories of Social Planning,” Journal of Contemporary
History 52 (2017): 3–15.
 Jan Tinbergen, Central Planning (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1964), 5.
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introduced distinctions between “planning” as a stage in policy process, as an
accounting and budgetary tool, and as a reflection on intended and unintended
consequences of the management of various decisions. In the latter case, it had a
feedback effect on social planning which mimicked a large range of practices
elaborated by economic planning.
Since the end of the Cold War, historians have interpreted the period stretch-
ing from the 1890s to the late 1970s as a distinct era in global history, character-
ized by a shared belief in the benefits of planned modernity and development.
Ulrich Herbert and the historians inspired by his insights into Europe in the
age of “High Modernity”¹⁷ started a debate that has continued ever since, partic-
ularly in the area of economic development.¹⁸ Nevertheless, the rise of various
historical forms of economic planning, as well as the making and circulation
of planning models, has not yet been the target of systematic research. From
state intervention during the World Wars One and Two, through Gosplan, the
New Deal and Nazi Zentralplanung, the different models of economic planning
have all been studied separately.
In our volume, we seek to do justice to the plasticity of the notion of plan-
ning. In order to historicize planning, our definition is necessarily broad. The
contributions to this work highlight and explain the economic, social, and intel-
lectual aspects of planning and approaches to planning and how these have
played out across time and space. Of course, this diversity of emphasis is the out-
come of the variety of geographical and chronological contexts in which ideas
about planning were formulated and implemented. Throughout the twentieth
century, times of crisis have been fertile moments for planning and there is a
well developed historiography on planning in moments of economic crisis and
global conflicts. The policy of the New Deal in the United States, implemented
in the 1930s, has been well-researched as a case study of planning used to over-
come a deep economic and social depression.¹⁹ Likewise, it was an economic cri-
sis that ended the New Economic Policy (NEP) in the Soviet Union and led to a
shift to central economic planning and to the idea of “building socialism in one
 Ulrich Herbert, “Europe in High Modernity: Reflections on a Theory of the Twentieth Centu-
ry,” Journal of Modern European History 5 (2007): 5–21.
 Mark Frey and Sönke Kunkel, “Writing the History of Development: A Review of the Recent
Literature,” Contemporary European History 20 (2011): 215–232; Corinna R. Unger, “Histories of
Development and Modernization: Findings, Reflections, Future Research,” H-Soz-Kult 9.12. 2010,
http://hsozkult.geschichte.hu-berlin.de/forum/2010– 12–001 (accessed 9 February 2018).
 Kiran K. Patel, The New Deal. A Global History (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2016);
David Ekbladh, The Great American Mission: Modernization and the Construction of an American
World Order (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010).
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country.”²⁰ The two world wars offered multiple occasions to think about plan-
ning and its implementation. During World War One and its aftermath, all the
states at war took on new, unprecedented economic prerogatives, especially in
industry, despite the prevailing laissez-faire ideology of this era.²¹ World War
Two sparked the development of large-scale “war economies” in the Soviet
Union, Nazi Germany, and the United States. International-level planning be-
tween the Allies took place in a Combined Production and Resources Board
and in the United Nation Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA).
UNRRA, a gigantic logistical system linked to US and British troops, functioned
from 1943 to 1949 and was deployed in various places in the world from Europe
to China in order to meet basic, immediate postwar economic needs for health
care, food, clothing and housing.²²
The aim of our volume is to show that the Cold War was also a time of active
planning at national and international levels. So far historians have studied Cold
War planning mainly as a manifestation of “technical internationalism,” which
was embodied in the international organizations established by the United Na-
tions after 1945.²³ Despite the fact that several historians have pointed out the
structural similarities between Marxist-inspired thought and Western theories
of modernization,²⁴ much of the scholarship on the development of planning
ideas and practices between 1945 and 1989 has concerned itself with only one
side or the other of the Iron Curtain.²⁵
Our collection will show that these two models and practices of planning
should be studied together. While competing against each other, the two blocs
shared many ideas about planning, a fact that did not go unnoticed even
while the Cold War was under way, and several scholars compared the plans
 As analyzed by Karl Polanyi as early as 1944 in Great Transformation: The Political and Eco-
nomic Origins of Our Time (Boston: Beacon Press, 2001).
 Engerman, “The Rise and Fall,” 578 on.
 Craig N. Murphy, The United Nations Development Programme: A Better Way? (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2006), 34–40. There are a few more recent studies on UNRRA, in-
cluding Jessica Rheinisch, Ben Shephard and Rana Mitter.
 Daniel Speich-Chassé, “Technical Internationalism and Economic Development at the
Founding Moment of the UN System,” in International Organizations and Development, 1945–
1990, ed. Marc Frey, Sönke Kunkel, and Corina Unger (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan,
2014), 23–45.
 For a systematic comparison, see Gilbert Rist, Le développement: histoire d’une croyance oc-
cidentale (Paris: Presses de la Fondation nationale des sciences politiques, 2007), 180–186.
 Michael J. Ellman, Socialist Planning (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014).
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and systems of the West²⁶ and the East,²⁷ usually focusing on UN international
organizations.²⁸ Those works gave rise to the “theory of convergence,” intro-
duced at the beginning of the 1960s by sociologists and economists, who argued
that industrial societies shared common economic and social characteristics.²⁹
Their interpretations underlined the fact that socialist and capitalist systems bor-
rowed solutions to similar problems from each other,³⁰ so that they were “con-
verging” toward an increasingly similar socio-economical model of developed
society. As we now know, instead of a “convergence,” one of the two competing
systems collapsed spectacularly. “Convergence” could never eliminate the polit-
ical, economic and social competition between the two blocs. However, that
should not prevent scholars from examining genuine circulations or exchanges
of knowledge or practices. Many of their recent studies have done this in the
technical,³¹ scientific,³² cultural³³ and economic fields,³⁴ particularly as regards
the role of specific actors.³⁵
With that in mind, our book has two objectives. On the one hand, in line
with the research trends outlined above, this volume will study planning as
 Alexander Eckstein, Comparison of Economic Systems: Theoretical and Methodological Ap-
proaches (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1973); Morris Bornstein, Plan and Market: Eco-
nomic Reform in Eastern Europe (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1973); Morris Bornstein, Eco-
nomic Planning, East and West (Cambridge: Ballinger PubCo, 1975).
 Tigran Sergeevich Khachaturov,Methods of Long-Term Planning and Forecasting: Proceedings
of a Conference Held by the International Economic Association at Moscow (London: Macmillan,
1976).
 U Thant, Planning for Economic Development: report of the secretary-general transmitting the
study of a group of experts (New York: United Nations, 1963–1965, 3 volumes).
 Raymond Aron, Sociologie des sociétés industrielles. Esquisse d’une théorie des régimes polit-
iques (Paris: Centre de documentation universitaire, 1961); Talcott Parsons, Structure and Process
in Modern Societies (Glencoe: Free Press, 1960).
 John K. Galbraith, The New Industrial State (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1967); Tinbergen, Cen-
tral Planning.
 Sari Autio-Sarasmo and Katalin Miklóssy, Reassessing Cold War Europe (New York: Rout-
ledge, 2011).
 Ludovic Tournès, Sciences de l’homme et politique: les fondations philanthropiques améri-
caines en France au XXe siècle (Paris: Classiques Garnier, 2011).
 Patrick Major and Rana Mitter, Across the Blocs: Cold War Cultural and Social History (Lon-
don: Frank Cass, 2004); Ioana Popa, “La circulation transnationale du livre: un instrument de la
guerre froide culturelle,” Histoire@Politique 15 (2011): 25–41.
 Vincent Lagendijk, Electrifying Europe: The Power of Europe in the Construction of Electricity
Networks (Amsterdam: Aksant, 2008).
 Martin Kohlrausch, Katrin Steffen and Stefan Wiederkehr, eds., Expert Cultures in Central
Eastern Europe. The Internationalization of Knowledge and the Transformation of Nation States
since World War I. (Osnabrück: Fibre Verlag, 2010).
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an expression of a widespread belief in modernity on both sides of the East-West
divide. On the other, ideas and practices of planning will be an entry point to
question the very notion of the “Cold War.” Such an approach is fully in tune
with new studies of the Cold War, which have recently emphasized the porosity
of the Iron Curtain and stressed convergence between the two blocs.³⁶ The con-
tributions in this volume will bring to light the shared inspirations and circula-
tions of models of planning in the context of the bipolar structure of Europe after
1945. The ideas and discussions surrounding planning reflected the East-West
competition between two models of economic and social organization, but
they also revealed specific commonalities and complementarities. This paradox,
which has been largely overlooked by the historiography of the Cold War and
planning alike, is at the core of this book. The volume brings together well-docu-
mented contributions based on new empirical research that approach the story
of planning from a variety of angles. They deal not only with traditional areas of
interest in economic and social planning, but also open the doors to lesser-
known (or simply unknown) fields in the planning of scientific research and en-
vironmental management.
They also take into account various levels of planning. The national level has
long been a research focus for the historiography of planning, (re)examining as-
pects of national histories, including the relationship between planning and pol-
itics in postwar Britain³⁷ and the peculiar form taken by statism in France.³⁸ Sev-
 Among a rich and growing historiography in this field, see in particular Alexander Badenoch
and Andreas Fickers,Materializing Europe Transnational Infrastructures and the Project of Europe
(Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010); Jeremi Suri, “Conflict and Co-operation in the Cold
War: New Directions in Contemporary Historical Research,” Journal of Contemporary History
46 (2011): 5–9; Peter Romijn, Giles Scott-Smith, and Joes Segal, eds., Divided Dreamworlds?
The Cultural Cold War in East and West (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2012);
Autio-Sarasmo and Miklóssy, Reassessing; Frederico Romero and Angela Romano, eds., “Euro-
pean Socialist Regimes Facing Globalisation and European Co-operation: Dilemmas and Re-
sponses,” European Review of History 21 (2014), special issue; Egle Rindzeviciute, The Power
of Systems. How Policy Sciences Opened Up the Cold War (Cornell: Cornell University Press,
2017); Matthieu Gillabert and Tiphaine Robert, Zuflucht suchen. Phasen des Exils aus Osteuropa
im Kalten Krieg / Chercher refuge. Les phases d’exil d’Europe centrale pendant la Guerre froide
(Basel: Schwabe, 2017).
 Glen O’Hara, From Dreams to Disillusionment (Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke, 2007); Dan-
iel Ritschel, The Politics of Planning:The Debate on Economic Planning in Britain in the 1930s (Ox-
ford: Clarendon Press, 1997); Richard Toye, The Labour Party and the Planned Economy 1931–
1951 (Rochester: Boydell, 2003).
 Richard F. Kuisel, Capitalism and State in Modern France: Renovation and Economic Manage-
ment in the 20. Century (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983); Philippe Mioche, Le Plan
Monnet, genèse et élaboration, 1941– 1947 (Paris: Publ. de la Sorbonne, 1987); Michel Margairaz,
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eral contributions in this book deal with national planning and the circulation of
various planning models originating in countries such as France (Isabelle
Gouarné), Finland and the Soviet Union (Sari Autio-Sarasmo), Czechoslovakia
(Vítězslav Sommer), and Yugoslavia (Zaccharia Benedetto). However, other con-
tributors examine planning at the regional (Bloc) level, including the Council of
Economic Mutual Assistance (CMEA) (Simon Godard) and the Organization for
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) (Jenny Andersson). Attention
is paid to the Pan-European level (Daniel Stinsky, Katja Naumann, Sandrine
Kott) and even to the global scale, as reflected in the careful analyzes of the ac-
tivities of international organizations with a global reach (Francine McKenzie,
Michel Christian, Ondřej Matějka).
The analysis of East-West circulations, conflicts, and competition lie at the
heart of each contribution. Taken as a whole, they document three fundamental
aspects of the transnational history of planning in postwar Europe: actors,
spaces and temporalities.
The actors of planning
Who were the people who formulated, preached, sustained and proselytized the
“religion” of planning in both the East and West? In what domains were they
principally engaged? Is it possible to identify common traits in their career tra-
jectories?
These questions are implicit in all the contributions. In several of them, we
encounter some of the “usual suspects,” well known from previous works on
planning: experts in various fields (most often relating to economic matters)
who were socialized at different stages of their lives within various international
organizations, and who, in some cases, held executive positions in the secretar-
iats of those international organizations. Daniel Stinsky (inspired by Wolfram
Kaiser and Johan Schot) links these actors’ trajectories to the emergence of
“technocratic internationalism,” mainly in UN agencies. Gunnar Myrdal is the
classic example of this phenomenon.
The focus on East-West exchanges in our volume allows us to identify lesser
known, yet not less important, actors in the history of planning. People whose
careers were linked to the rise of cybernetics and computer science emerge as
“La faute à 68? Le Plan et les institutions de la régulation économique et financière: une libér-
alisation contrariée ou différée?,” in Mai 68 entre libération et libéralisation. La grande bifurca-
tion, ed. Michel Margairaz and Danielle Tartakowsky (Rennes, PUR, 2010), 41–62. See also the
contributon of Isabelle Gouarné in this volume.
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a particularly interesting group. Since the mid-1960s at least, computers and
computer specialists have been key proponents of planning increasingly com-
plex approaches in the field of the environment and elsewhere. This is shown
in detail by Michael Hutter, who describes the case of the budworm pest and
the corresponding research project carried out at the International Institute for
Applied Studies Analysis (IIASA). It is also true of the contribution by Sandrine
Kott in relation to management strategies promoted by the International Labor
Organization (ILO). Due to an important East-West technological imbalance in
the field of informatics, computers and computer analysts played a role in con-
necting the East and the West, with repercussions that extended beyond the
sphere of planning. In fact, as Kott hypothesizes, one of the reasons that Eastern
countries enrolled in Western-led management training programs through the
ILO was that they gained access to otherwise almost unattainable computer tech-
nology. The interest was reciprocal.Western firms profited from trade openings in
the Eastern bloc linked to the transfer of high-tech goods. The case of Nokia, ex-
amined here by Sari Autio-Sarasmo, offers an interesting example in this regard.
Ondřej Matějka’s chapter further elucidates the importance of computer ex-
pertise and technology. He shows that anxieties about cybernetics constituted
common ground for Western and Eastern Marxist philosophers and Christian
theologians. In the mid-1960s, they entered into an improbable but intense dia-
logue in which they denounced the “dehumanizing effects” of ever more “tech-
nicized” planning and management strategies executed with computerized tools.
Hence, even in the theological sphere, seemingly distant from the new technol-
ogies being applied to planning and management, computers represented an im-
portant, connective East-West issue. The challenge of such technology was one of
the constitutive components of a particular Christian-Marxist “channel,” which
functioned without regard to the Iron Curtain.
Furthermore, attention to unexpected circulations through, across, under
and beyond the political divide on the European continent draws attention to im-
portant and so far little-explored features in the profiles of transnationally active
planners. First of all, several of our contributions reveal a certain marginality of
those actors on the national level: Katja Naumann introduces the Polish philos-
opher Adam Schaff, who embarked on an international career at the Vienna Cen-
ter of the International Social Sciences Council after he suffered the consequen-
ces of an anti-Semitic wave inside Polish academia. Daniel Stinsky argues that
Myrdal himself opted for the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe
(UNECE) after he became the “target of popular dissatisfaction” in Sweden
due to his participation in the negotiation of ambitious trade deals with the So-
viet Union. Isabelle Gouarné highlights the domestic political marginality of
French leftists – often from Jewish or Protestant backgrounds – but who were
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the key figures in establishing a channel to economic planners in Hungary and,
to some extent, the Soviet Union. These French state economists (such as Étienne
Hirsch, Claude Gruson, and Jean Saint-Geours) were able to reconcile their leftist
preferences with the opportunities offered by De Gaulle statism.
The leftist leanings of postwar planners come as no surprise, but our East-
West analyzes offer enough material to highlight the importance of “reformisme”
and the social democratic international networks in which these ideas circulat-
ed. Both Myrdals, in the initial phase of this story, found a safe haven in Stock-
holm to plan the future of Europe. They were surrounded by members of the In-
ternationale Gruppe Demokratischer Sozialisten, which brought together socialist
emigrés from all corners of wartime Europe (including Bruno Kreisky and Willy
Brandt). The solidity of these networks was confirmed after the Iron Curtain div-
ided the continent. Benedetto Zaccaria makes an essential contribution to this
largely unknown story when he persuasively describes how Western social dem-
ocrats, from the 1960s on, were fascinated with the Yugoslav model of self-man-
agement. Zaccaria introduces personalities like Sicco Mansholt, a member of the
Dutch Labour Party who, as the President of the European Commission, praised
Yugoslav successes; the German Social Democrat leader Herbert Wehner, who
pointed to the achievements made by Yugoslav self-management in the Bundes-
tag; and the philosopher Alexander Marc, who called the attention of his French
followers to the Balkan country that had succeeded, according to him, in “replac-
ing the Soviet model of the almighty State with that of Society.”
In her analysis of the transfer of management ideas and practices between
West and East, Sandrine Kott confirms the existence of this stable social demo-
cratic internationalism. She underlines the continuous connections between
Czech social democrats in the ILO who had been exiled to the West and those
who had remained in Prague. The impact of these exchanges on the national
and local level would be a rich future research project. Kott points in this direc-
tion when she refers to thousands of local cadres in Romania, Bulgaria, Poland,
and Czechoslovakia who underwent training organized by the ILO. Western
(often British) experts in management led this training. Kott identifies the exis-
tence and influence of such a “transnationally minded technocratic milieu”
which played an important role not only during the Cold War but also in the
years of the post-1989 transition out of communism.
The spaces of planning
The second thematic cluster addressed by this volume concerns the spatiality of
planning.What were the spaces and the levels where planning was a subject for
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debate and an important social practice? Which spaces produced and inspired
planners from both East and West?
The domains of planning introduced by our contributors are expansive.
These domains existed on the national, continental and the global level. Only
within such a wide perspective can one conclude that the European continent
was central to the history of planning. As Daniel Stinsky explains in his contri-
bution, Myrdal believed that the rebuilding of postwar Europe should be based
on international planning. He also contended that national economies should be
coordinated across the growing East-West divide, and stressed the importance of
planning issues in UNECE. Isabelle Gouarné also emphasizes Europe’s centrality
and importance in her study of the exchanges between French planners and their
Eastern counterparts. She identifies a genuine “European pole” which developed
from the lively interactions between economic experts from both sides of the Iron
Curtain, and which produced a plethora of ideas and models for managing na-
tional economies. The most visible evidence of those interactions was the conver-
gence in the socio-economic debates inside the European space in the 1960s and
1970s, which in the 1980s were overshadowed by the rapid rise of neoliberal
thought connected to American hegemony. Katja Naumann makes a similar
case when she analyzes the activities of the Vienna Center, where East and
West European social scientists attempted to plan and to carry out large scale
research projects together. Among other things, those research projects aimed
to “Europeanize” comparative social research and overcome North American
“data imperialism”.
Not every corner of the Old Continent was equally welcoming to planners or
produced the remarkably lively planning thought and practices found elsewhere.
Our volume brings substantial nuance to the geography of planning initiatives
inside the “European pole.” In fact, several contributions in this book agree
on the particular importance of the European periphery and border zones as
seedbeds for the cultivation of planners, sites of lively intellectual debate on
planning, spaces for implementation of planning practices, and experimental
laboratories for planners coming from various backgrounds and places.
It is useful to distinguish the different scales of planning with nuanced ob-
servation and reflection. On the micro level, we can identify peripheral spaces
that proved to be especially welcoming for planning debates and research. Be-
sides the well-known internationalist center in Geneva (home to the UNECE,
the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), the
World Council of Churches (WCC) and the GATT), Vienna seemed to play host
as a site of frequent encounters between planners. Vienna’s position on the bor-
derline between the Western and Eastern blocs made it attractive as another cen-
ter for the headquarters of international organizations, including the Interna-
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tional Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the United Nations Industrial Develop-
ment Organization (UNIDO). The city’s prestige grew during the Cold War be-
cause of its hospitality to East-West joint ventures of all kinds. Chapters on the
Vienna Center and the IIASA provide concrete details about this pragmatic di-
mension of the city’s international community.
Geneva and Vienna are central spaces in our story mainly for reasons related
to organization and infrastructure: they were an accessible and convenient lo-
cale for East-West encounters. Countries on the periphery of Europe played a
more complex role at the meso-level of interaction. Two examples in our volume
– Yugoslavia and Finland – reveal a multi-layered phenomenon. Benedetto Zac-
caria unpacks the reasons and conditions for the development of a genuine
Western fascination with Yugoslav self-management, which reached its apex in
the mid-1970s. In fact,Western observers’ attraction to Yugoslavia was only partly
attributable to the inspirational theories on economic management introduced
by its experts. Westerners were also enchanted by Yugoslavia’s promotion of it-
self as a “laboratory” for evaluating in real time the pros and cons of its planning
system, halfway between the highly centralized Soviet model and looser Western
planning measures. Similarly, Hungarian economists (as related in Isabelle
Gouarné’s chapter) and Czech philosophers and theologians (in Ondřej Matějka’s
account) understood that presenting their countries as “testing grounds” for var-
ious contemporary theories of economic models and socio-theological hypothe-
ses substantially improved their chances of attracting the attention of their coun-
terparts from capitalist countries. Yugoslavia’s special appeal in this regard
produced concrete results in terms of advantageous business deals with the
West, in particular Yugoslavia’s 1970 trade agreement with the European Eco-
nomic Community (EEC), which was the first to be signed between the EEC
and a socialist country.
Sari Autio-Sarasmo’s account of the benefits accruing to Finland from its po-
sition on the Eastern periphery of Western Europe, closely linked to the Soviet
Union, further enriches our understanding of the mutual instrumentalizations
related to planning. In fact, Finnish enterprises progressively learned to adjust
to the functioning of the centrally planned economy next door. They played
the role of privileged trade partner with the Soviet Union, in part because they
were forced to do so by the postwar constellation of power in Europe. In the
long run, the predictable rhythm of Soviet five-year plans, stable demand from
Moscow for high-tech goods, and persistent Soviet difficulties in implementing
innovative procedures domestically (as they sought to achieve self-sufficiency
in communications, for instance) all proved to be water of life for Finnish com-
panies such as Nokia. Nokia’s success in the capitalist world is undeniably relat-
ed to this exceptionally well-protected business environment. It existed on a sort
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of lee side that allowed it to invest extensively in modernization projects and
thus acquire a particularly advantageous position in the global arena.
If we mount one step higher on the scale of observation, Eastern Europe
after 1945 emerges as a special regional case in terms of both economic and so-
cial planning. The socialist regimes in power there established state-planned
economies and launched an in-depth transformation of their societies based
on the Soviet model. However, as Simon Godard stresses in his contribution,
the Eastern European model of economic planning was never monolithic. Not
only did the Eastern bloc’s internal diversity in this area increase as it imple-
mented a range of economic reforms beginning in the 1950s, but its member
countries failed to coordinate their national plans. Simon Godard argues that
this failure to coordinate did not result from economic inefficiency but from po-
litical processes emphasizing national identities. According to this interpreta-
tion, Eastern European countries used the Council of Mutual Economic Assis-
tance (CMEA) to shift the balance of power within the Eastern bloc.
Nor was the Eastern bloc itself a self-contained monolith, as official dis-
courses suggested. Before Eastern and Central European countries formed a
“bloc”, they constituted a “European first periphery,” as seen from the perspec-
tive of the Western “center” in the interwar years – as Sandrine Kott reminds us.
In her contribution, she argues that this perception of a peripheral position was
not completely abandoned after 1945. The Eastern part of the continent became a
site for testing new management strategies exported from Anglo-Saxon countries
through international organizations. Interest in opportunities for experimenta-
tion increased from the early 1960s against the background (or sometimes, the
specter) of a rapidly rising Third World, which became omnipresent in every ap-
proach to planning and development. Consequently, in certain fields the Europe-
an Eastern periphery was considered (at least in theory) to be a potential bridge
to the underdeveloped South, be it in management, in theological dialogue or in
trade agreements like those encouraged by UNCTAD.³⁹
Temporalities of planning
Interest in bridging the West-East-South divides, which was widespread in the
late 1960s and early 1970s, was overshadowed in the sphere of planning by a
 This aspect is further developed in Michel Christian, Sandrine Kott, Ondřej Matějka, “Inter-
national Organizations in the Cold War: the Circulation of Experts beyond the East-West Divide,”
Acta Universitatis Carolinae. Studia Territorialia 1 (2017): 35–60.
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more defensive type of thought aimed at preventing the demise of Western global
dominance, or at least slowing it down. This is one of the key points of Jenny
Andersson’s contribution to our volume. Her analysis substantially enriches un-
derstanding of the chronological milestones in the history of planning between
East and West,which is the third thematic cluster addressed by most of the chap-
ters in this volume. The importance of this chronology justifies our decision to
organize this volume along a time-line of the rise and fall of the influence of
the “political religion” of planning in East-West relations.
The early days of planning are relatively well covered, for example in the
studies of Judt or Engerman, who emphasized how the world wars accelerated
intellectuals’ enthusiasm for all kinds of non-conformist ideas that had been
popular in the interwar years.⁴⁰ Two contributions in our volume adopt an inter-
national perspective and deal with the first dreams of large-scale planning. Be-
sides an inescapable homage to Gunnar Myrdal and UNECE, we find it important
to remember one story of a planning failure on the macro level: the rise and fall
of the International Trade Organization (ITO), the most ambitious postwar proj-
ect aimed at regulating global trade movements, as detailed by Francine McKen-
zie. Although the ITO grew out of the experiences and hopes of the interwar and
war periods, it could not survive the mounting pressure of early Cold War real-
ities and the retreat of planning thought in the United States in the late 1940s.
References to pre-1945 planning initiatives and thought are certainly not lim-
ited to the two contributions that form the first part of our book. Our volume in
fact demonstrates the importance of the interwar roots of postwar developments
in East-West planning. Katja Naumann insists on that point when she explains
the genesis of Central European social scientists’ connections to the West. Sim-
ilarly, the influence of Czech actors inside the ILO and other management-orient-
ed assistance activities stemmed from networks first forged in the 1920s, as San-
drine Kott explains in her chapter.
The “classical planners” who grew up in, and were formed directly or indi-
rectly by the self-confident, goal-oriented ethos of European High Modernity,
lived their (last) moments of glory in the 1960s, as the, correspondingly extensive
Part Two of this volume illustrates. That European ethos was shaped by the con-
viction that people and societies could be improved through rationally planned
action. After Charles de Gaulle returned to power in France, planners held key
positions inside the institutional architecture of the state-run parts of the French
economy (see the contribution by Gouarné), social scientists from all corners of
Europe launched ambitious comparative research schemes through the Interna-
 Judt, Postwar, 67on.
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tional Social Science Council (Naumann), numerous Western modernizers be-
came hypnotized by Yugoslav self-management practices (Zaccaria), the ILO fi-
nanced impressive management development centers (Kott) and the founding
of UNCTAD in 1964 restored the regulation of world trade atop the international
agenda (Christian). The oil shock of the 1970s and the end of the Bretton Woods
system in 1973 did not automatically call into question the ability of planners to
master an economic crisis. As Jenny Andersson makes clear, the early 1970s was
characterized by the blossoming of “worldwide” analyzes and planning propos-
als in the spheres of trade, finance, industrialization and development. It was
only later in the decade that the planning approaches began to lose ground to
neoliberal ideas.
Michel Christian’s chapter on UNCTAD offers an interesting perspective on
the transitional years between the planning euphoria and the planning phobia
that became palpable in the 1970s and 1980s. Founded as a response to the ear-
lier failure of the ITO after the Havana Conference in 1948, UNCTAD raised the
profile of planning in relation to international trade and espoused new trade reg-
ulations more favorable to developing countries. UNCTAD’s strength was based
on the presumed legitimacy of state intervention and economic planning in
the economic field. The intellectual framework that supported the European
postwar consensus allowed a reconciliation of Keynesian economic regulation
and socialist state planning. But as Christian also explains, the progressive mar-
ginalization of UNCTAD owed much to the rise of neoliberal ideology after the
late 1970s and its global impact.
Several other contributions (assembled in the third part of this volume) fur-
ther explain the turn away from planning in the 1970s.⁴¹ Jenny Andersson uncov-
ers the anxieties of influential elites, mainly in North America, who reacted to
the challenge of global interdependence by trying to find tools that would pre-
serve Western dominance of the world economy. Her analysis describes signifi-
cant shifts on the conceptual level. “Planning,” which was narrowly linked to
the progressively outdated modernizing ethos of the postwar decades, gave
way to “scenarios” and “models” that better fit the worldviews of new managers
of an increasingly ungovernable global arena. Michael Hutter points in the same
direction when he presents the goals formulated by IIASA experts in the 1970s.
There were no more ambitious large-scale development projects. Instead, the
catchword of the moment was to “control and stabilize” through “modules”
 The 1970s are undoubtedly one of the main areas of current historiographical research, for
recent developments in this field see, among many other works, Elke Seefried, “Politics and
Time from the 1960s to the 1980s,” The Journal of Modern European History 13 (2015), special
issue 3.
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and “packages of techniques.” In that particular field, experts ceased to promote
change and began to focus on stopping, or at least limiting, some of the disas-
trous consequences of previous large-scale “modern” projects such as the exten-
sive use of DDT. Both Hutter and Christian justifiably link their reflections on the
debates of the 1970s and 1980s to present-day discussions of climate change and
the continuing problematic effects of global imbalances in trade. In that way our
volume lends historical consciousness to the issues burning in our contemporary
public space.
Conclusion
Dealing with planning models and their circulation in international thought and
practices offers new insight into the European dimension of the Cold War. First,
it calls into question the master narrative of the clash between two superpowers.
The history of the Cold War in Europe, as seen from the planning angle, does not
focus on the Berlin blockade, the smashing of the Prague Spring, and the Euro-
missiles crisis. Instead it reveals that even though the European continent was
divided into two blocs, in buffer states such as Finland, Austria and, in its
own way, Yugoslavia there were numerous and varied contacts above, below, be-
yond and through the Iron Curtain. The contributions to this volume also show
that social-democratic parties and organizations have remained a stable part of
political life in Europe, in sharp contrast to the United States. This social-demo-
cratic milieu was instrumental in creating bridges between West and East, espe-
cially in fields like planning. Our collective volume also underlines the deep his-
tory of contacts between the two halves of Europe (dating back to before World
War Two), which stretched from trade and industry to culture and education. Be-
cause of those past ties, the Cold War could not be waged in Europe simply as a
confrontation between two superpowers. Last but not least, from French planism
to Hungarian market-based reforms of its centrally managed economy, planning
thought and practices highlighted the internal diversity of the two blocs, which
was in many ways the result of the circulation of planning models between East
and West. Dealing with planning in this way raises substantial questions about
contacts, exchanges, and circulations, which can and should be more widely
taken into account in new histories of the Cold War.
Second, this transnational history of the Cold War leads to a reevaluation of
the role of Eastern Europe in the conventional narrative of European history,
which has all too often been reduced to the history of the Western part of the
continent. The contributions in this volume show that Eastern Europe was
more than an extension of the West in the interwar years or a lost or kidnapped
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part of it during the Cold War. Already in the interwar years in most of these
countries, political elites, both conservative and social democratic, developed
state-led economic and social projects to overcome what they saw as structural
underdevelopment. Many of the postwar international planners came from East-
ern Europe. Communist politicians built on prewar know-how; meanwhile cen-
tral planning became one of the main tools to enforce the socialist development
project. Up to the 1970s, Eastern European countries thus constituted genuine
laboratories for planning; in that sense they remained a source of inspiration
for some planners in Western Europe. Moreover, their own history of relative un-
derdevelopment, made these countries suitable exporters of planning expertise
to newly decolonized countries, putting them in a central mediating position be-
tween West and South.⁴²
Finally, the various contributions highlight the fluidity of the notion of plan-
ning. As seen at the beginning of this Introduction “planning” as an analytical
category has been used in various intellectual contexts: economy, political sci-
ence, sociology, history, yet always in connection with modernity. Most of the
contributions in this volume use the term in relation to those various analytical
dimensions. There is more to be done in producing a micro-history of planning in
a pan-European context, to confront those analytical categories that we as schol-
ars are using with the language of the above-mentioned actors on the ground.
Did they know or claim that they were “planning”? How did the use of the
term change and evolve over time? Which kinds of practical tools did the various
actors use to “plan”? We hope that this volume will provide a useful analytical
framework for future research in this direction.
 For more on this aspect, see Christian, Kott, Matějka, “International Organizations”, 53–58.
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Part 1: Planning a New World after the War

Francine McKenzie
Peace, Prosperity and Planning Postwar
Trade, 1942–1948
Most histories of the Second World War focus on key battles, strategy and lead-
ership, the management of resources, and the workings of alliances.While these
are all essential aspects of the Second World War, they leave out a crucial ele-
ment: planning for peace. No one believed that the end of the Second World
War would automatically restore peace. As John Winant, the US ambassador
to London explained: “Planning for peace is an essential part of the job of win-
ning the war.”¹ Long before the outcome of the war could be predicted, officials
from the countries that made up the Grand Alliance developed social, economic,
and diplomatic plans that would address long-standing and recent challenges to
improve living conditions, modernize economies, and prevent another war.
While American and British officials were in the forefront of planning efforts,
small countries, governments in exile, world leaders including Pope Pius, public
intellectuals, and everyday citizens prepared plans to combat malnutrition, con-
tain nationalism, and promote human rights, amongst many other problems as-
sociated with war, hardship and injustice. This was part of the “planning eupho-
ria” of the Second World War and people explained their ideas about a future
peace in blueprints and treatises, drafts and designs, some well-developed
and some piecemeal.²
Planning also applied to efforts to reconstruct the global economy. There was
widespread belief that a peaceful world must also be prosperous. Three interna-
tional organizations – the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the International
Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), and the International Trade
Organization (ITO) – were seen as the main pillars of a postwar global economy
that would be stable and growing. But if there was far-reaching support for plan-
ning a postwar global economy, there were many ideas about its nature, work-
ings and priorities. Despite the association of planning with Soviet economic
management in the 1930s, the World War Two variant of economic planning
 Draft of a speech for Mr. Winant on Carrying out the Atlantic Charter, n.d., Cox papers, box
100, postwar –foreign, Franklin D. Roosevelt Library [FDRL].
 David C. Engerman, “The rise and fall of central planning” in The Cambridge History of the
Second World War. Volume 3, Total War: Economy, Society and Culture, ed. Michael Geyer and
Adam Tooze (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 575–576. Planning for the peace
shared some of the characteristics of wartime planning, including a conceptual “fuzziness”, a
wide range of applications, and a confidence that plans were rational solutions to problems.
https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110534696-003
was more procedural and pragmatic than ideological. There were some funda-
mental points associated with plans for postwar trade, but above all planning
meant advance preparations, deep study, and a multilateral process. This ap-
proach conformed to Gunnar Myrdal’s belief that international civil servants
should be “post-ideological, rational and problem-oriented planners”, as Daniel
Stinsky explains in his chapter.³ This methodological conception of planning
was evident in the construction of a new global trade system. American and Brit-
ish officials led the way with early designs for the ITO upon which they put a
liberal impress. As discussions widened to include more members of the wartime
alliance, it became clear that there were numerous priorities at play. Between
1942 and 1948, the original Anglo-American draft which had focused on lowering
tariffs was revised and expanded to include interventionist practices, regional
economic arrangements, and the promotion of development. The result was a
significantly different vision of global trade than the one that had emerged in
wartime. Three insights emerge from a study of planning and negotiations of
the ITO: first, the priorities associated with trade reflected diverse national
goals, including development, reconstruction, modernization, and regional
trade blocs; second, real efforts were made to accommodate different national
economic goals and practices within the trade system⁴; third, trade priorities
were fundamentally politicized, in that they were seen as the way to achieve ob-
jectives associated with authority, status, leadership, security and sovereignty.
This chapter begins by examining wartime enthusiasm for planning in gen-
eral and for trade specifically. It makes the case that planning had a few substan-
tive implications for the workings of the global trade system, in particular about
the management of trade by government and the importance of international in-
stitutions to oversee and uphold an internationalist conception of trade. The
chapter then discusses plans and negotiations, starting in 1942 with British
and American designs and meetings, and ending in 1948 at the Havana confer-
ence at which 56 countries participated. Despite drastic revisions to the ITO char-
 Daniel Stinsky, “Western European or All-European Cooperation? The OEEC, the European Re-
covery Program, and the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (ECE), 1947– 1961,” in
Warden of the West? The OECD and the Global Political Economy, 1948 to Present, ed. Mathieu
Leimgruber and Matthias Schmelzer. Transnational History Series (New York: Palgrave Macmil-
lan, forthcoming).
 This is similar to the conclusion reached by Eric Helleiner. As he explained, “efforts to recon-
cile liberal multilateralism with the state-led developmental goals of poorer countries were in
fact at the centre of the politics that created the postwar international financial order.” Eric Hel-
leiner, Forgotten Foundations of Bretton Woods: International Development and the Making of the
Postwar Order (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2014), 3.
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ter, participating nations were by and large satisfied with the result, confirming
the belief that there were many routes to a liberal global trade order.
The planning Zeitgeist in the Second World War:
Managed trade and international organizations
Making peace was a daunting challenge. But in wartime, it seemed urgent and
unavoidable. Planning seemed to be the only way to come to grips with such
a complex undertaking. Moreover, officials believed that planning could effect
change which was clearly needed in the global community.⁵ The Beveridge
and Morgenthau Plans were two of the best known examples of wartime plan-
ning and they conveyed the ambition, urgency, and necessity of planning to en-
sure that large scale challenges could be addressed to achieve justice, progress,
and security. There were critics of planning. Some people claimed that planning
was a panacea, assumed to have transformative powers based on misunder-
standing the issues at hand. Others feared it encroached on freedoms or was elit-
ist and undemocratic.⁶ But the critics’ voices were drowned out by the advocates
of planning which included people who could not be dismissed as delusional
utopians, as so many advocates of peace had been in the past.⁷ For instance,
US President Roosevelt endorsed planning: he foretold a future of destruction
following the war “unless we plan now for the better world we mean to
build.” Richard Law, the minister of state in the British Foreign Office, conveyed
the sense of obligation to servicemen to ensure a better future that informed
planning efforts: “He felt that these young men and the sacrifices they were
called upon to make on the battlefields were a challenge to all who were respon-
 G.L. Schwartz, ‘Why Planning?’ (London: A Signpost Special, 1944), 3. World War II Subject
Collection, Box 26, Hoover Institution.
 G.L. Schwartz.
 See for example Carr’s dismissal of the views of Norman Angell who believed that economic
interdependence would strengthen global peace. Although Angell was awarded the Nobel Peace
Prize in 1933, he was dismissed by Carr as a utopian whose ideas were aspirational and unreal-
istic. Interestingly, Carr did endorse state planning of the economy as well as plans for postwar
Europe. Norman Angell, The Great Illusion: a study of the relation of military power to national
advantage (London: Heinemann, 1912), vii, ix, 30– 1. Jeremy Weiss, “E. H. Carr, Norman Angell,
and Reassessing the Realist-Utopian Debate”, The International History Review 35, no. 5 (2013):
1160–1161.
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sible for planning the future.”⁸ Although there was persistent scepticism about
whether or not future wars could be prevented,⁹ planning imbued the quest
for peace with legitimacy because plans were seen as realistic rather than quix-
otic, informed by diplomatic and technical expertize rather than romantic
dreams, and were the product of careful deliberation and the benefit of past ex-
perience.
The circumstances of war legitimized the necessity of planning at the inter-
national level. In the interwar years, planning was developed in relation to na-
tional economic strategies. As Joanne Pemberton has explained in the cases of
Britain and Australia, some people called for its international application, lest
the development of national plans spark conflict amongst states. But in general
the idea of international planning between the wars was not favored because it
constrained a state’s ability to implement economic policies. She argues that by
the end of the 1930s planning had become parochial, associated with national
and imperial spaces.¹⁰ But during the war, unchecked state power was identified
as one of the principal causes of the conflict and people were prepared to accept
international plans which restricted the authority of states. As Law said during
Anglo-American discussions of postwar trade in 1943, “[p]eople were capable,
at this moment, of sacrificing immediate advantage for the long-term gain, but
when the moment of danger was removed they would be in a different
mood.”¹¹ Ernest Bevin, Britain’s minister of labour, agreed that in wartime peo-
ple accepted “control, regulation and discipline” because it was necessary to
survive. This was now also seen as essential to security in peacetime. Hence
Bevin urged statesmen to “stand together resolutely and hold on to some form
of controls while the foundations of peace, stability and orderly development
are being worked out.”¹² The circumstances of war created the opportunity to
think differently about the peace, placing collective well-being above national in-
terests and accepting that international regulation required some constraints on
 Informal Economic Discussions, Plenary, 1rst meeting, 20 Sept. 1943, CAB78/14, The National
Archives (TNA).
 “Post-war Planning Must Show that Men Can Prevent Wars If They Take the Necessary Steps.”
Presenting Postwar Planning to the Public, Confidential Report from the Office of Public Opinion
Research, Princeton University, Winant Papers, FDRL. Note that 58% of those asked said there
would be future wars.
 Joanne Pemberton, “The Middle Way: The Discourse of Planning in Britain, Australia and at
the League of Nations in the Interwar Years,” Australian Journal of Politics and History 52, no. 1
(2006): 49, 51, 58.
 Informal Economic Discussions, Plenary, 20 Sept. 1943.
 Bevin’s Address, International Labour Office, Emergency Committee of the Governing Body,
Draft Minutes of the Fifth Session, 20–24 April 1942, CAB117/100, TNA.
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national sovereignty. But the emphasis on international planning and coordina-
tion never meant that national interests were secondary. A liberal trade order
was linked to national priorities of recovery and full employment, about
which there was apprehension as states transitioned from a wartime to a peace-
time economy.
A reconstructed economy that promoted stable growth, sustained full em-
ployment, and distributed benefits across classes and countries was a priority
in government planning efforts. The importance of economic growth to future
peace was influenced by the experience of the Great Depression, which in coun-
tries like the US, Britain and Canada centred on the problem of mass unemploy-
ment, and the Second World War, two catastrophes which many believed were
causally linked. Although laissez-faire liberalism had been discredited in the
1930s, a liberal spirit informed the postwar trade system based on the interna-
tionalist logic that interdependence and prosperity were essential to peace.¹³ Fur-
thermore, cooperative trade relations between states, even if still competitive,
were seen as essential to preserving peace. As Harry Hawkins, one of the leading
economic planners in the US State Department, put it in 1944: “Nations which
are economic enemies are not likely to remain political friends for long.”¹⁴
In wartime and postwar discussions, many used the term free trade or freer
trade to describe the liberal trade system, but what they were talking about was
a system of managed freer trade. The planned trade approach was not restricted
to those involved with the ITO. As Daniel Stinky has shown, Gunnar Myrdal was
also a “free-trading planner.”¹⁵ Although officials wanted states to remain the
central actors in the postwar international order,¹⁶ they envisaged a liberal
trade regime that depended on state support while also restraining state author-
ity.¹⁷ The creation of an international organization would establish a forum and
define rules and obligations that would facilitate international cooperation and
limit the nationalistic options of its members. Rules and obligations left room for
flexibility about specific trade practices, in contrast to the exacting details and
 Katherine Barbieri and Gerald Schneider, “Globalization and Peace: Assessing New Direc-
tions in the Study of Trade & Conflict,” Journal of Peace Research 36, no. 4 (1999): 389.
 Quoted in John H. Jackson, World Trade and The Law of GATT (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill,
1969), 38.
 Stinsky, “A Bridge between East and West”.
 Letter to Cadogan, 31 May 1942, FO371/31538, TNA. The author not only wanted nations to be
the basic unit of international society but he wanted Britain to remain the ‘Top Nation.’
 G. John Ikenberry makes a similar point about the essential compromise that defined Bretton
Woods such that it appealed to people with diametrically opposed ideas, from laissez faire to
planners. “AWorld Economy Restored: Expert Consensus and the Anglo-American Post-War Set-
tlement,” International Organization 46, no. 1 (Winter 1992): 307–308, 315–316, 318.
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state imposed targets that defined some socialist planning models. Nonetheless,
there was tension about the role of the state, at once constrained by rules and
obligations and enhanced by actively managing national and international
trade. Tony Judt has explained that “faith in the state” defined the planning
ethos of the interwar years.¹⁸ But during the war, mistrust of nationalism offset
that faith. Postwar trade plans reflected this tension, simultaneously depending
on and curbing state sovereignty and market forces.
Planning a liberal trade order in wartime
In the United States, a poll from January 1943 found that 65% of Americans be-
lieved planning should begin right away.¹⁹ In fact, by 1943 American plans for
postwar trade were well underway. The State Department was at the centre of
American trade policy because of the influence of Cordell Hull, the Secretary
of State from 1933– 1944. During the First World War, Hull had come to the con-
clusion that global peace depended on freer trade. He was not alone in this be-
lief. The corollary – that economic conditions could be a cause of conflict – re-
inforced the appeal of liberalization. The US had defined a liberal trade policy in
the 1930s as a way to combat the Depression and defuse geopolitical antago-
nism. The principles that had informed the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act
of 1934 (RTAA) were internationalism, reciprocity, the Most Favoured Nation
(MFN) principle, and liberalization through lower tariffs. The start of the war
did not dent the confidence of Hull or the State Department that liberalization
and internationalism were the key ingredients of a successful postwar trade
order that would engender peace and prosperity. As a result, the principles of
the RTAA continued to guide American planners during and after the war.²⁰
The apparent tension between the traditional role of the market as the main ar-
biter of global trade and government action that kept markets open and upheld
liberal trade practices was easily reconciled.
 Tony Judt, Postwar: A History of Europe Since 1945 (New York: Penguin Books, 2010), 69.
 “Presenting Postwar Planning to the Public,” Confidential Report from the Office of Public
Opinion Research, Princeton University, Winant Papers, Box 217, Reconstruction: Presenting
Post-war Planning to the People, FDRL.
 Irwin, Mavroidis and Sykes have concluded from this that the GATT “represented a contin-
uation and expansion of U.S. efforts during the 1930s.” Douglas A. Irwin, Petros C. Mavroidis,
Alan O. Sykes, The Genesis of the GATT (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 12. I
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American officials assumed that other governments would resist a liberal in-
ternational trade order. To pin down support for trade liberalization, the US at-
tached a consideration to the Lend-Lease agreement of 1941 by which they
loaned or leased vital war materials to Britain, the Soviet Union and other coun-
tries fighting the Axis powers. The consideration called for support for an open
economy after the war. At this stage, American efforts focused on securing prom-
ises to support liberal trade after the war. They did not lay out concrete ideas in a
blueprint or a detailed plan.
Instead, the first trade plan was developed in Britain by James Meade, a fu-
ture Nobel Laureate but then a young economist in the Economic Section of the
War Cabinet Offices. In 1940, he had returned from the Economic and Financial
Organization (EFO) of the League of Nations where his internationalist perspec-
tive had been reinforced. The EFO brought together economists from all over the
world who were intent on restoring “stability and growth” to the world economy
and who believed that international organizations facilitated cooperation as well
as curbed the narrow self-interest and inconsistent policies of national govern-
ments.²¹ Meade endorsed liberal trade not only because it was consistent with
his intellectual leanings, but also because he believed that economic practices
and conditions were root causes of geopolitical conflicts. As he wrote in his
1940 book The Economic Basis on a Durable Peace: “to a certain extent, the caus-
es of international conflict are economic in character”.²²
In 1942, he drafted a blueprint for a reconstructed global trade organization.
His plan – called the International Commercial Union – put his international and
liberal ideas front and centre. Meade believed that the best trade system for Brit-
ain was one in which freer trade prevailed. This would give Britain access to as
many markets as possible which was in turn the key to maintaining high levels
of employment for people working in all forms of export producing industries.
He acknowledged that Britain would face many challenges after the war – in-
cluding lost markets and a shortage of convertible currency – but he believed
that in the long run freer trade was the best policy for Britain: “If ever there
was a community which had an interest in the general removal of restrictions
to trade, it is the United Kingdom.” Hence his plan banned quantitative restric-
tions and excessive export subsidies, removed restrictions on currency exchange
and eliminated preferential prices. To work, his plan required regulation of the
global liberal trade system; he did not leave all to the free hand of the market.
 Patricia Clavin, Securing the World Economy: the Reinvention of the League of Nations, 1920–
1946 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 5, 6.
 Irwin, Mavroidis and Sykes, Genesis, 25. Also see 25–30 for their description of Meade’s
draft.
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Meade’s plan also made some allowance for historical and political factors that
influenced trade policies and patterns. For example, where a special and recog-
nizable geopolitical or political relationship existed, nations could exchange
moderate preferential tariffs; he set the rate at 10% ad valorem. This had partic-
ular relevance to Britain as there was significant support for retaining the pref-
erential tariff system of the British Empire and Commonwealth.²³
Meade’s plan was criticized by leading Treasury officials who feared that
freer trade would exacerbate Britain’s balance of payments problems after the
war.²⁴ John Maynard Keynes, whose ideas about Britain’s postwar economy
were based on dire forecasts and the need for mechanisms to stave off external
forces that could destabilize the British economy, was outspoken in his opposi-
tion to Meade’s plan. Meade described Keynes’ views on postwar trade as more
extreme than those of Schacht.²⁵ Keynes was not the only critic of Meade’s plan.
Others called for bilateral trade agreements and increased trade within the ster-
ling area. British policymakers looked to the past – the Depression – and the fu-
ture – unknown but ominous even if Britain emerged victorious in the war – and
decided to support Meade’s liberalizing plan, with a few safeguards, such as the
use of quantitative restrictions to offset balance of payments problems. Meade’s
plan for postwar trade combined long-standing ideas about British trade, in par-
ticular freer trade, along with more recent shifts in favour of intervention and
protection. Joanne Pemberton has suggested this represented an organic evolu-
tion of British trade policy, rather than an abrupt departure, and that it was
also a hybrid policy “between unregulated laissez faire and dictatorship.”²⁶
When British and American trade experts met in secret in Washington in
1943, they were pleasantly surprised to learn that their ideas were largely com-
patible, emphasizing liberalization and multilateralism. There was disagree-
ment. They understood the workings of international trade differently. The Brit-
ish stressed high rates of employment as a precondition to the growth of world
trade whereas the Americans believed that higher employment would follow the
removal of barriers to trade. Some disagreements became heated, such as over
the fate of imperial preferences. Although imperial preference was a constant
source of conflict between the US and Britain,²⁷ it should not obscure the extent
 Francine McKenzie, Redefining the Bonds of Commonwealth, 1939– 1948: The Politics of Pref-
erence (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan 2002), 40.
 Irwin, Mavroidis and Sykes, Genesis, 30–37.
 Author interview with Meade, 24 May 1993.
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 For an in-depth account, see McKenzie, Redefining the Bonds of Commonwealth, 102– 106,
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to which their respective approaches to the postwar trade order aligned. In fact,
British officials had decided before the meeting that if there was substantial
agreement they would share Meade’s plans with the Americans. Meade’s plan
was distributed. Harry Hawkins described the “remarkable progress” that had
been made and observed that differences were on questions of means, not on
substantive policies.²⁸
Anglo-American discussions about trade had been held in secret, but their
ideas were widely known because British officials met with representatives of
the Commonwealth (Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa) and
India to discuss postwar trade in advance of Anglo-American meetings in 1943
and 1944. James Meade recalled that the purpose of these meetings was to re-
move those aspects that were most obnoxious to members of the Common-
wealth. He did not remember any significant change arising from them. In his
words, the postwar trade plan remained an Anglo-American product.²⁹ Nonethe-
less, Dominion officials did not hold back their criticisms of the British trade
plan.While Canada found itself broadly in agreement with British and American
ideas, reflecting the importance of these two markets to Canadian exports, Aus-
tralia’s representative – Nugget Coombs – objected to the emphasis on tariff re-
duction. He insisted that conditions of full employment, income and rising
standards of living were essential to an expanding economy and these “positive
measures” were needed in addition to “negative measures”, meaning lowering
tariffs, to create demand which would stimulate growth in global trade.³⁰
Coombs repeated his argument in favor of a positive approach in 1944, making
clear that there had to be multiple paths leading to a liberal trade order if all
states were to benefit. That meant developing countries should be able to use
protective tariffs and other discriminatory or restrictive practices to encourage in-
dustrial development and diversification. Officials from New Zealand and South
Africa backed up this approach because industrial development and diversifica-
tion were high priorities in their national postwar economic plans.While Austral-
ia, New Zealand and South Africa do not always leap to mind when thinking
about developing countries of the 1940s, their dependence on one market (Brit-
ain) as well as a handful of primary commodities as exports were characteristics
of developing economies. By arguing for positive measures and the use of pro-
tective practices to promote industrial development, they made development a
 Thomas W. Zeiler, Free Trade Free World (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press,
1999), 36.
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priority of the postwar trade order and revealed their understanding that trade
could help or hinder this aim.³¹
European governments in exile were also aware that postwar planning had
begun, although according to Meade they were not consulted.³² But exclusion
did not mean that officials from the governments in exile were inactive. For ex-
ample, Belgium established a Commission d’ Etude des Problèmes d’Après-
Guerre (CEPAG) to consider postwar issues and put Paul van Zeeland, former
prime minister, in charge. CEPAG argued that smaller European nations should
be involved in postwar planning, in the hope they could “avoid the postwar
agenda being dictated by the Americans and the British.”³³ Thierry Grosbois
has also pointed out the politico-diplomatic reasons behind the creation of
the Benelux customs union in 1944: to bolster their standing so that the great
powers would take their point of view into consideration.³⁴
CEPAG produced several reports during the war, the first of which acknowl-
edged the economic causes of war and peace and advised against a return to the
“lawless competition” that had existed before the war. Its recommendations em-
phasized the need for regional economic arrangements for Europe.³⁵ CEPAG’s
fifth report from 1943 made a forceful case for regional solutions to international
problems.³⁶ This idea played out in other European groups. For example, in a
1944 discussion sponsored by the Association France-Grande Bretagne-États-
Unis on the organization of peace, one of the lead speakers – Bordaz – identified
the need for a trade plan for Western Europe.³⁷ Bordaz subsequently noted that
the challenge was to find functional groups – he thought France, Belgium, the
Netherlands was one workable option – which would allow them to “overcome
selfish nationalism”, all in the service of universal peace.³⁸
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about the centrality of development in the establishment of the IMF and World Bank. See
Eric Helleiner, Forgotten Foundations of Bretton Woods, 3.
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The reports of CEPAG, as well as the ideas and plans articulated by Europe-
ans in exile and members of the resistance, cohered around the need for a re-
gional economic arrangement after the war. Europe was a distinct space that
had to confront particular challenges, or what Jean Monnet called “the European
problem.”³⁹ A regional economic bloc also seemed the best way to confront the
challenge of postwar reconstruction. As Lucia Coppolaro has explained, Europe-
an officials conceived of trade liberalization along regional lines in order to bring
about recovery from the war. “The liberalization of Western European trade start-
ed on a regional basis” that “bypass[ed] Bretton woods multilateralism.”⁴⁰ But a
regional arrangement did not necessarily clash with the universalism of postwar
organizations. Grosbois agreed that the creation of the Benelux customs union
had a universalist spirit; it was a regional arrangement meant to support and
benefit from the global liberal trade order.⁴¹ Along similar lines, Diane de Belle-
froide contends that the representatives on CEPAG imagined “a three tiered inter-
national society”, with the regional level of primary relevance after the war, but
comfortably sitting between the national and world levels.⁴² However, regional
arrangements for postwar Europe ended up being pushed aside in the plans
of Britain and the United States. Early in the war, British and American groups
working on the postwar order had considered regional organization as building
blocks of a global system, but that approach was supplanted by American pro-
posals in favour of a global order carved into spheres led by regional hegemons:
the United States, Britain, China and the Soviet Union.⁴³
International trade meetings after the war
The next stage of planning postwar trade involved wider consultation with the
goal of eliciting broad support for the ITO. The representatives of 17 countries⁴⁴
gathered at Church House in London in the autumn of 1946. Committees were
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established to review all aspects of what was now called a Suggested Charter for
World Trade, including employment policy, commercial policy, restrictive practi-
ces, commodity policy and the organization and structure of the ITO. At Church
House, people drew attention to the fact that the draft served the interests of de-
veloped countries. For example, India’s representative called for an industrial
development policy and lambasted the trade charter because it would permit in-
dustrialized countries – the US, Britain and Canada were singled out – to “force
their goods on markets abroad.” Indian officials insisted that they have recourse
to the same kinds of protective tariffs behind which these nations had first de-
veloped their industrial potential.⁴⁵ Coombs repeated the argument about the
need for full employment and positive measures to stimulate economic growth
and demand. American accounts singled out Australia and India for making
the most substantive criticisms of the charter on the grounds that it favoured
countries that were already industrialized at the expense of developing coun-
tries. In other words, industrialized countries would profit “by keeping the back-
ward countries in a position of economic dependence.”⁴⁶ Their concerns were
shared by representatives from China, Chile, and Brazil, or what one US official
called the “underdeveloped areas bloc”.⁴⁷ The recognition that trade could help
or hinder economic development was acknowledged at this early stage and re-
sulted in significant modifications, crucially permitting the use of quantitative
restrictions for the purpose of development.⁴⁸
American reports expressed surprise at the “unexpected vigor” of support
for the trade proposals from western European participants, especially Belgium,
France, the Netherlands and Norway. Clair Wilcox, the director of the Office of
Trade Agreements, concluded that they were “motivated by a strong desire to fol-
low the U.S. line on trade policy” and suggested that the reason for the general
backing of the Suggested Draft was “confidence in our fairness and objectivity
 Note of a meeting in High Commissioner’s office, 2 Nov. 1946, RG25/3844/9100-A-40 pt. 1, Li-
brary and Archives Canada [LAC].
 The Director of the Office of International Trade Policy (Wilcox) to the Secretary of State,
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 Report of Treasury Participation in London Meeting of the United Nations Preparatory Com-
mittee of the International Conference on Trade and Employment, 4 Dec. 1946, Papers of John W.
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and is a tribute that could scarcely have been paid to any other power.”⁴⁹ But
other accounts revealed that western European nations were concerned above
all with the length of the transition period. France and Czechoslovakia pressed
for as long a transition period as possible (the Czechs apparently suggested it
should last 30–50 years) because during this period they would be allowed to
use quantitative restrictions to limit imports. The European representatives
also insisted that they should be classed along with developing countries –
then referred to as underdeveloped countries – which would mean they would
benefit from exceptions to the rules of the trade charter.⁵⁰ The main point to
take away is not of unexpected support for trade liberalization, but the search
for ways to navigate within this emerging trade order to exempt themselves
from rules and obligations, at least in the short term when recovery would be
an all-consuming challenge.
The Soviet Union was absent from Church House, claiming a shortage of per-
sonnel rather than a lack of interest.⁵¹ While American officials doubted that the
Soviet Union had much interest in negotiations to reduce tariffs, the acting Sec-
retary of State Dean Acheson did not want anything done to preclude their even-
tual participation: “We should always be in position to say we have kept door
wide open to Russian participation and not give slightest basis for propaganda
charge that US unilaterally precluded such participation.”⁵² American records in-
dicate a desire to maintain working relations with the Soviet Union. Canadian
accounts were more pessimistic. They anticipated “an all-out attack” on the
ITO by communist parties around the world alleging that it was an instrument
of Wall Street and big business. The Canadians feared that such an attack
would undermine support amongst those on the political left, such as in trade
unions and socialist countries. They suggested revising some of the wording to
dilute “the strong flavour of the philosophy of private capitalism and laissez-
faire” and to make the case that the ITO was the means to combat “economic
chauvinism” and create “ ‘one world’, or to go as far in that direction as proves
possible.” In particular, they could show the compatibility of the trade liberali-
 The Director of the Office of International Trade Policy (Wilcox) to the Secretary of State,
Confidential Report.
 Note of a meeting in High Commissioner’s office.
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zation approach of the ITO and “progressive methods of economic planning.”⁵³
American officials shared Canadian concerns about the polarizing effect of the
ITO. Echoing Winston Churchill’s May 1946 warning of an iron curtain descend-
ing in Europe, Paul Nitze, the director of the Office of International Trade Policy,
warned that if the ITO was exclusively associated with a liberal ideology, the re-
sult might be to “draw an economic line farther to the west than would otherwise
be necessary.”⁵⁴
American officials were satisfied with the outcome of the Church House
meeting. Over three quarters of their provisions were unchanged, an outcome
they described as a “tremendous victory.”Wilcox explained that accommodation
rather than intransigence had allowed the US to retain control of the process and
the substance of the trade proposals.⁵⁵ Moreover, in Nitze’s opinion, the amend-
ments had improved the trade charter, making it “better balanced and more
complete” as well as “a truly international document to which all delegates at
the conference have contributed” without detracting from “the essential princi-
ples of the American position.”⁵⁶ Despite the changes there was still a strong
sense of American authorship, as Clair Wilcox explained to Will Clayton, the As-
sistant Secretary of State for economic affairs.
The United States has set the program. It has written the document. It has planned the or-
ganization. It has outlined the procedure. The rest of the world is now moving in step with
us, in confidence that we are acting in good faith and that we shall do those things that we
have urged them to do, and that we ourselves have promised to do.⁵⁷
Other senior officials concluded that American leadership had unprecedented
credibility but that it could only be sustained if the US is “prepared to practice
what it preached.”⁵⁸ This conclusion reveals much about how American officials
 International Trade Organization Project, Some General Observations on the U.S. Draft Char-
ter, n.d., RG25/F-6/1035/8-H, LAC.
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perceived their own leadership rather than accurately conveys the views of other
countries, many of which were wary of American economic domination. The
American insights also reveal a particular understanding of multilateralism. Al-
though Canadian officials described multilateralism as “a positive international-
ist principle” which stemmed from a logic of benevolent interdependence,⁵⁹ and
others viewed multilateralism as an inclusive process that resulted in decisions
arrived at through give and take, in American eyes it also meant endorsement of
their own ideas and policies. And yet, their belief in the universal relevance of
liberal trade did not translate into rigid insistence on compliance, but rather
was reconciled with a variety of practices and policies that would all ultimately
lead to a liberal trade order.
Trade liberalization: The Geneva Conference and
tariff negotiations, April-October 1947
The circle widened at the Geneva conference at which 23 states participated.
Most of the time was dedicated to bilateral tariff negotiations (123 pairings in
all) which would then be bundled together and extended to all participants
through the application of the Most Favoured Nation rule. The effect would be
to extend the reduction of tariffs far beyond the two countries negotiating a
new tariff rate. Despite many public statements about the widespread benefits
of lower tariffs, once negotiations began concessions were grudging and were
contingent on adequate compensation. Negotiations between Britain and the
United States were particularly acrimonious as American expectations that impe-
rial preferences would be dismantled clashed with British insistence on retaining
them for their economic and geopolitical advantages as well as their symbolic
meaning. After months of frustrating negotiations, in which it was clear that Brit-
ain would make few concessions affecting imperial preferences, Will Clayton,
leader of the US delegation in Geneva, returned to Washington and advised Pres-
ident Truman and Secretary of State Marshall to quit the conference.
But the onset of the Cold War changed the stakes at the Geneva conference.
The participants were no longer establishing a trade order to uphold peace; they
were affirming a global capitalist order that was essential to their survival. Tru-
man and Marshall understood that the Anglo-American dispute encouraged ex-
ploitative interpretations of American leadership in the communist world. For ex-
ample, Soviet accounts explained American insistence on concessions affecting
 International Trade Organization Project.
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imperial preference as a way to break up the economic links that connected Com-
monwealth members. While the Americans might write off such a view as prop-
aganda, the British ambassador believed that the Soviet interpretation was large-
ly accurate.⁶⁰ American officials were also well aware that the dispute with the
UK would be seen as an example of American heavy-handedness, of “taking ad-
vantage of the one that was down and out.”⁶¹ Britain was a vital Cold War ally
and so the negotiations in Geneva would have to succeed to communicate their
common cause. The strength of allies and the cultivation of a western alliance
offset American insistence on the elimination of imperial preferences, even
though imperial preferences contradicted the basic tenets of a liberal and multi-
lateral trade order and offended American democratic convictions.
The focus on tariff negotiations in Geneva left little time for discussion of the
principles that defined the trade charter. Their work consisted mostly of clarifi-
cation.⁶² The charter would be the focus of the next major gathering in Havana
with 56 participating nations. In the meantime, the chapter dealing with trade
was hived off and packaged with the results of tariff negotiations as the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. The idea was for participating states to abide by
its terms, in the expectation that it would shortly be superceded by the ITO. Start-
ing in January 1948, eight participating states ratified the GATT.
Competing priorities: Liberalization, regional
trade, and development at the Havana
Conference, 1947– 1948
Since the publication of the Proposals for Expansion of World Trade and Em-
ployment in 1945, the text had been revised through international discussions,
taking into account the concerns and priorities of other states, including recon-
struction, modernization, industrialization, full employment, protection and de-
velopment. The focus, however, was still on trade liberalization, although it was
repositioned as a long term goal to work toward rather that a policy to enforce
right away. After several rounds of consultation, and many modifications as a
 Tel 2089 from Moscow to Foreign Office, 17 Sept. 1947, FO371/62317, TNA.
 McKenzie, Redefining the Bonds of Commonwealth, 216.
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result, many assumed that the work was near completion and that “the Charter
needed little more than polishing.”⁶³
Instead of polishing, the charter was overhauled at Havana. Over 800
amendments were proposed and the final purpose and scope of the ITO charter
was substantially revised. Developing nations constituted the majority at Havana
and their representatives were quick to denounce the draft charter. For example,
the representative of Mexico objected to the emphasis on the removal of barriers
to trade that could wipe out the rudimentary core of industrialization that devel-
oping nations had built up; he insisted that the charter should have focused on
global economic inequality and proposed positive measures by which to pro-
mote “the economic development of all nations and the international co-opera-
tion required to expedite it.”⁶⁴
Wilcox, a senior member of the American delegation, recalled that develop-
ing countries portrayed the ITO as “one-sided,” serving the interests of the great
industrial powers, and irrelevant to developing countries.⁶⁵ American officials
took this criticism seriously because of its Cold War implications. The Soviet
Union continued to portray the Trade and Employment proceedings as an at-
tempt by the strongest powers to enrich themselves at the expense of poorer na-
tions. An article in TRUD, the official publication of the Soviet Trade Unions,
characterized American conduct at Havana as imperialist, with the aim of open-
ing the world’s markets to American monopolies, thereby establishing American
global dominance by “enslav[ing] not only Europe, but the whole world.”⁶⁶ In-
ternal American reflections on the Cold War concluded that the ITO must suc-
ceed because the Soviet Union would make “heavy propaganda use of the Haba-
na failure”. Failure would also be a blow to American credibility and prestige, a
“decisive set-back” to capitalism and liberalism, would unleash trade discrimi-
nation, and weaken the emerging Western alliance because the “non-Russian
world . . . would be without a rudder in the international economic sea.” The
Americans concluded that a weak version of the ITO was better than nothing.
 Michael Hart, Also Present at the Creation: Dana Wilgress and the United Nations Conference
on Trade and Employment at Havana (Ottawa: Centre for Trade Policy and Law, 1995), 44.
 Address by Ramón Betata, President, the Mexican Delegation, United Nations Conference on
Trade and Employment, 26 Nov. 1947, ITO/32, http://gatt.stanford.edu/page/home, GATT Digital
Library [GDL], (accessed 29 April 2015).
 Wilcox, 1949, cited in Irwin, Mavroidis and Sykes, Genesis, 95.
 “Blackmail at Havana,” translation, TRUD, 28 Dec. 1947 in RG43: Records of International
Conferences, Commissions and Expositions, subject file 1947–48, Habana Conference – General
to Interim Commission – ITO Post Habana, NARA.
Peace, Prosperity and Planning Postwar Trade, 1942– 1948 37
Moreover, they continued to see the ITO, even with its many modifications as
“the very embodiment of economic liberalism in the international realm.”⁶⁷
Situating the ITO in a polarized, zero-sum geopolitical framework made it
easy for American officials to agree to substantial revisions to the trade charter,
although a spirit of accommodation had been evident throughout the negotia-
tions. The most significant change was to elevate development as the main ob-
jective of the postwar trade system. The Havana charter defined development as
“the productive use of the world’s human and material resources,” with an eye to
promoting “industrial and general economic development of all countries.” De-
velopment was at the nexus of interlocking economic goals including full em-
ployment, productivity of labour, rising demand, economic stability, higher in-
come levels, and expanding international trade.⁶⁸
But development was not the only element that was reopened.Western Euro-
pean representatives also proposed revisions to the charter to permit regional
economic organization and cooperation. By the time the Havana conference
began in late 1947, their governments were working on reconstruction and, in
part with the Marshall Plan in mind, economic organization along regional
lines was at the forefront of their plans for recovery. This spilled over into the
Havana conference in relation to the creation of customs unions. Jean Royer, a
French delegate, made a case that European “economic integration” should be
viewed as a positive contribution to the goals of the ITO.⁶⁹ Even though the US
had rejected a regional approach to trade during the war, in a Cold War context
they came to see European integration as a way to resist communist advances.⁷⁰
The Cold War imparted a new meaning to trade liberalization, emphasizing se-
curity rather than peace and stability. The main effect on the ITO charter was to
permit customs unions and free trade areas (Article 42). The article included
some criteria to ensure that such agreements would genuinely benefit the expan-
sion of world trade and stipulated that the organization would have oversight au-
thority “to avoid abuse and to guarantee that such arrangements do not deteri-
orate into new discriminatory preferential regimes.”⁷¹
Although some American officials feared that accommodation would weak-
en the ITO, they professed to be satisfied with the extensive revisions made to the
 Memo, Brown and Coppock to Wilcox, 30 Dec. 1947, Papers of Clayton-Thorp, TL.
 Article 8, UN Conference on Trade and Employment, Final Act and Related Documents, 1948.
 Third Committee: Commercial Policy. Summary Record of the Forty-Fourth Meeting, Havana,
Cuba, 11 March 1948, E/Conf.2/C.3/SR.44, 13 March 1948, GDL.
 Grosbois, “La Belgique et le Benelux,” 71.
 Report of the Canadian Delegation to the UN Conference on Trade and Employment at Ha-
vana, in Hart, Also Present at the Creation, 118.
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charter.Will Clayton, leader of the US delegation, praised the results of their de-
liberations. He believed that the Havana charter would still establish a liberal,
multilateral, and prosperous global trade order. “This may well prove to be
the greatest step in history toward order and justice in economic relations
among the members of the world community and toward a great expansion in
the production, distribution and consumption of goods throughout the world.”⁷²
The speeches of Western European officials also praised the revised charter
which now allowed regional economic organization. They insisted that this
change was consistent with the trade creating and liberalizing mandate of the
ITO. As Speekenbring of the Netherlands put it, regional economic units
would make a “very valuable contribution to the expansion of world trade.”⁷³
French officials had been particularly conscious of American authorship of ear-
lier drafts which predisposed them to doubt that such an initiative could also
serve French interests effectively. Grousset of France described the previous iter-
ation as an American draft, whereas the “profoundly modified” ITO charter was
more genuinely representative and inclusive. In a salve to American sensitivity,
he added that these changes had left the “original idea of the draft Charter . . .
intact.”⁷⁴
Interestingly, the representatives of states which had successfully pressed for
development to be made a priority professed the greatest disappointment with
the Havana charter. Chilean and Colombian officials lamented the premise
that nations at different stages of economic development should nonetheless be-
have according to the same standards and expectations.⁷⁵ One size did not fit all,
but the one size approach had largely prevailed. Many developing countries also
believed that economically advanced states bore a special responsibility to en-
courage economic development. As the Chilean official put it, there was a
“need for the economically stronger countries to co-operate altruistically in
the work of speedily improving the standards of living of the weak countries.”⁷⁶
This post-colonial view made justice the driving force behind trade policy as op-
 Statement by Clayton, Chairman, Delegation of the United States of America, 23 March 1948,
ITO/194, GDL (accessed 14 July 2012).
 Speech by Mr. A. B. Speekenbring, President of the Netherlands Delegation before Final Ple-
nary Session, ITO/210, GDL. (accessed 28 January 2017).
 Speech delivered by Mr. P. Grousset, Minister of France, Head of the French Delegation, at
the Final Plenary Session, 22 March 1948, ITO/211, GDL (accessed 29 January 2017).
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posed to efficiency, competition, and comparative advantage that had informed
British and American conceptions of the postwar trade order. Nugget Coombs,
the Australian representative who had been one of the first to point out the
need for positive measures to support development, praised the charter for bal-
ancing two competing ideas of economic freedom: one revolved around the re-
moval of barriers to trade, the other focused on opportunities. As he explained:
To many of us, mere absence of restraint, while an important element in freedom, is, taken
by itself, a negative and empty thing. . . . [I]f economic freedom is to be a real and living
thing, it must mean economic opportunity. . . . [P]ositive opportunity does not automatical-
ly come to the under-developed, the under-privileged, the unemployed, and to the poverty-
stricken.⁷⁷
Despite Clayton’s confidence that the Havana charter would be implemented, in
the end the United States government did not ratify the ITO. The Havana charter
was submitted to Congress in 1949, but did not move toward ratification. Al-
though people expected it would be reintroduced in 1950, it was not. Thomas
Zeiler has explained the American failure to ratify the ITO as a result of the
Cold War which recast compromises such that managed trade became “a threat
to the foundations of capitalism”.⁷⁸ Richard Toye similarly argues that the many
compromises turned off potential backers, a situation made more serious when
some of the key officials involved in negotiating the ITO resigned.⁷⁹ Restricting
state authority with respect to trade policy was also a factor as many American
politicians clamoured for unfettered sovereignty to combat Cold War threats.
That left the GATT – a series of bilateral trade agreements to lower tariffs
bundled with the commercial policy chapter of the ITO charter – to oversee
the expansion and regulation of global trade for the next 50 years. The General
Agreement was the result of Anglo-American collaboration with some wider con-
sultation in 1946 and 1947. Some modifications had been made to take into ac-
count the priorities of other participants, but the GATT’s focus was to promote
trade liberalization by lowering tariffs. It belonged to an earlier and more exclu-
sive stage of planning and throughout its history its claims to universalism
would be challenged by those who described it as a rich man’s club and an
Anglo-American sphere of influence. As a result, GATT members restored devel-
opment as a fundamental goal and permitted regional customs unions. But frus-
 Speech by Coombs, Head of the Australian Delegation Before Final Plenary Session, 22
March 1948, ITO/212, GDL (accessed 18 March 2012).
 Zeiler, Free Trade, Free World, 150.
 Richard Toye, “Developing Multilateralism: the Havana Charter and the Fight for the Inter-
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40 Francine McKenzie
trations linked to development and the oversight of regional trade blocs meant
these members turned to alternatives, including UNCTAD and the EEC, both of
which were seen as threats to the GATT.⁸⁰ The perceived shortcomings of the
GATT however did not discredit the planning approach, particularly in relation
to development as Michel Christian’s chapter shows. In UNCTAD, officials be-
lieved that planning was needed to establish the New International Economic
Order. However, like the planners behind the ITO, their objectives were not ful-
filled. Their failure can partly be explained by the limited ability of planners
to change the dynamics and norms of international relations.
Conclusions
The global trade system began as a plan, first drafted by James Meade, revised in
collaboration with the United States, and further modified through ever wider in-
ternational negotiations that allowed countries at different stages of economic
development and with different national economic priorities to put their mark
on it. Even with the failure of the ITO, the GATT had also been revised to take
into account the priorities and preferences of other states, such that it included
provisions that promoted industrial development and permitted regional trade.
Planning postwar trade never required doctrinaire adherence to liberal trade
ideas. There was acceptance that the global trade order involved departures
from key tenets of liberal economic theory, in particular about the role of govern-
ments and international authority to enforce rules and obligations. In addition,
liberal trade could not be implemented if it caused domestic economic hard-
ship.⁸¹ Rather, a liberal trade order was widely seen as the best long term option
for all peoples and countries, but countries would move toward that goal at dif-
ferent speeds and by a variety of routes that did not sabotage domestic postwar
plans linked to modernization, reconstruction, employment, and social welfare.
 I discuss these challenges to the GATT elsewhere. See Francine McKenzie, “Free Trade and
Freedom to Trade: The Development Challenge to GATT” in, International Organizations and De-
velopment, 1945– 1990, ed. Marc Frey, Sönke Konkel, and Corinna R. Unger (Basingstoke: Pal-
grave Macmillan, 2014),150–170 and Francine McKenzie, “The GATT-EEC Collision: The Chal-
lenge of Regional Trade Blocs to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, 1950– 1967”,
The International History Review, 32, no. 2 (2010): 229–252.
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in the postwar economic order”, in International Regimes, ed. S. Krasner (Ithaca: Cornell Univer-
sity Press, 1983), 195–232.
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The plans and negotiations that led to the GATT/ITO were also never only
about economic principles and ideas. In individual plans, as well as in interna-
tional negotiations, political priorities were attached to trade, especially political
interests linked to power, sovereignty, and influence. For example, the British
wanted to preserve imperial preference as a way of maintaining a tie with other
members of the Empire and Commonwealth, an association that many believed
was essential to keeping Britain in the top tier of states after the war.Western Euro-
pean governments pushed for regional trade arrangements which they saw as a
way to address causes of conflict, recover from the devastation of war, and resume
their standing as an international leader. American ideas about trade were origi-
nally conceived as a way to make the community of states more democratic, but as
the Cold War emerged, the liberal trade order became a way to defend capitalism
and democracy. Many years later, Michael Smith, deputy United States Trade Rep-
resentative, likened the GATT and the Marshall Plan to “an arrow in the Western
world’s quiver.”⁸² Finally, poorer countries made the case for development because
it would also enhance their standing, independence and influence in world affairs.
Political aims stuck to trade plans and policies. Focusing only on the soundness of
various ideas and theories about trade does not fully explain the commitment to
particular trade priorities and practices.
Some readers might be surprised that this account of the ITO is not an Amer-
ican story, or even an Anglo-American story. Although many authors claim that
the GATT was an American creation and that it was sustained by American he-
gemony, the postwar trade order was planned and negotiated through a multilat-
eral process. The General Agreement of 1947 more strongly reflected Anglo-Amer-
ican ideas and interests than the ITO, but it too had been revised to broaden its
relevance and legitimacy. Planning facilitated multilateral cooperation and
American participation in the planning process demonstrated that it valued com-
promises and consensus, so long as it could still recognize its ideas and interests
in the final product. Although the US is often portrayed as a hegemon and lead-
er, it is important to recognize its commitment to multilateralism.⁸³
The association of the ITO with planning and multilateralism contributed to
its demise as it revealed that the organization was not made only in America’s
likeness, nor was it an exclusive instrument for American global interests.
Even though less was heard about planning global trade after the war, many na-
tional and international civil servants and experts continued to have confidence
 Alfred E. Eckes, Revisiting U.S. Trade Policy: Decisions in Perspective (Athens: Ohio University
Press, 2000), 22.
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in planning as a way to realize ambitious and often transformative objectives, as
the other chapters in this volume reveal. Planning did not always work as expect-
ed. Indeed, there have been many cases of planning backfiring, creating new
problems. But it was still widely viewed as a way to tackle complex global eco-
nomic and social challenges, particularly in relation to development. Planning
therefore persisted as a method to bring about what were seen as desirable
changes even though many different ideas and ideologies shaped international
plans. Perhaps what made planning so durable was its post-ideological poten-
tial, as Stinsky has suggested. Even though the ITO failed, the GATT showed
over its 50 year existence that it was possible to reconcile seemingly incompat-
ible views about state-directed and free market economic systems.
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A Bridge between East and West?
Gunnar Myrdal and the UN Economic
Commission for Europe, 1947–1957
This chapter explores the impact of an archetypical social planner, the Nobel
prize-winning Swedish economist Gunnar Myrdal, on both the national and in-
ternational level. As a public intellectual and politician, Myrdal shaped the
“Swedish Model” of an interventionist, full-employment welfare state. In 1947,
Myrdal became Executive Secretary of the newly founded UN Economic Commis-
sion for Europe (ECE). During his formative tenure between 1947 and 1957, Myr-
dal shaped the Secretariat and the policy outlook of this international organiza-
tion (IO). ECE started as the first permanent IO dedicated specifically to
economic cooperation in Europe, and as a potential gateway to the integration
of European economies, but the advent of the East-West conflict frustrated its
pan-European ambitions. As a UN organization, ECE included both the United
States and the USSR, together with their respective European allies, and neutral
countries. The Commission, formally ECE’s central decision-making organ, be-
came paralyzed by international tension. Nonetheless, ECE remained a space
where East and West continued to meet on economic issues. “ECE gained sup-
port from the European reaction against . . . the cold war which gave it an im-
portance above and beyond its practical achievements” a British scholar wrote
in 1957; “it seemed to be one of the few remaining bridges between east and
west.”¹
Myrdal used the allegory of ECE being a “bridge between East and West” fre-
quently. He was convinced that such a bridge “must be built, even if no-one
crosses it for the time being.”² How did ECE seek to reestablish East-West coop-
eration, and in how far did it succeed? Was it possible for Myrdal to transfer his
ideas about planning and international economic cooperation from the Swedish
context to ECE? In this chapter, I argue that ECE’s insistence on saving East-West
cooperation was crucially linked to its Executive Secretary, and Myrdal’s previ-
ous experience in Sweden. The obstinacy on the Secretariat’s part was a risky
course, but it achieved its goal of maintaining a bridge that could be crossed
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in the future. Myrdal and ECE did not break the Cold War deadlock; but the
organization managed to survive the height of the tensions during the Korean
War, and stood ready for increased cooperation immediately after the death of
Stalin.
The key area in which Myrdal and the ECE Secretariat sought to facilitate
East-West cooperation was trade. As Swedish minister of commerce 1945–47,
Myrdal concluded a series of bilateral trade agreements with countries in East
and West. At ECE, Myrdal sought to revive all-European trade in a multilateral
environment, but this agenda had little success initially.³ ECE survived its first
years due to its entrenchment in various other intergovernmental functions,
e.g. coal allocation, the secretariat’s scientific work, and inland transport. Its ef-
forts to facilitate trade were frustrated by economic bloc formation on both sides
of the descending Iron Curtain. Nonetheless, the Secretariat’s continued exertion
to revive trade connections provides a strong example of an international bu-
reaucracy acting as an independent policy agent. The ECE Secretariat “regularly
went against the grain of the consensus of the regional blocks and more power-
ful states,” as Vincent Lagendijk has argued.⁴ Myrdal “was instrumental in shap-
ing the set of cultural values of the organization”: he established ECE as a prac-
tical economic research institute and a meeting place for East and West,
ostensibly disinterested in political quarrels, with the Secretariat maintaining
considerable sway over the agenda and process at ECE.⁵ Due to its focus on tech-
nical cooperation, ECE embodied, as Wolfram Kaiser and Johan Schot put it,
“the technocratic internationalist approach during the Cold War.”⁶
The technocratic internationalism characterizing the ECE Secretariat shared
several features with the benevolent, post-political social planners Myrdal imag-
ined as the driving force in modernizing Swedish society in the 1930s. Myrdal’s
career, oscillating between academia, national politics and international bu-
reaucracy, raises questions about the role of social science in administration.
The Swedish experience is linked to ECE by the “promises of economic exper-
tise” Daniel Speich-Chassé has emphasized. After 1945, economists gained a
new importance in the shaping of political processes. Economics transformed
from “just one of several ‘arm-chair’ sciences within the family of the social sci-
 On other institutional contexts for trade policy in postwar Europe, see Francine McKenzie’s
contribution in this volume.
 Vincent Lagendijk, “The Structure of Power: The UNECE and East-West Electricity Connec-
tions, 1947– 1975,” Comparativ 24, no. 1 (2014): 55.
 Ibid.
 Wolfram Kaiser and Johan Schot, Writing the Rules for Europe. Experts, Cartels and Interna-
tional Organisations (Basingstoke / New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014), 77.
46 Daniel Stinsky
ences” to “a crucial source in global political discourse, second only to legal
practice and international law.”⁷ Swedish economists during the interwar period
were pioneers in this transnational development. Myrdal’s assistant at ECE, Mel-
vin Fagen, wrote retrospectively that “the emphasis given by Myrdal to economic
analyzes of high professional quality reflected essentially his views as a social
scientist on the importance of research as a basis for action.”⁸ Myrdal’s ambition
as a scholar was “to understand society as a dynamic entity, conceived to oper-
ate like a machine, an image in the techno-spirit of Enlightenment reason and
rationalism,” as Sven Eliæson puts it.⁹ If society could be understood as a ma-
chine, it could not only be analyzed, but also optimized. The relationship be-
tween society and the social scientist Myrdal conceived of was thus similar to
that between the engine and the engineer: Social scientists were not only in
the business of understanding society, but also in the business of maintaining
and improving it.¹⁰ This technocratic ideal, with its radical implications, had a
considerable impact in Sweden, but economic and social planning in one coun-
try had its limitations. “We have constructed the ‘Swedish model’ as if we lacked
history and as if we were alone in the world,” Myrdal wrote in a rare moment of
self-reproach.¹¹
Planning on a national scale required international coordination.While Myr-
dal and his wife Alva developed their ideal of social science as a driving force for
rational change in the national context, they transferred it to the international
level from the 1940s onwards. The Myrdals are the only married couple to receive
Nobel Prizes in different fields. As a diplomat and UN official herself, Alva Myr-
dal was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize. Their biographer Thomas Etzemüller
writes that the Myrdals became national icons, portrayed in Swedish media as
the “most popular Swedes, downright charged by the UN with the task of saving
the world.”¹² When measured against such expectations, Gunnar Myrdal’s suc-
 Daniel Speich Chassé, “Towards a Global History of the Marshall Plan. European Post-War Re-
construction and the Rise of Development Economic Expertise,” in Industrial Policy in Europe
after 1945. Wealth, Power and Economic Development in the Cold War, ed. Christian Grabas
and Alexander Nützenadel (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014), 189.
 Melvin M. Fagen, “Gunnar Myrdal and the Shaping of the United Nations Economic Commis-
sion for Europe,” Coexistence 25 (1988): 427–435.
 Sven Eliæson, “Gunnar Myrdal: A Theorist of Modernity,” Acta Sociologica 43, no. 4 (2000):
331–341.
 Thomas Etzemüller, ed. Die Ordnung Der Moderne: Social Engineering Im 20. Jahrhundert
(Bielefeld: transcript, 2009).
 Quoted in Eliæson, “Gunnar Myrdal: A Theorist of Modernity,” 339.
 Thomas Etzemüller, Die Romantik der Rationalität. Alva & Gunnar Myrdal. Social Engineering
in Schweden (Bielefeld: transcript, 2010), 43.
A Bridge between East and West? 47
cess at ECE was limited at best. But what the ECE Secretariat’s persistence to fa-
cilitate East-West cooperation against the odds (and the superpowers’ resistance)
does showcase instead is the ability of IOs to maintain an independent policy
agenda, and to adapt to external circumstances, allowing them to carve out nich-
es to justify their continued existence.
The chapter proceeds in two steps. The first section sketches in broad strokes
Myrdal’s engagement as a public intellectual and politician in Sweden during
the 1930s and 40s. It explores Myrdal’s views on post-political social planning
and his influence on the Swedish Labor Party SAP. I argue that Myrdal’s contacts
in the US and with continental social democrats in exile during World War Two
shaped his opinion on pan-European economic cooperation, and informed his
actions as minister of commerce. In the second section, I explore the internation-
al coordination of reconstruction plans at ECE and trail the Secretariat’s efforts
to facilitate East-West cooperation, especially on trade. I argue that while Myr-
dal’s dedication to revive East-West trade risked the goodwill of Western govern-
ments, particularly in the US, his efforts were ultimately successful in establish-
ing a space for limited cooperation on the technical level.
Myrdal as a public intellectual
Myrdal’s experience as a public intellectual and politician in Sweden during the
1930s and 40s deeply influenced the strategic goals he set for ECE during his for-
mative tenure as Executive Secretary. ECE’s self-declared aim of providing a
bridge between East and West was rooted in Myrdal’s inclusive trade policy to-
ward the USSR as minister of commerce 1945– 1947, and his wartime involvement
with continental social democrats in exile. Myrdal’s theoretical and practical
participation in social and economic planning goes back even further, and is
deeply entangled with the development of the Swedish welfare state. Myrdal is
regularly credited as a key architect of the “Swedish Model.”¹³ He has even
been called a “Swedish Roosevelt,” and although this characterization overstates
his influence, it hints at Myrdal’s involvement in Sweden’s political, social, and
economic reconfiguration during the 1930s.¹⁴
Planning and proto-Keynesian macroeconomic policies were central to Swe-
den’s coping with unemployment and economic crisis. Sweden’s progressive
 Ibid.;William Barber, Gunnar Myrdal: An Intellectual Biography, Great Thinkers in Economics
(Basingstoke: Pelgrave Macmillan, 2008).
 Örjan Appelqvist, “Gunnar Myrdal i svensk politik 1943– 1947: En svensk Roosevelt och hans
vantolkade nederlag,” NORDEUROPAforum 9, no. 1 (1999): 33–55.
48 Daniel Stinsky
leadership used deficit spending to provide emergency relief, but also to create
jobs on public works projects and to enhance popular social security. Experts
and planners, especially social scientists, were key actors in the discourses
and politics of mid-century Sweden.¹⁵ One British scholar was impressed with
the “great respect” being “paid to the professional economist,” and found it cu-
rious that although Swedish economists “often take part in the hurly-burly of
politics, the authority attaching to their pronouncements is not thereby weak-
ened.”¹⁶ Preexisting institutions cemented the strong standing the comparatively
young social sciences enjoyed. Swedish society changed fundamentally in the
early twentieth century, from an agrarian, bureaucratic monarchy into an indus-
trial, parliamentary democracy. Despite the introduction of universal suffrage
and a parliamentary government, public policy-making did not devolve into par-
liamentary bargaining. Instead, leaders of political parties and interest groups
were absorbed into modernized versions of Sweden’s deeply rooted system of
state-centered, consultative policy-making. Investigatory commissions and par-
liamentary committees, once tools of the monarchical bureaucracy, carried on
in the new democratic polity. Such bodies mobilized the expertise of the modern
social sciences through the direct participation of researchers in their investiga-
tions.¹⁷
Particularly influential on both the political and the theoretical level was the
arbetslöshetsutredning, a committee of inquiry on unemployment appointed in
1926.¹⁸ Myrdal joined in 1931, after returning from a visiting professorship in Gen-
eva. The later UN Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld, then a graduate student
in his mid-20s, was the committee’s secretary.¹⁹ Two other members of the com-
mittee would later occupy important positions at ECE: Karin Kock became Swed-
ish head delegate and long-serving chairwoman of the Commission, and Ingvar
Svennilson was the author of a major study on European recovery for the ECE
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Research Division.²⁰ Following the election of an SAP government in 1932, coun-
tercyclical spending as suggested by the arbetslöshetsutredning became govern-
ment policy, and helped to mitigate the effects of the global economic crisis in
Sweden. Besides its political impact, the committee was the intellectual nucleus
for a Swedish brand of proto-Keynesian economics labeled the “Stockholm
School.” Reacting to the publication of Keynes’ General Theory in 1936, Bertil
Ohlin argued that the Swedish unemployment committee had published similar
ideas already four years earlier.²¹ The policy recommendations issued by the
committee and their theoretical work were indeed a form of Keynesianism
avant la lettre. Myrdal’s was the most radical voice in propagating countercycli-
cal, debt-financed spending to achieve full employment. Ohlin and Hammarsk-
jöld favored a less interventionist approach of “framework planning” through
monetary instruments and infrastructure investments.²² It is, however, hardly
convincing to call the committee members a “school,” since their collaboration
remained temporary and did not constitute a coherent economic theory.²³
For Myrdal, the 1930s were a time of rapid career advances. For the academic
year 1929/30, he and Alva had received Rockefeller Foundation grants that
brought them to the United States, just in time to witness the 1929 stock market
crash and the unfolding Great Depression first hand. After this experience, Alva
and Gunnar Myrdal came to see “politics, interference in society as a purpose in
life.”²⁴ In 1933, Gunnar became a full professor in Stockholm and a member of
the Swedish parliament’s Upper House. The Rockefeller Foundation noted with
content in its files that Myrdal was “rapidly becoming the driving force in intel-
lectual circles in Stockholm,” and that the Foundation had “placed its money on
a winning horse.”²⁵
While Myrdal’s political aspirations stalled after being sidelined in parlia-
ment, he continued to pursue an intellectual agenda of radical societal change,
executed by experts and planners. In the progressive magazine Spektrum, Myrdal
 Ingvar Svennilson, Growth and Stagnation in the European Economy (Geneva: United Na-
tions, 1954).
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Journal 47(1937).
 Assar Lindbeck, “Dag Hammarskjöld as Economist and Government Official,” Sveriges Riks-
bank Economic Review, no. 3 (2005): 9– 10.
 Etzemüller, Die Romantik der Rationalität. Alva & Gunnar Myrdal. Social Engineering in
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Transformation Problem (Cheltenham, UK and Lyme, NH: Edward Elgar, 1997), 46.
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outlined an ambitious social policy program.²⁶ He built his argument on an as-
sumed consensus on equality and rising prosperity as the key social values in
the industrialized world: “We have come to accept certain moral standards . . .
‘[T]echnically’ everyone has the right to live equally well. . . . Is the egalitarian-
ism of enlightenment philosophy beginning to penetrate all our assumptions?”²⁷
By basing his argument on an assumed consensus on enlightenment values,
Myrdal created a quasi-democratic legitimation for his proposals. Based on
this assumed volonté générale, social policy needed to be problem-oriented,
not embedded in political doctrine. Myrdal proclaimed that a new “social policy
ideology” would leave the hitherto dominant ideologies of bourgeois Liberalism
and revolutionary Marxism behind. This post-ideological ideology sought to ach-
ieve radical change through the means of cool, technical reasoning:
This new social policy ideology carries radical and in some ways revolutionary possibilities.
It is intellectual, cool, and rational,while the old, still ruling ideologies were decisively sen-
timental. [The new ideology] is free from liberal roadblocks to innovation. It is far too tech-
nical, on the other hand, to get lost in overly general and quixotic ideal constructions. . . .
Its romanticism is the engineer’s.²⁸
Myrdal considered shifting power to experts and planners – social engineers – to
be the strategic solution to all kinds of problems.²⁹ He thus postulated a rational,
scientific approach to social questions as a basis for political power. The social
sciences were particularly well positioned to facilitate social change. With Kris i
befolkningsfrågan [Crisis in the population question, 1934], Alva and Gunnar
Myrdal published a bestselling book that developed this technocratic ideal fur-
ther.³⁰ Based on an analysis of population trends in Sweden, the Myrdals predict-
ed a deep social and economic crisis that served them as legitimization for far-
reaching reforms. To combat falling birthrates, the Myrdals suggested a radical
re-distribution of capital to improve living standards. Childcare, wages, dwell-
ings, education, physical and mental health care – all of this had to be improved,
rationalized, and made accessible to everyone. Kris i befolkningsfrågan picked up
 Gunnar Myrdal, “Socialpolitikens dilemma,” Spektrum 3 (1932); Johan Svedjedal, Spektrum
1931– 1935: Den svenska drömmen. Tidskrift och förlag i 1930-talets kultur (Stockholm:Wahlström
& Widstrand, 2011).
 Quoted in Göran B. Nilsson, “Den sociala ingenjörskonstens problematik. En orättfärdigt dis-
sektion av den unge Gunnar Myrdal “ in Den svenska modellen, ed. Per Thullberg and Kjell Öst-
berg (Lund: Studentlitteratur, 1998), 167.
 Quoted in ibid.
 Etzemüller, Die Ordnung der Moderne: Social Engineering Im 20. Jahrhundert.
 Alva Myrdal and Gunnar Myrdal, Kris i befolkningsfrågan (Stockholm: Bonniers, 1934).
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on several debates of the 1930s; next to progressive ideas like public nursery
schools and improved working conditions for women, the Myrdals discussed
race biology and eugenics as potential solutions to the perceived population cri-
sis. While they dismissed race biology as unscientific, they considered forced
sterilization of disabled people a viable option. The book was a major influence
on the SAP around party leader Per Albin Hansson. Still in 1981, Myrdal said that
“the welfare program we laid out . . . was fully in line with Per Albin’s dream of
the good People’s Home”.³¹
Myrdal did not limit his claim that social engineering should constitute the
driving force for social change to Sweden. In 1938, he returned to the United
States, to head a large-scale research project on race relations and democracy
for the Carnegie Corporation of New York. The concluding book, An American Di-
lemma: The Negro Problem and Modern Democracy (1944) combined a detailed
sociological analysis with a clear-cut political message: If America could over-
come racial segregation and fulfill its own democratic promise at home, it
would rightfully assume world leadership in a postwar democratic order. The
book’s closing words predicted a crucial role for social science and social engi-
neering:
[S]ocial engineering will increasingly be demanded. . . . We are entering an era where fact-
finding and scientific theories of causal relations will be seen as instrumental in planning
controlled social change. The American social scientist, because of the New Deal and the
War, is already acquiring familiarity with planning and practical action. . . . [T]his never-
ending reconstruction of society is the supreme task of social science. . . . [W]e have
today in social science a greater trust in the improvability of man and society than we
have ever had since the Enlightenment.³²
An American Dilemma became a sociological classic, with a lasting impact on the
American Civil Rights Movement in the 1950s and 60s.³³ It established Myrdal’s
international reputation as a researcher, and it also laid the groundwork for his
subsequent political career. During his time in America, Myrdal met Polish econ-
omist and fellow Rockefeller stipendiary Oskar Lange, who was then at the Uni-
versity of Chicago. At the Yalta Conference, Lange served as a go-between for
 Ola Sigurdson, Den lyckliga filofosin: Etik och politik hos Hägerström, Tingsten, makarna Myr-
dal och Hedenius (Stockholm: Brutus Östlings bokförlag 2000), 126.
 Gunnar Myrdal, Richard Sterner, and Arnold Marshall Rose, An American Dilemma: The
Negro Problem and Modern Democracy (New York; London: Harper and brothers publ., 1944),
1022–1024.
 Maribel Morey, “A Reconsideration of an American Dilemma,” Reviews in American History
40, no. 4 (2012): 686–692.
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Roosevelt and Stalin, and later became the Polish communist regime’s first am-
bassador to Washington, DC. As such, Lange had a crucial role in the formation
of ECE, and as Polish diplomat would sometimes participate in ECE Commission
sessions.
Back in wartime Stockholm, Gunnar and Alva Myrdal participated in the
meetings of the Internationale Gruppe Demokratischer Sozialisten [International
Group of Democratic Socialists], a remarkable gathering of social democrats in
exile from Germany and German-occupied territories. Unlike other social demo-
crat groupings that were at the forefront of anti-communism, the Internationale
Gruppe advocated continental social democracy as a mediator between Western
liberal democracy and Soviet communism.³⁴ Among the 14 nationalities repre-
sented in the group were many Scandinavians and Germans, but also Czechoslo-
vaks, Poles, and Hungarians. The group was dissolved at the end of the war, and
its participants maintained only loose contact. Many had remarkable careers in
IOs and national governments.Wladek Malinowski, a Polish economist, came to
Stockholm as a refugee with the help of a Swedish committee including the Myr-
dals. Malinowski later joined the UN secretariat in New York and became chief of
the Regional Commissions Section, the body coordinating ECE and the other re-
gional commissions at UNHQ.³⁵ David Owen, the later UN Assistant Secretary-
General for Economic Affairs, was a liaison officer for the British Royal Air
Force in Sweden and participated in some of the group’s meetings.³⁶ Owen
would later propose Myrdal for the post of Executive Secretary at ECE to UN Sec-
retary-General Trygve Lie, a Norwegian social democrat who knew Myrdal
through his own contacts in the group. Other regular participants included
later chancellors of West Germany and Austria,Willy Brandt and Bruno Kreisky.³⁷
While the group remained a loose association of World War Two exiles rather
than a network centered around a set of core political beliefs, its deliberations
on reconciliation between the West and the USSR would echo in Myrdal’s
East-West trade policy at ECE as well as in Brandt’s Ostpolitik.
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On May 1, 1943, the group published a manifesto called the Peace Goals of
the International Group of Democratic Socialists. Brandt, Kreisky, and Myrdal
were among its principal authors.³⁸ The manifesto proposed a system of organ-
ized international cooperation in the economic and social area, to replace con-
flicts between nation states and the anarchy of capitalist economies. At the cen-
ter of the group’s ideas was a loosely federal European system, embedded in the
global organization of a new League of Nations. The manifesto’s authors empha-
sized that regional cooperation should never be directed against certain other
countries, especially the USSR. Instead, they wanted to positively engage others
through economic cooperation. Continental Europe should act as an arbitrator
between the Anglo-American democracies and the USSR. An alliance of neutral
countries in Europe’s center, including a de-nazified Germany and stretching
from Scandinavia to Italy, should counterbalance the great powers.³⁹ While no
party or government adopted the Peace Goals, the work on the manifesto influ-
enced the later political practice of its authors. Myrdal himself provides the best
example.
Already in the fall of 1943, Myrdal returned to the US, to negotiate about re-
establishing trade contacts on behalf of the Swedish government. Neutral Swe-
den profited from exporting iron ore, pulp, and machinery to Nazi Germany, but
relations to the Allied countries suffered. Myrdal’s good reputation and contacts
after An American Dilemma made him the ideal candidate to try and fix commer-
cial relations with America. After three months, however, Myrdal did not return
with a trade agreement, but with a new political manifesto. In Varning för fred-
soptimismen [Warning of peace optimism], he warned that the alliance between
the US, UK, and the Soviet Union would break very soon after the war.⁴⁰ As Re-
publicans gained momentum in Congress, the book predicted that America
would return to isolationism. A new economic crisis comparable to or worse
than the Great Depression would follow. Myrdal doubted, therefore, that America
could simply replace Germany as Sweden’s most important trading partner.
Echoing the Peace Goals, Myrdal argued instead that in an upcoming conflict be-
tween the Western democracies and the USSR, Sweden must pursue active, “in-
 Die “Internationale Gruppe Demokratischer Sozialisten” in Stockholm, 1942– 1945: Zur sozia-
listischen Friedensdiskussion während des Zweiten Weltkrieges (Uppsala: Almquist & Wicksell,
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no. 1 (1999). n.p.
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ternationalist neutrality,” and engage in trade with both sides.⁴¹ While the pre-
dicted crisis in America never came, Myrdal stayed true to the ideal of reconci-
liation, both as a government minister and at ECE.
In the SAP government formed in 1945, Myrdal became minister of com-
merce, succeeding the Liberal Party leader and fellow “Stockholm School” econ-
omist Ohlin. The Internationale Gruppe’s deliberations about positively engaging
the USSR in economic relations, together with Myrdal’s own prediction of eco-
nomic crisis in America, guided his decisions as minister. Myrdal advocated “or-
ganized free trade” as part of a system of international planning.⁴² Against the
experience of the Great Depression, complete free trade seemed neither possible
nor desirable. At the same time, European reconstruction plans depended on
lower trade barriers, and the ability to buy and sell abroad. For small and ex-
port-dependent Sweden, trade was particularly vital. To compensate for the
loss of the German market, Myrdal thus concluded no less than 20 bilateral
trade agreements in rapid sequence. Personal contacts from the Internationale
Gruppe and to Oskar Lange in Poland proved useful for several of these agree-
ments. In 1946, parliament ratified Myrdal’s biggest and most controversial proj-
ect: a five-year trade and credit agreement with the USSR. Russia was, then, still
perceived as Sweden’s hereditary enemy, and the Red Army’s invasion of Finland
had stirred up anti-Soviet feelings only recently. The trade agreement with its
generous loan to Stalin was therefore highly unpopular. When Myrdal an-
nounced a return to rationing in the winter of 1946/47, newspapers blamed the
shortages of imported goods like coffee on the Russian loan. Myrdal personally
became the target of popular dissatisfaction, and was increasingly isolated in
government.When asked to head the newly founded ECE as Executive Secretary
in this heated atmosphere, Myrdal did not hesitate to give up his cabinet post.
East-West cooperation at ECE
At ECE, Myrdal became the head of an organization that was quite similar to the
inclusive European order built on economic cooperation envisioned by the Inter-
nationale Gruppe: It was a European organization embedded in the global UN
system, and offered the possibility to engage both the US and the USSR. Instead
of having to rely on a series of short-term, bilateral trade agreements, ECE offered
 Quoted in Appelqvist, “Gunnar Myrdal i Svensk Politik 1943–1947: En svensk Roosevelt och
hans vantolkade nederlag.”
 Ibid. On planning and trade, see also Francine McKenzie’s and Michel Christian’s contribu-
tions in this volume.
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the chance to conclude multilateral deals. Likewise, Myrdal’s ideas on post-po-
litical planning, developed in interwar Sweden, were elevated to an all-European
scale. It soon emerged that reconstruction plans projected on a national level ran
into considerable obstacles if they were not coordinated internationally. The
challenges of reconstruction, encapsulated in the so-called bottleneck problems
of transport and resource distribution, seemed to call for the rational judgment
of the planner.
Despite the trend toward bloc formation that dominated Europe in the late
1940s, ECE tried to maintain East-West cooperation. Myrdal called East-West
trade ECE’s “responsibility par préférence.”⁴³ The preference for a recovery of
East-West trade over a full Westintegration that guided Myrdal’s actions as min-
ister of commerce now became a leitmotif for ECE.Without a resurgence of East-
West trade, he feared that economic recovery would be deterred. An exclusive
consolidation of Western Europe as a viable economic area seemed impossible
not only to Myrdal. A study by the Marshall Plan organization OEEC assumed
in 1948 that without a continued influx of US dollars, Western Europe could
only become sustainable if the volume of intra-European trade tripled from its
1947 value.⁴⁴ In practice, however, the volume of East-West trade declined sharp-
ly each year between 1946 and the summer of 1953, when it began to recover by
15–25% annually.⁴⁵ Despite this trend, Myrdal and the secretariat sought to es-
tablish ECE as the champion of East-West cooperation, a strategy with little ini-
tial success that risked the goodwill of Western governments.
Prior to his appointment at ECE, Myrdal was skeptical about the politics of
the new UN System, but praised the technocratic potential of IOs.When the UN
Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) and other bodies in its orbit were first
projected, Myrdal doubted that “the lively thinking about organizational plan-
ning in the international economic and social area” would lead to any results
as long as economic IOs were dependent on the UN’s political organs.⁴⁶ At the
 Gunnar Myrdal, Two Notes on ERP and East-West Trade, December 1949. UNOG Archives ARR
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same time, however, Myrdal expressed some admiration for the League of Na-
tions. While the League “made a fiasco as a political organ for international
peace and security,” it “carried out a great deal of useful, technical work in
the economic, social and humanitarian field through its secretariat, various spe-
cialized commissions and expert committees.”⁴⁷ Technocratic coordination, as
detached as possible from the politics of IOs and executed by expert committees
and secretariats, not unlike the Swedish committees of inquiry, became the ideal
ECE pursued under Myrdal’s leadership.
Among the European IOs that mushroomed during the late 1940s and the
1950s, ECE stood for “all-European economic co-operation,” as Myrdal called
it in a lecture before Soviet economists in Moscow.⁴⁸ ECE was “all-European”
in the sense that it was open to every country geographically located on the Eu-
ropean continent, with the addition of the United States as an occupying power
and as Europe’s most important trading partner. Franco-Spain and Germany
were initially excluded, but allowed to join later on. Countries that were not
full UN members from the beginning, like Switzerland or Hungary,were nonethe-
less invited to participate. ECE did not have access to funds that could be distrib-
uted to member states, like the European Recovery Program (ERP) did, and it did
not have legislative competences like today’s European Union (EU). It was thus
about “economic co-operation” in the sense that it did not seek to supersede or
replace, but to coordinate national economic policies.
ECE’s creators at the UN anticipated the international coordination of recon-
struction plans to be a key activity for the new organization.With state planning
on the rise across Europe, reconstruction plans were often at conflict with each
other. “Most of them contemplate a substantial increase in exports, increase
which in aggregate and if uncoordinated could clearly not be achieved,” as
Eric Wyndham White summarized the problem.⁴⁹ Wyndham White was the sec-
retary of ECE’s predecessor, the Emergency Economic Committee for Europe
(EECE), and in 1947 became Secretary-General of the General Agreement on Tar-
 Ibid.
 Gunnar Myrdal, The United Nations Economic Commission for Europe as an Organ of All-Eu-
ropean Economic Co-Operation. Lecture given under the auspices of the Institute of Economics
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iffs and Trade (GATT).⁵⁰ A lack of international coordination for reconstruction,
he argued, would lead to painful waste and delay: “Skill, labour and capital so
urgently needed for the economic recovery of Europe would have been misap-
plied and this at the most critical time.”⁵¹ ECE was founded to provide such co-
ordination. It inherited a focus on technical cooperation from its predecessors,
the UN Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA) and the three emer-
gency or “e-organizations.”⁵² These were Wyndham White’s EECE, the European
Coal Organization (ECO), and the European Central Inland Transport Organiza-
tion (ECITO).⁵³ The e-organizations suffered from coordination difficulties and
an inconsistent membership. To solve this problem, Walt Whitman Rostow, a
young economist in the US State Department, proposed to merge the emergency
organizations into one permanent, all-European organization with consistent
membership.⁵⁴ This idea was particularly attractive to Poland and other war-dev-
astated countries facing a prospective gap in foreign aid after the termination of
UNRRA. ECE also offered the possibility of a long-term settlement of common
economic interests. To Rostow, “ECE appeared as a possible realistic first step
along the slow path towards a democratically negotiated, economic unity in Eu-
rope.”⁵⁵
ECE belonged to a type of postwar IOs developed to tackle the immediate
needs of reconstruction. These IOs, like UNRRA, the e-organizations, and the
Western European OEEC,were intergovernmental and technocratic. Governments
retained the right to take decisions and to implement them at home, and were
formally voting on equal footing. Because most issues dealt with at ECE were
highly specialized, governments often sent technical experts rather than diplo-
mats. International bureaucracies gained an important role as providers of stat-
istical data and reports on which technical committees based their decisions, ef-
fectively turning secretariats into agenda-setters.
ECE’s pratical achievements during its first years were, for the most part, rel-
evant to problems of reconstruction and infrastructure development and to re-
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source distribution. Between 1947 and 1950, ECE organized the international al-
location of coal. Most of the coking coal that many reconstruction plans depend-
ed on came from the Ruhr: “We effectively allocated German coal in the ECE” UK
delegate Lord Derek Ezra remembered, “with all the countries there, East and
West.”⁵⁶ In the transport sector, ECE began to develop several international proj-
ects already during the 1950s that continue today to shape road mobility in Eu-
rope and beyond, e.g. standardized road signs and traffic rules, the Transports
Internationeaux Routiers (TIR) system, and the European highway network of
e-roads.⁵⁷
The Secretariat had an important part in all of these accomplishments. The
influence planners in international bureaucracies could wield on policy, howev-
er, was much more subtle than Myrdal’s influence on the SAP and the Swedish
state as a public intellectual, not least due to the advent of the Cold War.
As the Cold War began in earnest by the end of 1947, bloc formation on both
sides became the defining feature of politics in ECE. Myrdal suspected that the
creation of ECE in 1946/47 happened at “the last moment when such a decision
could have been taken.”⁵⁸ Two major problems dominated ECE during its first
five years, as Myrdal summarized in 1952: “One was relations with the OEEC
and the second, the apparent boycott by eastern European countries of the
work of the technical committees.”⁵⁹ In the West, OEEC emerged as a competing
IO with a similar portfolio and overlapping membership.⁶⁰ Western governments
disagreed over how to use the two IOs:While the US wanted to retain them both,
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with OEEC facilitating Western Europe and ECE maintaining a potential back-
door for defectors from the East, the UK sought to reduce ECE’s activity to a min-
imum. In the East, communist proxy governments were installed and Western in-
fluence refuted. Poland and Czechoslovakia in particular had been instrumental
in the creation of ECE, but under Communist rule both countries began to ab-
stain from its technical committees.⁶¹ After the death of Czechoslovak foreign
minister Jan Masaryk in March 1948, the Eastern countries did not fully take
part in ECE’s work again until 1954.⁶² The absence of Eastern representatives fur-
ther increased the problem of duplication with OEEC, as active membership in
the technical committees at both venues was now effectively Western.
ECE thus had to reinvent itself: it had to become an organization seeking to
bridge rather than prevent the division of Europe.With OEEC facilitating a West-
ern bloc, “it was up to us in Geneva to use our ‘bridgehead’ and try to save East/
West cooperation,” Myrdal wrote, convinced that “not even a lavish . . . flow of
US dollars could make up for the supplies which had of necessity to come from
Eastern Europe.”⁶³ Trade with the East was never a huge proportion of Western
Europe’s economic performance. Its significance was not about volume, but
about specific goods. Grain, timber, coal, oil, manganese, nickel, and chrome
were among the materials Western countries had to import from the East. Like-
wise, Eastern Europe needed manufactured goods from the West to achieve its
industrialization targets. Despite its goal to achieve strategic autarky, the USSR
still sought to exchange foodstuffs and raw materials for manufactured goods
and know-how.⁶⁴ The foreseeable reemergence of German production would ag-
gravate problems for both sides, as the Western zones’ exports were increasingly
directed toward Western Europe and the United States, instead of what the ECE
secretariat regarded as their “natural” outlets in Eastern Europe. This view was
harshly criticized in the UK Foreign Office:
What the ECE Secretariat cannot bring themselves to realise is that Eastern Europe is a fun-
damentally different economic entity now . . . and no amount of tinkering with trade . . . will
alter this fact. . . .We cannot encourage the long-term developments of trade between West-
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 Fagen, “Gunnar Myrdal and the Shaping of the United Nations Economic Commission for
Europe,” 427.
 Gunnar Myrdal, Report on development in relations with Paris Conference, 24 September
1947. ARBARK: Václav Kosteleckýs arkiv, 3332–4–2– 1 1946–48.
 Gunther Mai, “Osthandel und Westintegration 1947– 1957. Europa, die USA und die Entste-
hung einer hegemonialen Partnerschaft,” 205–206.
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ern and Eastern Europe on a basis which may change in four or five years . . . . This is, sure-
ly, the real case against the grandiose ideas put forward by the ECE Secretariat.⁶⁵
While the UK thus doubted the practicality of East-West cooperation, the Truman
administration increasingly saw it as a security threat. Preventing the USSR from
bolstering its military capacity through imports, however, took more than a ban
on American military technology: “Don’t forget,” the former Hungarian minister
and American exile Miklós Nyárádi told Myrdal, “you cannot differentiate be-
tween shipments of military or nonmilitary value. . . . This goes even for items
like wood and glass if they are to be used for framing Stalin pictures . . . to
lift the morale of Soviet soldiers.”⁶⁶ To create effective export controls, the US
thus had to apply a broad definition of the “strategic goods” affected by the
ban, and ensure the cooperation of other countries. In March 1948, the US intro-
duced export controls that drastically reduced trade with the USSR. ERP recipi-
ents had to comply with the American restrictions for goods and materials paid
with Marshall aid.⁶⁷ Following the Soviet blockade of Berlin in September 1948, a
Western counter-blockade shut down inter-zonal trade and German trade with
Eastern Europe.⁶⁸ Other western countries were increasingly forced to comply
with the American embargo.⁶⁹
ECE’s self-declared aim to provide a bridge between East and West thus con-
flicted with American security interests. At an ECE Trade Committee meeting in
May 1949, “a deadlock developed”, wrote Myrdal’s assistant Melvin Fagen, when
“the eastern European countries stressed the futility of any efforts . . . as long as
discriminatory export licensing policies were practiced against them.”⁷⁰ The em-
bargo policy became the dominating issue in ECE’s annual Commission ses-
sions, and rendered its Trade Committee almost useless. Walt Rostow, by now
Myrdal’s right hand man in the Secretariat, complained to American journalist
Walter Lippman that the embargo “is a bad policy because it does not seriously
affect the war potential of Eastern Europe, while at the same time it disrupts a
commercial relationship on which the future position of Western Europe de-
 E.A. Radice, untitled document, 20 July 1948. TNA, ECE and OEEC relations, FO 371–71802.
 Nicholas Nyárádi, My Ringside Seat in Moscow (New York: Crowell, 1952), 211.
 Frank Cain, Economic Statecraft During the Cold War: European Responses to the US Trade
Embargo (New York: Routledge, 2007).
 Mai, “Osthandel Und Westintegration 1947–1957. Europa, Die USA Und Die Entstehung Einer
Hegemonialen Partnerschaft,” 205–206.
 Gunnar Adler-Karlsson, Western Economic Warfare 1947– 1967. A Case Study in Foreign Eco-
nomic Policy (Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell, 1968).
 Fagen, “The Work of the Committee on the Development of Trade, 1949– 1957,” vii–2.
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pends. It is denying the Western European countries one . . . method for ending
their dependence on the US.”⁷¹
The Korean War further increased American skepticism toward ECE. In a
book published in 1952, Nyárádi warned American readers of “a strong trend
in western European countries to reflect [Myrdal’s] trusting attitude”, adding
that an ECE report dated May 6, 1951 “when the Russian-supplied Chinese Com-
munist troops were busily killing the soldiers of the U.N. forces in Korea – dis-
closed that the European nations who were benefiting by Marshall Plan aid
had doubled their shipments of engineering products to Russia!”⁷² The secretar-
iat’s insistence on East-West trade thus risked American goodwill that was vital
for ECE’s survival. On the other hand, ECE’s work was also threatened by the lim-
itations posed on trade. Technical cooperation in ECE’s committees, as Vincent
Lagendijk has shown for the example of electricity connections, was severely
hindered by the prevalence of trade obstacles.⁷³ A four-party deal to share energy
resources involving Austria, Poland, and the transit countries Czechoslovakia
and West Germany, was projected from 1949 onwards. While the project was
not hindered by technical difficulties, it did not take off before the 1960s. Eastern
absenteeism and the Western embargo on generating equipment made it impos-
sible to fulfill the plans of ECE’s Electric Power Committee during the 1950s. ECE
succeeded, however, in keeping the idea alive and on the agenda. In this in-
stance, Myrdal’s dictum that a bridge between East and West “must be built,
even if no-one crosses it for the time being” worked out.⁷⁴
Besides trade, ECE sought to facilitate East-West cooperation through regular
exchanges of expertise in the form of conferences, study tours, and a harmoni-
zation of statistics.⁷⁵ Groups of timber experts from East and West studied wood-
cutting methods in Finland or Switzerland, and housing experts were invited to
Warsaw. These occasions were framed in academic terminology as “excursions,”
“seminars” etc., emphasizing their political neutrality through the link to aca-
demic research. The academic habitus was particularly prevalent in the ECE Re-
 Walt Rostow to Walter Lippman, 17 March 1949. UNOG Archives: ARR 14/1360 – Box 73 Folder
“Germany”.
 Nyárádi, My Ringside Seat in Moscow, 211.
 Lagendijk, “The Structure of Power: The UNECE and East-West Electricity Connections, 1947–
1975,” 57–63.
 Quoted in Anika de la Grandville to Václav Kostelecký, 28 April 1980. ARBARK, Václav Kos-
teleckýs arkiv, 3332/4/3/5 Övriga handlingar rörande ECE.
 Tom Griffin, “The Relationship of the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UN/
ECE, Geneva) to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD, Paris) and
the Statistical Office of the European Communities (Eurostat, Luxembourg),” Statistical Journal
of the United Nations ECE 13, no. 1 (1996).
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search and Planning Division, the largest administrative unit of the Secretariat.
“[O]ur research set-up here amounts to quite a faculty,” Myrdal boasted to Ohlin,
“we certainly keep up the academic spirit.”⁷⁶
The research work of its Secretariat became a crucial raison d’être for ECE.
Western delegates discussing the future of ECE in 1953 agreed that it was “not
accomplishing much of importance at present,” but considered its “statistical
and research work useful and want to keep it.”⁷⁷ It proved difficult, however,
to incorporate economists from all member states into Myrdal’s “faculty.” Not
only did Myrdal hold a poor opinion over Eastern European university education,
the governments usually presented candidates for UN service whose qualifica-
tions were political rather than academic. In 1948, ECE launched an In-Service
Training Scheme for Eastern European economists, funded by the Rockefeller
Foundation. Myrdal’s goal was to train “bright young boys” for service in IOs di-
rectly at ECE.⁷⁸ Despite not achieving its original purpose, the scheme was con-
sidered a success at the UN and the Rockefeller Foundation. Of the 27 students
who participated in the scheme until 1955, only two came from countries behind
the Iron Curtain. The majority came from Yugoslavia, Austria, and Finland, and a
few even from NATO states such as France, Norway, and West Germany.⁷⁹ Even-
tually, the scheme was redirected toward the developing world, and recruited
participants in India and Ceylon.⁸⁰ When Rockefeller funding ran out in 1955,
In-Service Training continued as part of the UN Technical Assistance program.
The scheme failed to provide a loophole for recruitment from Eastern Europe,
but it did help to mitigate the problem that personnel qualified for UN service
was more readily available in some countries than in others.⁸¹
 Gunnar Myrdal to Bertil Ohlin, 15 August 1953. ARBARK: Václav Kostleckýs arkiv,
3332–4–2–5.
 Telegram, State Department to US Representation at the UN, New York, 26 March, 1953. Na-
tional Archives and Records Administration (NARA): RG 59 Department of State Decimal File
340.240, 1950–54, Box 1349.
 Excerpt from letter to NSB from Gunnar Myrdal, 16 November 1948. Rockefeller Foundation
records, projects, RG 1.2 (FA387), Series 100: International. Folder: Economic Commission for Eu-
rope – Scholarships 1947–1951, Box 7 Folder 49.
 Gunnar Myrdal, The Research work of the Secretariat of the Economic Commission for Eu-
rope (draft), Rockefeller Foundation records, general correspondence, RG 2, 1952– 1957
(FA425). Subgroup 1956: General Correspondence: Series 1956/100: International. Folder: ECE
(A-Z).
 Gunnar Myrdal, “The Research Work of the Secretariat of the Economic Commission for Eu-
rope,” in 25 Economic Essays in English, German and Scandinavian Languages in Honour of Erik
Lindahl, ed. Ekonomisk tidskrift (Stockholm: Ekonomisk Tidskrift, 1956), 624.
 On other examples of ooperation in the social sciences across the Cold War divide, see Katja
Naumann’s contribution in this volume.
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Despite rising international tension, declining Western support, and con-
tinuing Eastern absenteeism in its committees, the ECE secretariat upheld its
commitment to East-West trade. Myrdal told ECOSOC that “[e]ven in the best
event, I am not looking forward to rapid and spectacular accomplishments . .
. . The maximum hope I have is that . . . it will be possible gradually to change
a situation which is not good to a situation which is somewhat better.”⁸²
Seeing the futility of further regular Trade Committee meetings, the Secretar-
iat introduced a practice of extraordinary trade consultations upon invitation.
These trade meetings were prepared through consultations the Secretariat held
directly with governments.⁸³ A meeting planned for September 1952 had to be
cancelled after the Secretariat received no confirmation from the USSR. Myrdal
had stepped on a lot of people’s feet to get this meeting going, particularly at
the US delegation in Geneva: “. . . the trade consultations will be held . . .
only because Myrdal and the ECE Secretariat want them to be held and because
no country is prepared to take a strong position against them,” one official com-
plained to the State Department.⁸⁴ The Secretariat’s persistence during the early
1950s was thus, at least to some extent, hinged on Myrdal personally. When he
was hospitalized after a severe car accident in 1952, sources in the Swedish gov-
ernment told the US embassy that Sweden could not provide a successor if Myr-
dal should resign. Assuming that “the member nations could not agree on any
other national,” the Swedes regarded it a likely outcome that ECE could be dis-
solved.⁸⁵ Myrdal’s accident came at a critical time. For The Manchester Guardi-
an’s correspondent, the failure of the 1952 trade meeting a few weeks earlier
was “the end of [the Secretariat’s] efforts to expand trade with Eastern Europe.”⁸⁶
Despite such seemingly bleak prospects, the trade consultations achieved a
remarkable breakthrough in 1953/54. To a large degree, this was due to the
change in Soviet leadership and subsequent policy changes toward the West
 Gunnar Myrdal’s speech to the Economic and Social Council, 8 July 1953. UNOG Box 83, ECE
Debate at 9th Session.
 Fagen, “Gunnar Myrdal and the Shaping of the United Nations Economic Commission for
Europe,” 431.
 Joseph Greenwald, Economic Officer, US Resident Delegation to ECE, to Ruth Philipps, State
Department, July 10 1952. NARA: RG 59 Department of State Decimal File 340.240, 1950–54, Box
1349.
 Telegram, US Embassy Stockholm to State Department, 20 February 1953. Subject: “Future of
Gunnar Myrdal as Secretary General of the Economic Commission for Europe”. NARA: RG 59 De-
partment of State Decimal File 340.240, 1950–54, Box 1349.
 London Embassy to State Deparment, Manchester Guardian Comment on the Economic
Commission for Europe, 5 September 1952. NARA: RG 59 Department of State Decimal File
340.240, 1950–54, Box 1349.
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and the Eastern Europe. Yet, even before Stalin’s death in March 1953, Soviet of-
ficials at ECE had begun to carefully explore a change in trade policy. The enor-
mous economic requirements of reconstruction, combined with the effects of
land reform, forced industrialization, urbanization, and arms build-up brought
the USSR’s efforts to achieve strategic autarky to its limits.⁸⁷ Soviet planning
and the economic exploitation of Eastern Europe did not replace the need to im-
port Western manufactured goods. But it was only after Stalin’s death that a
trade consultation was held with the participation of the USSR at Myrdal’s initia-
tive.⁸⁸ The ECE secretariat facilitated informal, bilateral talks in a multilateral en-
vironment. It scheduled parallel, bilateral talks between experts from all partic-
ipating countries in the many conference rooms of the Palais des Nations, even
involving countries that did not entertain diplomatic relations with one another.
“[S]eldom have the trade statistics so rapidly and decisively registered a big jump
in response to what in effect was an intergovernmental meeting, although it was
concealed as a consultation of the Executive Secretary with experts,” Myrdal
wrote later in a rather self-congratulatory article.⁸⁹ While the ECE trade talks
did not restore trade to its pre-war level, they did give an impetus to a quantita-
tive upturn in East-West commercial exchange.⁹⁰ More importantly, however,
they reestablished a link for economic consultation between East and West
that was not subsequently broken again.
Once the USSR’s grip on the Eastern Europe weakened after Stalin’s death,
ECE provided existing institutions that allowed a rather quick restoration of East-
West contacts, albeit on a limited scale. For the 1953 Commission session, a Cze-
choslovak chairman was elected for the first time. In 1954, the Eastern countries
returned to the committee meetings, established permanent missions in Geneva,
and began to take part in all of ECE’s work. Among the files of the American res-
ident delegation, several full-colored brochures advertising Czechoslovak prod-
ucts in English and German can be found – something almost unthinkable
two years earlier. ECE’s In-Service Training scheme, now financed by the UN
Technical Assistance Administration, admitted Bulgarian and Romanian stipen-
diaries for the first time in 1956. “The change in the political situation has per-
 Mai, “Osthandel und Westintegration 1947–1957. Europa, die USA und die Entstehung einer
hegemonialen Partnerschaft,” 205.
 Fagen, “Gunnar Myrdal and the Shaping of the United Nations Economic Commission for
Europe,” 428.
 Myrdal, “Twenty Years of the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe,” 621.
 Evgeny Chossudovsky and Jean Siotis, “Organized All-European Co-Operation: The Role of
Existing Institutions,” in Beyond Détente: Prospects for East-West Co-Operation and Security in
Europe, ed. Nils Andrén and Karl E. Birnbaum (Leiden: A.W. Sijthoff, 1976), 161.
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mitted us to realize the original intention of getting trainees from countries in
Eastern Europe,” ⁹¹ Myrdal wrote. With Eastern participation restored, ECE be-
came a meeting space for experts from both parts of the continent. While East-
West tensions in the face of Soviet military interventions in East Germany in
1953 and in Hungary in 1956 prevailed, ECE provided a niche for ongoing coop-
eration over de-politicized, technical issues. Evgeny Chossudovsky and Jean Sio-
tis argue that “it proved possible to concentrate on programs which lent them-
selves to being ‘de-politicized,’ by reducing them to a series of narrowly
circumscribed technical components (such as the supply of fertilizers and alka-
lis, and the classification of hard coal by types . . .) that could be dealt with by
specialists.”⁹² Other practices – such as consensus-based, no-vote decision-mak-
ing in the committees, and a system of East-West rotation of chairmanship –
aimed to ensure ECE’s usefulness. The price for this policy of re-focusing ECE
on piecemeal, technical cooperation instead of ambitious trade agreements,
however, was that it removed ECE from its central position on the more contro-
versial questions of East-West coordination. During the détente of the 1970s, ECE
was already entrenched in technical cooperation, and it and the UN played a sec-
ondary role to the Conference on Security and Co-Operation in Europe (CSCE).
Conclusion
In a speech to the American Psychological Association in 1952, Myrdal called for
all social sciences (including psychology) to engage collectively with problems of
international cooperation: “[T]he powerful tools of social engineering . . . are so
badly needed in this field where more than anywhere else the practitioner must
at present work by rules of thumb.”⁹³ The firm belief in the capacity of rational
planning and social engineering that was central to Myrdal’s thinking as a public
intellectual during the 1930s and 40s was thus transferred from Sweden to the
international level. The relative independence of the ECE Secretariat from its su-
perior bodies in the UN system and its member states meant that as Executive
 Gunnar Myrdal, The Research work of the Secretariat of the Economic Commission for Eu-
rope (draft), Rockefeller Foundation records, general correspondence, RG 2, 1952– 1957
(FA425). Subgroup 1956: General Correspondence: Series 1956/100: International. Folder: ECE
(A-Z).
 Chossudovsky and Siotis, “Organized All-European Co-Operation: The Role of Existing Insti-
tutions,” 161.
 Gunnar Myrdal, “Psychological Impediments to Effective International Cooperation,” The
Journal of Social Issues 8, no. 6 (1952): 5–31.
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Secretary, Myrdal was able to adopt for ECE key agendas rooted in his own in-
tellectual and political work. Myrdal’s ideal representation of international
civil servants was similar to the social engineers he saw in charge of moderniza-
tion in Sweden and elsewhere: post-ideological, rational and problem-oriented
planners acting on the basis of an assumed volonté générale. The self-styling
of the Secretariat borrowed several elements from academia. Not only was the
Research and Planning Division the biggest unit within the Secretariat, its re-
search work became a raison d’être for the entire organization. Social scientists,
in Myrdal’s view,were naturally inclined to not only analyze and understand, but
to improve and rationalize societies. On the international level, social science
and in particular economic analysis should form the basis for action in what
Myrdal perceived as a world interest toward détente and against bloc formation.
Founded as an organ for technical cooperation, ECE was a prolongation of
the trend toward economic planning from the national to the international
level. Acknowledging that the reconstruction plans of different European coun-
tries were at conflict with each other, ECE’s founders at the UN sought to make it
a venue for the international coordination of economic policy. As such, ECE was
the first permanent post-1945 IO dedicated to general economic cooperation in
Europe. The bottleneck problems to economic recovery – especially coal, food,
housing, timber and transport – seemed to call for experts and planners.
Other postwar IOs, like ECE’s predecessors or OEEC, shared the mindset of tech-
nocratic internationalism that characterized ECE. Nonetheless, cooperation in
these IOs remained intergovernmental; the international bureaucracies attached
to them had only a limited capacity to start policy initiatives. The ECE Secretar-
iat’s continued push for a revival of East-West trade stands out as an exception.
Positing that the trend toward economic bloc formation in Europe was ab-
normal and detrimental to economic development on either side of the Iron Cur-
tain, Myrdal stylized ECE as a champion of East-West cooperation. The prefer-
ence for East-West trade over intra-mural economic integration was rooted in
Myrdal’s engagement during the 1940s with continental social democrats in
the Internationale Gruppe and as Swedish minister of commerce. In both capaci-
ties, Myrdal had held the conviction that positively engaging the USSR in eco-
nomic cooperation was both necessary and possible. ECE retained this position
even in the face of growing hostility among Western governments, particularly in
the United States. While the American embargo policy and the ongoing Eastern
absenteeism in ECE’s technical committees seriously threatened the organiza-
tion’s continued existence, the Secretariat was nonetheless able to considerably
shape the agenda and keep the call for East-West cooperation alive. The deadlock
that paralyzed the Commission for years could not be broken by Myrdal’s policy
of small steps, but only by Stalin’s death and the subsequent changes in Soviet
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policy. The power of experts and planners in international bureaucracies thus
had clear limitations. Their actions, however, indicated a direction and a place
for limited cooperation on technical issues once contacts were re-established.
Myrdal’s stated intention to build a bridge between East and West “even if no
one crosses it for the time being” was thus fulfilled, albeit not in the ambitious
form of a full restoration of trade connections.
The example of ECE shows a trend toward rationalization and scientization
in international relations. While the Secretariat tried very hard to disentangle
trade and economic cooperation from foreign policy, geopolitics remained the
defining force that shaped ECE. Nonetheless, ECE’s preoccupation with technical
cooperation allowed it to de-politicize complex problems by dissolving them into
smaller, technical question addressed by experts instead of diplomats. The trend
toward economic planning and the acute supply shortages of the postwar period
encouraged this development. The breakthrough in ECE’s deadlock, finally, took
place within a broader development of careful détente after Stalin’s death. The
USSR began to engage with the UN on a broader scale. In the following year,
the Soviet Union joined the International Labor Organization (ILO) and the Unit-
ed Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO).⁹⁴ The
Geneva Summit of 1955 – the last meeting that brought together the “Big
Four” of 1940s summit diplomacy – was the climax of this development of care-
ful rapprochement. Although the opportunity for a lasting détente passed with
Soviet military interferences in the GDR and in Hungary, ECE was able to keep
its “bridge” for technical cooperation on a limited scale open for the following
decades.
As an intellectual, Gunnar Myrdal “could be characterized in terms of a
number of antinomies”, as Sven Eliæson suggested: “the parochial cosmopoli-
tan, the patriotic internationalist, the compassionate ‘nihilist,’ the elitist egalitar-
ian, the social Darwinist anti-racist, the male-chauvinist feminist, the ahistorical
‘historicist’, the conservative socialist.”⁹⁵ One might add the post-ideological
ideologue, the pan-European Cold Warrior, and the free-trading planner.
 Wightman, “East-West Cooperation and the United Nations Economic Commission for Eu-
rope,” 6.
 Eliæson, “Gunnar Myrdal: A Theorist of Modernity,” 331.
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Part 2: High Modernism Planning

Isabelle Gouarné
Mandatory Planning versus Indicative
Planning?
The Eastern Itinerary of French Planners
(1960s-1970s)
It is one of the ironies of this strange century that the most lasting results of the October
revolution, whose object was the global overthrow of capitalism, was to save its antagonist,
both in war and in peace – that is to say, by providing it with the incentive, fear, to reform
itself after the Second World War, and by establishing the popularity of economic planning,
furnishing it with some of the procedures for its reform.
Eric J. Hobsbawm, Age of Extremes: The Short Twentieth Century, 1914– 1991
(London, Abacus, 1995 [1994]), 7–8
In his famous book The Age of Extremes: The Short Twentieth Century, Eric Hobs-
bawm invited readers to challenge the distinction made by economic historians
between “mandatory planning” (i.e. the Soviet mode of organization of economy
based on a strong hierarchical top-down decision process and a strict state con-
trol) and “indicative planning” (i.e. a “flexible” administrative mode of regula-
tion, set up in a few capitalist countries after the Second World War in order
to correct imperfections of the market). Instead, Hobsbawm examined the effects
of “real socialism” on the political and economic structures of Western states.
Through the fears and borrowings it elicited, he argued, the Soviet regime was
a powerful accelerator of structural reforms in Western economies, thereby con-
tributing to their “golden age”. By contrast, the collapse of the socialist “bloc”
precipitated the rise of neoliberalism by discrediting the project of a planned
economy. Hobsbawm’s argument was an invitation to study how the fate of East-
ern societies influenced the trajectory of the welfare state in the West. This chap-
ter takes up the challenge by looking into the case of France.
Sometimes presented as the only Western state with a genuinely planned
economy, France opted for a centrally managed economy to rebuild and modern-
ize the country in the wake of World War Two. A “culture of regulation and eco-
nomic and social protection,” initiated during the Popular Front, prevailed
among French political and administrative elites, who supported the setting
up of a “mixed economy” combining planning and market.¹ Based on the
 See the works of Michel Margairaz, in particular: L’État, les finances et l’économie (1932–
1952). Histoire d’une conversion (Paris: Comité d’histoire économique et financière de la France,
https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110534696-005
model of a large company and supported by a comprehensive statistical informa-
tion system, French planning was meant to ensure the coherence and feasibility
of the country’s projects. It relied on a process of negotiation and consultation
(the commissions du plan included “social partners”) to anticipate social con-
flicts. This socio-technical innovation was conceived as an original solution to
the crisis of political representation that had led to the war.²
To what extent can the French system be considered as an “adaptation of So-
viet ideas to a capitalist mixed economy,” as Hobsbawm argued?³ What type of
dialogue did French planners engage in with the East, and for what purposes?
What were the social uses and impact of these exchanges, in the East and in
the West, during decades of crisis? To tackle these questions, I rely on an ap-
proach that highlights transnational circulations of ideas as well as their under-
lying social networks and discursive practices. The renewal of Cold War studies
has indeed been based on the deconstruction of political categories such as
“blocs,” “iron curtain” and opposition between systems,⁴ paving the way for
the analysis of East-West circulations in the cultural, scientific and technological
realms, and more recently regarding the very structures and forms of government
of states.⁵
The Cold War’s “mental map” effectively shifted substantially, being alterna-
tively based on the idea of an irreducible “opposition” and “competition” be-
1991, 2 vol.); “Rénovation,” in Dictionnaire De Gaulle, ed. Claire Andrieu, Philippe Braud, Guil-
laume Piketty (Paris: Laffont, 2006), 1000–1005; “La faute à 68? Le Plan et les institutions de la
régulation économique et financière: une libéralisation contrariée ou différée?”, in Mai 68 entre
libération et libéralisation. La grande bifurcation, ed. Michel Margairaz and Danielle Tartakowsky
(Rennes: PUR, 2010), 41–62.
 Alain Desrosières, “La commission et l’équation: une comparaison des plans français et néer-
landais entre 1945 et 1980”, Genèses 34 (March 1999): 28–52.
 Eric J. Hobsbawm, Age of Extremes, 274.
 See György Péteri, “Across and Beyond the East West Devide,” Slavonica 10 no. 2 (November
2004); Sandrine Kott and Justine Faure (ed.), “Le bloc de l’Est en question,” Vingtième siècle 109
(2011/2); Sari Autio-Sarasmo and Katalin Miklóssy (ed.), Reassessing Cold War Europe (London/
New York: Routledge, 2011); Paul Boulland and Isabelle Gouarné (ed.), “Communismes et circu-
lations transnationales,” Critique internationale 66 (January-March 2015).
 See recent research on East-West circulations in the area of planning and forecasting, includ-
ing: Gil Eyal and Johanna Bockman (ed.), “Eastern Europe as a Laboratory for Economic Knowl-
edge: The Transnational Roots of Neoliberalism,” American Journal of Sociology 108–2 (Septem-
ber 2002): 310–352; Johanna Bockman, Markets in the Name of Socialism. The Left-Wing Origins
of Neoliberalism (Stanford: Stanford Univeristy Press, 2011); Jenny Andersson and Eglė Rindze-
vičiūtė (ed.), The Struggle for the Long-Term in Transnational Science and Politics: Forging the Fu-
ture (London/New York: Routledge, 2015); Eglė Rindzevičiūtė, The Power of Systems. How Policy
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tween political systems on the one hand and of a “convergence” on the other. Its
definition was a constant subject of tension in the East and West alike, among
intellectual and political elites whose internationalization strategies are never
unrelated to national concerns, as Yves Dezalay has noted.While the internation-
al space of state expertise was structured on the basis of “resources acquired
and accredited in national fields of power”, the “mobilization of an international
capital of competencies and relations” is also an “important asset in strategies of
power in the national field”.⁶
This chapter pursues this approach by studying an oft-neglected component
of the internationalization of political and administrative elites – namely, the ac-
tual and symbolic relations between the French modernizing fractions and the
Soviet Union and some Eastern European socialist countries, during a historical
period (late 1950s-1970s) dominated by the idea of a “convergence of systems.”⁷ It
examines how this conception informed strategies of internationalization toward
the East, which admittedly differed depending on the countries and their respec-
tive ongoing structural reforms, but enabled the emergence of economic exper-
tise networks. Ultimately, a forgotten stage in the development of an internation-
al field of expertise will be documented – before neoliberalism became the new
orthodoxy along with the US hegemony, when Europe and the Soviet Union
formed a hub around the idea of a state-controlled economy.
 Yves Dezalay, “Les courtiers de l’international. Héritiers cosmopolites, mercenaires de l’impér-
ialisme et missionnaires de l’universel,” Actes de la Recherche en sciences sociales 151– 152
(2004/1): 4–35. See also Marion Fourcade, “The Construction of a Global Profession: The Trans-
nationalization of Economics,” American Journal of Sociology 112, no. 1 (July 2006): 145–194.
 This article draws on a study of archival documents from the French and Soviet state institu-
tions in charge of planning and from research centers in economics: in Russia, the Archive of the
Academy of Sciences (ARAN) and the State Archive of the Economy (RGAE); in France, the Na-
tional Financial and Economic Archive (CAEF) and the archives of scientific organizations such
as the National Center for scientific research (CNRS) and the School of Advanced Studies in the
Social Sciences (EHESS). This study of archival materials was complemented by memoir litera-
ture and also by a dozen face-to-face semi-structured interviews with French economists who
took part in the exchanges with Eastern countries in 1960s-1970s. The interviews were focused
on their professional trajectory (the successive positions held in the political-administrative
and economic fields), on the different phases of their cooperation with Eastern economists,
the conditions of work and dialogue, and on their visions and representations of Eastern social-
ist system.
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Thinking beyond Cold War oppositions
Developed since the late 1930s, the convergence theory supported, with a num-
ber of variations,⁸ the idea of a rapprochement between the “capitalist” “West-
ern” systems and the Soviet Union’s and Eastern Europe’s “socialist” systems.
Their respective evolutions, it argued, led to the same type of “industrial societ-
ies” (or “post-industrial”) whose goals and operating methods were similar. This
idea was largely popularized with de-Stalinization and the subsequent thaw, es-
pecially in US social science, where Soviet studies scholars fueled general con-
siderations on modern society (Inkeles, Sorokin, Parsons, Rostow, Bell et al.).⁹
According to David Engerman, however, it had limited interest to the US govern-
ment.¹⁰ In France, on the other hand, it resonated far beyond academic circles
and into the political and administrative field itself, especially among its mod-
ernizing elements who had gathered within the “triangle” formed by the
INSEE (National institute of statistic and economic studies), the national plan-
ning board (Commissariat au Plan) and the Ministry of Finance’s economic
and financial studies department (Service des études économiques et finan-
cières), later renamed Directorate of forecasting (Direction de la prévision).¹¹
Between interest and sympathy:
French economists and the Soviet “model”
At a time when the French political and administrative field was experiencing
sweeping changes, the outlines of this new institutional space were traced in
the immediate postwar period by a group of senior officials with atypical back-
grounds. Senior public service was rarely a family tradition for them. Many of
 For discussion of different formulations of this thesis, see Théofil I. Kis, “État des travaux sur
la problématique de la convergence: théories et hypothèses,” Études internationales 2, no. 3
(1971): 443–487. See also in this volume the contributions by Sandrine Kott, “The social engi-
neering project,” and Ondřej Matějka, “Social engineering and alienation.”
 David C. Engerman, “To Moscow and Back: American Social Scientists and the Concept of
Convergence,” in American Capitalism. Social Thought and Political Economy in the Twentieth
Century, ed. Nelson Lichtenstein (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2006), 47–68.
 David C. Engerman, Know Your Enemy. The Rise and Fall of America’s Soviet Experts (Oxford/
New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), chap. 7.
 Alain Desrosières, La Politique des nombres. Histoire de la raison statistique (Paris: La Décou-
verte, 1993); Gouverner par les nombres. L’argument statistique (Paris: Presses de l’École des
Mines, 2008, 2 vol.).
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them came from religious minorities (Jewish – for instance, François Bloch-
Lainé, Étienne Hirsch, Simon Nora or Pierre Uri; or Protestant – as Claude Gru-
son and Jean Saint-Geours) or had modest social backgrounds (Claude Gruson,
Robert Marjolin, Jean Serisé). At odds with the posture of apoliticism tradition-
ally prevailing in the field, their trajectories had often been marked by intense
political commitments, in the Resistance (Jean Serisé, for instance) or in left-
wing parties – the Socialist Party (Pierre Uri, Jean Saint-Geours) and even the
Communist Party (Claude Alphandéry, Jean Bénard, Jean Denizet, Jacques le
Noane, Jacques Mayer, André Nataf; in the next generation: Philippe Herzog,
Gaston Olive and others).¹² While their training (Polytechnique, École des
Ponts et Chaussées, École des Mines) put them within the tradition of state en-
gineers who are the bearers of economic knowledge,¹³ they had also been deeply
impressed by the crisis of democracy in the 1930s and 1940s and were eager to
restore social bonds by implementing a political modernization project. This
group of state economists thus brought forward an original response to the chal-
lenge of postwar reconstruction based on national planning and accounting.
United by the same ambitions for modernization, this community of senior
officials was however divided as to the definition of the type of planning that
should be implemented.¹⁴ There had been heated debates on the subject at
the time of the country’s liberation. Under the helm of Jean Monnet, a soft, in-
dicative and consultative form of planning had eventually prevailed against
the more controlling approach envisioned by some, who considered the Soviet
Union as a “model” from which France could draw inspiration (Pierre Mendès
France and his adviser Georges Boris, and also Claude Gruson, Alfred Sauvy
and other planners of the postwar period).¹⁵
 Brigitte Gaïti, “Les modernisateurs dans l’administration d’après-guerre. L’écriture d’une
histoire héroïque,” Revue française d’administration publique 102 (2002/2): 295–306; De Gaulle,
prophète de la Cinquième République (1946– 1962) (Paris: Presses de Science Po, 1998), chap. 7.
See also François Fourquet, Les Comptes de la puissance. Histoire de la comptabilité nationale et
du plan (Paris: Encres, 1980).
 Marion Fourcade, Economists and Societies: Discipline and Profession in the United States,
Britain & France, 1890s to 1990s (Princeton/Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2009), especially
chap. 4.
 On this topic, see Vincent Spenlauher, L’évaluation des politiques publiques, avatar de la pla-
nification (Grenoble: Thèse de l’Université Pierre-Mendès France, 1998), chap. 1.
 Philippe Mioche, “La planification comme ‘réforme de structure’. L’action de Pierre Mendès
France de 1943 à 1945,” Histoire, économie et société 1, no. 3 (1982): 471–488; Le Plan Monnet.
Genèse et élaboration, 1941– 1947 (Paris: Publications de la Sorbonne, 1987). See also Jean-
Louis Crémieux-Brilhac, Georges Boris. Trente ans d’influence. Blum, De Gaulle, Mendès France
(Paris: Gallimard, 2010).
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Claude Gruson (1910–2000)
Often presented as the “father” of French national accounting, Claude Gruson
was a long-time admirer of Soviet and East German planning. In the biographical
interviews he published under the title Programmer l’espérance [Programming
Hope] in 1976, he noted:
The first reason for my admiration,which indeed I am not trying to hide, is that this system,
which is completely different from capitalism, exists: it is capable of evolving and meeting
complex goals. . . . From a political standpoint, the Soviet system has visible flaws. On the
other hand, the Eastern system is arguably much more egalitarian than ours.” Later, he
adds: “We need to look for another model of society, as it is in Western Europe that this
problem whose responsibility is ours arises. . . . Still, I don’t want to completely rule out
any form of application of the Soviet model in the future. Europe will certainly be threat-
ened by a deep crisis within a few years. . . . Under that assumption, the only way out might
be a system inspired by Eastern socialisms: a deeply troubled and disorganized Europe
would find its salvation in the implementation of a simple and robust system, based on
a centralism that wouldn’t necessarily be Stalinist, being on the opposite capable of moving
toward decentralization and democracy. But it all depends on how deep and lasting the cri-
sis is.¹⁶
Gruson’s interest in Soviet planning and Marxism was anchored in his vocation
as a state engineer and a Protestant intellectual concerned with “programming
hope” and bringing about the “future of brotherhood, justice and love” to
which the world was “promised.” An alumnus of the Ecole Polytechnique and
a “self-taught” economist, he was one of the key actors of postwar French plan-
ning in the Ministry of Finance and as Director-General at the INSEE (1961–
1967). Upon the liberation of France, he was tasked with setting up the Depart-
ment for economic and financial studies at the Treasury and with coming up
with information and analysis tools to guide the reconstruction’s economic
and social policy.¹⁷ He viewed economic power as “oppressive” and “dictatori-
al,” and remained a steadfast supporter of planning even after the 1960s,
when state regulation of the economy in all forms was heavily criticized. He con-
ceived planning not simply as a means to “reduce uncertainty,” to use Pierre
Massé’s phrase, but as a “political support tool for policy-making” and an instru-
ment of democratization.
 Claude Gruson, Programmer l’espérance (Paris: Stock, 1976), 162–163 and 177– 178.
 Aude Terray, Des Francs-tireurs aux experts. L’organisation de la prévision économique au
ministère des Finances, 1948– 1968 (Paris: Comité pour l’Histoire économique et financière de
la France, 2002).
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While the Khrushchev Thaw introduced a “peaceful coexistence” policy and
allowed Soviet scientists to open up to the world, he actively participated in the
first exchanges between French and Soviet planners and economists. In 1958, he
was part of the delegation of French planners and economists sent to the Soviet
Union to learn about the methods of Socialist planning. After leaving his post at
the INSEE in 1967, he went on to work in the banking sector and drifted away
from the East-West state expertise networks. Yet, he continued to carefully mon-
itor attempts at reforming Socialist economic systems; during the “transition”
years, he strongly opposed the economic orientations that were adopted. In
his view, introducing a market economy in the former Socialist countries re-
quired an “adaptation effort” that demanded “not a centralized planning that
would stifle initiative, but at least a powerful central apparatus of strategic reg-
ulation, capable of providing strong insights on economic activity and of correct-
ing its inconsistencies”.¹⁸
As we can see with Claude Gruson’ case, communists were far from the only
ones with an interest in Soviet planning. In the postwar period, it was very wide-
ly shared among this circle of state economists, characterized by a left-wing sen-
sibility.¹⁹ It had much to do with the engineer-state (or expert-state) model that
the Soviet Union had managed to embody, especially after the trials of World
War Two and the fight against Nazi Germany, as several French economists
noted in interviews:
It is necessary to understand the moment well. Russia is one of the great victors of the War,
but maybe, seen from France, with a specific orientation, because the fight against the Ger-
mans was horrendous.Well, Stalingrad and so on. The Communist Party is the first party in
France. Maybe it wasn’t anymore at that time, but it had been until recently. Thus Russia
has a special aura. And in particular, we are very impressed by its success in the area of
planning. (Interview with Jean Serisé, 28 November 2012)
We faced a planned economy, which had won the War.Well, they [the Soviets] were saying
it, but it is true that they had a certain prestige. Soviet Russia had prestige, not only for
having won the War against the Germans, but for having won with an economic base
that they sort of managed to embellish enough, if you will, and so on. (Interview with
Jean Saint-Geours, 19 November 2012).
 Claude Gruson, Propos d’un opposant obstiné au libéralisme mondial (Paris: Éditions MSH,
2001), 73–81 and 79.
 Aude Terray, Des Francs-tireurs aux experts.
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French interpretations of the convergence theory
Having lost momentum in the early stages of the Cold War, the postwar interest
in planning in the East was revived in the post-Stalinist period as the Soviet
Union achieved a series of technological feats (including the launch of Sputnik,
the first artificial satellite, in 1957, of the first man in space in 1961, etc.) and en-
gaged in a set of structural economic reforms alongside other Eastern European
countries.²⁰ Edmond Malinvaud (1923–2015), who embodied a model of success
for French state economists, despite his great political restraint,²¹ recalled:
According to my tentative assessment, however, we overestimated the real performance in
the USSR in 1960, and we also had for long a too favourable image of the changes since
then. . . . I shall venture into giving two reasons explaining why propaganda achieved
its aim to some extent. First, we were too much impressed by some Soviet successes: in
Word War II, hence, we thought, by its war economy; and on the technological front, par-
ticularly in the nuclear and aerospace fields. Those successes were too easily accepted as
such (we did not know their cost) and as more widely significant. Second, looking at the
social problems in our part of the world we fell too much into mistake of the believing
that “the grass was greener” in the other part. . . . Without accepting the Communist polit-
ical project, whose political features were found by most to be too undemocratic, many
were ready to concede that the Soviet system was performing better on the social front.²²
From the late 1950s on, multiple initiatives were taken in France and in the other
Western countries to get information not only on the content of those reforms
and their political orientations, but also on the technical innovations they
could bring in terms of planning and “economic information.” That period
also saw the rise of a generation of French academics who specialized in the So-
viet economy (Charles Bettelheim, whose first works were already well known,
but also Marie Lavigne, Basile Kerblay, Jean Marczewski, Henri Chambre, Georg-
es Sokoloff and others), which reflected that wider interest.
 For an overview, see Bernard Chavance, Les réformes économiques à l’Est, de 1950 à 1990
(Paris: Nathan, 2000).
 On his career path, see Frédéric Lebaron, La Croyance économique. Les économistes entre sci-
ence et politique (Paris: Seuil, 2000), and especially 67–71. His election to the Collège de France
in 1987 marks the culmination of his career as an economist, at the junction of research and high
administration.
 Edmond Malinvaud, “Introduction: Some Notes on Assessments about Economic Systems,”
in Planning, Shortage, and Transformation. Essays in Honor of János Kornai, ed. Eric Maskin and
András Simonovits (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2000), 1– 14, 4–5.
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The renewal of economic thinking in the East²³ was attentively followed by
the “modernizers,” who then faced “the experience of relegation,” in the words
of Brigitte Gaïti. The March 1952 appointment of Antoine Pinay as Prime Minister
and the end of the Marshall Plan aid in 1953 had led them to be politically margi-
nalized. Pierre Mendès France’s political return allowed them to remobilize, but
this was short-lived. Only by rallying to the support of General de Gaulle in 1958
did they manage to genuinely get back into the political and administrative
game; this was the golden age of the French Plan.²⁴ The idea of a “convergence
of systems” found a lasting echo in France during that political juncture. The call
to move beyond the “outdated stereotype” of an opposition between socialism
and capitalism became a leitmotiv in the discourse of these economists:
First, let’s give up on the all too common distinction between ‘centrally planned economy’
and ‘market economy’. The image suggested by that distinction might be convenient for the
sake of an argument, but it gives us a false view of reality. . . . It is trivial to note that the
variety of regimes that exist in the world match neither of those two images [that of a cen-
tral body determining an optimal program; that of the market]. Decision-making processes
are actually far more complex. They require the effects of decentralized actions and of de-
cisions taken at the highest national level to be combined everywhere.²⁵
Conceived in really different circumstances, for different, if not opposed, purposes, Soviet-
type planning and Western-type planning, very dissimilar in the beginning, are slowly
evolving toward a common model. . . . The most advanced socialist and capitalist countries
have reached a very similar, if not identical, stage of development. They are consciously
seeking the forms of economic management allowing to make the best use of resources,
which are not fundamentally different, and with methods which are, indeed, practically
the same. Is it surprising that they are gradually finding similar solutions?²⁶
Such a comparative approach to the Eastern and Western systems may appear
surprising. It was a departure first from the dominant discourse during the
Cold War, which held that communism and capitalism were radically at odds;
also, it clearly strayed from the idea of a “third way,” which had been influential
 Bernard Chavance, “La théorie de l’économie socialiste dans les pays de l’Est entre 1917 et
1989,” in Nouvelle histoire de la pensée économique, ed. Alain Béraud and Gilbert Faccarello
(Paris: La Découverte, 1993), vol. 2, chap. 19.
 Brigitte Gaïti, De Gaulle, prophète de la Cinquième République.
 Edmond Malinvaud, “Réflexions pour l’étude de la planification dans les sociétés occiden-
tales,” Presentation at the conference on long-term planning organized by the International Eco-
nomic Association (Moscow, December 1972). INSEE Papers, Centre des archives économiques et
financières (CAEF), France (B55.512).
 Jean Marczewski, “Planification et convergence des systèmes,” Revue de l’Est 2/4 (1971):
5– 19.
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to that generation of senior civil servants when they were young, in the 1930s.²⁷
In fact, even if it received the intellectual backing of French economists who
were specialists of Eastern countries, its diffusion elicited strong criticisms, com-
ing primarily from Marxist communist intellectuals, who faulted the convergence
thesis for neglecting the fundamental differences between the two systems when
it came to their “economic and social basis.”²⁸
The success of the convergence thesis among the “modernizers” is actually
owed to the fact that it could be used as a tool in the legitimation struggles in
which they were engaged, rekindled by the “uncertain configuration of the po-
litical game” opened with General de Gaulle’s return to power (1958). Against the
traditional powers of parliament and the political parties, these senior civil serv-
ants then sought to “diffuse a new representation of politics, in which technical
management skills countered political representation, economic efficiency coun-
tered legal regularity, planning countered law, and the executive countered the
legislative.”²⁹ In these political rivalries, the convergence thesis offered a theoret-
ical rationalization to the political interests supported by state economists. As it
defined the most advanced societies as “mixed economies,” it made planning a
key feature of the social and political modernization process and even a back-
bone of the “French grandeur” that was so dear to de Gaulle: France, thanks
to its original experience of planning, could play a prominent role in the field
of international economic expertise.³⁰ The idea of convergence thus gave the
“modernizers” a theoretical foundation for their alliance with Gaullism.
 Antonin Cohen, “Du corporatisme au keynésianisme. Continuités pratiques et ruptures sym-
boliques dans le sillage de François Perroux,” Revue française de science politique 56 (2006/4):
555–592.
 See, for example, the review written by the Marxist historian Jean Bouvier of Choix et effi-
cience des investissements (Paris: École Pratique des Hautes Études, 1963) in Annales. Histoire,
sciences sociales (January-February 1970, 144– 145). On the positions of economists in the French
Communist Party, see Nicolas Azam, Le PCF confronté à “l’Europe”. Une étude socio-historique
des prises de position et des recompositions partisanes (Paris : Dalloz, 2017).
 Delphine Dulong, Moderniser la politique. Aux origines de la Ve République (Paris: L’Harmat-
tan, 1997), 287.
 It was this specificity, which, for instance, justified the organization in France of the IEA (In-
ternational Economic Association) conference on public economics. In the introduction to the
conference proceedings, Julius Margolis (Professor at Stanford University) noted: “It was fitting
that the Conference on the Analysis of the Public Sector be held in France where there existed a
tradition of economic analysis for public works planning and a remarkable renaissance of anal-
ysis in many branches of the public services. The French experiences are being duplicated in
many nations of the world as increasing recognition has been given to the value of economic
concepts and models to guide the operations of government.” Introduction to Julius Margolis
and Henri Guitton, Public economics: an analysis of public production and consumption and
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Turning to the East
In the late 1950s, French planners and economists turned to the East, targeting
the socialist countries that seemed to have made the most progress in reforming
their planning systems and that were accordingly thought to be the most ad-
vanced in the “convergence” process. This worldview had thus a performative ef-
fect,³¹ effectively shaping a space of East-West circulations that remains to be
precisely mapped. Now eager to identify “common concerns” between “indica-
tive planning” and “mandatory planning,” the French economists seized every
opportunity they could to engage in a dialogue with the East. This international-
ization effort was primarily but not exclusively aimed at the Soviet Union. It in-
cluded other socialist countries such as Poland and Hungary, where structural
reforms had been attempted since the 1960s. However, these East-West networks
were defined not only by the opportunities for exchange created by the reforms
underway in socialist countries, but also by the degree to which political author-
ities in those states made opening up to the West possible and the ways in which
they allowed it to happen.
Soviet economic science and the West: a negotiated opening
The development of these networks of expertise was in no way an easy process.
Admittedly, the Thaw had marked a turn in East/West relations, starting with
France and the Soviet Union,³² but exchanges remained limited, including in
the field of social science, where tensions still ran high in the East between
the “defenders of the dogma” and “scholars concerned with studying ‘real’ soci-
ety.”³³
their relations to the private sectors. Proceedings of a conference (New York: MacMillan/St Mar-
tin’s Press, 1969), xi–xii, x. On this international conference, see Mathieu Hauchecorne,
“L’État des économistes au ‘miroir transatlantique.’ Circulations et hybridation de l’économie
publique française et états-unienne,” in Comparaisons franco-américaines, ed. Daniel Sabbagh
and Maud Simonet (Rennes: Presses Universitaires de Rennes, 2016).
 Pierre Bourdieu, “Décrire et prescrire. Les conditions de possibilité et les limites de l’effica-
cité politique (1980),” in Langage et pouvoir symbolique (Paris: Seuil, 2001), 186– 198.
 Marie-Pierre Rey, La Tentation du rapprochement. France et URSS à l’heure de la détente
(1964– 1974) (Paris: Publications de la Sorbonne, 1991).
 Martine Mespoulet, “La ‘renaissance’ de la sociologie en URSS (1958– 1972). Une voie étroite
entre matérialisme historique et ‘recherches sociologiques concrètes,’” Revue d’histoire des sci-
ences humaines 16 (2007): 57–86.
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This applied to economics in particular. In the Soviet Union, the discipline
was constructed as a detailed defense of socialism against capitalism (including
in the form of political economics, “politèkonómiâ”). It had managed to gain
more autonomy by turning to applied methods and mathematics.While debates
remained heated, at the time of Khrushchev’s reforms, a division of labor
emerged between theory, which was assigned to the Marxist-Leninist ideologues,
and practice (intersectoral and sectoral economies), which fell to the mathemat-
ical economists. This dividing line was sometimes challenged, in particular dur-
ing political crises, as in 1968, when the entire discipline was again subjected to
greater political control. Still, as Natalia Chmatko notes, “the adoption of that
structure gave free rein to the economists: in theory they no longer contested
the superior role of Marxism-Leninism and did not assert their autonomy from
that ideology; but on the other hand they claimed to take interest in special dis-
ciplines, inferior levels.”³⁴ Often originally trained in mathematics or engineer-
ing, the mathematical economists rarely took part in general theoretical debates,
which were monopolized by the Marxist-Leninist political economists. Mathe-
matical economics was reduced to applied mathematics, disconnected from the-
oretical generalizations. All references to the neoclassical school remained polit-
ically suspect, as Ivan Boldyrev and Olessia Kirtchik have shown.³⁵ The
mathematical economists were mostly found in the research institutes created
during the 1960s mainly by the Academy of Sciences and the Central Institute
of Mathematical Economics [CEMI : Central’nyj ėkonomiko-matematičeskij insti-
tut], as well as in the Siberian branch of the Academy,³⁶ the Institute of Econom-
ics and Industrial Engineering [Institut èkonomiki i organizacii promyšlennogo
proizvodstva] and the research centers affiliated with the Gosplan, such as the
Institute for Economic Research [Naučno-issledovatelʹskij èkonomičeskij insti-
tut].
 Natalia Chmatko, “Les usages des sciences économiques en Russie entre les années 1960 et
1990,” Histoire Économie et Société 4 (2002): 583–603, 586.
 See Ivan Boldyrev and Olessia Kirtchik, “The Culture of Mathematical Economics in the Post
War Soviet Union,” WP6 (Moscow: High School of Economics Publication, May 2015); “General
Equilibrium Theory behind the Iron Curtain: The Case of Victor Polterovich,” History of Political
Economy 46/3 (2014): 435–461. On the uses of cybernetics in Soviet economy, see Slava Gero-
vitch, From Newspeak to Cyberspeak. A History of Soviet Cybernetics (Cambridge,Mass./London:
MIT Press, 2002), chap. 6; Adam E. Leeds, “Dreams in Cybernetic Fugue: Cold War Technos-
cience, the Intelligentsia, and the Birth of Soviet Mathematical Economics,” Historical Studies
in the Natural Sciences 46, no. 5 (2016): 633–668.
 On the Siberian branch of the Soviet Academy of Science, see Paul R. Josephson, New Atlan-
tis Revisited. Akademgorodok, the Siberian City of Science (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
1997).
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Even though it was limited to specific applications, the international open-
ing up of Soviet economic science required constant negotiations to counter the
political and ideological reluctances it elicited, but also to circumvent the regime
of secrecy surrounding economic information. Much of the data on the Soviet
economy indeed remained classified, and research centers such as the Gosplan’s
Institute for Economic Research fell under a special scheme that strongly limited
opportunities for receiving foreign colleagues.
An argumentative strategy was however devised to justify the expansion of
such exchanges. It used the discourse on the “scientific and technical revolu-
tion” led in the post-Stalin period by the “reformist” Soviet elites, taking up
the idea of a “convergence of systems.”³⁷ In this sense, the reports drafted by
the mathematical economists following their first contacts with Western collea-
gues are a revealing read. Two arguments were systematically put forward: the
East/West dialogue could meet the objectives of Soviet authorities concerning
their political influence abroad and economic modernization. For instance, in
the 1971– 1972 memo of the CEMI research institute, the “great interest” of
these exchanges was emphasized, first in terms of “propaganda for Soviet ach-
ievements abroad” and also of the “practical application of foreign experience.”
In a number of cases, these contacts would allow the Soviet Union “not to waste
time and resources” in replicating the management and policy-making systems
discovered abroad that could “successfully be applied in our country.”³⁸
Building a network of state expertise
These closely monitored international exchanges began gaining momentum in
the late 1950s. Although France was not the only Western country to open a dia-
logue with Eastern economists, it probably acted as a driving force³⁹ due to the
Gaullist policy of opening up to the Soviet Union and the planning community’s
 Eglė Rindzevičiūtė, The Power of Systems, chap. 1. On the Soviet planners’ interest in the
Western (and especially French) experience of economic governance, see also Eglė Rindze-
vičiūtė, “A Struggle for the Soviet Future: The Birth of Scientific Forecasting in the Soviet
Union,” Slavic Review 75/1 (2016): 52–76.
 “Spravka ob èffektivnosti meždunarodnyh naučnyh sviazej CEMI AN SSSR za 1971– 1972 g.”
Central Mathematics and Economics Institute Papers, Russian Academy of Sciences Archives,
Moscow (F. 1959, Op. 1, D. 384, L. 2– 11).
 See, for instance, Vladímir Alekseevič Vinogradov’s memoirs: Moj XX vek. Vosponimaniia
(Moscow: Izdatelʹskij dom kalan, 2003), 132 on.
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keen interest in Eastern reform attempts based on mathematical economics and
computer science.
The mathematical economists were particularly sought after by the French
economists who exchanged with the East. Jean Marczewski, a French economist
of Polish origin, was for instance bitterly disappointed in the fifth international
economic history conference held in Leningrad in August 1970, where he moder-
ated a session on the history of planning: not only was the convergence thesis, of
which he was one of the leading French theoreticians, officially disputed by the
Soviets, but he was also unable to pursue the dialogue he had engaged a few
years before with Soviet economists/planners:
Defended by the author of this report, the thesis of the necessary convergence between So-
viet and Western management systems provoked clearly negative reactions from the Soviet
participants and also from some Romanian and East German colleagues. In contrast, it was
received favorably by most Westerners as well as by Yugoslavian, Hungarian and Polish col-
leagues.[…]
Conclusion:
Contrary to their compatriots directly involved in planning action – with whom I had had
long discussions during my three-month stay in the USSR, the Soviet economical historians
seem not to have yet understood the significance of the evolution of the Eastern and West-
ern economic systems under the pressure of technical progress.
This difference may result partly from the fact that Soviet historians have much less contact
with the contemporary reality than the economists involved in action.
It may also come from a certain doctrinal hardening of the regime, whose instructions in
the domain of intellectual relations with capitalist countries are currently stricter than in
1966, the year of my previous trip [to the USSR].⁴⁰
To clear these ideological and political hurdles, forms of exchange other than
large-scale international conferences were favored. These included workshops
and seminars with small numbers of participants, focused on applied economics
and avoiding ideological questions as much as possible, drawing on the support
of international organizations and academic institutions. On the French side, the
École pratique des Hautes études (EPHE) worked on developing regular institu-
tional exchanges with the Soviet Union and Eastern European countries in the
economic field, primarily through joint workshops. A director of studies at the
EPHE since 1948, Charles Bettelheim, whose ties with the Soviet Union dated
 Jean Marczewski, “Rapport sur les résultats de la mission à Leningrad, Paris, 27 octobre
1970”. CNRS Papers (National Center for scientific research)/French National Archives
(19860367/16).
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back to his years as a Communist activist (1933– 1937),⁴¹ played a key mediation
role in the 1950–1960s. During several trips to the East, he made multiple con-
tacts with Soviet Union economists – in the Central Institute for Mathematical
Economics (CEMI) with N. P. Fedorenko and V. S. Nemčinov, at the Gosplan’s In-
stitute for Economic Research with A. N. Efimov, and at the Institute for Global
Economics and International Relations (IMEMO) –, and more broadly with East-
ern European economists, particularly in Poland.⁴² In May 1960, for instance, he
coordinated a Franco-Polish workshop at the EPHE in Paris, on the theme
“Choice and efficiency of investments,” featuring French academic economists
and representatives of the Institute of Statistics-national planning board-Ministry
of Finance triangle (Claude Gruson, Edmond Malinvaud, Jean Bénard, Joseph
Klatzman, André Platier, Charles Prou).⁴³ The workshop offered not to revisit the-
oretical debates, but instead to adopt an “operational outlook” by focusing on
concrete problems: how should the volume and distribution of investments be
determined? How should the efficiency of investments be calculated? How
should the discount rate be set? etc. In doing so, French economists were
keen to highlight common ground between “indicative planning” and “manda-
tory planning” and overcome the reluctance that had been voiced on the subject.
After having presented the methods applied in France for the choice of pub-
lic investments, Edmond Malinvaud noted:
The above could suggest that the criteria adopted in France differ fundamentally from the
criteria recommended in Eastern countries. That is not my opinion. I have already indicated
that we deal with the problem in the same way that the economists working in the coun-
tries of mandatory planning. I will now try to show that in practice, in the simple situa-
tions, we arrive at formulas similar to some of those proposed by Polish and Russian au-
thors.⁴⁴
Charles Bettelheim stated also:
The presentations of Gruson and Fedorowicz are complementary. Since in both cases fun-
damental financial problems of indicative planning and mandatory planning appeared, we
 In 1936, he spent five months in Soviet Russia. On his life and career, see Fabien Denord and
Xavier Zunigo, “‘Révolutionnairement vôtre’. Économie marxiste, militantisme intellectuel et ex-
pertise politique chez Charles Bettelheim,” Actes de la recherche en sciences sociales 158 (June
2005): 8–29.
 See the manuscript of his memoirs filed in his archives: Charles Bettleheim Papers, EHESS
Archives (École des Hautes études en sciences sociales).
 Charles Bettelheim, Choix et efficience des investissements (Paris: Mouton & Co, 1963). The
Polish delegation included H. Dunajewski, Z. Fedorovicz, K. Laski, B. Minc and K. Romaniuk.
 Ibidem, 78.
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could point to the common and the specific data and questions for both planning sys-
tems.⁴⁵
Another favored means of establishing dialogue between Eastern and Western
experts consisted in organizing fact-finding missions. In 1958, a delegation of
French economists, led by the Commissioner General of the national planning
board Étienne Hirsch, went to the Soviet Union for a nearly three-week-long mis-
sion (11–30 May 1958). Put together with the assistance of the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, the team included planning administrators (François Bloch-Lainé,
Claude Gruson, Simon Nora, Jean Sérisé, Jean Bénard), and academic econo-
mists who worked in relation with the political and administrative field (Jean
Marchal, Jean-Marcel Jeanneney, Robert Goetz-Girey, Raymond Barre et Basile
Kerblay). Its objective was to initiate in-depth talks on Soviet planning – not
so much its results as its methods, institutions and mechanisms.
A report over 100 pages long was drafted after the mission.⁴⁶ Diplomatic pre-
cautions were obviously taken in the report’s wording, since it was circulated to
the Soviets, and it adopted a rather measured tone. It presented the successes
and failures of Soviet planning, the challenges it encountered and the solutions
envisioned. Mostly it showed how seriously the French delegation took these ex-
changes. An in-depth questionnaire had been developed and submitted to the
Soviets before the mission. It included very specific questions on planning tech-
niques – on the “logic” of planning (the consistency and balance of the objec-
tives, the choice of objectives and optimums), economic calculation issues (rela-
tions between the plans, price-setting, evaluation of the investments,
consumption studies, etc.) as well as the methods used to implement and mon-
itor planning.Work sessions were organized to disseminate concrete information
on Soviet planning at various levels: the Gosplan, the research institutes of the
Academy of Sciences, the Republics,⁴⁷ the factories and the kolkhozes.
The impressions of the French delegation were probably rather lukewarm. In
an interview, Jean Sérisé reported observing numerous discrepancies between
the Soviet reality and the logic of the planning in the course of his mission: fac-
tory work stopped between noon and 2pm, the black market was expanding, ac-
cess to consumer goods was difficult, etc. His account mostly conveys disillu-
sion:
 Ibidem, 121.
 The report was written mostly by Jean Bénard, the youngest member of the delegation, but it
was reviewed collectively. Interview with Jean Serisé, 28 November 2012.
 The French delegation was divided in three groups for tours in Leningrad, Kiev and Tbilisi.
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That vision of planning was rather different from the one we had at the start. That is, it was
much more pragmatic; and essentially, they did not proceed the way we thought they pro-
ceeded. . . . My colleagues were quite sad. They sympathized. But finally, there was a little
something that was beginning. (Interview with Jean Serisé, 28 November 2012)
Although this first-hand experience of the Soviet reality was a disappointment
for some, the report’s conclusions remained inconclusive:
A problem remains.We can glimpse paths toward a solution.We can be assured that Soviet
economists are actually committed to exploring these paths with very powerful resources
and a great deal of flexibility and inventiveness. But obviously, we have no right to predict
the results of a research that is still in the realm of creative imagination. . . . All we can say
is that if the Soviet planners follow through on their current research – even they manage to
put the huge core production apparatus developed during the Stalinian period to work for a
continuous and free improvement of living standards as well as the achievement of great
collective objectives – the achievements of the Soviet economy will far exceed the remark-
able ones we can already observe today.⁴⁸
Lastly, in the 1960s, these exchanges of experts were boosted by De Gaulle’s in-
ternational policy of rapprochement with the East. They were institutionalized
with the intergovernmental agreement on technical and scientific cooperation
signed by France and the Soviet Union in 1966. The nuclear and spatial sectors
were pilot areas in that cooperation, but it concerned numerous scientific fields,
and included exchanges on planning and forecasting methods.
A “working group on economic information” was created in June 1967 within
that framework.⁴⁹ On the French side, it mainly involved the Institute of Statis-
tics-national planning board-Ministry of Finance triangle. On the Soviet side, it
included participants from the Gosplan and its research institutes,⁵⁰ the central
directorate for statistics,⁵¹ as well as research institutes of the Academy of Scien-
 Report on May 1958 mission to the USSR. Direction du Trésor Papers, CAEF (B 594). See also
the paper that Basile Kerblay published after this mission: “Entretiens sur la planification avec
des économistes soviétiques,” Cahiers du monde russe et soviétique 1/1 (1959): 174– 179.
 Groupe de travail mixte franco-soviétique sur l’information économique réciproque, “PV de
la première session, Moscou, 20–23 juin 1967”. Direction générale de la Recherche scientifique
et technique Papers/French National Archives (19770321/411).
 Especially the Council for Study of Productive Forces (Sovet po izučeniju prouzvoditel‘nyh
sil) and the Institute for economic research (Haučho-issledovatel‘ckij ėkonomičeckij institut).
 On the history of the Soviet Institute for Statistics in the Stalinist period, see Alain Blum and
Martine Mespoulet, L’Anarchie bureaucratique. Statistique et pouvoir sous Staline (Paris: La Dé-
couverte, 2003).
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ces.⁵² Bringing together “high-level executives in planning and in economic and
technical bodies,” it was aimed at initiating a dialogue “in the fields of mathe-
matics and of the information processing methods used for economic research,
planning and management.” Five themes were initially selected: the use of math-
ematical economics and computer science in corporate management; the prep-
aration of the state’s economic decisions; the issues relating to the processing
of useful information for corporations and the state; the issues relating to the
training of executives; the application of computer science to planning and man-
agement issues. In the 1970s, these themes were included in the “computer sci-
ence” section of the cooperation. The signature of the intergovernmental scien-
tific cooperation agreement enabled the intensification and diversification of
forms of exchanges (seminars and workshops; exchanges of documents; long-
term missions or internships) between French and Soviet planners, economists
and statisticians.
Transnational circulations and planning reforms
Beginning in the late 1950s, a network of experts on economics and state was
formed between France and Eastern countries, based on the participants’ shared
belief that they were working on “similar problems” and could identify “com-
mon solutions.” In an interview, the French economist Jean-Michel Charpin
stressed this sense of belonging to the same professional community:
In the 1970s, well, during much of the 1970s, we considered them [Eastern economists] as
colleagues. We considered them as colleagues, who were working in a very different coun-
try, of course, in an authoritarian regime, really different lifestyles . . . . However, funda-
mentally, we considered them as colleagues, who used methods of quantitative economics,
at the service of their government. Besides, they were not so bad. Generally they had good
training in mathematics. (Interview with Jean-Michel Charpin, 5 September 2016)
Should this be seen as a genuine circulation of ideas between East and West?
What were the effects of these exchanges on planning practices in the East
and in the West? These questions pave new avenues of research – I will only pro-
vide a few pointers for further research here, as taking comprehensive stock of
the crisscrossing uses of these relationships remains to be done.
 In particular, the Central Mathematics and Economics Institute (CEMI) and the Institute of
economics and industrial engineering (Siberian branch of Soviet Academy of Sciences).
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“Common solutions” to “similar problems”
One particular example is worth looking at – the discussions initiated with So-
viet and Hungarian economists around the French macro-economic modeling ex-
periment prepared for the Sixth Plan. Contacts had been made for that project
within the framework of the Matheco program launched by the United Nations
Economic Commission for Europe⁵³ with the assistance of the United Nations De-
velopment Programme. The project aimed at promoting cooperation on the ap-
plication of computer science and mathematical methods in economics. A first
cycle of study was held in Varna (Bulgaria) in September-October 1970 on the
use of macroeconomic planning models. It brought together planners and econ-
omists from France (Seibel, Courbis), Norway (Spurkland, Sevaldson), the Neth-
erlands (Van de Pas), as well as Hungary (Kornai, Norva & Bager), Bulgaria (Ni-
kiforov), Czechoslovakia (Cerny) and the Soviet Union (Isaiev).
The Hungarian presentations particularly caught the French participants’ at-
tention; the decision was made to further pursue these talks in the form of Fran-
co-Hungarian meetings held alternatively in Paris and Budapest in the early
1970s (a French delegation was in Hungary on 25–29 October 1971;⁵⁴ a Hungarian
delegation was in Paris in June 1972; etc.):
While friendly relationships have existed for many years between Hungarian and French
planners, the starting point of the mission lies more precisely in the contacts that were es-
tablished between the French and Hungarian delegations at the international seminar in
Varna (October 1970) and results from the interest that the representatives of each of the
two countries manifested for the economic research carried out in the other country. The
current mission aimed to allow each partner to be informed of the most recent develop-
ments in each other’s research (research, which in the Hungarian case seems promising
and very instructive for French planning), and, on the basis of the experience gained in
each country, to have an exchange of views on common problems.⁵⁵
Regarding the French expectations of these exchanges with Hungarian planners,
the initial goal was to find “lessons to draw” from the Hungarian experience,
and more precisely to study how Hungarian techniques could be used to over-
 On the role of the Economic Commission for Europe, see the contribution of Daniel Stinsky
in this volume.
 The French delegation included: Claude Seibel, Henri Guillaume, Bernard Ullmo (INSEE);
Pierre Malgrange (CEPREMAP); Jean-Pierre Pagé and Alain Bernard (Division des études et syn-
thèses quantitatives, Commissariat au Plan).
 Report of Commissariat au Plan, INSEE (Institute for Statistics), CEPREMAP (Center for the
Economical Research and its Applications), “Mission in Hungary,” 25–29 October 1971. Commis-
sariat au Plan Papers/ French National Archives (1992 0270/1).
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come difficulties encountered in models for planning, especially the FIFI (Phys-
ico-Financial) model devised by the directorate for programs at the French na-
tional institute of statistics (INSEE).⁵⁶ FIFI was introduced as a model for “sim-
ulating” economic policy. It proposed a description of “‘spontaneous’
economic developments” and possible variants based on the objectives “consid-
ered desirable.” It was referred to as “physico-financial” because one of the tech-
nical innovations it attempted to introduce consisted in taking into account the
interdependence between physical variables and value variables (based on the
treatment of firms, prices and wages), an approach it shared with the Hungarian
forecasting model:
For our part, we were particularly interested in the way in which a very detailed and fully
formalized model, such as the “mathematical model of the IVth Hungarian plan”, could be
inserted in the real planning process and also in the possibilities of using “dual price sys-
tem” (or a system of implicit valuations) as reference indicators for sectoral studies. The at-
tempts made in France in this domain revealed a number of difficulties that related to the
double nature (financial and physical) of the FIFI model, a characteristic that we also find
in the Hungarian model.⁵⁷
The French had proposed three themes for discussion: establishing a function
for state preference; the relations between micro- and macro-economics; the
search for sector-specific optimization criteria.⁵⁸ It appears, however, that French
planners mostly focused on the then crucial question of the integration of the
international dimension and the development of an “international specialization
model.” By the late 1960s, the growing internationalization of the economy re-
quired coming up with forecasting models (such as FIFI) that distinguished be-
tween production sectors subject to international competition, “exposed sec-
tors,” and so-called “sheltered sectors.” The Hungarian innovations were
perceived as a potential source of inspiration in that respect, even though that
appropriation required adjustments to be relevant to a “liberal economy”:
We need to examine how relations describing production costs . . . can be adapted to the
accounting practices of French sectors and if necessary, to include on a sector-by-sector
basis in the international specialization model relations of that nature (possibly by adding
a supplementary constraint for the industry as a whole, which could be extracted from FIFI
 Michel Aglietta and Raymond Courbis, “Un outil pour le Plan: le modèle FIFI,” Économie et
statistique 1/1 (1969): 45–65.
 Commissariat au Plan, INSEE, CEPREMAP, “Mission en Hongrie, 25–29 octobre 1971”. Com-
missariat au Plan Papers/French National Archives (1992 0270/1).
 Letter from Claude Seibel to T. Norva, 27 May 1971. CAEF (H 1931).
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results and would translate in indirect form the hypothesis of an economy affected by com-
petition).⁵⁹
However, another form of circulation quickly developed, consisting in the trans-
fer of the FIFI model to the East. As the minutes of the Franco-Hungarian meet-
ing held in Paris in May-June 1972 report:
It was suggested that one country might use a model built in the other country; in this case
the [French] model FIFI would be tested for the Hungarian economy. The [French] Institute
for Statistics would transfer the computer program and provide technical assistance for the
transcription, either by sending someone to Budapest or by receiving a Hungarian intern in
Paris.⁶⁰
The FIFI model was of interest to Hungarian planners in that it allowed them to
conceive the volume-price relation in various production sectors. The underlying
planning rationales in the French and Hungarian models were different, but in
this respect complementary, as Claude Seibel explains:
The Gosplan was ultimately a regulator in the Marxist sense. That is also why they took an
interest in our business: in fact, we were trying to monitor movements in prices, whereas
they had instructions in terms of quantity and quality, but not at all in terms of prices.
So for Kornai and the Gosplan guys . . ., having a volume-price balance was a guide: prices
were administered, so making a forecast, a projection on prices that would be closer to the
company’s economic reality was what interested them, because it was a sectoral model.
There were only eight sectors, which wasn’t a lot, but it allowed them to think: ‘We’ve
got planning on volume; but if we set too low a price, we’re going to run into big problems
in a number of companies’. That’s what they were interested in: the volume-price verifica-
tion. ⁶¹
Mutual legitimizations of state expertise
Similar exchanges were developed with Soviet economists, who also took an in-
terest in the macro-economic models built in France. Several Franco-Soviet meet-
ings were held in the early 1970s within the framework of a cooperation agree-
ment on “the problem of the elaboration and practical utilization of
 “Rapport sur la rencontre des planificateurs hongrois et français,” 7 December 1971. CAEF (H
1931).
 Commissariat au Plan, Service économique, “Conclusion de la visite de la délégation hon-
groise,” 20 June 1972. CAEF (H 1931).
 Interview with Claude Seibel, 13 April 2016.
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macroeconomic models in planning”. On the Soviet side, they involved econo-
mists from the Central Institute of Mathematical Economics (CEMI), who were
then engaged in efforts to optimize and decentralize the Plan. The cooperation
in France on that issue was considered “very effective,” especially given that
this country was “visibly the only one of the capitalist countries where this re-
search [on the elaboration and practical utilization of interbranch and macroeco-
nomic models in planning and forecasting] is a state endeavor.” The report draft-
ed following the French mission (6–27 January 1971) of CEMI deputy director
Stanislav S. Šatalin and his aides states that the methods, models and proce-
dures used in France can be “applied with great usefulness in the research con-
ducted in our country.”⁶²
This recourse to foreign experience may have been legitimized by the Soviet
discourse of the time on the “scientific and technical revolution” and the idea of
a “convergence of systems” but was challenged by the “conservative” factions of
Soviet economic science.⁶³ In 1973– 1974, for instance, mathematical economists
were the targets of harsh attacks, being accused of using “the formulas of bour-
geois economists,” particularly regarding the then central question of price-set-
ting, an underlying issue in the appropriation of the French model FIFI for the
purposes of Socialist planning.
These attacks had an impact on the uses of Western experience by Soviet
mathematical economists. Their reforming efforts, aimed at decentralizing eco-
nomic management and giving firms increased autonomy, met with much resist-
ance at the time, not only among the ideologue economists who defended the
Marxist dogma, but also among the bureaucrats whose role in the “top-down”
control of the economy was challenged in the process. The mathematical econ-
omists had a narrow path for reform, as all references to “market socialism” had
become politically suspect after the repression of the Prague Spring in 1968. The
dialogue with the French was subject to limitations. It continued, but was refo-
cused on economic quantification tools (modeling, operational research,⁶⁴ etc.).
It happened for the most part within the framework of the “computer science”
cooperation sector and primarily involved the research institutes of the Academy
of Sciences on the Soviet side, beginning with the Central Institute of Mathemat-
 Report on the scientific mission in France (6–27 January 1971). Central Mathematics and
Economics Institute Papers, Russian Academy of Sciences Archives, Moscow (F. 1959, Op. 1, D.
333).
 On the debates in Soviet economics in 1950s-1970s, see Sergei Alymov, “‘This is profitable for
all’: Agrarian Economists and the Soviet Plan-Market Debate in the post-Stalinist period,” Jahr-
bücher fur Geschichte Osteuropa 65/3 (2017): 445–474.
 Eglė Rindzevičiūtė, The Power of Systems.
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ical Economics (CEMI), which had been appointed as the Soviet organization of
reference for these collaborations in 1967. Under the umbrella theme “Automa-
tization of information processing and application of mathematical and comput-
er science methods in research on economics, planning and management,” the
exchanges of the Soviet economists with the French were structured in the 1970s
and 1980s around two main clusters: “scientific methods for corporate manage-
ment” and “the use of mathematical methods in macroeconomics.” Like other
East-West exchange networks, this cooperation became a means to acquire West-
ern computer science technology and circumvent the embargo imposed by the
CoCom (Coordinating Committe for Multilateral Export Controls).⁶⁵
The refocusing of the exchanges on quantification and computer science is-
sues was arguably a means to leave a space for dialogue open in the West in the
context of the ideological and political tightening of the Brezhnev years, once the
debates on future structural reforms had been closed.⁶⁶ Drawing on a long tra-
dition of state engineering, the French tradition remained of interest to Soviet
economists. However, only during the so-called “transition” years were some
Russian economists able to cite “indicative” French planning as a model and
a source of inspiration for pursuing a moderate, progressive reform agenda.⁶⁷
The Franco-Soviet dialogue, which since the late 1950s had revolved around a
reflection on combining planning and market mechanisms, took on a new rele-
vance then, even though the networks that had also for several decades brought
together US and Eastern economists enabled a quick and enthusiastic embrace
of neoliberal economic policies.⁶⁸
Indeed, by the 1960s, Eastern socialist countries had become testing grounds
for French planners, allowing them to validate and perfect the models they were
elaborating, such as the strategy devised by Wassily Leontief, a US economist
with Russian roots, to promote his input-output model.⁶⁹ In doing so French
planners were legitimizing their economic expertise and more broadly their
role at a time when they were being increasingly marginalized in the French
state apparatus. As Claude Seibel noted in an interview on the subject of the dif-
fusion of French macroeconomic models in the East, the point of these exchang-
es was “to validate our work from a scientific standpoint: it was a form of vali-
dation.”⁷⁰
 See the contribution by Sandrine Kott in this volume.
 Gil Eyal and Johanna Bockman, “Eastern Europe as a Laboratory.”
 Interview with Dmitrij B. Kuvalin, 20 February 2017.
 Gil Eyal and Johanna Bockman, “Eastern Europe as a Laboratory.”
 Ibid.
 Interview with Claude Seibel, 13 April 2016.
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Introduced after World War Two, the “sociopolitical consensus” across the
aisle on the need for an “administered mode of regulation” using a planning
board started to fall apart by the mid 1960s. Reports of a “disenchantment” or
“disaffection” with the Plan became routine. French planning then faced a dou-
ble challenge.⁷¹ First, within the political field, mounting criticism against the
culture of economic regulation came from both right and left.⁷² Then, within
the political and administrative apparatus, after an income policy was aban-
doned in 1965, the Plan was increasingly conceived as a management tool and
no longer as a political project.⁷³ Additionally, the importation in France of
PPBS (Program, Planning, Budgeting System), a US technology for rationalizing
public policy, resulted in a loss of power for the planners, as the Ministry of Fi-
nance took this opportunity to reassert its control over the planning board.⁷⁴
These criticisms intensified in the 1970s, as the oil crisis called into question
the balance between short-term and long-term approaches, and led to a growing
gap between a management logic (focused on managing economic crises as they
arise) and a planning logic (focused on long-term control).
In response to these intensifying challenges, state economists developed an
intense reflection on the planning board, its methods, models and political role
for the advent of an “economic democracy,” documented in multiple books, ar-
ticles and leaflets on the subject. Following the reform momentum in the East
was a response to expectations in terms both of technical upgrading and polit-
ical legitimization. Each sign of disinterest manifested by Soviet economists to-
ward these exchanges was therefore bitterly disappointing, despite the asymme-
tries that characterized them. In 1973, for instance, the French delegation’s report
following the Moscow meeting of the French-Soviet group on economic informa-
tion read:
According to the French participants present at previous meetings, and in particular the
President of the delegation, a number of small facts suggest that [the French-Soviet eco-
nomic information group] would be losing its value in the eyes of GOSPLAN. A slight bitter-
 Henry Rousso, La Planification en crises (Paris: Éditions CNRS, 1987).
 Michel Margairaz and Danielle Tartakowsky (ed.), Mai 68 entre libération et libéralisation.
 On this transformation, see Thomas Angeletti, “Faire la réalité ou s’y défaire. La modélisa-
tion et les déplacements de la politique économique au tournant des années 1970,” Politix 95
(2011/3): 47–72.
 Vincent Spenlehauer, “Intelligence gouvernementale et sciences sociales,” Politix 48 (1999):
95– 128. See also: Aude Terray, Des Francs-tireurs aux experts, 466 on; Philippe Bézès, Réinventer
l’État. Les réformes de l’administration française (1962–2008) (Paris: Presses universitaires de
France, 2009).
94 Isabelle Gouarné
ness appeared in the concluding remarks made by President Huet during the signature of
the memorandum.⁷⁵
Conclusion
This research on the relations between French planners and economists with
their Eastern counterparts offers some insights into the broader and as of yet
still very much incomplete study of East-West economic science networks during
the Cold War. It shows at least that alliances were set up during the 1960s in Eu-
rope to redefine the role of economic expertise in the state apparatus.
This dialogue served different national strategies. For the French state econ-
omists, the chief objective was to reformulate and legitimize the role of the coun-
try’s planning board and to validate its methods, as the postwar consensus on
the need for a regulated form of economic management was breaking down.
For the Eastern economists, the goal was to propose a new expertise based on
a “neutral” economic science and acquire some degrees of autonomy from the
political and ideological communist authorities. For some time, an alignment
of interests was possible. Faced with the rise of neoliberal discourse,⁷⁶ these
East-West networks conveyed another definition of economic science, open to so-
cial science, in favor of combining planning and the market, and attentive to
mechanisms of decentralization and democratization of economic power.
The intensity of this dialogue has been largely forgotten today. The history of
French economic science largely reflects the scope of the exchanges with the
United States, but entirely neglects those with the East. This relates to what
can be described as the “failed” internationalization of French economic sci-
ence, which did not succeed in asserting its state expertise on the long term de-
spite having forged ties with the East at a very early stage. While the East was
becoming a field for experimenting and a key stake in struggles over the defini-
tion of economic science, the economists who opposed any form of state inter-
ventionism were the ones who managed to rally East European and Soviet econ-
 INSEE, Service des programmes, “Compte rendu de la IXe Session du Groupe de travail mixte
franco-soviétique (Moscou, 21–29 mai 1973),” 7 June 1973. INSEE Papers, CAEF (B 57 701).
 See such recent works on the history of neoliberalism as: Serge Audier, Néo-libéralisme(s).
Une archéologie intellectuelle (Paris: Grasset, 2012); Philip Mirovski and Dieter Plehwe, The
Road From Mont-Pèlerin. The Making of the Neoliberal Thought Collective (Cambridge, Mass.: Har-
vard University Press, 2009); François Denord, Néo-libéralisme version française. Histoire d’une
idéologie politique (Paris: Demopolis, 2007).
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omists to their cause and impose an authoritarian interpretation of neoclassical
economics.⁷⁷
Translated from the original French by Jean-Yves Bart
 Gil Eyal and Johanna Bockman, “Eastern Europe as a Laboratory.”
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Katja Naumann
International Research Planning across the
Iron Curtain: East-Central European Social
Scientists in the ISSC and Vienna Centre¹
The production of applicable social knowledge by a professionalized body of re-
searchers developed in tandem with the idea of planning research itself. Interna-
tional research coordination became a field of action and policy because its de-
velopment coincided with the emergence of multiple international organisations
at the end of the nineteenth century. Planning is, therefore, not only an outcome
of social science research but also its prerequisite.² It is the planning of social
science research, much more than research for the sake of social planning,
that I will unpack.
This chapter addresses cross-border cooperation in the social sciences, fo-
cusing on two organizations set up by the United Nations Educational, Scientific,
and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO): the International Social Science Council
(ISSC) – which was a coordinating body for international disciplinary organisa-
tions, such as the International Sociological Association – and the European Co-
ordination Centre for Research and Documentation in Social Sciences (Vienna
Centre) – which was created as one (of many) regional centers whose aim was
to coordinate collaborative work of research institutes, in this case from both
sides of Cold War-divided Europe, and to develop what has been called compa-
rative social science studies.
The two organizations were spaces of encounter, of cooperation and compe-
tition across the Iron Curtain, and they were spaces in which East-Central Euro-
peans proactively participated – contrary to the popular belief that Soviet (USSR)
domination of the overall geopolitical constellation left hardly any room for self-
 I want to thank Geert Castryck for his comments on earlier versions of this article.
 In recent years, the history of social scientific knowledge (and its application for social plan-
ning) has gained momentum, see for example: Peter Wagner, “Social Science and Social Plan-
ning during the Twentieth Century” in Cambridge History of Science: The Modern Social Sciences,
vol. 7, ed. Theodore M. Porter and Dorothy Ross (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003),
591–607; Kerstin Brückweh, Dirk Schumann, Richard F. Wetzell, and Benjamin Ziemann, Engi-
neering Society (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2012), Christiane Reinecke, Thomas Mergel, Das Soziale
ordnen: Sozialwissenschaften und gesellschaftliche Ungleichheit im 20. Jahrhundert (Frankfurt
am Main: Campus, 2012).
https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110534696-006
directed action, effectively generating a self-contained Eastern bloc.³ Scholars
from that region could enter the ISSC as individuals by invitation, or via their
countries’ official membership. This “double ticket” strengthened their position,
and Polish scholars, in particular, made use of this opportunity. As a result,
membership in the ISSC and its executive committee (EC) broadened from
1954 onwards,⁴ and this led to innovations in the agenda. In a similar vein,
scholars from the Eastern part of Europe proactively engaged in the Vienna Cen-
tre, by suggesting and co-directing large research projects with collaborators
from all over the continent. The fact that they made intensive use of these insti-
tutionally provided spaces of participation are signs and evidence that the two
institutions were not completely captured by the Cold War constellation.⁵
Therefore, histories of these two institutions demonstrate (once again) that
international organizations during the Cold War were much more than instru-
ments for and under complete control of the two superpowers; they were used
as platforms to connect and exchange, and became spaces where it was possible
to move beyond nominal participation and marginality, resulting from the dy-
namics of the confrontation between the two superpowers. Scholars from
 Drawing inspiration from Global Cold War Studies and new research on international organ-
isations, the idea of an isolated and sealed off Eastern bloc has been disproved, and entangle-
ments across the East-West divide have been shown: Tobias Rupprecht, “Die sowjetische Gesell-
schaft in der Welt des Kalten Krieges: Neue Forschungsperspektiven auf eine vermeintlich
hermetisch abgeschottete Gesellschaft,” Jahrbücher für die Geschichte Osteuropas 3 (2010):
381–99. Michel Christian, Sandrine Kott and Ondřej Matějka, “International Organisation in
the Cold War: The Circulation of Experts beyond the East-West Divide,” Acta Universitatis Caro-
linae Studia Territorialia 17 (2017): 35–60; György Péteri, “Sites of Convergence: The USSR and
Communist Eastern Europe at International Fairs Abroad and Home,” Journal of Contemporary
History 47 (2012): 3– 12; in this volume the article by Stinsky.
 In 1954, after Stalin’s death, the Soviet Union (USSR) joined UNESCO. That same year, Poland,
Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Yugoslavia resumed their membership (they had been founding
members but ceased their relations with the organization in 1952).
 A Cold War orientation also resonated in studies of Eastern European sciences, which are
treated separately, creating the impression of scientific and scholarly isolation. The bipolar
structure of the geopolitical and ideological confrontation shaped the view, and consequently
scientific organisations, networks, and individuals that may have interacted, connected, and
communicated across the Iron Curtain have been “under-explored.” This is changing, and unlike
earlier works that considered mainly platforms of unofficial exchange, newer works show pro-
fessional societies and other scholarly institutions as sites of encounter and negotiation between
increasingly diverse group members, see: Maxine Berg, “East-West Dialogues: Economic Histor-
ians, the Cold War, and Détente,” Journal of Modern History 87 (2015): 36–71, Thibaud Boncourt,
A History of the International Political Science Association (Quebec: Association internationale de
science politique 2009); Johanna Bockman, Markets in the Name of Socialism: The Left Wing Ori-
gins of Neoliberalism (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2011), 50–75.
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throughout East-Central Europe engaged in these institutions with their own aca-
demic and political agendas, and helped the harboring and advancement of in-
tentions that extended beyond the rationale of the belligerent hegemonic pow-
ers. The Vienna Centre’s raison d’être, for example, was to bridge the East-
West divide, and in the way it was used even thwarted the bipolar logic.
Among the reasons that enabled East-Central European experts to partici-
pate in their own right is a long tradition of transnationally connected social sci-
ence research and the institutional opportunities offered by international organ-
izations in the field, after the end of World War Two (WWII). Substantively, the
professional exchange despite (much more than across) the East-West divide in-
troduced innovations in the design and conduct of comparative social science
research, and it consequently contributed to the transcendence of the bloc-di-
vide.
To substantiate this argument, this chapter will sketch two dimensions of the
development of the ISSC and Vienna Centre respectively: First, the institutional
possibilities and structural framing of the participation of East-Central European
actors will be explored, by describing the politics of membership and internal
modes of operation. Second, based on biographical and other evidence of indi-
vidual experiences and interests – which included engaging as experts and
being on equal footing with their colleagues from other parts of Europe – I
will highlight the scope and direction of East-Central European scholars’ involve-
ment in the research planning of these institutions.⁶
Addressing infrastructure and research, planning means several things in
this context: It involved setting up an institutional platform to increase contact
and exchanges between scholars from countries all over Europe; coordinating
the joint work of different research institutions, which includes developing
guidelines for collective work (i.e. regulations for the composition of teams,
workflows, or joint meetings); organizing funding from governments and foun-
dations; building infrastructure for large-scale social science research, such as
databases, and supporting the development of common research designs,
which involves provisions to secure the comparability of the collected data
and the possibility for coherent interpretations of the results. At the heart of
 This chapter is based on published materials (progress reports, evaluations, etc.), and it is
supplemented by literature on key actors. These sources do not allow for an in-depth evaluation
of the connections between the internal politics of these bodies and the course of the program-
matic work. They also do not display the direction of the actual research undertaken, for exam-
ple the decision to opt for certain types of methods, and they are rather silent about conflicts
and confrontations. They are, however, a valuable source for reconstructing the institutionally
provided spaces for participation and demonstrating that Eastern European scholars filled them.
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the endeavor was the advancement of social science methods towards a compa-
rative social science studies methodology, which could explain the differences in
the ideologies and socio-economic systems in Europe (and beyond); in addition,
its ultimate goal was to establish a general theory of development.⁷ However, in-
itially and for quite some time thereafter, the idea and concept of international
comparative research remained vague, and its planning headed in different di-
rections.
The last section of this chapter will briefly address the place of Cold War en-
tanglements between Eastern and Western social scientists, in the longer history
of transnational scientific relations.WWII and the onset of the Cold War are still
understood as introducing a marked rupture in continuities and legacies from
the pre-war era. However, the postwar activities of East-Central European schol-
ars, who participated in the ISSC and the Vienna Centre, clearly relied on con-
tacts, networks, and experiences that originated in the 1920s and 1930s. The rap-
idly developing cooperation across Europe, also globally, in social science
research planning since the mid twentieth century is, in my view, closely con-
nected to entangled European scientific relations of the previous period.
Through this essay, it should become clear that the international production
of social knowledge from the 1960s through the 1980s had a strong Polish and
East-Central European imprint, and that this imprint resulted as much from
new institutional settings emerging after the onset of the Cold War as from intel-
lectual traditions and networks from the pre-war period. Both dimensions under-
cut the idea that the East-West divide was the prime and all-encompassing logic
of the time. Recognising this may help to contextualize the period of the Cold
War confrontation between the United States (US) and the USSR in longer trajec-
tories, and to understand the Cold War not as a bipolar confrontation but as a
plural and layered constellation.
 See, among other things, the report on the inspection of the Vienna Centre by UNESCO in 1971:
Lucio Garcia del Solar, European Coordination Centre for Research and Documentation in the
Social Sciences, JIU/HBP/71/13, GE.72– 1890; see also the Statutes of the Centre, and: Pierre Feld-
heim, introduction to International Cooperation in the Social Sciences. 25 Years of Vienna Expe-
rience, ed. František Charvát,Willem Stamation, Christiane Villain-Gandossi (Vienna: European
Co-ordination Centre for Research and Documentation in Social Sciences, 1988), 9– 16.
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The ISSC: Spaces of participation and Polish
organizational power
During the Cold War, international research planning increased; older institu-
tions were reorganized and new ones were founded, such as the World Federa-
tion of Scientific Workers. Research coordination expanded, too, especially
through UNESCO and its institution-building. A double structure emerged, con-
sisting of self-organized scholarly bodies, based on individual membership, and
bodies that represented national research institutions (often government spon-
sored), in which relations were at times close and at other times strained.
By incorporating “Science” into UNESCO’s name, the founders sought to
promote their understanding of an open society, in a time of sharpening ideolog-
ical competition over the best form of social organization.⁸ The competing uni-
versalisms of the two blocs, for which international organizations were prime
sites of cooperation and competition,⁹ were a driving factor behind scientific in-
ternationalism from the 1950s to the 1980s; decolonization processes and the re-
sulting demands for representation by newly independent nations were another.
Therefore, UNESCO’s written agenda specified the planning of social science re-
search, which would become an ongoing issue of negotiation and contestation
by policymakers and scholars from Europe, the US, and, later, other world re-
gions.
The division of social sciences (DSS) was one of eight divisions of UNESCO’s
secretariat. Admittedly, the social science program had always been one of the
smallest in the organization.¹⁰ However, until at least the early 1970s, the DSS
was effective, especially in terms of building a network of institutions that
would broaden, anchor, and shape international social science research plan-
ning. It initiated disciplinary international organizations for economics, sociolo-
gy, and political science in which respective national associations would collab-
orate. It helped establish permanent regional coordination centres: The first was
the Vienna Centre (in 1963); later followed by CODESRIA (Council for the Devel-
opment of Economic and Social Research in Africa), UNAPDI (UN Asian and Pa-
 Aant Elzinga, “Unesco and the Politics of International Cooperation in the Realm of Science,”
in Les Sciences Coloniales: Figures et Institutions, ed. Patrick Petitjean (Paris: Orstom, 1996), 163–
202.
 Sandrine Kott, “Cold War Internationalism,” in Internationalisms: A Twentieth-Century History,
ed. Glenda Sluga and Patricia Clavin (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016), 340–362.
 Peter Lengyel, International Social Science: The UNESCO Experience (New Brunswick: Trans-
action Books, 1986), 2.
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cific Development Institute), CLACSO (Consejo Latinoamericano de Ciencias So-
ciales), and FASRC (Federation of Arab Scientific Research Councils).
The secretariat also established two bodies: the International Committee for
Social Science Documentation (in 1950), which aimed at bringing together tech-
nicians to prepare international bibliographies and catalogues of periodicals,
journals, and other reference works, and the International Social Science Council
(in 1952).¹¹ The activities and publications of the ISSC triggered the founding of
national counterparts; for instance, the Polish Academy of Science, beginning in
1958, published the Quarterly Review of Scientific Publications in English, in
order to make Polish research available to a broader audience. These develop-
ments indicate the emergence of an infrastructure for mutual observation and
exchange, which in its scope and technical sophistication did not exist in the
first half of the twentieth century.
UNESCO was by no means the only actor operating in this domain. By the
mid 1950s, more than a dozen international organizations played an active
role in shaping the social sciences.¹² However, it played a substantial role in cat-
alyzing institutional expansion for the planning, coordination, and exercise of
social science research. These efforts evolved into a globally connected network
of national, regional, and international organizations.
The idea of creating a (new) international social science institute was first
voiced in 1948 by a United Nations (UN) committee of experts, who were charged
with designing research institutes for wings of the UN. Two years later, the World
Congress of Sociologists supported the initiative, and in 1952, the ISSC was estab-
lished through a resolution by UNESCO’s Sixth General Conference. It was as-
signed three tasks: (1) to advance “the social sciences throughout the world”;
(2) to promote the application of social sciences “to the major problems of the
present day,” and (3) to facilitate internationalization of the social sciences
through policies oriented towards organizing comparative research and the inter-
pretation of data. The hope was that it could be achieved by establishing con-
tacts and collaboration between existing organizations in the field, creating
new international structures for subjects not yet institutionally anchored, and
by disseminating publication information, making recommendations to funding
agencies, as well as by designing and conducting research. In summary, the ISSC
 The establishment of national centres, schools, or institutes, and the linking of local institu-
tions with UNESCO spurred the worldwide spread of social sciences (in particular the US-in-
spired method of social theory building). See S.P. Agrawal and J.C. Aggarwal, UNESCO and Social
Sciences: Retrospect and Prospect (New Delhi: Concept, 1988), 52–54.
 See T.H. Marshall, International Organizations in the Social Sciences, revised edition (Paris:
UNESCO, 1965),
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was founded as an instrument for coordinating social science research planning
and policy.¹³
In 1953, it began operating as an autonomous body funded by UNESCO. The
membership procedure specified that two-thirds of the members would consist
of recommended representatives from the six professional associations that con-
stituted its council.¹⁴ The remaining third would be individuals chosen based on
their professional standing, rather than their affiliation with any association.
These specifications came out of an intensive debate on what form the new
institution should take: a federation of the major social science organizations, or
a consultative body of individual members acting in their personal capacity. This
seemingly technical discussion was in fact crucial, as it would affect the relation-
ship between disciplines in the ISSC, the nature of authority, and the balance of
power between different actors – i.e. alliances of scholars, professional associ-
ations, and international organizations, such as UNESCO’s DSS – engaged in
field research. Broad international involvement was also crucial, including par-
ticipation by Eastern European scholars. The final decision gave the ISSC limited
powers, in relation to international disciplinary associations, but the member-
ship criteria also allowed the council to involve experts on subjects not yet insti-
tutionalized, and people who, for interdisciplinary or political reasons, could not
otherwise participate.
Given the six-year limit on membership, and the requirement that half of all
council members must retire every three years, the ISSC was constructed as a dy-
namic body. At the same time, its structure allowed for continuity in personnel,
since terms of office for the EC were not limited. For example, Jean Piaget, the
first president of the council, remained in office until 1961. Conversely, the EC,
which consisted of roughly 10 researchers, saw an influx of new people from
both sides of the Iron Curtain from 1957 onwards; before this time, members ex-
clusively came from France, Britain, and the US, sparking criticism. Scholars
 Statutes in Marshall, International, 79. See also Jennifer Platt, Fifty Years of the International
Social Science Council (Paris: International Social Science Council, 2002), 7– 10. In parallel with
the ISSC, the General Conference provided for an “International Social Science Research Centre
for the study of the implications of technological change”; it was established by the ISSC and, in
1960, incorporated into it.
 Report on the Constituent Assembly of the Provisional International Social Science Council,
October 1952, International Social Science Bulletin V, no. 1 (1953): 143– 148. Founding members
were the International Sociological Association, International Economic Association, Interna-
tional Political Science Association, International Union of Psychology, International Associa-
tion of Legal Sciences, and the International Union of Anthropological and Ethnological Scien-
ces.
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from East-Central Europe began taking part in 1959, when Józef Chałasińky (Po-
land) was appointed to the council.¹⁵
Chałasińky (1904– 1979) was one of the foremost internationally recognized
Polish sociologists of the second half of the twentieth century. His international
profile, relations, and skills dating back to the interwar period shaped the role he
played in the ISSC. Born in Lublin into a rural civil-servant family, he studied
sociology in Poznań with Florian Znaniecki, one of the founders of the field in
Poland following World War One. In 1931, after completing his first and second
thesis, he received a grant from the Rockefeller Foundation, and went to the Uni-
versity of Chicago where he worked with Ernest W. Burgess on a study that ad-
dressed living conditions of a Polish workers’ colony in South Chicago. In 1936,
he accepted both a position at the University of Warsaw and the chairmanship of
the National Institute of Rural Culture, a recently established extra-university re-
search unit. He used the institute to unite and further institutionalize sociolog-
ical research in Poland, by, among other things, organizing and leading a collec-
tive study on the Polish countryside. The study was still under way when war
broke out, and some research was destroyed during warfare. However, four vol-
umes of Young Generation of Peasants written by Chałasińky had already been
published in 1936. The volumes were later criticized for offering a mythical nar-
rative of Polish peasantry, and Chałasińky’s aim had indeed been to mobilize
Poles in rural areas to take part in the development of the Polish nation. The col-
lective study, however, had another agenda, namely a critical move away from
the main concern of contemporary sociologists in Western Europe and the US.
Unlike Western sociologists, whose studies focused on workers and the function-
ing of industrialized societies, Chałasińky wanted to better understand and ad-
vance rural society. Although industrialized production had emerged in certain
regions of Poland, agriculture remained the primary occupation. Thus, Chałasiń-
ky wanted to broaden the narrow focus of established sociological research. Fol-
lowing WWII, he moved to the University of Łódź, where he continued to insti-
tutionalize his discipline, while also maintaining his international connections
through, among other things, his engagement with the ISSC. In 1961, he was
made a full member.¹⁶
 Platt, Fifty Years, 11– 12.
 Late in his career, he lost his right to teach for criticizing the influence of Stalinism on Polish
sociology at the 1959 World Sociological Congress. He also lost his strong academic standing
when a new style of sociology, based on the neo-positivist turn in American sociology, gained
momentum. See Wlodzimierz Winclawski, “Józef Chalasińky: A Classic of Polish Sociology,”
Eastern European Countryside 13 (2007): 169–178.
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The programmatic principle that Chałasińky used to advance sociology in
Poland also guided his international work. Postwar Polish sociology, as prac-
ticed by Chałasińky, aimed at understanding societal development in agrarian
societies. Other Polish sociologists studied the mobility of peoples, and these
studies appear to have been prompted by the need to understand and deal
with people, living in areas of East Poland, who were gained after WWII.
These two lines of inquiry met and found expression in the research the ISSC
planned and coordinated.
Thus, the exemplary case of Chałasińky instructively shows how the ISSC be-
came a platform for people whose ideas thwarted the opposing official discours-
es of the time. The presence of “Polish”-minted academic interests in interna-
tional research planning hints at academic logic outweighing geopolitical logic
(which does not exclude competition over who produces the most convincing so-
ciological explanations and social theories).
In 1961, the council was enlarged and statutes were changed so that no more
than two members of the EC could be of the same nationality; the council also
had to consist of “scholars representing the principal cultural regions of the
world”.¹⁷ The change in statutes resulted in substantial changes in personnel:
Sjoerd Groenman, a Dutch sociologist, was elected president; E. Pendleton Her-
ring, a US political scientist, became vice president, and Kazimierz Szczerba-Li-
kiernik became the new secretary general. (Szczerba-Likiernik was of Polish ori-
gin and had just retired as head of UNESCO’s DSS, where he had worked with
Alva Myrdal to found the ISSC.) In addition, Adam Schaff (Poland), René
König (West Germany), and Stein Rokkan (Norwegian-born residing in the US)
became members of the council. This pluralization, as well as the share of schol-
ars from Eastern Europe is also clearly indicated in Jennifer Platt’s data.¹⁸ As
Table 1 indicates, the number of council members from North America (mostly
from the US) and from Western Europe had declined considerably by the early
1980s. The 1960s witnessed an influx of Eastern European scholars, whose num-
bers remained stable until 1989–1990, while the 1970s saw an expansion in
scholars from the global South. Regarding the composition of ISSC officers, a
similar trend is visible in Table 2. Until the end of the Cold War, officers from
Eastern and Central Europe increased, becoming the largest represented group.
 Statutes, in Marshall, International Organizations, 81.
 Platt, Fifty Years.
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Table 1: Representation by region in the executive committee¹⁹
s s s s s
North America     
Western Europe     
Eastern Europe (incl. GDR)     
Asia     
Latin America – –   
Africa – –   
N     
Table 2: Representation by region among ISSC officers²⁰
s s s s s
North America     
Western Europe     
Eastern Europe (incl. GDR) –    
Asia – –   
Latin America – –   
Africa – – –  
N     
With the addition of Szczerba-Likiernik and Schaff, the council had two highly
committed members from Poland within its ranks. Together with Rokkan, they
immediately began pushing the organization in new directions, especially to-
wards cross-national comparative research.
Schaff and Rokkan, in particular, made use of the opportunity within the
ISSC to develop both the infrastructure for comparative studies and a policy
for internationalizing comparative social science research.²¹ Two major strategies
were agreed upon: (1) the creation of a long-term program of meetings, work-
shops, and training to develop skills and resources for comparative research,
 Ibid, 55.
 Ibid.
 Stein Rokkan, “Cross-Cultural, Cross-Societal and Cross-National Research,” Historical Social
Research 18 (1993): 6–54, here 7 (originally published in Main Trends of Research in the Human
and the Social Sciences, Paris: UNESCO/Mouton 1970, 645–689). For an overview of the activities
until 1972, and reflections on how the program was received in the different social science dis-
ciplines, see Stein Rokkan, AQuarter Century of International Social Sciences: Papers and Reports
on Developments, 1952– 1977 (New Delhi: Concept Publishing, 1979).
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and (2) the establishment of an organization to promote systematic research
across cultural and political boundaries. In short, ISSC activities were directed
towards the development of infrastructure services (for the social sciences at
large and for comparative studies), which, in the first place, targeted existing
data, materials, and expertize. The Vienna Centre, then, was conceived as the in-
strument and space for creating new comparable data and knowledge.
When, in 1965, the ISSC evaluated its program, it confirmed the double struc-
ture but expanded its own work. On the one hand, it continued to focus on the
institutional and infrastructural foundations of research, namely the develop-
ment of data archives in different countries, especially of statistical data that
could be processed using computers; on the other hand, it decided to engage
more directly in stirring the direction of research. It entered three new fields to
facilitate systematic comparisons: work on qualitative cross-cultural methods,
analyzes of historical change, and analyzes of processes of modernization.
Historical investigations, jointly conducted by historians and sociologists,
addressed nation-building, urbanization, industrialization, and demographic
transformation in Europe and the East. These themes were specifically chosen
in view of pressing social and political challenges. The hope was that knowledge
could make the social world more predictable and could improve it. Research for
the sake of social planning and the planning of social science research are often
interrelated. In a similar vein, the analysis of contemporary changes focused on
regional disparities in development in South Asia,Western Europe, and Eastern
Europe. Here, insights into general patterns of social and political change were
hoped for.
Notions of development, directional change, and modernization had already
been discussed extensively within the ISSC, but mainly based on quantifiable
data that could be coded and processed (levels of growth, spread of innovations,
and the speed of economic, social, and political mobilization). The work was
guided by the belief that the developmental course of societies could and should
be directed, which emerged within the wider process of the “scientification of the
social.”²² They wanted to organize research that analyzed such data in a broader
historical context, considering chronology and other variables. As Rokkan ex-
plained, “The social sciences can only become ‘developmental’ through close
 Lutz Raphael, “Embedding the Human and Social Sciences in Western Societies, 1880– 1980:
Reflections on Trends and Methods of Current Research,” in Engineering Society: The Role of the
Human and Social Sciences in Modern Societies, 1880– 1980, ed. Kerstin Brückweh, Dirk Schu-
mann, Richard F. Wetzell, and Benjamin Ziemann (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2012), 41–58.
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co-operation with the students of the time dimensions of social life, the histor-
ians.”²³
Additionally, the ISSC supported projects that allowed for the participation
of Polish scholars not involved in the council, and who fostered concrete ties
in divided Europe. For example, it supported research projects, such as the inter-
action between social values and the responsibilities of local political authori-
ties, which entailed fieldwork in Poland, Yugoslavia, the US, and India, and
which was planned and conducted by teams from all four countries.²⁴
The strong involvement of Polish sociologists faltered at the end of the
1960s. Following the death of Szczerba-Likiernik (in 1969) and the departure
of Chałasińky out of the EC, fewer Polish scholars participated in the council. Al-
though Chałasińky had taken steps to ensure continued Polish influence, con-
vincing his colleague Jan Szczepański to replace him, Szczepański left the EC
after four years, abiding by new rules that limited EC participation to four
years. There were also structural and political reasons for declining Polish par-
ticipation: In 1968, the Polish government partly blocked collaboration with
UNESCO. In 1972, the council became a federation of international disciplinary
associations, ending individual membership based on expertize. From then
on, participation in the ISSC depended upon having a strong international posi-
tion within one’s discipline, and to be delegated to the ISSC by one of the inter-
national disciplinary associations.²⁵
The Vienna Centre: An infrastructure for
planning and cooperation in social science
research across the blocs
After the ISSC had voiced the need for a new institution devoted to planning com-
parative studies by scholars from both blocs, expert talks and political negotia-
tions began immediately. In 1962, UNESCO’s general assembly adopted a resolu-
 Stein Rokkan and Kazimierz Szczerba-Likiernik, introduction to Comparative Research across
Cultures and Nations, ed. Rokkan Stein (Paris: Hague Mouton), 1–13, 6.
 See the description in Alexander Szalai and Riccardo Petrella, in collaboration with S. Rok-
kan and E.K. Scheuch, Cross-National Comparative Survey Research: Theory and Practice (Oxford:
Pergamon Press, 1977), 231–278.
 It was not until the mid-1980s that there was another Pole, Leszek Kosinki, in the executive
committee. Kosinki had previously served as secretary general of the International Geographical
Union, and it was his involvement in this organization that qualified him for the ISSC.
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tion, presented by delegations from Austria, Belgium, Czechoslovakia, Italy, Po-
land, and Yugoslavia, that gave the ISSC responsibility for setting it up. In May
1963, the council implemented the resolution, and in early 1964, the Austrian gov-
ernment and UNESCO reached an agreement that it would be based in Vienna; it
was motivated by the country’s neutrality. Co-funded by the ISSC and UNESCO,
the non-governmental organization (NGO) would operate autonomously.
The Vienna Centre’s primary function was that of a platform for cooperation
of scholars from leading European institutions, which have (in UN terminology)
“different social and economic structures”²⁶ in the field of comparative studies;
its purpose was to devise respective methodologies and research techniques. The
Vienna Centre was a coordinating agency – not a research institute; it was con-
cerned with research planning, selecting general themes for projects that would
be carried out by multinational teams, nominating scientific directors and partic-
ipants for these projects, and directing the teamwork.²⁷
Another motive of the initiators (Schaff, Stein, and others) was to European-
ize the cross-national survey research of the time. Until the early 1960s, US schol-
ars had dominated the field. Their superior access to funding had given them
control over field operations and coding in each country. In Europe it was per-
ceived as “American data imperialism,” leading to “a variety of distortions:
too many of the questions were phrased and too much of the analysis was car-
ried out in ignorance of the cultural intricacies and socio-political realities of
each of the systems covered.”²⁸ The Vienna Centre also clearly came into
being as a joint effort of East-Central and Northwestern Europeans to counter
the American hegemony in the field. Here, again, one can grasp that the confron-
tation and geography of the Cold War was more complex than the bipolar axis of
East-West suggests.
In a larger sense, the Vienna Centre was set up in the spirit of détente and
the policy of peaceful coexistence of the early 1960s; it was premised on the idea
that rapprochement between the East and the West could be supported by un-
derstanding the social problems and challenges on each side. The effort to ap-
 European Coordination Centre for Research and Documentation in the Social Sciences, JIU/
HBP/71/13, GE.72– 1890, 5; Ricchardo Petrella and Adam Schaff, Une expérience de coopération
européenne dans les sciences sociales: Dix ans d’activités du Centre de Vienne, 1963– 1973 (Vien-
na: Centre européen de coordination de recherche et de documentation en sciences sociales,
1973), 7– 11 and the Statutes.
 Adam Schaff, “The Foundations of the Vienna Centre: Their Development and Prospects,” in
International Cooperation in the Social Sciences. 25 Years of Vienna Experience, eds. František
Charvát, Willem Stamation, Christiane Villain-Gandossi (Vienna: ECCRDSS, 1988), 17–33.
 Szalai and Petrella, Cross-National Comparative Survey Research, ix.
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prehend the social structures and conditions that existed in countries with differ-
ent ideologies and sociopolitical systems would also help each country to reflect
inwardly. This enhanced knowledge would allow more informed contributions to
social theory-building. In essence, the Vienna Centre was a manifestation of the
belief in progress and social engineering, and in the capacity of social science
expertize to transcend the antagonism of the Cold War. To achieve this, an
NGO seemed to yield better results than UNESCO’s DSS or the ISSC.
Finally, the Vienna Centre’s founding was motivated by professional compe-
tition. Demographers and economists, it was believed, had already organized in-
ternationally through their work in organizations like the UN, World Bank, and
the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). In con-
trast, sociologists, anthropologists, and political scientists, despite their exten-
sive work interpreting data from a large number of countries and producing mod-
els of the socio-economic order, did not yet have any infrastructure for cross-
national studies and large-scale theories.²⁹
Cooperation across the East-West divide brought together different and, in
fact, rival values, research orientations, and practices, sparking confrontations
and challenging ideological ambitions. Competing agendas, vocabularies, and
geopolitical rationales clashed, tensions arose, and efforts at concrete collabora-
tive research projects were derailed.³⁰ Nevertheless, within the Vienna Centre,
scholars observed and learnt about one another, and this triggered the circula-
tion of knowledge.³¹ The main domain was the development of comparative
methodologies and research designs, which would substantiate theory-building.
Although much of the debate was about how to count, these debates were, in
fact, about how to interpret and, thus, about prognosis and social planning.
The Vienna Centre’s ability to present itself as a space for conceptualizing a
kind of European social science arose from the fact that it did not openly contra-
dict Cold War rationales. Governments, for example, had a stake in the Centre’s
agenda. The research it initiated was done at the involved research institutes,
which were financed by their states; several countries also supported the centre
 Rokkan and Szczerba-Likiernik, 8.
 Ricchardo Petrella and Adam Schaff, Une experience, 100– 105.
 For a similar incident at UNESCO in which the trajectory went from confrontation to common
learning, see Katja Naumann, “Avenues and Confines of Globalizing the Past: UNESCO’s Inter-
national Commission for a “Scientific and Cultural History of Mankind” (1952– 1969),” in Net-
working the International System: Global Histories of International Organizations, ed. Madeleine
Herren (Heidelberg: Springer, 2014), 187–200.
110 Katja Naumann
directly.³² However, political concerns seemed not to have outweighed the idio-
syncrasies of the leading figures at the centre. Additionally, the institutionalized
spaces for exchange and collaboration prevented and prohibited politically mo-
tivated interventions.
In what follows, I outline the substantial spaces of manoeuvre that existed
within the Vienna Centre for East-Central European scholars and experts, which
are visible in their level of involvement in the director’s committee, work proce-
dures, and programs. To repeat, I understand their positioning and contributions
as expressions of the Centre’s power to cut through the already porous Iron Cur-
tain.
The Vienna Centre’s organizational chart was simple, consisting of the direc-
tor’s committee and a fairly small administrative and technical staff. Scientific
collaborators were involved only for the duration of a project, and the director’s
committee was the nucleus of decision-making; at the beginning, it consisted of
10 members, and by the 1980s it increased to 20.
In 1978, six of the director’s committee of 18 members came from East-Cen-
tral or Southeast Europe.³³ Crucial for the influence of scholars from that region
was the presidency of Adam Schaff, which lasted almost 20 years (1964–82) and
encompassed the entire initial stage, the program’s evaluation c. 1972–73, and its
restructuring in the early 1980s. After his retirement in 1982, Pierre Feldheim
(Belgium) took over.³⁴
Adam Schaff (1913–2006) was a controversial academic figure, whose career
path was shaped by the changing ability of the Communist Party to control the
social sciences, and by a generational shift in Polish sociology that ushered in an
American-inspired form of empirical research. Schaff had studied law and eco-
nomics at the École Libre des Sciences Politiques in Paris, and philosophy in
Warsaw and Moscow, where he received a doctorate. In 1948, he was awarded
the first chair in Marxist philosophy at the University of Warsaw, after which
his academic stature, as well as his standing in the Communist Party climbed
 In the period from 1964–1972, Hungary, Poland, Czechoslovakia, the USSR, and Yugoslavia
covered 14.9% of the Vienna Centre’s expenses; Western European countries paid 34.4%, while
Austria as the host country covered 15.5%. UNESCO had the largest share with 34.4% (Petrella
and Schaff, Une expérience, 71). Things changed in 1973 when UNESCO terminated its subven-
tion, resulting in its share having to be shouldered by member states or other funding sources.
 Petrella and Schaff, Une Une expérience, 8, and Marshall, International Organizations, 77. See
also the entry for the Vienna Centre, in International Directory of Social Science Research Councils
and Analogous Bodies, 1978–79, 134–5.
 The president was assisted by a director; the post was filled, among others, by Oskar Vogel
(German Democratic Republic) from 1982–86, who was followed by František Charvát (Czecho-
slovakia/Canada).
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steadily. He quickly gained influence and received political support for his efforts
at establishing a Marxist perspective on Polish history.³⁵ In his writings from the
1960s, he demonstrated openness to less orthodox positions.³⁶ In 1968, however,
he was dismissed from his teaching post and removed from his leading positions
in the Communist Party (he was later also excluded). However, because of his
international standing, he was able to leave Warsaw for Vienna, where in 1971
he was given an honorary position as professor of social philosophy at the Uni-
versity of Vienna.³⁷
The choice of location for international-organization meetings is not an in-
significant matter; when a nation is chosen as host, it signals and recognizes
that nation’s stature. By looking at the cities where the directorate met, one
can observe a shift to the East: In 1964, the first board meeting was held in Vien-
na, followed by Paris (1965), Constance (1966), Moscow (1968), Budapest (1969),
and Ljubljana (1970). Between 1964– 1972, the Vienna Centre organized approx-
imately 130 official meetings for project directors and participants; a total of
1,600 people attended. Austria hosted the most meetings (25), followed by
France (22), Poland (18), Czechoslovakia (13), Hungary (10), and Yugoslavia (9).³⁸
East-Central Europe’s presence in the directorate and in the symbolic politics
of the Vienna Centre can be attributed to policies during the early years aimed at
maintaining a strict equilibrium between East and West, both in terms of the
composition of the board and of the multinational research teams. As difficult
as it must have been to uphold, the Centre remained committed to balanced par-
ticipation; the principle was also a “protective shield” against accusations of po-
litical misuse.
The director’s committee was charged with maintaining that balance in the
research projects sponsored by the Vienna Centre; it reviewed, selected, and re-
vised proposals for joint research projects submitted by scientific institutions
and by individual researchers. Once approved, research secretaries established
contacts with potential partners, so that international working groups could
 Maciej Górny, Die Wahrheit ist auf unserer Seite: Nation, Marxismus und Geschichte im Ost-
block, (Cologne: Böhlau 2011), 177. See also Marcin Kula,Mimo wszystko bliżej Paryża niżMoskwy.
Książka o Francji, PRL i o nas, historykach [Closer to Paris than to Moscow. About France, the
Polish People’s Republic and about us, historians] (Warsaw: Wydawnictwa Uniwersytetu Wars-
zawskiego 2010).
 He even participated in Christian-Marxist dialogical enterprises, see Ondřej Matějka, “Social
Engineering and Alienation between East and West,” in this volume.
 On Schaff, see Armando Montanari, “Social sciences and comparative research in Europe:
Cross-national and multi-disciplinary projects for urban development. The role of geography,”
Revue belge de géographie 1–2 (2012), http://belgeo.revues.org/6085 (accessed 19 June 2017).
 Petrella and Schaff, Une expérience, 18– 19.
112 Katja Naumann
be formed. The working groups, then, determined the methodological approach
and identified the reference concept. Concomitantly, the chair nominated two re-
search directors for the project, one from each of the blocs. The chair also ap-
proved the project’s budget, which could only be used for the “international
part” of the work (group meetings and publications). Data collection, fieldwork
in the participating countries, and the comparative analysis of results then fol-
lowed.³⁹
The scope of the collaboration is noteworthy: During the first decade, schol-
ars from 25 European countries, including researchers from eight Eastern Euro-
pean academies, were involved in the program; 11 non-European countries also
participated.⁴⁰ Typically, 4–7 experts collaborated on a project; the number
could exceed a dozen in larger projects. Participation was, however, not evenly
distributed: In the 80 projects and conferences directed by the Vienna Centre in
its first 25 years (until 1988), six countries from the East (Bulgaria, Czechoslova-
kia, Hungary, Poland, the USSR, and Yugoslavia) and five countries from the
West (France, West Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom)
had the highest levels of involvement. Researchers from these countries took
part on 26 or more occasions. Poland was involved the most (46, see also
Table 3).⁴¹ Looking at the number of participating institutions in the period
1964–69, Poland is also at the top (14 institutions), followed by Czechoslovakia
(13), and France and the USSR (9 each).⁴² Thus, it is no surprise that Warsaw was
chosen to host the First International Seminar on Cross-national Comparative Re-
view (in 1980), and that Polish researchers would utilize the occasion to high-
light their role in the field.⁴³ Overall, the Vienna Centre’s research network up
to 1972 was far-reaching and dense, including 216 institutes in Europe and 22
outside of Europe, with 165 Eastern European research institutions involved.⁴⁴
 Chantal Kourilsky, Armando Montanari and G. Vyskovsky, Vienna Centre Report of Activity
1979–80, no.10–11 (Vienna: ECCRDSS, 1980): 1–44.
 Petrella and Schaff, Une expérience, 16.
 Willem Stamatiou, “International Cooperation in the Social Science: The Vienna Centre,” In-
ternational Social Science Journal 118 (1988): 597–603.
 European Coordination Centre for Research and Documentation in the Social Sciences, JIU/
HBP/71/13, GE.72– 1890, 10.
 Manfred Niessen and Jules Peschar, International Comparative Research Problems of Theory,
Methodology and Organisation in Eastern and Western Europe (Oxford: Pergamon, 1982).
 Petrella and Schaff, Une expérience, 16.
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 Location of new industries V. Raskovic
M. Penouil
  –
 Petrella and Schaff, Une expérience, 15. I have added information from later progress reports.
The figures are taken from reports produced by the Vienna Centre, which undoubtedly assem-
bled them to highlight their achievements. Thus, some institutes included in these figures
most likely collaborated only on paper, or for a brief period. Nevertheless, the figures indicate
that the contacts and connections that the Vienna Centre developed across Cold War Europe
were extensive.
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The research projects initiated and led by Czechoslovakian, Polish, and Hungar-
ian scholars also display that they played a significant role in planning the sub-
stantive direction of comparative social science research. They had the coordinat-
ing power needed to negotiate and conduct projects involving scholars from up
to 20 institutions, half from each side of the Cold War, who had to synchronize
their data, adjust their methodologies for data production to obtain comparable
data, and debated their interpretations.
In selecting its program of research, the Vienna Centre, at first chose topics
based on existing research, and decided to pursue long-term comparative studies
on three broadly defined fields of inquiry: “planning in global comparison,”
“basic concepts of aid to developing countries”, and the “economic and social
consequences of disarmament.”⁴⁶
The second field listed above (internally described as “backward areas”)
opened with the project “Backward regions in industrialised countries,” co-di-
rected by Sjoerd Groenman and Pavel Turčan (Czechoslovakia). In its third
year, researchers collaborating on the project decided to organize a conference,
in order to promote dialogue with economists who had studied the subject in
 Petrella and Schaff, 12– 13.
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other European countries and other parts of the world. In partnership with the
International Economic Association, approximately 40 scholars were invited to
the 1967 conference in Varenna, including Ota Šik (Prague), B. Winiarski (Wro-
cław), and Imre Vajda and L. Koszegi (Budapest). Conference discussions
prompted the project members to develop a new research line focusing on prob-
lems of urbanization. Based on a proposal by Gaston Gaudard and Jean Valarché
(Switzerland), the new research line “The Costs of Urban Growth” began in
1973.⁴⁷
In 1964, two of the main and best-known projects of the Vienna Centre start-
ed: The first, “Time-Budgets and Industrialization,” was conceived and directed
by Alexander Szalai (Budapest).⁴⁸ The second, “Images of a disarmed world,” or-
iginated in Polish studies of the future, in particular on public opinion concern-
ing the consequences of disarmament and the future course of foreign policy. In-
volved in this research was Julian Hochfeld, who later became director of
UNESCO’s DSS, and who in that role encouraged an international study on the
topic. It began with a pilot project and fieldwork in France, Poland, and Norway,
under the direction of Jean Stoetzel (Paris). Shortly thereafter, in 1966, a follow-
up investigation led by Johan Galtung (Oslo) was approved, which involved 10
countries.⁴⁹
Many projects in the initial years dealt with social change under conditions
and consequences of industrialization and modernization; once again, the nexus
between planning social science research and social science-based social plan-
ning is at hand. It included a study of juvenile delinquency in France, Hungary,
Poland, and Yugoslavia, which was led by Stanislaw Walczak (Warsaw); it was
prepared at a meeting in Warsaw in 1964, with sociologists from 11 countries.⁵⁰
In parallel, comparisons on agricultural settings and developments were organ-
 See the list of participants and introduction in E.A.G. Robinson, Backward Areas in Advanced
countries: Proceedings of a Conference held the International Economics Association at Varenna
(London: Melbourne MacMillan, 1969); Petrella and Schaff, Une expérience, 52–5; Montanari,
9– 10.
 See the description in Szalai and Petrella, Cross-National Comparative Survey Research, 201–
231.
 Helmut Ornauer and Johan Galtung, Images of the World in the Year 2000: A Comparative
Ten Nation Study (Atlantic Highlands: Humanities Press, 1976); see also, Jenny Andersson and
Eglė Rindzevičiūtė, The Struggle for the Long-Term in Transnational Science and Politics (Rout-
ledge: New York, 2015).
 See the description in Szalai and Petrella, Cross-National Comparative Survey Research, 131–
168; ECCRDSS, La délinquance juvénile en Europe. Actes du Colloque de Varsovie, octobre 1964
(Université libre de Bruxelles: Brussels, 1968).
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ized. Based on a joint initiative by Schaff (for the Vienna Centre), Bogusław Ga-
łęski, and Henri Mendras, the “Diffusion of innovation in agriculture” became a
subject of investigation in 1965. The origins in this collaboration were regular
meetings of Polish and French sociologists from about 1960s onwards.⁵¹ In the
program line “planning in global comparison” the project initiated by Włodzi-
mierz Brus (Warsaw) started working on “Criteria for choosing between market
and non-market (public) ways of satisfying population needs.” Brus, who was
also involved in the UNESCO study “Main trends of research in the Social and
Human Sciences,” had to cancel his participation in both projects in 1968,
after he and other colleagues were not permitted to continue their engagement
with UNESCO.
Several other topics for which the Vienna Centre organized collaborative re-
search had been co-directed by scholars from East-Central Europe: Comparisons
of university graduates, suggested by Helmut Peisert (Constance) and conducted
with Władysław Markiewicz (Poznań); comparisons of legislation concerning fer-
tility, directed by Massimo Livi Bacci (Florence) and Egon Szabady (Budapest),
involved the International Union for the Scientific Study of Population, and com-
parisons of the effects of organizational hierarchy, which was developed by Ar-
nold S. Tannenbaum (Ann Arbor) and co-directed with Kazimierz Dóktor (War-
saw). In 1970, the first project based in the region, namely in Bratislava, dealt
with problems of tourism in Europe.
Upon the suggestion of Imre Szabó, the Vienna Centre prepared an interna-
tional round-table discussion on the methodology of international comparative
research, which evaluated the Centre’s activities and decided on its future
course. As a consequence, the policy shifted strongly away from planning
large collective projects towards more shorter projects, as well as topical confer-
ences; furthermore, the training of young researchers was added.⁵²
New subjects came in and non-European colleagues were invited.⁵³ With this
new orientation, the Vienna Centre sought to address the internal criticism that
the national framework had hardly been transcended, and that the applicability
 Bogusław Gałęski,Wacław Makarczyk, Lili M. Szwengrub, Cross-national European Research
Project on the Diffusion of Technical Innovations in Agriculture (Vienna: International Social Sci-
ence Council, 1969).
 Training was offered in a series of International Seminars on Cross-national Comparative Re-
search, see among others the documentation in Manfred Niessen, Jules Peschar, Chantal Kour-
ilsky, International Comparative Research: Social Structures and Public Institutions in Eastern and
Western Europe (Oxford: Pregamon Press, 1984).
 Jan Berting, Felix Geyer, Ray Jurkovich, Problems in International Comparative Research in
the Social Sciences (Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1979).
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of the results had been higher than the explanatory value of the studies.⁵⁴ Plan-
ning the research was valued more than the research of planning. The output
should not be underrated: Over 70 books, published on both sides of the Iron
Curtain, and several periodicals through which research circulated throughout
Cold War Europe, were written.⁵⁵
Situating the post-WWII period within longer
transnational scientific relations
Polish sociologists and philosophers, who together with colleagues from other
parts of the socialist bloc proactively participated and indelibly influenced the
ISSC and Vienna Centre, were not the only scholars from the region involved
in international scientific institutions. From the mid 1950s onwards, and espe-
cially in the 1960s, a large number of intellectuals from East-Central Europe
took part in such organizations. Hochfeld (1911–66), another key figure in the
establishment of Polish sociology, was elected deputy director of the UNESCO
DSS. Oskar Lange, a prominent Polish economist, participated in the study
“Main trends of research in the Social and Human Sciences,” coordinated by
the DSS. Witold Kula, a seminal figure in Polish historiography, was on the
board of the International Commission for a Scientific and Cultural History of
Mankind, which was contracted by UNESCO to produce a six-volume world his-
tory, and also presided over the International Economic History Association. Erik
Molnár, a prominent Hungarian historian, served with Kula on the board of the
world-history project. To this list, one could add the Polish sociologist Stanisław
Ossowski, one of the founders of the International Sociological Association.⁵⁶ As
more studies on this topic are undertaken, it is likely that this list is only the tip
of the iceberg.
The scope of East-Central European engagement raises the question: How
was this high level of participation possible? Two processes, I believe, were es-
sential: the extensive institutionalization of research coordination in the second
half of the twentieth century, which I sketched before, and East-Central Europe-
ans’ previous experience with international cooperation. To this second aspect, I
will now turn briefly.
 Willem Stamatiou, Vienna Centre, 600; Charvát, International Cooperation.
 Stamatiou, International Cooperation, 601.
 Maxine Berg, “East-West Dialogues: Economic Historians, the Cold War, and Détente,” Jour-
nal of Modern History 87 (2015): 36–71.
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The rapidly developing European-wide, and later global, cooperation in the
mid twentieth century was closely connected with scientific entanglements from
the 1920s and 1930s. The speed with which the institutional expansion took
place later makes it unlikely that it emerged from scratch; rather, it was made
by people who were experienced with international cooperation from before
WWII, people who had been well connected with colleagues working on similar
topics at other places, and who as academic teachers had introduced their stu-
dents to practices of transnational scientific exchanges.
Acting confidently and successfully on the international stage is demanding
and requires specific skills and expertize. It also, often, requires permission from
the state, which presupposes that the ruling powers recognize the value of inter-
national participation – an attitude that forms over time, as a society learns to
see itself as part of a connected world. Instead of seeing the war as marking a
rupture in scientific relations across Europe, I argue that earlier connections
were channelled and found expression in the postwar institutional setting, albeit
in indirect ways. The trajectories of East-Central European social scientists and
historians are instructive here. If one looks closer at the academic biographies
of those involved in the ISSC, the Vienna Centre, and related undertakings,
one detects few newcomers to the international scene and many whose careers
began in the first half of the twentieth century. For example, Chałasińky and
Szczepański studied under the founding fathers of Polish sociology, Znaniecki
and Stefan Czarnowski (1879– 1937). The extensive scientific networks of their
mentors, which spanned across Leipzig, Paris, Geneva, and Chicago, left a last-
ing impression on the two men.
The interwar years had been a time in which academic disciplines were con-
solidated as part of nation-building efforts. During the 1920s, Polish sociologists
tackled contemporary challenges, writing commentaries on modern ideologies,
mass movements, sudden social dislocations, economic depressions, as well
the question of how to modernize Poland’s predominantly peasant society.
One of the major issues of the day was the Minority Treaty, which Poland had
signed at the Paris Peace Conference. The treaty sparked a nationwide debate
on how, or even if, national minorities could be integrated into the Polish
state. This issue gave the social sciences increased stature in Poland and facili-
tated its institutionalization.⁵⁷
 Stephan Stach, “The Institute for Nationality Research (1921– 1939): A Think Tank for Minor-
ity Politics in Poland?,” in Religion in the Mirror of Law: Eastern European Perspectives from the
Early Modern Period to 1939, ed.Yvonne Kleinmann (Frankfurt am Main: Klosterman, 2015), 149–
179; Olga Linkiewicz, “Scientific Ideals and Political Engagement: Polish Ethnology and the ‘Eth-
nic Question’ Between the Wars,” Acta Poloniae Historica 114 (2016): 5–27; Martin Kohlrausch,
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However, parallel to the nexus of scientism, professionalization, and nation-
building, intensifying movements across disciplinary and national borders also
shaped the social sciences in interwar East-Central Europe. Intellectual exchang-
es at conferences, fellowships, and visiting appointments, some of which were
supported by American philanthropic foundations, were taking place across Eu-
rope. Emigration resumed in the 1920s, taking scholars across Europe and the
Atlantic. Over the next decade, hundreds of social scientists emigrated from Cen-
tral Europe, in the process accessing and building scientific networks. Others
took advantage of access to international organizations made possible by the
(re‐)establishment of nation states in the region. For example, Marceli Handels-
man, one of the doyens of Polish historiography, built extensive personal con-
tacts across Europe. More importantly, he utilized them to help convince the In-
ternational Committee of Historical Sciences to hold its seventh congress in
Warsaw (in 1933).⁵⁸
Consequently, the entangled processes of nationalization and international-
ization turned out to be good preparation for the postwar constellation. One had
the intellectual background needed to engage proactively with postwar studies
on processes of nationalism and modernization, and one knew how to institu-
tionalize new fields of studies and participate in existing international struc-
tures.
The pre-war transnational contacts and experiences that East-Central Euro-
pean scholars had cultivated were certainly altered by WWII, diminishing them
in number and, in some cases, altering their influence. Some protagonists lost
their lives, such as Handelsman who died in a German concentration camp.
Wars, however, also produce new transnational dynamics. Znaniecki left Poland
for the US in 1939, and many others fled, or chose to leave their homelands dur-
ing WWII, which also redrew national boundaries, and, thus, shifted people
nominally and practically to new national contexts. Against the backdrop of
this upheaval, resettling and integrating into new surroundings took precedence,
at least, temporarily over previous intertwinements.Within East-Central Europe,
the situation was particularly complex, in part because the new ruling powers
Katrin Steffen, and Stefan Wiederkehr, Expert Cultures in Central Eastern Europe:The Internation-
alization of Knowledge and the Transformation of Nation States since World War I (Osnabrück:
Fibre, 2010).
 Dorothy Ross, “Changing Contours of the Social Science Disciplines,” in Cambridge History
of Science, vol. 7: The Modern Social Sciences, ed. Theodore M. Porter and Dorothy Ross (Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 205–237, 224–237; Helke Rausch, “Akademische Ver-
netzung als politische Intervention in Europa. Internationalismus-Strategien US-amerikanischer
Stiftungen in den 1920er Jahren,” Jahrbuch für Universitätsgeschichte 18 (2015): 165–188.
120 Katja Naumann
pushed for radical new beginnings. There were other dynamics of change, for ex-
ample the pre-war practice of studying abroad for an extended period of time in
multiple countries, popular from roughly the turn of the century to the 1930s,
which became less common. Postwar international institutions and expanded
networks made shorter research trips more practical and enhanced long-distance
communication. International periodicals and bibliographies achieved wide-
spread circulation, making it possible for scholars to keep abreast of internation-
al research developments without leaving home; they also allowed authors to
publish abroad more easily. When, in the 1950s, the political and institutional
context in Eastern Europe created new possibilities for connecting, the skill
sets required for developing international connections and the general attitude
of valuing cross-border exchange already existed. It seems in many cases,
East-Central Europeans were able to swiftly reactivate their scholarly connec-
tions and networks.
Conclusion
This chapter dealt with the planning of social science research as a particular
domain of social planning. Contributing to social reform was not the predomi-
nant aim; often, however, it was closely related to it, either by dealing with
the same social and political topics, and/or by being used at some stage for gov-
ernment and policy purposes. The ISSC and the Vienna Centre have been inves-
tigated as institutions, which developed European-wide research planning that
was not limited by the East-West divide. The East-Central European experts,
who made use of the institutionally given spaces of participation, testify that
the Vienna Centre not only provided nominal cooperation but was perceived
and used as a space in which they could follow their professional calling – to
design and to conduct social science research in scholarly competition with col-
leagues from other places. Even more so, as part of the governing and adminis-
trative structure, they had organizational power and could co-determine the pro-
grammatic direction and the further institutionalization of international
collaboration from the 1950s onwards.
Situating the post-WWII developments within a larger history of European
scientific cooperation has shown that the 1950s introduced a massive process
of institutionalization at the national and international level, aimed at providing
the means for cross-border exchange and competition across the Cold War divide
(while the institutionalization of cross-border exchange had begun at least half a
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century earlier).⁵⁹ The fact that institutionalization was not new meant that it
could draw upon previous international experiences that facilitated the success-
ful expansion of international scientific institutions and the participation of
East-Central European experts. International planning activities multiplied,
and older mechanisms of connectivity were gradually replaced. One finds in
the 1950s, I want to argue, a complex constellation in which remnants of an in-
terwar internationalism based on personal contacts, networks, and experiences
have been transferred to a new setting created by the expansion of institutions of
international research coordination
 Frank Greenaway, Science International. A History of the International Council of Scientific Un-
ions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996).
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The Social Engineering Project.
Exportation of Capitalist Management
Culture to Eastern Europe (1950–1980)
In their important book The New Spirit of Capitalism Luc Boltansky and Eve Chia-
pello describe management as a set of prescriptive indications which give direct
access to the real spirit of capitalism.¹ In the same perspective, scholars have
often studied management as a means to produce or reproduce a social order
in which labor is treated and used as a commodity.² Therefore, the story of the
“exportation” of the management culture from the US to Western Europe has
been widely studied as a triumph of US capitalism and one feature of the Amer-
icanization of Europe.³ This point of view has been recently challenged by schol-
ars who have studied the exportation of this management culture to European
peripheries and countries where the economic, social and ideological context
differed drastically from that in the US and Western Europe. The question of
the reception and above all the translation of this US management culture has
thus become a central question.⁴
This chapter seeks to address this issue although from a different point of
view by studying the rather counter-intuitive circulation of Western managerial
knowledge to Eastern Europe during the Cold War. In order to grasp the deep
meaning of this exchange we first have to look at management as part of a broad-
er social engineering or social planning project. In that broader meaning, man-
agement is a set of prescriptions aiming to organize and rationalize human be-
 Luc Boltanski, Eve Chiapello. The New Spirit of Capitalism (London; New York: Verso, 2005)
see also Luc Boltanski, “America, America…: Le Plan Marshall et l’importation du ‘manage-
ment,’” Actes de la recherche en sciences sociales 38, no. 1 (1981): 19–41.
 Marie-Laure Djelic, Exporting the American Model: The Post-War Transformation of European
Business. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998.
 Matthias Kipping, “The U.S. Influence on the Evolution of Management Consultancies in Brit-
ain, France, and Germany Since 1945,” Business and Economic History 25, no. 1 (1996): 112‐123;
Terry Gourvish and Nick Tiratsoo, Missionaries and Managers: American Influences on European
Management Education, 1945–60 (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1998), Bent Boel,
The European Productivity Agency and Transatlantic Relations, 1953– 1961 (Copenhagen: Museum
Tusculanum Press/University of Copenhagen, 2003).
 Michal Frenkel, “The Americanization of the Antimanagerialist Alternative in Israel: How For-
eign Experts Retheorized and Disarmed Workers’ Participation in Management, 1950– 1970,” In-
ternational Studies of Management & Organization 38, no. 4 (2008): 17‐37.
https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110534696-007
havior and conduct in order to make human activity and more specifically
human work more effective.⁵ By forging predictions and strengthening coherence
in human activity, management can certainly be interpreted as a social planning
tool even if the actors themselves do not use the language of planning.With that
in mind, management cannot be reduced to a mere product of capitalism.⁶ As a
social engineering project, management should be dated back to the end of the
nineteenth century but became a field of study in its own right during the First
World War. Already in the interwar years, social planners crossed the boundaries
between political and economic systems, as in the case of the sociologist and so-
cial worker Mary Van Kleeck, executive director of the Russel Sage foundation.⁷
While conceptualizing management both as a social and economic project she
turned her attention to the Soviet Union to find new inspiration.
Two conclusions should be drawn from this example. First, as already ar-
gued by the recent historiography of the Cold War, in the interwar years circula-
tions and convergence between both economic and social systems were taking
place and models of economic and social planning were exchanged.⁸ That
leads to my second point: in order to understand these exchanges, we should
be aware of the longer continuities. This chapter will show that the circulation
of knowledge in the field of social planning was deeply rooted in the longer his-
tory of the relationships between Western and Eastern European countries, be-
tween the center of Europe and its (at first) less developed periphery.
To that purpose, I will use the sources produced by the International Labour
Organization (ILO), which was set up in 1919 and has been both an actor in and a
platform for these exchanges from the 1920s onward. For the post- World War
Two period I will mainly analyze the documents produced by the management
 See the important book by Thibault Le Texier, Le maniement des hommes: essai sur la ration-
alité managériale (Paris: la Découverte, 2016).
 Thomas Etzemüller, “Social Engineering als Verhaltenslehre des kühlen Kopfes. Eine einlei-
tende Skizze, “ in Die Ordnung der Moderne. Social Engineering im 20. Jahrhundert, ed. Thomas
Etzemüller (Bielefeld: Transcript, 2009), 11–39.
 Guy Alchon, “Mary van Kleeck and scientific management” in A Mental Revolution. Scientific
Management since Taylor ed Daniel Nelson ( Columbus: Columbus State University Press, 1992)
102–130.
 Among a very rich list and fast growing body of works Sari Autio-Sarasmo and Katalin Miklós-
sy, Reassessing Cold War Europe (NY: Routledge, 2011), Sandrine Kott, “Par-delà la guerre froide:
Les organisations internationales et les circulations Est-Ouest (1947– 1973),” Vingtième Siècle.
Revue d’histoire, 109 (1 Jan., 2011): 143‐154. Akira Iriye, “Historizicing the Cold War,” in The Ox-
ford Handbook of the Cold War, ed. Immermann, Richard H, and Petra Goedde (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2013) 15–32.
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projects set up by the ILO in the framework of the United Nations Development
Programme (UNDP).⁹
I will first present how management became an important development proj-
ect in the ILO and how it was exported to the Eastern part of Europe as a mod-
ernizing tool. Second, I will try to understand who were the players and stake-
holders of this story, who was implementing and receiving this managerial
culture. Third, we need to ask to which extent these players formed a “transbloc”
new technocratic class, which has produced and used a common global lan-
guage based on the same values.
Management as a development project from
West to East
Management has been an important aspect of the activity and philosophy of the
ILO since the 1920s, this led to the creation of the International Scientific Man-
agement Institute in 1926.¹⁰ During the interwar years the organization encour-
aged management training in Western Europe as part of a larger ideal of social
engineering seen as “scientifically” guided social planning.¹¹ Management
would foster an increase in labor productivity and open the road to welfare cap-
italism.¹² During the 1950s, in the framework of the Expanded Programme of
Technical Assistance, the ILO began to extend its management activities to Euro-
pean peripheries, first to Israel in 1952, then to Yugoslavia in 1955.¹³
 The UNDP started in 1965 taking over the Expanded Programme of Technical Assistance
(1946– 1966). Craig Murphy, The United Nations Development Programme : A Better Way? (Cam-
bridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006).
 See Thomas Cayet, “Travailler à la marge: le Bureau International du Travail et l’organisation
scientifique du travail (1923– 1933),” Le Mouvement Social, 228 (1 Sept., 2009): 39‐56. Interesting-
ly names differ in the various languages. The French say “Organisation scientifique du travail”
and the Germans “Rationalisierung.”
 Laak Dirk van, “Planung. Geschichte und Gegenwart des Vorgriffs auf die Zukunft [Planning.
The past and presence of advancing the future],” Geschichte und Gesellschaft 34, no. 3 (1 July,
2008): 305‐326. Jon Alexander, Adam Podgorecki, Rob Shields, Social Engineering, (Beaconsfield,
Quebec: Carleton University Press, 1996).
 Thomas Cayet, Rationaliser le travail, organiser la production : le bureau international du trav-
ail et la modernisation économique durant l’entre-deux-guerres (Rennes: Presses universitaires de
Rennes, 2010).
 An overview of this can be found in International Labour Office, The effectiveness of ILO
management development and productivity projects, Report and conclusions, Management Devel-
opment Series, 3 (Geneva: International Labour Office, 1965).
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In 1962, ILO Director General David Morse emphasized the relationship be-
tween economic modernization and social management: “Successful industrial-
isation implies a social revolution. To set up industry . . . is not only acquiring
capital and a knowledge of new techniques. Modern industry calls into being
its own kind of society. It requires attitudes towards work different from those
of traditional rural communities.”¹⁴ In 1958, in his opening speech to the Inter-
national Labour Conference, he had already insisted on making “the ILO a real
clearing house for information in the labour management field : a world centre
for the exchange of information and research techniques and results and for the
dissemination of labour management experiences to employers, workers and
governments in all countries.”¹⁵ In the same year, the International Labour Con-
ference voted for a resolution to set up a programme on management develop-
ment, “more especially in the industrially less advanced country.”¹⁶ This task
was taken over by the Management Development Branch of the ILO in 1960. Be-
tween 1960 and 1965, the number of professionals employed in this branch rose
from one to 12. These professionals were engaged in special research projects
and nine worked full time on the supervision and administration of field projects
including recruitment and briefing of management experts.¹⁷ One of the most
visible results of this politics was the setting up in 1964 of the ILO Training Cen-
ter in Turin. Its objective was to provide vocational training for future economic
and social elites from newly decolonized countries. With the Turin Center, the
ILO could really globalize its approach and become the vehicle of a broader ex-
portation of this management culture. The first survey mission of the new ILO
Management Programme was sent to Poland in 1958¹⁸; it later served as an inspi-
ration for other undertakings of this kind in Eastern Europe and then in newly
decolonized countries. The development of the ILO’s management activities in
Eastern Europe was an attempt to diffuse management tools in the first periph-
ery of the Western World as part of a larger development programme, which was
launched in Eastern Europe during the 1960s.
 International Labour Office, The ILO and Asia, (Geneva: International Labour Office, 1962).
 Director General report (Geneva: International Labour Office, 1958), 29.
 Record of Proceedings of the International Labour Conference (ILC) (Geneva: International La-
bour Office, 1958), 777–778.
 International Labour Office, The effectiveness of ILO management development and produc-
tivity projects, Report and conclusions, management development series, 3, (Geneva: Internation-
al Labour Office, 1965) 6.
 International Labour Organization Archives (ILOA) OTA/Poland/R.1 Report to the govern-
ment of Poland on a survey mission in connection with management, productivity, supervisory
of vocational training.
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At the end of the 1950s and during the 1960s, all Eastern European countries
except the GDR received development aid through international development
programmes, a reality which cannot be understood without taking into account
the longer economic history of these countries. As part of the European first pe-
riphery, Eastern European countries had already been the target of ‘develop-
ment’ projects during the interwar period. In the 1930s, the League of Nations
had commissioned a study on peasants and nutrition with regard to agricultural
development.¹⁹ Under the guidance of the Polish medical Doctor Ludwik Rajch-
man and with the help of the Rockefeller Foundation, the League of Nation’s
Health Organization got involved in sanitation and rural hygiene projects.²⁰
The ILO carried out technical assistance to various southeastern countries in
the field of social insurance and labor law. The Second World War left a tragic
imprint on this already less developed part of Europe with some countries losing
from one third to 40% of their national wealth. With the end of the United Na-
tions Relief and Rehabilitation Administration and the launching of the Marshall
Plan in 1947, Eastern European actors felt threatened by the rapid reconstruction
of Western Germany, and they turned to UN agencies for help. Already in 1947
the Polish government requested that the Food and Agriculture Organization
send a mission to Poland “to investigate the economic and technical problems
linked to the reconstruction of Poland’s agriculture and related industries.”²¹
In the wake of destalinization, the Polish government applied for a training pro-
gramme for disabled people²² and between 1957 and 1960 several Polish Fellows
went to West Germany, France, Great Britain and Sweden to study rehabilitation
programmes for disabled people and invalids.²³ Following the Polish example
Hungarian, Romanian and Bulgarian officials requested assistance in developing
their agriculture (in the case of Bulgaria) or their tourist industry. During the
1960s and the early 1970s, almost all state socialist countries in Europe (apart
from the Soviet Union and the GDR) applied for development programmes to var-
ious UN agencies. Unlike newly decolonized countries, Eastern European govern-
 Sunil Amrith and Patricia Clavin, “Feeding the World: Connecting Europe and Asia, 1930–
1945,” Past & Present 218, no. 8 (2013): 29‐50.
 Iris Borowy, Coming to terms with world health : the League of Nations Health Organisation,
1921– 1946 (Frankfurt am Main/New York: Peter Lang, 2009).
 United Nations Archives (UN-A) 507–2– 10– 1 (S-0472/67/5) Letter David Weintraub to Mac
Dougall 3 April 1947.
 ILO-A Z 3/64/2 see the demand addressed to Morse during his March 1958 mission to War-
saw: “Mr Rosner recalled that the office had been informed through Miss Fidler that the Polish
government would be interested in participating in the ILO technical assistance scheme.”
 ILOA OTA 50– 1 (A).
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ments did not request important financial support but they did call for Western
expertise and technology.
This request for expertise increased in the 1960s in the dual context of the
détente and the economic reforms implemented throughout the Eastern Bloc.
The communist countries had to face labor shortage and needed to increase
labor productivity. Throughout the Bloc, reforms were implemented to introduce
more flexibility into central planning,while giving more autonomy to the top and
middle management. This required new training for these managers who beside
political loyalty had to develop economic and managerial skills.²⁴ As Zdenĕk
Mošna, a Czechoslovak economist put it very clearly in 1967: “One of the most
difficult problems which the socialist countries are now facing is that the new
models of management are being applied to managers formed under the central-
ised economic system. This is why there is a certain discrepancy between the
content and objectives of the new economic systems and the present qualifica-
tions of managers. . . . The level of education of Czechoslovak industrial directors
compares very unfavorably with that of directors in industrially developed coun-
tries in the West.”²⁵
It is in this context that the ILO began testing its new management pro-
gramme in Poland. As it would be the case in the other socialist countries during
the 1960s, the Polish project combined a fellowships programme and the setup
of a management center. Forty-three fellowships for a total cost of $100,000, on
the basis of 18 long-term periods of six months and 25 short term periods of two
months were granted over three years. The host countries were all situated in the
Capitalist West: primarily the United Kingdom, France and Sweden, secondly the
Federal Republic of Germany and Belgium; three fellows went to Australia and
one to Japan. Twelve fellowships were also awarded to members of the new Cen-
tre’s staff, which had already been established in 1960 with the help of ILO ex-
perts. The national Management Development Centre (CODKK), the first of this
kind in Eastern Europe was installed in a proper Building at the end of 1960.
In 1962, more than a thousand people could attend the courses including senior
executives from ministries and leading industries. In 1965, a computer was pur-
chased through the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), and was
installed after a long negotiation under the supervision of a British team.²⁶
 Andrzej Korbonski, “The politics of economic reforms in Eastern Europe: The last thirty
Years,” Soviet Studies, 41, no. 1 (1989): 1– 19.
 See Zdenĕk, Mošna, “The New Economic System and Management Development in Czecho-
slovakia,” International Labour Review, 3 (1967): 61–81.
 For a brief history of the Centre, see National Management development Centre Poland. Re-
port prepared for the Government of Poland by the International Labour Organisation acting as
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This undertaking was, as David Morse had recommended in his 1958 report, a
joint project between the ILO and local agencies. At the end of the 1960s, the
last ILO experts left and the Centre became completely independent²⁷.
Drawing from the Polish experience, emphatically celebrated as a successful
model, ILO officials developed programmes of this kind in other Eastern Europe-
an and later on in newly decolonized countries. The setup of the UNDP in 1965,
while allowing governments to contribute in their national currency, facilitated
applications from socialist countries.²⁸ The same year the Bulgarian and Roma-
nian Government requested the newly founded UNDP /Special Fund (UNDP/S) to
provide technical assistance in establishing management training centers in
Sofia and Bucarest. Both projects started in 1967, and both were very large in
scope: Four hundred and 57 expert’s man-months were allocated to Bulgaria
and 202 man-month fellowships were distributed. The Romanian Management
Center (CEPECA) was set up in 1967 thanks to a UNDP allocation of 1,985,900
USD and a government contribution of 4,307,867 USD.²⁹ The Hungarian govern-
ment applied for the same kind of programme in February 1966 and – in antici-
pation – a management development center (OVK) was set up in April 1966
under the direction of Imre Laszlo and the supervision of the Minister of Labour.
The UNDP Governing Council approved the project in June 1967 and provided
228 man-month experts and 195 man-month fellowships. The ILO was responsi-
ble for the recruitment of the international experts teaching in the center and or-
ganized the fellowships programme, which was mostly reserved for the centre’s
staff. For the ILO, “the creation of the Management Development Centre in Hun-
gary was an essential factor for the development of the country’s economy,” and
instrumental to prepare the economic reforms of 1968.³⁰ Unlike the other coun-
tries already mentioned, Czechoslovakia, the most developed Eastern Bloc coun-
try (alongside with the GDR) could build on a long tradition of scientific manage-
executing agency for the Special Fund Sector of the United Nations Development Programme (Gen-
eva: International Labour Office,1966).
 National Management Development Centre Poland, Report for the government of Poland (Gen-
eva: International Labour Office, 1966): 29.
 For the larger context of “bridge building” in the mid-1960s and the exchange of know how
in the field of cybernetic and management, see Leena Riska-Campbell, Bridging East and West:
The Establishment of the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA) in the United
States Foreign Policy of Bridge Building, 1964– 1972 (Finnish Society of Science and Letters, 2011),
Eglė Rindzevičiūtė, The Power of Systems: How Policy Sciences Opened up the Cold War World
(Ithaca, London: Cornell University Press, 2016), and Michael Hutter’s chapter in this volume.
 ILOA UNDP ROM/67/502. Report on project results, conclusions and recommendations, Gen-
eva, Sept. 1972.
 ILOA UNDP 7/B09/256 Report in Project results conclusions and recommendations, July 1971.
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ment.³¹ The first international congress of scientific management of work had
been held in Prague in 1924, under the supervision of the newly founded Masar-
yk Academy of Labour.³² During the 1930s, the Shoe factory Bata was regarded
among experts of labor management as an exemplary place where the combina-
tion of scientific organization of labor and democratic management in small
teams had been successfully implemented. The reformist communist regime in-
herited this expertise and could establish its own Institute of management with-
out asking for international support.³³ Faculties of Management were set up at
the Schools of Economics in both Prague and Bratislava.³⁴ Nevertheless, intellec-
tual exchanges with the West were still vital for the Czechoslovak experts and
strongly encouraged by the political authorities during the 1960s. In this period,
there was a marked interest in two issues: the teaching of the workforce to adapt
to automation and the training of top managers. In 1965, the Czechoslovak au-
thorities applied for fellowships to send their top managers to the newly opened
Turin center. By 1969 they could already participate in high-level management
courses.³⁵ These exchanges were not stopped by ‘Normalisation’: in 1972– 1974
seminars for top managers on rationalization in industrial enterprises were or-
ganized in Prague, Bratislava and Ostrava under the supervision of the ILO.³⁶
Conversely, with the financial and logistic support of the UNDP, in 1970 Czecho-
slovak authorities were able to organize a seminar on management in Jiloviste
(close to Prague), in which 45 top managers and academics, mainly from devel-
oping countries participated. In a nutshell, in the 1960s Eastern European coun-
tries became involved in a larger and global circulation of management knowl-
edge.
Moreover, even after the communist elites put an end to the economic re-
forms initiated in the 1960s and reinforced central planning (at least in Czecho-
slovakia, Romania, Bulgaria and the GDR) these management centers remained
active, but functioned in closer association with the party and state apparatus. In
1971, the Romanian CEPECA was absorbed by the Stefan Gheorghiu academy led
 Regarding this, see also the contribution of Vítězslav Sommer in this volume.
 http://www.mua.cas.cz/en/masaryk-academy-of-labour-masarykova-akademie-prace-685
(accessed January 2017).
 See also the contribution of Vítězslav Sommer in this volume.
 Report on the Seminar Management Development in Practice, Jiloviste, Czecholsovakia, Janu-
ary, ILO, Management Development Series, 9, 1970 (Geneva: International Labour Office, 1970).
 ILOA TAP 0– 17
 ILOA UNDP 17–2-B-1–1
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by the Communist party³⁷ and “brought under the control of the political ma-
chine.”³⁸ The same holds true for the Bulgarian management center which
was included in the Academy of Social Science and Social Management³⁹ as
early as 1969.
These institutions were used as training centers for the new generation of ca-
dres. During the second phase of economic development in all socialist coun-
tries, political loyalty was no longer sufficient to attain leading economic posi-
tions; technical and managerial competencies were bitterly needed. The new
cadres of the socialist regimes were thus largely trained in these institutes,
which functioned in close symbiosis with Western managerial culture. In Bulga-
ria the management training center was supervised by Mr Tsankov, first deputy
minister of the ministry of labor and social welfare, and became an Institute for
training administrative cadres.⁴⁰ The Romanian CEPECA became one of three
centers forming the Central Institute for Management Development for the Eco-
nomic and State administration.⁴¹ As a result, in all Eastern European countries
a new class of internationalized technocrats began to emerge and could build a
bridge between both Blocs.
A trans-bloc epistemic community?
The ILO Programme of Management launched in 1958 was drafted by Donald K.
David, former Dean of the Harvard school of Business Administration and, at the
time, Chairman of the Ford foundation. This clearly underlines the role played by
two major actors: Harvard Business School and the Ford Foundation. They dis-
seminated a particular US/Western managerial culture and continued to promote
the scientific organization of work inherited from Ford.⁴² Nevertheless, the Man-
agement Development Branch at the ILO was not directly linked to the powerful
US management expert sphere, but was set up and led by the British expert Rhys
 For a closer contextualisation, see Anna-Maria Catanus,”Official and Unofficial Futures of
the Communism System Romanian Futures Studies between Control and Dissidence,” in The
Struggle for the Long-Term in Transnational Science and Politics Forging the Future, ed. Jenny An-
dersson and Eglė Rindzevičiūtė (New York: Routledge, 2015), 170– 192.
 ILO MI 221–11 C.R Wynnes-Roberts Report on mission to Romania 17–24 October 1971.
 ILOA UNDP, 10–2-B-2– 1–1technical report 1, July 1971.
 ILOA MI 221–11 Wynne-Roberts’ mission to Bulgaria October 1971.
 ILO MI 221– 11 C.R Wynnes-Roberts’ Report on mission to Rumania 17–24 October 1971.
 Giuliana Gemelli, From imitation to Competitive Cooperation. Ford Foundation and Manage-
ment Education in Western Europe (1950’s-1970’s) (Florence: EUI, working papers, I and II, 1997).
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Wynne-Roberts.⁴³ Under his leadership, the ILO developed a model largely in-
spired by the relatively new-born British management culture.⁴⁴ Wynne-Roberts’
Manual of Management used by the ILO experts and republished in 1969, was
“based on the British Standard Glossary of Terms in Work Study published in
1959.”⁴⁵ The people acknowledged in the introduction all belonged to the
same circle⁴⁶.
Moreover, experts sent to Eastern European countries to set up the manage-
ment centers or organize seminars largely (but not exclusively) came from the UK
and only secondarily from the US. Among the seven experts invited to give a lec-
ture in the seminar held in Jilovitse (near Prague) in 1970, four came from the UK
and one from the US. As for the remaining two, one was programme manager of
the IBM International School in the Netherlands, and the other one the sales
training manager of Caterpillar in Geneva. Between 1972 and 1975, the famous
British Cranfield School of Management in Bedford subcontracted the three sem-
inars on the rationalization of industrial enterprises in Czechoslovakia.⁴⁷ In the
Hungarian case, even if the experts originated from 12 countries (including
USSR, Poland, Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria) the three successive project direc-
tors as well as the computer specialists were British.
This centrality of British management in the ILO is astonishing considering
that management education was comparatively underdeveloped in the UK. Be-
side the personal role played by Wynne-Robert himself and the linguistic re-
quirements imposed by the programme, which gave an immense advantage to
the English-speaking experts, three structural reasons can explain this situation.
First, in the interwar years,with Lyndall Urwick⁴⁸ as a director of the Internation-
al Scientific Management Institute between 1929 and 1933, the British manage-
 ILOA P file 7045
 Mildred Wheatcroft, The Revolution in British Management Education (London: Pitman,
1970), and John F Wilson and Andrew Thomson, The Making of Modern Management: British
Management in Historical Perspective (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006).
 International Labour Office, Work study, (Geneva: International Labour Office, 1969),vii–viii.
 Dr. T. U. Matthew, formerly Lucas Professor of Engineering Production, Birmingham Univer-
sity, Mr. F. de P. Hanika of the Royal Technical College, Glasgow, and Mr.Winston M. Rodgers of
the United Kingdom Department of Scientific and Industrial Research, an agency which was set
up by the British government during the First World War.
 ILOA UNDP.17–2-B-1– 1– 1.
 On Urwick see Edward Brech, and alii, Lyndall Urwick, Management Pioneer: A Biography
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010). More precisely on the importance of Urwick in the
UK see Wilson R Guerriero, “The struggle for management education in Britain: The Urwick Com-
mittee and the Office Management Association,” Management and Organizational History 6,
no. 4 (2011): 367–389.
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ment culture and networks had already played an important role in the ILO. Sec-
ond, the Glossary, to which Wynne-Roberts referred to justify the exclusive use of
British terminology, was established by a tripartite committee in which employ-
ers and the British Trades Union Congress (TUC) had a seat and “represent[ed]
the outcome of their collective thinking.” ⁴⁹ This tripartite collaboration was in
line with the ILO culture and in tune with the way scientific management had
been conceived by its officials. From the 1920s onward, the French first Director
of the ILO, Albert Thomas, and his British deputy director Harold Butler tried to
find ways to involve the trade unions in the management process. Unlike some of
the members of the American Management Association close to Rockefeller and
US big business, Thomas and Butler did not limit management to a technical tool
in the hands of engineers or salaried managers. In close cooperation with Mary
van Kleeck and the International Industrial Relations Institute, they approached
management as intrinsically linked to industrial relations, a field that, since the
pioneering work of Beatrice and Sidney Webbs at the end of the nineteenth cen-
tury, had a long tradition in the UK.⁵⁰ Inside the ILO machinery, this approach of
management through industrial relations could set the basis of a consensus be-
tween workers and employers, a consensus which was even more necessary, as
there was a long tradition of hostility toward scientific management in a large
part of the trades union movement, in particular in Southern Europe. ⁵¹ By con-
trast, British trade unionists viewed themselves and their mode of action as a
necessary condition for the achievement of industrial democracy, which relied
on well-managed industrial relations. In the management development pro-
gramme presented in 1958, the articulation between organization of work, the
training of managers, and industrial relations was again mentioned, but the in-
dustrial relation dimension of the project became clearly marginalized and the
emphasis was put on the training of managers.⁵² Moreover, that is the third rea-
son which has to be mentioned, employers were deeply involved and interested
in the development and spread of a new management culture. For their part,
British employers and managers stressed the importance of using the new tech-
nology of computers to implement a scientific management programme. Since
the end of World War Two operational research which had been widely devel-
 International Labour Office, Work study, (Geneva: International Labour Office, 1969), viii.
 As for the role of the Webbs, the British tradition and the paradoxical late institutionalisa-
tion of management studies in British higher education institutions, see Bruce E. Kaufman, The
Global Evolution of Industrial Relations: Events, Ideas and the IIRA (Geneva: International Labour
Office, 2004) 81–217.
 Cayet, Rationaliser le travail, 109–135,
 Report of the Governing Body (Geneva: International Labour Office, 1959, 143) 112– 115.
The Social Engineering Project 133
oped by the British Army during the war,⁵³ made its entry into the business sec-
tor, and the British Operation Research Quarterly launched in 1950 was the first
journal in this emerging research field⁵⁴. The new computational industry was
heavily involved in and was pushing for the recognition of “management sci-
ence,” as it was called.⁵⁵ Thus, it does not come as a surprise that most of the
management training centers set up in Eastern Europe by the ILO received com-
puters financed and installed through the UNDP by British firms, beginning with
the Poles, which purchased computer equipment from the International Comput-
ers and Tabulators, Ltd. in London (later ICL) for $209,000. The same company
installed the computer of the Hungarian management-training center. As stated
in the report, the use of the computer was modelled after the British example.⁵⁶
In Bulgaria the Manpower Development Programme was managed by John Mc
Donald, a US civil servant. McDonald was working with a local team consisting
of eight people, among them five experts from the UK.⁵⁷ He entertained very good
relationships with the local representative of the British International Computers
limited (ICL) which was also in charge of the computerization of the hotel book-
ing system.⁵⁸
On the other side, there was a consensus among the experts sent by the ILO
that the success of the project was tightly linked to the possibility of developing
good contacts with local experts and the possibility of working together as a
team.⁵⁹ In Eastern European countries, a group of people already internationally
connected established the first contacts. In the 1950s and at the beginning of the
1960s experts who hade developped a close relationship with international or-
 Dominique Pestre, “Understanding and assessing complex systems to wage total war. OR
and the Prime Minister Statistical Branch in the United Kingdom, 1939– 1942,” in Engaged. Sci-
ence in Practice from Renaissance to the Present, ed. Mario Biagioli and Jessika Riskin (London:
Palgrave, 2012), 83– 102 and Dominique Pestre, “Repenser les variantes du complexe militaire –
industriel – universitaire,” in Les Sciences pour la guerre, 1940– 1960, ed. Dominique Pestre and
Amy Dahan (Paris: Presses de l’EHESS, 2004), 195–221.
 Dominique Pestre, “La recherche opérationnelle pendant la dernière guerre et ses suites, la
pensée des systèmes,”, Revue scientifique et technique de la défense 54 (2001), 63–69.
 See the PhD thesis of Cédric Neumann, De la mécanographie à l’informatique. Le relations
entre catégorisation des techniques, groupes professionnels et transformations des savoirs mana-
gériaux, Thèse (Paris: ParisX, 2013), 172–244.
 ILOA UNDP 7/B09/256 Report in Project results conclusions and recommendations, July 1971,
p.37.
 As an example, see Robert Hyman, “The historical evolution of British industrial relations,”
in Industrial Relations, Theory and Practice, ed. P. Edwards (Oxford: Blackwell, 2003).
 ILOA MI 221 Wynne-Roberts Report on mission to Bulgaria, 10– 17 October 1970.
 ILOA TAP14– 130.
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ganizations in the interwar years, like the Polish ergonomist Jan Rosner, played
an important intermediary role. In this regard, a common socialization within
the ranks of social democratic parties seems to have helped to maintain the
links since socialist exiles in the West could easily reconnect with former
party members who had been forced to join the communist parties after 1947.
Anton Zelenka was one of these figures; as an ILO official he declined the invi-
tation to go back to Czechoslovakia after 1947 but was able to maintain links to
his home country through his relations with Evzen Erban. A former member of
the social democratic party, Erban had joined the Communist Party and become
a minister for social affairs in the new Czechoslovakia. ⁶⁰
In general, in the 1960s, the reformers who could also have been former so-
cial democrats were crucial for the start of negotiations with the international
organizations and the setting up of these management programmes. This was
the case of what ILO experts labelled the “Men of October” in Poland. In Czecho-
slovakia, Karel Padevĕt, member of the State Committee for Technical Develop-
ment, professor Pernica from the Prague School of Economics, or Zdenĕk Mošna,
dean of the faculty of management, Prague School of Economics, all reformers,
played crucial roles. ⁶¹ The same holds true for Romania, where the mathemati-
cian and philosopher Mircea Maliţa¸ at that time deputy of the Foreign Ministry,
was instrumental in the launching of CEPECA.⁶²
However, the number of people who got involved in these programmes went
well beyond this narrow group. As stated in a report for Bulgaria,
Shortly after the project was approved by the UNDP, the Government established a scheme
for management training for virtually everyone in a responsible position in the country in-
cluding party, trade union, Komsomol managing staffs, local leaders, managers of state and
cooperative farms, heads of functional divisions of ministries, district people’s councils.
The management Development Centre was designated to carry out courses at the first
three levels of management, namely Ministers,Vice-Ministers and Director-general of trusts
and state enterprises.⁶³.
 See ILOA SI-0–17 correspondence about social security between Zelenka and Erban.
 Zdenĕk Mošna, “The New Economic System and Management Development in Czechoslova-
kia,” International Labour Review 3 (1967): 61–81.
 Anna-Maria Catanus, “Official and Unofficial Futures of the Communism System Romanian
Futures Studies between Control and Dissidence,” in The Struggle for the Long-Term, ed. Ander-
sson, and Rindzevičiūtė, 173.
 ILO UNDP, 10–2-B-2–1–1 Technical report 2, November 1971.
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Between 1967 and 1972, 16,000 managers participated in training programmes
run by the Romanian CEPECA.⁶⁴ In Hungary, between 1969 and 1971, 1,454 indi-
viduals – company directors, chiefs of section in ministries as well as chief en-
gineers and assistant company directors – attended courses offered by the Man-
agement Centre in Budapest. Taking into account the fact that experts who wrote
the reports were not bound by the use of “diplomatic” language,which prevailed
among international civil servants, it is worth mentioning that the relations be-
tween foreign experts and the trainees were generally defined as “excellent.”
A global language for planning
economic progress
In fact Western experts and Eastern trainees shared a common “modern” belief
in the possibility of planning and engineering the economy and society. Apart
from some remarks concerning Bulgaria,⁶⁵ Western experts barely mentioned
the fact that they were acting in a different economic system. In 1977, ILO offi-
cials even played with the idea of transforming the Bulgarian center into a Re-
gional institute for the Balkans that they could use to train managers from
Greece, Turkey, Romania, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia, regardless of their country
of origin.⁶⁶
This common language was based on two assumptions. First, the increase of
productivity was a non-questioned prerequisite and was regarded as a precondi-
tion for the general increase of wealth. In socialist countries in which the Com-
munist Party was supposed to represent the workers and to lead the country in
their interest, the increase of wealth generated by the productivity gains was
supposed to be redistributed by the state; it was a technical and not a social
issue. Second, all social discontent and conflicts were to be solved within the ex-
isting economic and social framework by applying good management tools with-
out really questioning the verticality of the power relations within the enterpris-
es.⁶⁷ In that respect, socialist countries in which the trade unions played the role
 ILOA UNDP, 52–2-B-1–1 Review mission, Schiefelbusch, 18/04/1975.
 “In contrast to Rumania the Bulgarian authorities want to ensure that management and
management training in particular remain fully within the Marxist Leninist framework.” ILOA
MI 221 Report, Wynne-Roberts, Oct. 1970.
 ILOA UNDP 10–2-C-2–2, report July 1977
 Johanna Bockmann,Markets in the Name of Socialism :The Left-Wing Origins of Neoliberalism
(Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2011) and Yves Cohen, Le siècle des chefs: une
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of transmission belts – in the Leninist language – of the party and the state were
very convenient partners for the ILO experts.
In general terms, from the experts’ point of view, there was no doubt that the
Western expertise should be exported to countries,which were not primarely per-
ceived as socialist but as less developed. Wynnes Roberts made it clear in 1971
during a stay in Hungary: “There are a lot of things they [the leadership] still
do not understand. In two years’ time, I hope, they will have come to grip
with reality and have understood better the sort of recommendations which
the ILO experts including myself have been making to them and which they
have tended to reject largely from sheer ignorance”⁶⁸.
In return, precisely because Eastern European countries were seen as being
in a position of relative backwardness, their newly trained experts were consid-
ered particularly well suited to re-export the newly acquired knowledge to the
decolonized and underdeveloped countries, and thus to become bridge builders
between the First and the Third World. In 1964 the medical adviser, Dr. J. Now-
acki of the Polish CODKK in Warsaw was already seconded as an adviser to the
Ghanaian government.⁶⁹ This function became institutionalized during the 1970s
in the framework of the UNDP; Bulgaria and Romania played the role of go-be-
tween, a role that the communist leadership endorsed easily.⁷⁰ The Romanian
CEPECA developed as an international center in 1973 and managers coming
from developing countries could follow the programme free of charge. In 1974,
53 participants from 19 African and Asian countries attended courses at the CE-
PECA; ILO experts stressed that the Romanians were in a better position to un-
derstand the problems that developing countries had to face when acquiring and
implementing new management methods.⁷¹ When the ILO expert George Boul-
den taught management courses in the Bulgarian city of Varna in 1983, ILO offi-
cials encouraged the Bulgarian authorities to export this knowledge to Cuba.
However, the existence and circulation of a common language on manage-
ment did not mean that the various stakeholders used it for the same purposes.
When the Ford Foundation developed a programme of fellowships in 1968– 1969
histoire transnationale du commandement et de l’autorité (1890– 1940) (Paris: Éditions Amster-
dam, 2013).
 ILOA MI 221 Report, Wynne-Roberts on mission to Hungary 17–24 January 1971.
 National Management Development Centre Poland, Report prepared for the government of Po-
land by the ILO acting as executing agency for the Special Fund Sector of the United Development
Programme (Geneva: International Labour Office, 1966), 30.
 See also in this reagard the role played by the United Nations Industrial Development Organ-
ization.
 ILOA UNDP 52–2-b-1– 1, Rabenold to Stig Andersen (UNDP Regional Bureau).
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to train Hungarian⁷² as well as Czechoslovak⁷³ top managers in the US,⁷⁴ it was
clearly a way to subvert socialist values. This led to tense discussions among the
Eastern European countries at the beginning of the 70s. The GDR, which was the
most developed country in the Bloc and the most identified with “socialism,”
heavily criticized the use of these training management centers, which for its
leaders were just a way to spread capitalist management culture in a socialist
economy.⁷⁵
Meanwhile communist managers knew how to use this international man-
agement-culture for their own needs. After having taken advantage of manage-
ment development programmes to train their cadres in the context of the eco-
nomic reforms, the communist leadership began to pursue other objectives, as
made clear by the Hungarian authorities. In 1972, with the beginning of the
new Five Year Plan, they decided to put an end to the training course programme
but remained interested in computerization. More generally, it seems that one
main objective of the communist leadership was to acquire computers. If the So-
viet Union as well as the GDR did produce computers, they never mastered this
technology at the level of the capitalist West. The UNDP offered a relatively easy
way for both Eastern European regimes and Western businessmen to bypass the
embargo on Western technology imposed by the Coordinating Committee for
Multilateral Export Controls (CoCom).⁷⁶ This was facilitated by the fact that, un-
like the Expanded Programme of Technical Assistance, all countries could con-
tribute to UNDP in their own currencies this solved the difficult problem of pay-
ing for technology in very scarce hard currencies. Thus, through UNDP, Eastern
European countries could get access to computers, which, for their communist
 Berlin-SAPMO (Archives oft the Party and mass Organizations of the FRG in the Federal ar-
chives) DY 3023–802 Bl. 204. Information der Botschaft der DDR in der UVR.Wirtschaftspoliti-
sche Abteilung. Budapest, den 7.3.1968
 ILOA Z 1/17/1.
 On the Ford foundation, see Peter D Bell, “The Ford Foundation as a Transnational Actor,”
International Organization 25, no. 3 (1971): 465‐478 and Berman, Edward H. The Ideology of Phi-
lanthropy: The Influence of the Carnegie, Ford, and Rockefeller Foundations on American Foreign
Policy (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1983) and above all Gemelli, From imitation.
 SAPMO DY 34 / 12515. Information über die Konferenz der Vertreter der Ministerien für Arbeit
der RGW-Staaten am 19 4 1973 in Bukarest zum Tagesordnungpunkt-Fragen der ILO.
 On the CoCom in its earlier phase see Egil Førland, Cold Economic Warfare: CoCom and the
Forging of Strategic Export Controls, 1948– 1954 (Dordrecht: Republic of Letters, 2009) and Mi-
chael Mastanduno, Economic containment: CoCom and the politics of East-West trade (Ithaca,
N.Y: Cornell University Press, 1992). Even if the CoCom never succeeded in organizing a full em-
bargo, it was nevertheless an obstacle for economic exchanges, in particular for high technolog-
ical products.
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leadership, were a crucial tool to make the central planned economy run prop-
erly. As clearly stated in the Bulgarian case in 1982 : “The task of analysing and
collecting the mass of information required in a planned economy would be
enormously facilitated by the use of electronic data processing methods. State
ownership and control of industry produce conditions which are particularly
susceptible to treatment and analysis by computers, which can assist manage-
ment decision-making in many ways.”⁷⁷ But if centrally planned economies,
which relied on processing very large amounts of data, were in particular need
of computers, both capitalist and socialist societies alike shared the belief that
computers should be an essential tool to run the economy as well as to engineer
society and manage people in enterprises. In Western countries, it became a
widespread conviction in the 1960s that management could be a scientific activ-
ity, based on collecting and circulating information and not just on charismatic
leadership.⁷⁸ Operational research, which developed along with the computeri-
zation of big firms, is a perfect example of the rise of this new common mana-
gerial culture. For Western engineers, computers should help to decentralize au-
thority, to promote participation and to ensure that each manager or cadre
becomes accountable for his/her achievements. Management by objectives and
on specific projects were promoted simultaneously in Eastern European industri-
al combines.⁷⁹
So one can wonder whether and to what extent this circulation of knowledge
had, in return, an impact on Western management culture, and if socialist coun-
tries became a testing ground for the exportation of management techniques
from the private to the public sector. Until the end of the 1970s, there was still
a large public industrial sector in most Western European countries. In France,
Polish or Romanian fellows were first sent to public and nationalized enterpris-
es.⁸⁰ In Great Britain as well as in Norway, the public sector was the first to push
for the implementation of management schools, while private business was rath-
er reluctant.⁸¹ In France, the planning authority (Commissariat général au plan)
strongly supported the development of operational research. In all countries, the
 ILOA UNDP 10–2-B-2– 1– 1 Report, George Boulden March 1985.
 See the contribution by Isabelle Gouarné in this volume.
 Norman Giles, Management by objectives (Bucharest/Paris: International Labour Office,
1970) 70B09/472.
 ILOA UNDP 52–2-b-1– 1 Chevron to Tidmarsh May 1973.
 Amdam Rolv Petter and Gunnar Yittri, “The European Productivity Agency, The Norwegian
Productivity Institute and Management Education,” in Missionaries and Managers: American In-
fluences on European Management Education, 1945–60, ed., Terry Gourvish and Nick Tiratsoo
(Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1998) 121– 140.
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military was one of the driving forces behind these social engineering projects.
Rather than the sheer exporting of a Western model of management, we should
rather describe this process as an encounter between managerial cultures based
on deep technocratic convergences.
Conclusion
This chapter has shown that an important exchange and circulation of expertise
in the field of management between Western and Eastern Europe developed be-
tween the 1960s and the 1980s. This circulation took several forms: fellowships
programmes, organization of seminars and above all the creation of large man-
agement centers in the framework of the UNDP, and with support coming from
the Ford Foundation’s management programmes. All these contributed to the ex-
portation of a Western management culture to Eastern Europe; a large part of the
top and middle management of socialist Eastern European countries ended up
being trained in seminars and courses taught by Western and US European ex-
perts. One first and early conclusion of this finding could be that long before
the opening of the wall, capitalist values had already penetrated the socialist
East. We have shown, however, that the reality is much more complex; the fol-
lowing concluding remarks open wider questions, which open new fields of re-
search.
First, management should be interpreted as part of a larger social engineer-
ing and social planning project deeply rooted in common modernist objectives.
In both Blocs, management was expected to help raising productivity and to pro-
duce wealth. For the capitalist West it was an essential part of the Fordist com-
promise and the pre-condition of welfare capitalism. For the socialist East, man-
agement was a crucial tool in the proper functioning of the state planned
economy. In both Blocs it was a way to enforce discipline and control within
companies and state enterprises.
Second, management implemented in the Eastern European Bloc countries
by Western European experts should also be seen as part of the operational re-
search and cybernetic turn, which went hand in hand with a belief in the possi-
bility of the computerization of decision-making.⁸² A wider circulation of com-
puters is closely linked to this conception of management. On one side,
Eastern European countries could obtain computers, which were not easily avail-
 See the contributions of Michael Hutter and Jenny Andersson in this volume
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able in the Bloc through the UNDP. On the other side,Western European (mainly
British) firms could enter new markets.
This – a third conclusive point – stands in line with longer term dependen-
cies. Since the nineteen century Eastern Europe has been regarded by the West
as a European periphery, the newly founded countries received relief and aid for
rehabilitation (in the aftermath of both wars) as well as development aid. At the
beginning of the Cold War, this aid dried out while these countries went through
a period of rapid industrialization and a development phase connected to the
“construction of socialism.” In the eyes of international organization experts,
they became a semi-periphery, and were very well suited to becoming a bridge
between the fully developed West and the newly decolonized countries.
On these grounds – and this is the fourth conclusive point – this knowledge
transfer was made possible thanks to the rise of a new class of Eastern European
managers or cadres, who were ready for the changes which would occur after the
fall of the Berlin wall⁸³.
In order to grasp the deep meaning and consequences of this circulation,
more research should be done in the archives of the Eastern European countries
themselves. This could help us to decipher how Eastern European cadres as well
as the workers on the shop floor took up – or, on the contrary, rejected – this
Western management culture. Conversely, important questions remain unan-
swered regarding the precise intellectual context in which Western expertise
was shaped and the political and economic motivations of the experts. Finally
yet importantly, one can wonder to what extent this exchange also had an im-
pact in the West and could have fostered the long-term success of the New Public
Management.
 Bockman, Markets, Gil Eyal, Iván Szelényi, Eleanor R Townsley, Making Capitalism without
Capitalists: Class Formation and Elite Struggles in Post-Communist Central Europe (London;
New York: Verso, 1998); Gil Eyal, The Origins of Postcommunist Elites: From Prague Spring to
the Breakup of Czechoslovakia (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2003).
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Sari Autio-Sarasmo
Transferring Western Knowledge to a
centrally planned Economy: Finland and the
Scientific-Technical Cooperation with the
Soviet Union
Super power competition, the arms race, division and conflict between different
socio-economic systems determine our understanding of East-West relations dur-
ing the Cold War era. The US-led high technology embargo, CoCom, which con-
trolled all technology transfers that might have had strategic importance be-
tween the West and the Soviet Union, dominated the state of affairs in the
field of technology and trade. In this context, the attempt by the Soviet Union
to modernize¹ seemed impossible. In spite of the hindrances created by the
East-West division, the Soviet Union managed to create a system of technology
transfers with Western European states that was functional, even during the
coldest phases of the Cold War era. Through the system of scientific-technical co-
operation (STC), the Soviet Union was able to establish official and inter-govern-
mental connections with Western European states, which created a vivid sphere
of East-West interaction in Europe.² In spite of the East-West divide, the Soviet
Union was an attractive trade partner, which helped to cooperate through the
STC with West European states during the Cold War decades.³
The Soviet STC with the Western European states was possible because it
took place “behind the scenes” that made the Soviet STC, in spite of the ideolog-
ical-political differences, functional and active from the mid-1950s until the end
of the Cold War. The STC is an interesting case study because it was launched
with a clear purpose to solve the problem of technology and related knowledge
in the situation when technological modernization was an imperative for the So-
 The author’s research has focused on the technological modernization in the Finnish Centre
of Excellence in Russian Studies “Choices of Russian Modernisation” coordinated by the Alek-
santeri Institute, University of Helsinki, Finland.
 Sari Autio-Sarasmo and Katalin Miklóssy, “The Cold War from New Perspective,” in Reassess-
ing Cold War Europe, ed. Sari Autio-Sarasmo and Katalin Miklóssy (Abingdon: Routledge, 2011),
1– 15.
 By the end of the 1970s, there were agreements with, among others, West Germany, France,
Italy, Japan, the UK, Austria, and Finland. M. Maksimova, “Economic Relations between the So-
cialist and the Capitalist Countries,” in Finnish-Soviet Economic Relations, ed. K. Möttölä, O.N.
Bykov and I.S. Korolev. (London: Macmillan Press, 1983), 23.
https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110534696-008
viet Union. The STC – and the East-West interaction based upon it – has been
missing from the Cold War historiography that has focused almost solely on
the macro level developments. The Soviet STC was practical cooperation on
micro level and remained thus nearly invisible at the level of superpower poli-
tics. In order to make the Soviet STC visible, the focus has been placed on
case studies. Neutral Finland, the first STC partner of the Soviet Union, offers
a good case study to investigate the STC cooperation in practice. During the
Cold War, Finland became one of the major mediators of Western technology
and related knowledge with the Soviet Union. State regulation and planning,⁴
which were closely connected to the system of the Finnish-Soviet trade and
the Soviet-Finnish STC, supported the process of mediation. This chapter aims
to analyze what kinds of processes of technology and knowledge transfers
took place between Finland and the Soviet Union during the Cold War. What
kinds of Western technologies were transferred, and how were the transfers dis-
seminated into the Soviet system? The following is based on materials collected
in Russian and Finnish archives, on contemporary studies, research literature,
and the author’s prior publications.
The Soviet technological modernization and the
system of STC
The Soviet scientific-technological cooperation (STC), launched in mid-1950s was
connected to the technological modernization of the Soviet economy project,
which was based on the acquisition of foreign technology and related knowhow.
As a leader of the new superpower, Nikita Khrushchev (1956– 1964) followed the
model adapted by Peter the Great and the strategy that had been determining
factor in the modernization project by Lenin and Stalin, that is, to borrow ad-
vanced Western technology in order to move quickly forward. Khrushchev’s suc-
cessor Leonid Brezhnev (1964– 1982) continued on the same path in order to
maintain the Soviet superpower status amid hardening East-West competition.
The technological modernization was needed to strengthen the resilience of
the Soviet economy and to transform extensive economic growth into intensive
one. The Soviet Union had to compete with the United States as an equal com-
 In this chapter, planning is understood through the system of mixed economy in Finland and
Finnish-Soviet clearing trade, i.e. the balanced flows of goods that were fixed to match with the
Soviet five-year plans. The five-year planning horizon proved to be beneficial for the research
and development (R&D) activities of the Finnish enterprises.
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panion in order to prove the superiority of the socialist system and to be a credi-
ble leader for the socialist bloc.⁵ Being far from autarky, the Soviet Union had to
seek interaction with Western states.⁶ The adopted modernization plan was
based on serious planning, and on taking advantage of the existing connections
with Western states in Europe with the aim to “catch up.”
The key objective for the Soviet STC “to faster exploit the achievements of
science and technology and the new methods of production”⁷ set the goals,
and illustrates well the Soviet aims in its cooperation with the West. The main
actor in the Soviet STC was the State Committee of Science and Technology
(GKNT),⁸ which organized and coordinated all technology and know-how trans-
fer and mediated information, propagated new practices, and took care of the
diffusion of new technologies and related knowledge in the Soviet Union.⁹ The
STC created a system of reciprocal and bidirectional transfers of technology
and related knowledge between the partners.
The Soviet technological modernization project was an extraordinary en-
deavor. The Soviet military-industrial complex was capable of creating the com-
petitive high technology of which the successful space program was a good ex-
ample. Technology transfers from abroad were needed because there were hardly
any ties between the high-prioritized military sector and civilian industry, which
 Sheila Fitzpatrick, The Russian Revolution, 2nd edition, (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1994), 19; P. Gregory and R. Stuart, Soviet and Post-Soviet Economic Structure and Performance,
5th edition, (New York: Harper-Collins, 1994), 8; See also Philip Hanson, The Rise and Fall of the
Soviet Economy: An Economic History of the USSR from 1945 (London: Longman, 2003), 62; Sari
Autio-Sarasmo, “Soviet Economic Modernisation and Transferring the Technologies from the
West,” in Modernisation in Russia since 1900, ed. Markku Kangaspuro and Jeremy Smith (Helsin-
ki: Finnish Literary Society [Studia Fennica Historica], 2006), 104– 123.
 Oscar Sanchez-Sibony, Red Globalization. The Political Economy of the Soviet Cold War from
Stalin to Khrushchev (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014).
 M. Kaje and O. Niitamo, “Scientific and Technical Cooperation Between a Small Capitalist
Country and big Socialist Country,” in Finnish-Soviet Economic Relations, ed. K. Möttölä, O. N.
Bykov and I.S. Korolev. (London: Macmillan Press, 1983), 143– 144.
 The establishment of GKNT was an outcome of a chain of reorganizations during 1957– 1965.
The idea of the state committee remained much the same, in spite of different names. The final
name Gosudarstvennyi komitet po nauki i tekhnologii SSSR (GKNT) was the final result and exist-
ed between 1965– 1991. Russian State Archive of the Economy (RGAE) fond 9480, opis’ 2. The
GKNT was part of the wider structure of collection of information in the Soviet Union together
with KGB and military intelligence GRU that were in charge of the illegal transfer of technology.
 Russian State Archive of Contemporary History (RGANI), fond 5, opis’ 40, delo 52, list 1–6;
RGANI fond 5, opis’. 40, delo 52, list 13– 19; RGANI fond 5, opis’ 40, delo 121, list 29–30.
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was not able to benefit from the innovations in the military-industrial complex.¹⁰
In order to enhance the resilience of the economy, the Soviet leadership adopted
the Western post-World War Two model of economic growth. The model was
based on the transformation of extensive economic growth on an intensive
one with the help of developed technology, especially automation. Due to the rel-
atively low level of technological knowhow in the socialist bloc, the Soviet Union
needed foreign technology in order to keep up with extremely fast technological
development.¹¹ Transfer of technology through the system of the STC was a sol-
ution for that problem.
In this context, the major benefit was that the Soviet STC was based on in-
tergovernmental agreements and thus an official way to transfer Western tech-
nology and technology-related knowledge to facilitate the Soviet modernization
project. Through the system of the STC, the Soviet Union was not only able to
gain technology but also knowledge and expertize connected with the technol-
ogy that was needed to facilitate technological development and to boost domes-
tic innovations in the Soviet Union. In spite of the CoCom, there were ways to
obtain the desired technology through illegal trade and spying.¹² These chan-
nels, however, did not further the modernization project of the Soviet Union.
In order to profit from the transferred technology, it needed knowledge to use,
 The Soviet military-industrial complex, the prioritized nine ministries, devyatka ‘group of
nine’ in the 1960s and 1970s included ministry of aircraft industry, defence industry, general ma-
chine building industry, medium machine industry, radiotechnology industry, electrotechnical
industry, ship building industry, machine building and communication device industry. In the
1960s, the priority was on rocket technology. N.S. Simonov, VPK SSSR: Tempy ekonomicheskovo
rosta, struktura, organizatsija proizvodstvo, upravlenie [Military-industrial complex SSSR: Tempo
of economic growth, structure, organisation of production and management]. Izdanie 2, (Univer-
sitet Dmitria Pozharskovo, Moskva 2015), 482; Irina B. Bystrova, Sovetskij voenno-promyshlennij
kompleks: problemy stanovlenija i razvitija 1930– 1980 gody [The Soviet military-industrial com-
plex: problems of structuration and development 1930– 1980] (RAN: Institut Rossijskoi Istorii
Moskva, 2006).
 Sari Autio-Sarasmo, “Khrushchev and the challenge of technological progress,” in Khrush-
chev in the Kremlin. Policy and Government in the Soviet Union, 1953– 1964, ed. Jeremy Smith
and Melanie Ilic (Abingdon: Routledge, 2011),133–143.
 Philip Hanson, “The Soviet Union’s acquisition of Western technology after Stalin; Some
thoughts on people and connections,” in Reassessing Cold War Europe, ed. Sari Autio-Sarasmo
and Katalin Miklóssy (Abingdon: Routledge, 2011), 28–30; For an overview, see Christopher An-
drew, “Intelligence in the Cold War,” in The Cambridge History of the Cold War, vol II, ed. Melvyn
P. Leffler and Odd Arne Westad (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 430; In this
chapter, illegal transfers are not investigated.
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diffuse and refine it.¹³ The STC enabled the transfer of the technology-related
knowledge but it was also a way to establish bilateral cooperation that helped
to maintain and continue the knowledge transfers and the technology trade in
the future.
For the Soviet Union, neutral Finland was an easy choice as the first partner
for the STC. Finland was part of the Russian Empire as an autonomous grand
duchy from 1809. In 1917 Finland became independent and the two states con-
tinued the long tradition of bilateral trade until the “Winter War” broke out in
1939.¹⁴ After the peace treaty in 1945, the Soviet Union demanded Finnish war
reparations to focus on a certain type of technologies, which forced Finland to
develop a machine-building industry. This served the Soviet plan well of turning
Finnish production more in the direction of technology that was desired and
needed in the Soviet Union.¹⁵ The war reparations and the signing of the treaty
of friendship, cooperation and mutual assistance (FCMA) between Finland and
the Soviet Union in 1948 directed postwar relations and created the basis for
the Finnish-Soviet trade.
Finland became the first market economy country to sign a five-year agree-
ment on the exchange of goods with the Soviet Union; this was for the years
1951– 1955.¹⁶ In 1955, three years after the completion of war reparations, the
FCMA treaty was prolonged and the agreement of the Soviet-Finnish STC was
concluded.¹⁷ The Soviet-Finnish STC agreement was the first treaty between
 Philip Hanson, Trade and Technology in Soviet-Western Relations (London: Macmillan, 1981),
223; Gary Bertsch, “Technology Transfers and Technology Controls: a Synthesis of the Western-
Soviet Relationship,” in Technical Progress and Soviet Economic Development, ed. Ronald
Amann and Julian Cooper (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986), 127– 128; Ian Jackson, The
Economic Cold War. America, Britain and East–West Trade, 1948– 1963 (London: Palgrave, 2001).
 The Soviet Union attacked Finland on 30 November 1939 and the short war was called the
“Winter War.” After a short period of peace, the conflict started again in 1941 and lasted until
1944. The “Continuation War” was part of World War Two. After the peace in 1945 large areas
of Eastern Finland were annexed to the Soviet Union and Finland had to pay heavy war repar-
ations to the Soviet Union.
 Tatiana Androsova, “Economic interest in Soviet post-war policy in Finland,” in Reassessing
Cold War Europe, ed. Sari Autio-Sarasmo and Katalin Miklóssy (Abingdon: Routledge, 2011), 33;
Markku Kuisma, Kylmä sota, kuuma öljy. Neste, Suomi ja kaksi Eurooppaa [Cold War, hot oil. En-
terprise Neste, Finland and the divided Europe] (Helsinki: Werner Söderström Ltd, 1997).
 Juhani Laurila, Finnish-Soviet Clearing Trade and Payment System: History and Lessons (Hel-
sinki: Bank of Finland Studies A: 94, 1995), 30.
 “Sopimus tieteellis-teknillisestä yhteistoiminnasta Suomen tasavallan ja SNTL:n välillä,
16.8.1955” [Agreement on scientific-technical cooperation between the Republic of Finland
and the Soviet Union], http://www.finlex.fi/fi/sopimukset/sopsteksti/1955/19550030 (accessed
15 September 2017).
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any two states with different economic systems to agree upon scientific-technical
cooperation (STC) on a contemporary basis.¹⁸ Since the main targets for the So-
viet STC were the technologically more developed countries in Western Europe,
in the 1950s cooperation with Finland served as a model to establish connections
with the West and rehearse East-West interaction in practice.¹⁹ In spite of the fact
that during the early years of cooperation Finland served as a testing site for the
Soviet cooperation with the West, the STC agreement set the direction of the Fin-
nish-Soviet technology cooperation for years to come.
State regulation and planning:
Finnish-Soviet trade and the STC
The STC was strongly intertwined into the Soviet-Finnish trade. The trade was
based on state regulation and planning through the mixed economy system of
Finland. The Finnish-Soviet trade was based on the bilateral clearing system,
that is, the balanced flows of goods was fixed to match the Soviet administrative
and central management and planning system but in a way that did not hamper
the workings of the Finnish market economy. The clearing arrangements consist-
ed of five-year agreements and annual trade protocols. Each agreement deter-
mined the volume and content of trade for the forthcoming five-year period.
These agreements focused on the exchange of goods and set concrete targets
for trade by containing lists of imports and exports and specifying the value
and volume of delivered goods. The lists were prepared in cooperation with
the Finnish firms and Soviet foreign trade organizations. The prices of individual
deliveries were negotiated and contracted between a supplier and a purchaser.
The positive side of the system was that trade was foreseeable due to the long
 A. Romanov, “Suomen ja Neuvostoliiton välisen tieteellis-teknisen yhteistyön tuloksia,” in
Suomen ja Neuvostoliiton välinen tieteellis-tekninen yhteistoiminta 30 vuotta [The results of the
Finnish Soviet scientific-technical cooperation in Soviet-Finnish STC 30 years] (Helsinki,
1985), 8.
 The main target in the West in the 1960s for the Soviet Union was technologically developed
West Germany. RGAE fond 9480, opis’ 7, delo 805, list 9; RGAE fond 9480, opis’ 7, delo 805, list
39–41; The Soviet-West German trade agreement was concluded in 1958 and cooperation was
widened after the agreement of cultural and scientific-technical cooperation in 1959. Archive
of the Russian Academy of Sciences (ARAN) fond 579, opis’ 13, delo 147, list 1– 15; About the
case of West Germany, see Sari Autio-Sarasmo, “Knowledge through the Iron Curtain: Soviet Sci-
entific-Technical Cooperation with Finland and West Germany” in Reassessing Cold War Europe,
ed. Sari Autio-Sarasmo and Katalin Miklóssy (Abingdon: Routledge 2011), 66–82.
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agreements with secure payments. The drawback of the arrangement was that
trade became very bureaucratic.²⁰
The development of Finnish-Soviet trade presents a good picture of the
structure of the Finnish-Soviet trade (import/export) in the 1970s and the simul-
taneous intensification of the STC.²¹ Finnish exports to the Soviet Union took a
remarkable leap in the mid-1970s. This was due to the worldwide oil crisis in the
early 1970s that prompted almost inexhaustible Soviet demand for Finnish
goods: the higher the oil price, the greater the export possibilities for Finland.²²
The value of Finland’s exports to the Soviet Union almost doubled from 1974 to
1975.²³ The share of exports from Finland to the Soviet Union was 13.8% in 1971–
1975 but in 1976 the exports were 20.2% in one year. Due to the clearing trade,
import from the Soviet Union increased correspondingly: in 1971– 1975 import
was 14.7% but in 1976 the share was 18.5%. In 1978, the Soviet Union was the
biggest trade partner of Finland and Finland was the third biggest trade partner
of the Soviet Union.²⁴ Finnish-Soviet trade was at its highest in the first part of
the 1980s. In 1982– 1983, the share was over 25%,which was the peak year of the
trade. For a short period of time, Finland was the most important trading partner
for the Soviet Union.²⁵ Finnish-Soviet bilateral trade is a good example of “the
commerce between countries with different economic and social systems” and
thus Finnish-Soviet trade resonates well with the aims of the TRADESOC section
in UNCTAD analyzed by Michel Christian in this volume. If not the most tradi-
tional one, there were several elements in the trade that were advocated in
the Finnish-Soviet trade. At the same time, however, the Finnish-Soviet trade
 Laurila, Finnish-Soviet Clearing Trade and Payment System, 18–21, 60–62, 100– 103.
 Pekka Sutela, Trading with the Soviet Union. The Finnish Experience 1944– 1991 (Helsinki: Ki-
kimora Publications Series B 39, 2014), 42.
 Sutela, Trading with the Soviet Union, 44–45. This also worked the other way round: when
the oil price was low, Finland benefitted in terms of income, but had to accommodate decline
in exports to the Soviet Union.
 “Value of Finnish imports and exports by country 1856–1975” (Table 5.14.) in Suomen ta-
loushistoria. Historiallinen tilasto, osa 3 [Economic History of Finland. Historical Statistics,
part 3], ed. Kaarina Vattula (Helsinki: kustannusosaekyhtiö Tammi, 1983), 240; One explanation
for the increase of exports was the oil crisis during which upward oil prices increased Finnish
exports to the Soviet Union due to the bilateral balancing of Finnish-Soviet trade. Sutela, Trad-
ing with the Soviet Union, 64.
 Suomi-SNTL: Tieteellis-teknisen ja taloudellisen yhteistyön vuorovaikutus. Raportti Suomen ja
Neuvostoiiton välisen yhteistyön metodologiaa koskevasta tutkimuksesta. Osat 1–2 [Finland-SSSR:
Scientific-technical and economic interaction. Report on the methodological study of the Soviet-
Finnish cooperation. Part 1–2] (Helsinki: Suomen ja Neuvostoliiton välisen tieteellis-teknisen
yhteistoimintakomitean julkaisusarja 7, 1980), 15– 16.
 Sutela, Trading with the Soviet Union, 49, 64. On a per capita basis.
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is a good example of the Soviet Union willingness to focus solely on bilateral
trade.²⁶
It is possible to see the interconnectedness of the Finnish-Soviet trade and
the STC in the development of trade and the organization of the STC. The perma-
nent Soviet-Finnish commission on economic cooperation based on the model of
the STC was established in 1967 to support the development of the trade. Two
years later the scientific cooperation was strengthened by establishing disci-
pline-based working groups under the structure of the STC. In 1971, the treaty
to develop economic, technological, and industrial collaboration between Fin-
land and the Soviet Union was signed. In 1974 and 1975, long-term programs
to increase economic and industrial collaboration between the two states were
approved. In 1977 a long-term program was signed to deepen and develop the
economy and trade in the field of industrial and scientific-technical cooperation
between Finland and the Soviet Union until 1990. From the 1970s, the main aim
of the joint programs was to increase technology transfers and especially tech-
nology trade between the two states.²⁷
The Finnish mixed economy system enabled planning and state regulation
that maintained the strong connection between the trade and STC. Many of
the large conglomerates participating in the Finnish-Soviet trade and the STC
were owned by the state, which made the regulation and planning even easier.
In addition, actors in the trade and the STC were the same: intergovernmental
working groups, trade delegations, Finnish enterprises, and the Soviet foreign
trade organizations.²⁸ The five-year agreements and secured payments made
the Finnish-Soviet trade attractive for Finnish enterprises. The trade possibilities
in the Soviet Union and the whole socialist bloc offered huge possibilities for
Finnish partners. Through the system of bilateral trade, Finnish enterprises
were able to export upgraded goods to the Soviet Union and in exchange Finland
was able to import oil and energy.²⁹ At the state level over-dependence on Soviet
trade and Soviet oil was seen as problematic. That is why Finland tried to trade
with the West and diminish its energy dependence on the Soviet Union by coop-
erating with Western oil suppliers. Still, the share of the trade was high and the
 Michel Christian, “It is not a question of rigidly planning trade” in this volume.
 Suomi-SNTL: Tieteellis-teknisen ja taloudellisen yhteistyön vuorovaikutus. Part I, 16– 17.
 Riitta Hjerppe, “Teollisuus” in Suomen taloushistoria. Teollistuva Suomi.Osa 2 [Economic his-
tory of Finland. Industrializing Finland, Part 2], ed. Jorma Ahvenainen, Erkki Pihkala, Viljo Ra-
sila (Helsinki: Kustannusosakeyhtiö Tammi 1982), 412–413; Laurila, Finnish-Soviet Clearing
Trade and Payment System, 61.
 Suomen ulkomaankauppatilasto 1971 [Export statistics of Finland 1971] (Helsinki 1972),
82–83.
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share of the Soviet oil was at least half of Finnish oil imports.³⁰ Due to the fact
that the clearing trade was based on a balanced flows of goods, it was difficult
for Finland to find marketable goods to import from the Soviet Union. During the
years of Finnish-Soviet trade, the imbalance of export/import was the major
problem, but as a whole the trade with the Soviet Union was beneficial for Fin-
land. The disadvantage of the clearing trade with the Soviet Union was that it
cast a shadow on Finland’s desired image in the West as a free, modern and de-
veloped Western market economy.³¹
Soviet STC and Finland –
focusing on practical cooperation
The commission of Soviet-Finnish scientific-technical cooperation was establish-
ed in 1955 as a state-level organization comprising of the Finnish ministry of for-
eign affairs, the Academy of Finland, and in the Soviet Union, the State commit-
tee of science and technology (GKNT) and the Soviet Academy of Sciences. The
early years of the cooperation mainly consisted of reciprocal visits to the basic
industrial production units that were possible to organize without overly compli-
cated official arrangements. Soviet experts visited Finnish production units
where the experts in komandirovka ‘assignment’ wrote reports about their obser-
vations,which were very practical, such as details related to the equipment used,
lighting, and the organization of work.³² This information was collected in order
to develop the organization of work at home and was based on interaction with
the experts; Soviet experts asked questions and hosts shared information with
their guests. During the late 1960s, when the technological development in Fin-
land was fast, the STC started to divide into two: scientific cooperation and tech-
nological cooperation. The scientific cooperation consisted of experts from Fin-
nish and Soviet universities, research institutes and ministries (in the Soviet
Union). Finnish and Soviet experts met and exchanged information during the
reciprocal visits, seminars, workshops, and conferences organized on the basis
of the STC. In the bilateral meetings current scientific issues were discussed
 Kuisma, Kylmä sota, kuuma öljy, 257, 275.
 Laurila, Finnish-Soviet Clearing Trade and Payment System, 100– 103.
 A Soviet delegation visited the city of Tampere in August 1958 in local factories. Noted in the
report was, for example, the quality of machinery (mainly American and West German). Russian
State Archive of Scientific-Technical Documentation, branch in Samara (RGANTD) f. 18, op. 2–6,
d. 205, l.1– 12; Similar examples in West Germany, see RGANI, f. 5, op.40, d. 67, l. 1–2.
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(such as new trends and technologies). Scientists conducted joint research proj-
ects and wrote books together.³³
The technological cooperation consisted of the experts but also of Finnish
enterprises and the Soviet trade organizations. In the export-oriented Finnish
firms, it was understood that participation in the STC helped to widen economic
and industrial cooperation with the Soviet Union.³⁴ In the field of technology co-
operation, the system was closely connected to the Finnish-Soviet trade.³⁵ Tech-
nological knowhow had diversified in Finland because of the active collabora-
tion with the Western enterprises, of which the electronic industry and oil
refining industry were good examples.³⁶ These areas were also the primary inter-
est of the Soviet partners.When Finland’s connection and access to the Western
technology and knowhow increased, the Soviet partners’ interest in collabora-
tion with the Finnish enterprises increased too. From the late 1960s, the visits
of the Soviet partners were much better prepared than before. To enhance the
process, the GKNT organized the collection of in-advance information, which in-
creased Soviet specialists’ ability to adapt knowledge during their visits. Soviet
technology advisors in the Soviet embassies in respective countries collected
the information available in technology fairs, such as brochures and advertise-
ments, but also through specialized literature that was used to plan and specify
the target enterprises to visit.³⁷
 A good example is the Finnish-Soviet STC in the field of computer science. ARAN f. 579,
op. 13, d. 162, l. 72–73; Concerning the Soviet delegations visits, see: ARAN f. 579, op. 13, d.
162, l. 17–34. From Finnish side, see Selostus suomalais-neuvostoliittolaisesta symposiumista
13.5.1975 [Report from Soviet-Finnish symposium 13.5.1975)]. Commission of the Finnish-Soviet
scientific-technical cooperation: travelogues. Archive of foreign ministry of Finland (FMA).
 Suomi-SNTL: Tieteellis-teknisen ja taloudellisen yhteistyön vuorovaikutus, Part I, 11.
 In the case of Finland, see for example, Tieteellis-teknistä yhteistoimintaa varten Suomen ta-
savallan ja Sosialististen Neuvostotasavaltain liiton välille asetetun suomalais-neuvostoliittolais-
en komitean pöytäkirja 17.-25. 2.1956 Moskovassa pidetystä istunnosta (jäljennös) [Copy of the
protocol of establishment of the commission on scientific-technical cooperation between Fin-
land and the Soviet Union]. Commission of the Finnish-Soviet scientific-technical cooperation
(STC), Archive of Finnish foreign ministry (FMA).
 Martti Häikiö, Fuusio. Yhdistymisen kautta suomalaiseksi monialayritykseksi 1865– 1982 [His-
tory of the enterprise Nokia 1865– 1982, part 1] (Helsinki: Edita, 2001), 99; Kuisma, Kylmä sota,
kuuma öljy, 255.
 RGANI fond 5, opis’ 61, delo 55a, list 45–55. Soviet sovetniki, ‘technology advisors’ worked as
coordinators between the GKNT and foreign enterprises; Instruction of the use of foreign jour-
nals: RGAE fond 9480, opis’ 7, delo 805, list 81–86. Collected information was administered
and translated into Russian by the All-Union Institute of Scientific-Technical Information, (Vse-
soyuznyi institut nauchnoi i tekhnicheskoi informatsii,VINITI). RGANI fond 5, opis’ 33, delo 46, list
15– 16, 21.VINITI was established in 1952. It collected and produced summaries from 22,000 sci-
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The Soviet specialists were assigned clear plans of action for their visits. On
the basis of the information collected in advance, the GKNT drew up a list of
questions about technological processes to be answered during the visit,
based on detailed knowledge of the production of the receiving enterprise.³⁸
After demand for the new technology increased remarkably in the Soviet
Union in the 1960s and 1970s, the cooperation started to focus on technology re-
lated-knowledge. It is possible to observe this phenomenon in the archival ma-
terials for instance when the Finnish partners brought to the discussions prob-
lems with the Soviet experts who were eager to get information about
technology that was forbidden by strict license and patent agreements.³⁹ The co-
operation became challenging for Finnish partners who did not want to risk
problems in their contacts with their Western partners.
By focusing on the practical cooperation, the Soviet Union was able to keep
the STC cooperation bilateral and use it in a way that served the needs of the
Soviet side without creating tensions in the superpower politics. A good example
of the target-oriented STC activity in the field of high technology was the estab-
lishment of the working group in cybernetics, later a working group on computer
technology. During Khrushchev’s leadership, cybernetics was given an important
entific journals and publication series, and about 8,000 books from 130 countries in 70 different
languages. It was re-organized under the jurisdiction of the GKNT and the Academy of Sciences.
Seppänen, Jouko, Tieteellis-tekninen informaatio Neuvostoliitossa [Scientific-technical informa-
tion in the Soviet Union] (Helsinki: Suomen ja Neuvostoliiton tieteellis-teknisen yhteistoiminta-
komitean julkaisusarja 2, 1978).
 RGAE fond 9480, opis’ 7, delo 805, list 57.
 Neste Oy:n vastaus TT-komission tiedusteluun 16.10.1961 [Reply from enterprise Neste to the
enquiry sent by the commission of scientific-technical cooperation]. 13/647–55, FMA. The letter
referred to the earlier experiences; In West Germany, the Soviet experts were accused of indus-
trial espionage and Soviet experts’ visits to the West German enterprises were suspended. RGAE
fond 9480, opis’ 7, delo 805, list 138. Illegal trade and spying were organized in more effective
ways e.g., through military intelligence (GRU) and KGB. Additionally, dummy firms were estab-
lished in Europe to acquire desired technology. Report. Soviet acquisition of Western technology
(Library of Congress, 1. April 1982); Collection of information during the Cold War was easily
connected to technological espionage. In the STC spying was not – at least not openly– an ex-
pressed aim because the desired information was available freely; Kuisma, Kylmä sota, kuuma
öljy, 276. Finnish oil refining enterprise Neste collaborated with American technology enterpris-
es; Although Finland was not a member of the CoCom embargo, enterprises were unwilling to
share knowhow that was in conflict with the CoCom lists; Niklas Jensen-Eriksen, “CoCom and
Neutrality:Western Export Control policies, Finland and the Cold War, 1949–58,” in Reassessing
Cold War Europe, ed. Sari Autio-Sarasmo and Katalin Miklóssy (Abingdon: Routledge, 2011),
49–65.
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role in technological modernization.⁴⁰ The position of cybernetics changed in the
mid-1960s when Leonid Brezhnev took over the leadership. In spite of the previ-
ous existence of Institutes of Cybernetics and efforts to develop Soviet computer
technology, the Soviet leadership made a decision to give up the development of
its own computer systems and to copy IBM 360⁴¹ technology in 1969. Coinciding
with the decision, the Soviet STC partner suggested the establishment of the
working group of cybernetics through the system of STC to Finnish counterparts.
The timing was impeccable because through the Finnish cooperation, Soviet ex-
perts gained access to the software that was needed to make the copied comput-
ers work.⁴² Computer technology remained one of the major interests in the STC
until the end of the Cold War.
The Cold War context created frameworks for the Soviet technology cooper-
ation with the Western partners. Furthermore, it explains the ways in which the
cooperation was motivated and organized. The Soviet-Finnish STC was based on
individual projects, which helped to keep the cooperation bilateral and motivat-
ed on both sides. The Soviet partners were willing to strengthen the state-level
cooperation and trade that would have supplied the economic, technological,
and scientific demand in the Soviet Union. As a capitalist country, Finland
was motivated by economic profit, marketing possibilities, and possibility to en-
hance domestic R&D. For the Finnish STC partners, especially export-oriented
enterprises, the main motivator was direct contact with the Soviet partners.
 A good example of this was the establishment of the Tallinn Institute of Cybernetics, which
was part of Tallinn University of technology. Sampsa Kaataja, “Expert Groups Closing the Divide:
Estonian-Finnish Computing Cooperation Since the 1960s,” in Beyond the Divide. Entangled His-
tories of Cold War Europe, ed. Simo Mikkonen and Pia Koivunen (Oxford: Berghahn books 2015),
103. According to Kaataja, Tallinn Institute of Cybernetics did not participate in fully classified
projects but was a category B institution. There is an increasing number of studies focusing on
Soviet cybernetics, see for example Slava Gerovitch, From Cyberspeak to Newspeak. A History of
Soviet Cybernetics (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2002); An important contribution to the field of
cybernetics but also technology transfers is Egle Rindzeviciute, The Power of Systems. How Policy
Sciences Opened up to the Cold War World (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2016).
 About IBM in Finland, see Petri Paju and Thomas Haigh, “IBM rebuilds Europe. The curious
case of the transnational typewriter,” Enterprise & Society 2(2015); Petri Paju, “Monikansallinen
yritys ja siteet länteen. IBM Suomessa ja Länsi-Euroopassa 1940-luvun lopulla ja 1950-luvulla”
[A multinational corporation and ties to the West: IBM in Finland and in Western Europe during
the post-war years and the 1950s], Historiallinen aikakauskirja 3 (2015).
 Autio-Sarasmo, “Knowledge through the Iron Curtain,” 72; For a discussion about the ben-
efits of the cooperation, see ARAN, fond 579, opis’ 13, delo 162, list 72–73. Other contributions in
this volume thematize the East-West dimension of the computerization process – i.e. Sandrine
Kott, “The social engineering project” and Ondřej Matějka, “Social engineering and alienation
between East and West.”
154 Sari Autio-Sarasmo
When they had direct contacts, firms were able to collaborate outside the official
STC organs.⁴³ The Finnish enterprises were able to negotiate directly with their
Soviet partners and agree, for example, on the prices.⁴⁴ The “technological
turn” in the STC and the Soviet-Finnish trade took place in the 1970s when the
technological level had markedly increased in Finland.
Finland as a mediator of Western technology
to the Soviet Union
The Finnish enterprises in Soviet trade were mainly large conglomerates. The five
largest accounted for almost 40% of all exports from Finland to the Soviet Union
because of the clearing trade system. Due to the long-term contracts, the private-
ly owned profit-maximizing enterprises actively participated in the trade.⁴⁵ Fin-
nish exporters were able to use the Soviet markets’ springboard to the Western
markets because Finland was able to develop and produce exports for which
there was no demand in Finland. Long-term contracts and trade agreements
and secured payments increased security in Finland and Finnish exporters
were protected from external competition.⁴⁶ In the 1970s, when it was difficult
to get into the Western market, the Soviet Union offered several trading possibil-
ities and strict payments. Among especially successful enterprises were con-
glomerates that could offer a large assortment of products to supply Soviet de-
mand.
A good example of an enterprise like this was Nokia, a conglomerate that
became a member of the Soviet-Finnish STC in 1957. Nokia’s cooperation and
trade with the Soviet Union illustrates the development of the STC from the
1950s until 1991. During the Cold War era, Nokia had two major export lines
to the Soviet Union: cables and communication devices.⁴⁷ Although Nokia be-
came well known for communication devices, especially mobile phones in the
 These organs were the STC Commission and Economic Commission in Finland and in the
Soviet Union Ministry of foreign trade, State Committee of Foreign Trade (GKES), ministries,
and commercial missions of the Soviet Union in Finland. Suomi-SNTL: Tieteellis-teknisen ja ta-
loudellisen yhteistyön vuorovaikutus. Part I, 40–43.
 Laurila, Finnish-Soviet Clearing Trade and Payment System, 60–62.
 Sutela, Trading with the Soviet Union, 65–66.
 Laurila, Finnish-Soviet Clearing Trade and Payment System, 100– 103.
 Martti Häikiö, Sturm und Drang. Suurkaupoilla eurooppalaiseksi elektroniikkayritykseksi
1983– 1991. Nokia Oyj:n historia. osa 2 [History of enterprise Nokia 1983– 1991, part 2] (Edita: Hel-
sinki, 2001), 195.
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1990s, it was cable production that created the cornerstone for Nokia’s beneficial
trade with the Soviet Union. Soviet industry was not able to produce enough ca-
bles to meet the increasing demand, which opened large and widening trade
possibilities for Nokia with the Soviet Union. Nokia had to follow the export
quota defined in the state-level trade protocols for the exchange of goods, but
being a privately-owned, profit-maximizing enterprise, Nokia’s main aim was
to make the export quotas as high as possible in order to gain maximum benefit
from the trade with the Soviet Union.
In 1971 a protocol of exchange of goods was signed. It included the export of
high technology cables. This profitable deal was important for enhancing the
R&D and furthering other units at the Nokia conglomerate. The mid-1970s repre-
sented an especially beneficial time after the oil crisis when the Soviet Union
wanted to import more cables than Nokia was able to produce. As a conglomer-
ate, Nokia could exploit the positive turnover in the other units. One of the rea-
sons for the possibility to develop R&D in Finland was the system of bilateral
trade, which included the pre-pay system. When the product was partly paid
in advance, it gave Finnish partners the advantage of developing their products,
especially technology which was not only for the Soviet trade but targeted at
Western markets as well. Thus, the Soviet trade was a useful stepping stone
for new and expanding firms such as Nokia, but it also secured markets for
other Finnish enterprises.⁴⁸
Nokia Electronics started in the 1960s and developed on the basis of the So-
viet trade. For Nokia – as well as other Finnish enterprises – connections to tech-
nologically-advanced Western countries were extremely important. The Finnish
firms sent personnel to work in the electronic firms in the United States in
order to learn to use the newest technologies in this sphere. Nokia bought elec-
tronic devices from West Germany (Siemens) and delivered the provided technol-
ogy to Finland. The share of electronics in Nokia’s exports was 40%, of which
30% was directed to the Soviet Union and COMECON countries and 10% to
the West. In the 1970s, computer technology and computer systems became
part of Nokia’s portfolio and Finnish banks ordered computers and computer
systems from Nokia.⁴⁹ Simultaneously the interest of the Soviet partners started
to focus on these systems and STC visits focused on enterprises using these tech-
nologies.⁵⁰ These visits were partly connected to the work of the STC working
 Sutela, Trading with the Soviet Union, 67, 73.
 Häikiö, Fuusio, 93, 156, 161,164.
 ARAN fond 579 opis’ 13, delo 162, list. 17–34; Neuvostoliittolaisen delegaation Suomen vier-
ailu. TT-komitea: saapuneet kirjeet [Soviet delegation in Finland, letters]. 1/1–30/6–71 FMA; Se-
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group of cybernetics. The cooperation bore fruit decades later when Nokia deliv-
ered digital phone exchanges to the whole Soviet communication system.⁵¹ The
Soviet Union clearly played a crucial role in the development of Nokia Electron-
ics.
Personal contacts and mutual trust were essential in the cooperation with
the Soviet Union. These factors were especially important in the technology
trade. That is why the role the commission of STC was fundamental when build-
ing contacts between Finnish enterprises and Soviet partners. In the 1980s when
the Nokia’s trade with the Soviet Union was at its highest, Nokia’s CEO was a
member of the Soviet-Finnish Commission on STC. Because of the bureaucratic
and slow Soviet system, personal contacts were demanded at every level to en-
hance the collaboration. Trust was earned through the long partnership and
good reputation but in Nokia’s case the physical presence of its representatives
in the Soviet Union proved to be very beneficial for trade. Nokia opened an office
in Moscow in order to organize exhibitions and to facilitate negotiations with So-
viet partners.⁵² When the Cold War cooled down, personal contacts became even
more important. Individual approaches and personal connections were used
whenever it was needed to bypass the official and politically embedded macro
(state) level politics.
After the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, the CoCom restrictions were
tightened remarkably. Although not a member of the CoCom embargo, Finland
followed the strict trade restrictions.⁵³ Nokia had to adjust to Finland’s economic
policy and to take into account the changing situation. Finnish electronic indus-
try needed American components and thus could not ignore the US geopolitics.
Especially in the late 1970s and 1980s, the Finnish STC with the Soviet Union was
viewed by the United States as suspicious and problematic.⁵⁴ The concern and
suspicion in the United States was certainly partly justified, because besides
the trade with the Soviet Union Nokia also delivered technology to the Finnish
army. This became alarming in the 1980s when the CoCom embargo was signifi-
lostus suomalais-neuvostoliittilaisesta symposiumista 13.5.1975. TT-komitea: matkakertomuksia
[Report from the Finnish-Soviet symposium. ST commission, travelogues] 1956–1978. FMA.
 Häikiö, Sturm und Drang, 54–55.
 Sutela, Trading with the Soviet Union, 2014, 88; Häikiö, Sturm und Drang, 47–48, 50, 53;
Häikiö, Fuusio, 120, 157– 158, 182. Nokia’s CEO Kari Kairamo was an important figure in Finnish
trade in the 1980s.
 Jensen-Eriksen, “CoCom and Neutrality,” 58–61.
 Report: Soviet Acquisition of Western Technology April 1 1982 (Library of Congress). The report
did not mention Nokia or Finland but similar activities were defined as “suspicious.”
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cantly tightened.⁵⁵ In order to get American components, Nokia had to get appro-
val from the United States to continue trade with the Soviet Union. The solution
was that Nokia’s CEO made a personal agreement with the Pentagon to provide
them with information about technological progress in the Soviet Union.⁵⁶ The
fact that Finnish enterprises were always technologically one step ahead of
the Soviet Union, kept the cooperation on track. In the late 1980s, Finland con-
cluded a secret, state-level agreement with the United States about how to con-
tinue trade in the both directions.⁵⁷ By this time, however, Soviet-Finnish trade
was reaching its final stage.
It is possible to argue that Nokia was able to continue trade with the Soviet
Union under surveillance because the technology traded to the Soviet Union did
not threaten the military strategic equilibrium. Nevertheless, the other branch of
advanced technology in Finland, the ship building industry and especially the
construction of icebreakers, was followed more closely during the Cold War.⁵⁸
A good example of the Cold War restrictions directly influencing Finland is con-
nected to the case of Finnish mini-submarines in the 1980s. The Soviet Academy
of Sciences ordered two deep-sea mini-submarines able to dive down to six kilo-
metres from the Finnish conglomerate Rauma-Repola. At the beginning, the proj-
ect was not objected to by Finland’s Western allies, because they believed that
Finland was not able to master the advanced technology needed for the project.
Still the project was closely followed by the United States. After finishing the
order successfully, the United States started to pressure the shipyard Rauma-Re-
pola Oceanics by threatening the mother company Rauma-Repola with bank-
 Full technological information was delivered only after the next generation device was cre-
ated. Häikiö, Sturm und Drang, 126– 127.
 Interviews with Former Deputy Minister of Defence Richard Perle in the documentary film
“Kauppasotaa pinnan alla” [Trade war under water]. Presented by Channel One YLE on Finnish
Television 7 December 2008. Assistant Secretary of Defence in the Bush Administration in the
US, Richard Perle was in charge of the negotiations with Nokia. The existence of the agreement
was confirmed by Stefan Widomski, former Senior Vice President International Trade Affairs in
Nokia corp. Discussion with Widomski in Helsinki in 21 May 2014.
 Autio-Sarasmo, “Knowledge through the Iron Curtain,” 74. Clearing trade between Finland
and the Soviet Union/Russia ended in 1991.
 For the political dimension and techno-politics of the Soviet-Finnish icebreaker trade, see
Saara Matala, “Flashy flagships of Cold War cooperation – The Finnish-Soviet nuclear icebreak-
er project,” Technology & Culture, 4/2018 forthcoming. Saara Matala, “The Business of Foreign
Affairs. Unrealized visions of joint business, technology and politics in Finnish -Soviet ship-
building at the end of the Cold War”. (Paper presented in the ICOHTEC International Committee
for the History of Technology) in Proceedings of the 41th ICOHTEC Symposium 2014 Technology in
times of transition, ed. Helerea, E., Cionca, M, Ivãnoiu, M (Brasov: Transylvania University of Bra-
sov, 2014), 65–70.
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ruptcy. In the end, two ready-made vessels were delivered to the Soviet Union but
Rauma-Repola was forced to abandon Oceanics and the whole branch of the
deep-sea industry.⁵⁹
Transferred technology in the
centrally planned economy
The main aim of the Soviet economic modernization project was the dissemina-
tion of the transferred technology and related knowledge into the Soviet R&D
and industry to boost domestic innovations and thus facilitate the moderniza-
tion of the Soviet (civilian) industry. Dissemination of the transferred technology
and knowledge was essential for the process of diffusion,⁶⁰ the next phase of the
modernization process that would have created a strong basis for the use of new
applications and the emergence of domestic innovations. This process was ex-
pected to change the technological basis of the Soviet economy and to transform
its extensive economic growth into an intensive one. From the perspective of So-
viet leaders, the intensification would have increased the resilience of the USSR
economy, and domestic innovations would have enabled the independent devel-
opment of the Soviet industry and so lead to modernization.⁶¹
In the 1960s and 1970s, the main organ in the dissemination of the transfer-
red technology and knowledge was the State Committee of Science and Technol-
ogy (GKNT). It was in charge of new technologies and methods of developing sci-
ence and technology in the Soviet Union. Thus the GKNT also coordinated the
transfers channelled through the STC.⁶² The process of dissemination and imple-
mentation of the transferred technologies had been evaluated in the mid-1950s.
Due to its poor outcomes, the whole system was reorganized in the late 1950s in
order to improve the process. One of the major changes was that GKNT’s role in
 Sutela, Trading with the Soviet Union, 93.
 Diffusion is the process by which new technology and related knowledge is transferred
through certain channels among the members of social system. Everett M. Rogers, Diffusion of
Innovations, Third Edition (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1983). Rogers refers also to
the transfer of knowledge and technology.
 Intensification, growth and innovation have been the main concepts in the Soviet and Rus-
sian modernization discussion. For an overview of the modernization discussion, see Joachim
Zweynert and Ivan Boldyrev, “Conflicting patterns of thought in the Russian debate on modern-
isation and innovation 2008–2013,” Europe-Asia Studies 69, No. 6 (2017), 921–939.
 Suomi-SNTL: Tieteellis-teknisen ja taloudellisen yhteistyön vuorovaikutus. Part II, 37, 163; Rog-
ers, Diffusion of Innovations, 335.
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the dissemination of the collected information to the Soviet R&D and industry
were clarified and strengthened. In order to make the process more effective,
the GKNT was given authority to sign international contracts with foreign enter-
prises and organizations.⁶³ In addition, the GKNT was subordinated more clearly
to the centralized planning system.
The Soviet planning system was seen as a booster for the dissemination
process by determining how much and where the resources (including transfers)
were to be allocated and how the allocations were controlled.⁶⁴ In spite of the
obvious advantages of the planning system in resource allocation and mis-
sion-oriented projects, the main problem was that the innovation emphases
and plan fulfilment were almost always in conflict. A major innovation often re-
quired several years before it began to operate successfully. The planning hori-
zon in the Soviet Union was short and did not enable experimentation that
would last several years. Any new technology also required considerable new re-
sources and new suppliers, which represented a fundamental problem because
of the lack of horizontal connections⁶⁵ between industries in the USSR. All
branches of civilian industry needed to compete for the same materials, which
resulted in departmental barriers being set up. The prices of new products
were often set at a level that provided a lower rate of profit and counted for
less towards plan fulfilment than the older, standard products. Hence, if plan
fulfilment was threatened, the tendency was to shift away from new products to-
ward the safe, old ones. There was a great gap between Soviet scientific and en-
gineering achievements and the capacity to transform them into economically
 Suomi-SNTL: Tieteellis-teknisen ja taloudellisen yhteistyön vuorovaikutus. Part II, 165; A good
example of this kind of contract was the one signed with West German enterprise Siemens in
1971. RGAE fond 9480, opis’ 9, delo 2509 A, list 18–26 L; See also RGAE fond 9480, opis’ 7,
delo 816, list 57.
 Joseph Berliner, Soviet industry from Stalin to Gorbachev. Essays on management and innova-
tions (Aldershot: Edward Elgar, 1988), 225; E.P. Hoffman & R.F. Laird, “The scientific-technolog-
ical revolution” and Soviet foreign policy (Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1982), 82. Scientific research
work was connected to the planning system in the ‘thirties and ‘forties. Loren Graham, Science in
Russia and the Soviet Union. A short History (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 181;
See also Alec Nove, An Economic History of the USSR, 1917– 1991 (London: Penguin books, 1992),
350.
 In the cases where horizontal connections were created, the outcome of the process was also
more successful. A good example is the case of the Kirov kolkhoze in Estonia. Antti Sarasmo,
“The Kirov Fishing kolkhoz. A Socialist Success Story” in Competition in Socialist society, ed. Ka-
talin Miklóssy and Melanie Ilic (Abingdon: Routledge, 2014), 53–70.
160 Sari Autio-Sarasmo
competitive innovations.⁶⁶ Paradoxically, it was the same centralized control that
enabled impressive mission-oriented projects, such as the Soviet space program,
yet blocked innovation in many other fields.⁶⁷
It was paradoxical that the process of transfer was very functional and in-
cluded tools that could have enhanced the dissemination and diffusion of new
technologies. One of the tools was the system of organizing expert visits through
the STC. These visits were not only channels for communication between Finnish
and Soviet experts, but also a way to obtain the knowledge necessary for the suc-
cessful diffusion process. During their visits, based on their own expertize, spe-
cialists collected different kinds of knowledge about the technology, but also
about how to use it. After their visits, they wrote reports based on their observa-
tions and returned the questionnaires they were expected to fill during their vis-
its to the GKNT. The GKNT was expected to deliver the information to the Soviet
R&D and industry in order to develop further transfers and diffusion of the tech-
nologies and related knowledge. Practical information that was collected and re-
ported by the specialists in their travel reports would have been easy to adopt in
everyday work. However, the adaptation at the shop-floor level proved to be
poor. The futility of the personal contributions to the process and the inability
of individuals to utilize the imported models in their own work created an atmos-
phere of deep discontent among Soviet specialists. This brought the aspect of un-
intended consequence to the transfer process.⁶⁸
There are various explanations for the problems in dissemination, imple-
mentation, and diffusion of the transferred technology and related knowledge.
The dissemination might have taken place but the diffusion was not realized
and in many cases the transferred technology was implemented into use as
such. This was especially the case when there was an urgent demand for certain
technology. It was easier to start production by directly using the technology
rather than to launch time-consuming experiments based on the new technology
in order to enhance domestic innovations. Furthermore, there were departmental
barriers created by the system of a planned economy but also institutional and
personal barriers that hindered the process of diffusion and also implementa-
tion.
Such barriers were visible for instance in the Soviet forest industry that was
one of the many modernization projects in the Soviet Union carried out during
 Hoffman & Laird, The Scientific-Technological Revolution, 98; Berliner, Soviet industry from
Stalin to Gorbachev 203, 218.
 Graham, Science in Russia and the Soviet Union, 201.
 Sari Autio-Sarasmo, “Technological Modernisation in the Soviet Union and Post-Soviet Rus-
sia: Practices and Continuities,” Europe-Asia Studies 68, no.1 (2016): 79–96.
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the Khrushchev leadership in the 1950s and 1960s. In the forest industry trans-
ferred technology filled technological gaps and helped the branch to be more
competitive. At the same time there were clear failures in implementing transfer-
red technologies and supporting innovations either based on the transferred
technologies or genuine domestic innovations.⁶⁹
The case of continuous pulp cooking⁷⁰ provides a good example in which
different techniques had been innovated in the West but also in the Soviet
Union. This genuine Soviet innovation did not succeed and the Western technol-
ogy was implemented in the Soviet pulp mills. The Soviet pulp mills are a good
example of the role of Finland as a mediator of the new technology. A major part
of the most advanced pulp mills in the Soviet Union were originally Finnish but
became Soviet when the Karelian Isthmus was annexed to the Soviet Union after
World War Two. The original Finnish technology was used in the mills until the
demand for more modern technology emerged. In the beginning, the Soviet in-
novation was introduced to the pulp cooking but due to severe problems in im-
plementation, the home technology was replaced by foreign technology. Fin-
land, again, had an important role in the mediation of the new technology
and related knowledge. The Soviet forest industry specialists visited Finland
through the STC and collected information. The existing knowledge and the im-
plementation of the new technology did not solve the problem of the low quality
pulp. The main reasons for the poor outcome were the quality of the raw materi-
al, problems in maintaining technology, the lack of spare parts, and horizontal
connections and problems in sharing information. The system did not support
providing enough resources for complicated technology.⁷¹
Similar problems emerged in other complicated systems of technology. In
the 1980s, Nokia participated in the Finnish-Soviet protocol of an exchange of
goods channelled through the STC with the project of the automatic phone ex-
change system DX 200. The DX 200 project was Nokia’s production collaboration
with the Soviet partner, that is, cooperation on an enterprise-production unit
level. In the project, there was a conflict between the expectations and practical
cooperation from the Soviet side. The Soviet partners seemed to be interested in
 Elena Kochetkova, “The Soviet Forestry Industry in the 1950s and 1960s: A Project of Mod-
ernization and Technology Transfer from Finland,” Publications of the Faculty of Social Sciences
52 (2017).
 The pulp cooking is an interesting case because it had a dual meaning. Pulp was also need-
ed in the military industry (especially in the production of ammunition) that explains the re-
source allocations to the field.
 Elena Kochetkova, “A history of failed innovation: continuous cooking and the Soviet pulp
industry, 1940s-1960s,” History and Technology 31, no. 2 (2015), 108–132.
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the long-term collaboration in order to “learn-by-doing.” But even though the
system was based solely on planning in Nokia (Finland) and all the components
came from the West (from the US, Japan or Germany) the Soviet partners were
not able to benefit from the collaboration as expected. The Soviet partners com-
plained that Nokia had not sent the necessary information to them and thus they
had not been able to “sovietize” the production, that is, to produce equipment
and components in the Soviet Union. Nokia replied to the accusations saying
that all technical information was shared with the Soviet partners well in ad-
vance. The reply brought to the fore the fact that the problem was at the techno-
logical level of the Soviet partners and not in the actions of Nokia. In spite of the
occasional problems, Nokia continued its projects of production collaboration
with the Soviet Union. Among others, Nokia exported communication systems,
robotics, and computer technology to the USSR.⁷²
Conclusion
The Soviet system of the scientific-technical cooperation created an active net-
work of bilateral connections between the Soviet Union and the Western Europe-
an states. The Soviet-Finnish STC is a good example of how “behind the scene”
East-West cooperation developed during the decades of Cold War division.When
the Soviet-Finnish STC began in the mid-1950s the contacts were relatively mod-
est and consisted mainly of reciprocal visits and the transfer of basic informa-
tion. During the 1970s and 1980s, the cooperation started to focus on high tech-
nology and joint projects between Finnish and Soviet partners. The Soviet-
Finnish STC was specific because it was connected and supported by the Fin-
nish-Soviet clearing trade, regulated by the state and based on planning. For Fin-
land, the role as mediator of Western technology and its cooperation with the So-
viet Union proved to be beneficial. The Finnish export-oriented enterprises
learned quickly to cooperate with the Soviet Union and to adjust their supply
to the demand of the Soviet partners. With long trade agreements and secured
payments from the Soviet trade, Finnish enterprises were able to focus on
R&D and develop their products for the Western markets as well. Finland learned
to “play” the Cold War and to balance trade with Soviet Union according to its
own goals to increase Western trade. Thanks to this capacity Finland was able
to diversify its economy and to transform into a technologically-oriented, mod-
ern state during the Cold War decades.
 Häikiö, Sturm und Drang, 56–57, 196– 198, 254.
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On the other side, from the point of view of modernization, economic diver-
sification or domestic innovations, the outcome did not meet the aims of the So-
viet Union. The main aim of the Soviet STC and its trade with Finland, i.e. the
transfer of technology and related knowledge to boost domestic innovations
and to enhance economic modernization, was not fully realized. The practical
transfers through the bilateral STC proved to be very effective. Technologies
and related knowledge were transferred to the Soviet Union through the STC ac-
cording to the plan created by the GKNT. However, the dissemination, implemen-
tation and especially the diffusion of transferred knowledge to the Soviet R&D
and industry proved to be difficult. Transfers, including new production models,
technology and related knowledge, were processed in the system of GKNT, but
the dissemination to the production level was not realized as planned. Technol-
ogies were not adapted at the shop-floor level as expected and the Soviet R&D
was not able to boost domestic innovations. The system of the Soviet planned
economy favored the fulfilment of the plan and the lack of horizontal connec-
tions created barriers that hindered the introduction of new technologies and
technological experiments.
Technology transfers during the Cold War substantially influenced the inno-
vation policy in the Soviet Union with obvious consequences for contemporary
Russia. The Soviet Union acquired new technology from abroad and paid for
the transfers with raw materials and energy. This created a basis for the one-
sided, raw material-based economy that has proved to be one of the major ob-
stacles for economic development in contemporary Russia. Current discussions
about the economic modernization of Russia follow the same discursive patterns
today as they did in the 1970s. The road towards the diversification of the econ-
omy presupposes competitive domestic innovations and intensive economic
growth that would enhance resilience in the economy which in the Soviet-Rus-
sian case has remained an elusive objective.
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Ondřej Matějka
Social Engineering and Alienation between
East and West: Czech Christian-Marxist
Dialogue in the 1960s from the National
Level to the Global Arena¹
In April 1968, the World Council of Churches (WCC), the most important interna-
tional organization in the field of international ecumenical relations, organized a
two-day debate among elite Christian theologians, Marxists from both sides of
the Iron Curtain (some of whom were highly-placed representatives of the Com-
munist Parties of the East), and scholars from Third World countries as well. This
event attracted attention of both Western and Eastern observers of worldwide
church affairs. The Times, L’Humanité, Swiss Weekly Tribune and even the Cze-
choslovak Literární listy offered relatively extensive coverage of this “unique de-
bate” between “old ideological enemies,” who were trying to find common
ground on issues related to “the humanization of technical and economic devel-
opment.”² Reporters particularly emphasized the “global proportions and im-
pact” of this dialogue.³
The surprising amount of interest in this enterprise is quite understandable
when one keeps in mind that ever since its beginning, the Cold War was per-
ceived and theorized as one of “great religious wars” by an important number
of its protagonists, as well as by those who analyzed its history.⁴ Communist
leaders did not conceal their belief that it was imperative to overcome religion
(and at times to actively fight against it), regarding it as an essential part of
the ancien ordre. Western, and in particular, US political elites tended to base
their anti-communist stance on an analogous “global conflict between the
god-fearing and the godless.”⁵
 I would like to thank the FNS (project “Shared modernities or competing modernities? Europe
between West and East 1920s-1970s,” based at the University of Geneva) and the PRVOUK re-
search scheme (P17) at Charles University, Prague for support in different stages of this project.
 “Marxists in Talks with Christians,” 17 April 1968, The Times; “Marxists, Christians Theorize
Together,” 28 April 1968, Swiss Weekly Tribune; “Un colloque international entre marxistes et
chrétiens s’est tenu a Genève,” , 22 April 1968, L’Humanité.
 Jan Milíč Lochman, “Dialog překračuje meze,” Literární listy 14 (1968): 13.
 Dianne Kirby, Religion and the Cold War (Houndmills: Palgrave, 2013), 1.
 Ibid.
https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110534696-009
The Geneva meeting in the Spring of 1968 was an obvious break with this
dominant pattern of antagonism. This chapter argues that this rupture with
the past constituted the most visible manifestation of the existence of a particu-
lar “channel” of East-West exchange that had evolved in various European coun-
tries from the late 1950s. Over time, this channel was more and more explicitly
described by its proponents as a reaction to the “de-humanizing” and “alienat-
ing” effects of various kinds of social engineering and planning in Europe’s
highly developed industrial societies. Questions about the “place of the
human being” in an ever more regulated and technicized society seemed funda-
mental to both Christians and Marxists of the time across the Iron Curtain which
justifies the relevance of the analysis of their debates for a more general reflec-
tion on planning and social engineering between East and West. Both camps
found surprisingly compatible language that was inspired, on the one side, by
the Gospel and, on the other, by the young Karl Marx, who first addressed the
issue of alienation in his 1844 Manuscripts. Anthropocentric resistance to the
“de-humanizing” effects of both “Stalinist techno-bureaucracy” and “capitalist
productivism” led the protagonists of the Christian-Marxist encounters to consid-
er themselves as “two minority sects.” They saw themselves as struggling against
a “technicized indifference” linked to ever more computerized planning and
management practices, and for “a more human world of man – today and tomor-
row.”⁶
Different countries could be chosen as the field of observation of these phe-
nomena. The Czech case is especially interesting and relevant for several rea-
sons. First, in the 1950s the Czech lands became a site for experimentation in
various forms of social engineering focused on rapid social transformation
(i.e. the construction of a “socialist society”). An important component of
those initiatives was the attempt to accelerate the atheization of society in a
planned manner. Projects aimed at “getting rid of religious obscurantism”
were imposed on Czechoslovakia with a heavier hand than in other countries
of the Eastern bloc. Such projects were aided by the particularly weak position
of institutionalized religion in the country and a stable grounding of local
free-thinking and anti-church movements.⁷
 These concepts were frequently referred to by both Eastern and Western proponents of dia-
logue, including Jan Milíč Lochman, Church in a Marxist Society: A Czechoslovak View (Evanston:
Harper & Row, 1970), 192; Roger Garaudy, L’alternative (Paris: Éditions R. Laffont, 1972); Milan
Machovec, Smysl lidského života: studie k filosofii člověka (Praha: Nakladatelství politické litera-
tury, 1965).
 Antonín K. K. Kudláč, Příběh(y) Volné myšlenky (Praha: Nakladatelství Lidové noviny, 2005);
Martin Schulze Wessel, Revolution und religiöser Dissens: der römisch-katholische und russisch-
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At the same time, there was the tradition of debate between Czech Marxists
and Protestant elites about issues of modernity and modernization that dated
from the interwar period and created favorable conditions for national and inter-
national exchanges, despite deepening political differences after 1948.⁸ Last but
not least, Czech intellectuals of various confessions and political backgrounds
profited from past connections to different Western networks that were establish-
ed during the interwar period or even earlier. These networks were the basis of
the infrastructure of the East-West intellectual exchanges⁹ in which Czech actors
played a remarkable role.¹⁰
My analysis will begin at the national level and in the first part will examine
the so-called “executive phase” of one particular campaign of anti-religious of-
fensive: it is an example of social planning in practice where the actors them-
selves (in this case communist apparatchiks) used the then trendy P-word.
Their effort in the mid-1950s had the objective of limiting the social influence
of institutionalized religion in the public realm and hastening development to-
wards a “communist society” in a “scientifically controlled” way. I will then re-
construct the process by which a Czech Christian-Marxist space of exchange (a
“channel”) was created, which appeared, in part, in reaction to this campaign.
In fact, certain planners of atheization campaigns became progressively disen-
chanted with “administrative” anti-church measures, began to reflect upon the
shortcomings of their own social-engineering practices and finally (at least
some of them) opened themselves to inspiring debates with their former princi-
pal ideological adversaries (Christian theologians). In its third part, the chapter
will explore the internationalization of this channel of interaction during the
1960s, taking into account the different motivations of the main Czech and West-
orthodoxe Klerus als Träger religiösen Wandels in den böhmischen Ländern und in Russland
1848– 1922 (München: Oldenbourg, 2011).
 For this aspect see Ondřej Matějka, “A generation? A school? A fraternity? An army? Under-
standing the Roots of Josef Lukl Hromádka’s Influence in the Czech Protestant Milieu 1920–
1948,” Communio Viatorum. A Theological Journal 3 (2012): 307–320.
 I offer a perspective of longue durée on this aspect of the Czech Protestant milieu in my article
“‘Unique Connections’: Uses of the Transnational Social Capital of Czech Pastors, 1860s–1960s,”
to be published in Cultural and Social History in 2019. This article connects my research to the
type of reflection introduced by Katja Naumann and Sandrine Kott in this volume.
 The Geneva Christian-Marxist meeting held in April 1968 offers a particularly striking illus-
tration of this phenomenon. There were four Czech participants among 41 elite representatives of
the principal world denominations and prominent East and West European Marxists. See Con-
ference on Trends in Christian and Marxist Thinking About the Humanization of Technical and
Economic Development – List of Participants (April 1968), File 994.3.50.12, World Council of
Churches Archives, Geneva.
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ern actors, as well as the inner dynamics of one international organization, the
World Council of Churches (WCC), which was struggling for relevance in a secu-
larizing world.
This field of research in East-West dialogue has so far remained rather unex-
plored.¹¹ This chapter is therefore based almost entirely on primary sources (both
published and unpublished) which come from different places: the relevant files
in Czech National Archives covering the development of communist social engi-
neering projects in the religious field; the archives of the Czechoslovak secret po-
lice, which closely followed all kinds of East-West contacts; the private papers of
influential actors; and the testimonies of local participants in dialogue activities.
I was able to analyze the international aspect of these contacts thanks to my
gaining access to relevant files in the WCC archives in Geneva.
Planning a society without religion
It is undeniable that the vision of a society free of institutionalized religion was
an important part of the project of communism in the Soviet bloc. In the late
1940s, the builders of socialism all over Central and Eastern Europe endlessly
quoted the passage from Karl Marx’s Contribution to the Critique of Hegel’s Phi-
losophy of Right where he famously stated that religion “is the sigh of the op-
pressed creature, the heart of a heartless world, and the soul of soulless condi-
tions. It is the opium of the people.”¹² In the 1940s and 1950s, in the rising
European communist dictatorships, Marx’s words were frequently instrumental-
ized as a battle call against religion. One of the main aims the builders of social-
ism had was to achieve, as quickly as possible, a state of development where
such an “opiate” would be unnecessary, thanks principally to the benefits of sci-
entifically planned economic management.¹³ The big question of that time was
 The first collective volume on this subject (emphasizing the philosophical dimension of the
dialogic phenomenon) appeared recently in Czech Ivan Landa and Jan Mervart, Proměny marx-
isticko-křesťanského dialogu v Československu (Praha: Filosofia, 2017). I presented the first results
of my research on Christian-Marxist dialogue in my article “Dialogues on Religion in a ‘Socialist
Society’ under Construction: Marxist Social Scientists and Czech Protestants, 1940s-60s,” in Re-
constructing Communities in Europe, 1918–68, ed. Stefan Couperus and Harm Kaal (London:
Routledge, 2017), 238–259.
 For a historical contextualization of this thought, see Andrew McKinnon, “Reading ‘Opium
of the People’: Expression, Protest and the Dialectics of Religion,” Critical Sociology 1–2 (2005):
15–38.
 Erika Jindřichová-Kadlecová, “Úloha křesťanství v historii třídních bojů” (PhD diss., Charles
University in Prague, 1949), 1–2.
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whether a direct, centrally planned campaign against the churches was a neces-
sary part of such a process.
In the Czechoslovak case, in August 1948 a group of influential young appa-
ratchiks prepared substantial materials on religious affairs for the deliberation of
the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia (Komunistická
strana Československa [KSČ]). They proposed a series of measures laying out ex-
plicitly the need to “take all necessary steps,” including direct anti-church pol-
icies, with the objective of achieving the “final and definitive liquidation of reli-
gion.”¹⁴ Zealous Czech Stalinists in their early twenties fervently admired the
social engineering practices of their Soviet comrades, who had succeeded in
“rapidly spreading the scientific world view among the masses” thanks to cen-
trally-planned atheization campaigns undertaken in the USSR in the interwar pe-
riod.¹⁵
However, early Cold War tensions and postwar socio-economic difficulties
meant that the Czechoslovak communist leadership had to create as vast a con-
sensus as possible for their project of building socialism. They could not antag-
onize an important segment of the population. Consequently, all believers (ex-
cept for the “treacherous hierarchy” of the Catholic church and its religious
orders¹⁶) were invited at the end of the 1940s to join the “joyful socialist enter-
prise.”¹⁷ While Catholics (mainly in the traditionally religious areas of Moravia
and Slovakia) regarded this invitation with trepidation, an important number
of Czech non-Catholics more or less enthusiastically embraced the socialist proj-
ect, arguing that “when one reads Marx and Lenin, one can hear resonance of
what was announced by the Old Testament prophets and New Testament apos-
tles.”¹⁸
Nevertheless, the idea of doing away with institutionalized religion (always a
reminder of the incompleteness of the “new socialist reality”) did not disappear
 Návrh na řešení náboženských otázek v ČSR (30 August 1948), fond Generální sekretariát ÚV
KSČ 1945– 1951 (100/1), National Archives (NA) Prague.
 Erika Kadlecová, interview by Ondřej Matějka, 15 January 2008.
 See on this point Karel Kaplan, Stát a církev v Československu 1948– 1953 (Brno: Doplněk,
1993).
 Ondřej Matějka, “La religion est devenue l’affaire privée des citoyens. La construction du so-
cialisme et les milieux religieux dans les Pays tchèques,” Histoire@Politique 7 (2009).
 Josef Lukl Hromádka, Komunismus a křesťanství: o nápravu věcí lidských (Hradec Králové:
Evangelické dílo, 1946), 34–35. A more detailed analysis can be found in Ondřej Matějka,
“‘Správný komunista má také býti správným křesťanem, jako byli křesťané první.’ Vztah česko-
bratrských evangelíků ke Komunistické straně Československa 1921–1970,” in Český a slovenský
komunismus (1921–2011), ed. Jan Kalous and Jiří Kocian (Prague: Ústav pro studium totalitních
režimů, 2012), 284–296.
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from the to-do lists of the leading Czech communist ideologues. This goal resur-
faced with new vigor in the second half of the 1950s, when the dictatorship al-
ready seemed socially and economically stabilized. In fact, in the late 1950s,
the Czechoslovak communist leadership, always struggling for the prestigious
position of “Moscow’s best pupil,” decided to accelerate the construction of a
socialist society in an organized, thoroughly-planned manner, so that they
could legitimately proclaim Czechoslovakia to be the second “pure” socialist
state in the world.¹⁹
Antonín Novotný, then the First Secretary of the KSČ, outlined the roadmap
in his opening address to the Party’s eleventh congress, held in Prague in June
1958. He emphasized the necessity of forging “moral and political unity” among
the Czechoslovak people and closely linked this kind of unity with the process of
“finishing the cultural revolution.”²⁰ He further called for a resolute and “care-
fully planned” campaign that would “speed up the cultural development” of the
Czechoslovak population. Manifestations of “religious backwardness,” and
those who espoused them, soon became the main targets of this policy.²¹
This ambitious social-engineering offensive proceeded in several steps. It al-
ways combined a great deal of chaos with minutely planned bureaucratic meas-
ures that targeted important crossroads of social life. The most socially conflic-
tive action was limiting the visibility and influence of practicing Christians in
public spaces and more importantly, in the field of education. Following several
rather ambiguously worded messages from the top level of the KSČ hierarchy,²²
regional and local Party officers decided that teachers at all levels of the educa-
tive system should be obliged to sign a document proclaiming their “successful
coming to terms with religious prejudice” if they wanted to keep their positions.²³
Numerous witnesses agree that at the turn of the 1950s and 1960s, an alarming
shortage of teachers resulted in some regions as many hyperactive school head-
masters set for themselves the objective of attaining a purely atheist staff as soon
 “Usnesení XI. sjezdu,” Rudé právo, 23 July 1958, 1.
 Antonín Novotný, Zpráva o činnosti ústředního výboru KSČ XI. sjezdu a současné hlavní úkoly
(Praha: Ústřední výbor KSČ), 1958.
 11. sjezd KSČ – dovršení výstavby socialismu v naší vlasti (Praha: ÚV ČSM, 1959). For a previ-
ous position of the Central Committee of the KSČ on this issue, see: “Zásady zkvalitnění ideo-
logické a politické práce mezi učiteli všeobecně vzdělávacích a odborných škol,” 18 September
1957 published in Od X. do XI. sjezdu: Usnesení a dokumenty ÚV KSČ (Praha: SPNL, 1958), 593.
 This ambiguity arose from the fact that from 1954 on, the religious affiliation of Czechoslo-
vak citizens was not recorded in any kind of official materials: file 3, archival unit 3, p. 23, fond
1261/0/14 (Secretariat of the Central Committee of the CPC 1954– 1962), NA Prague.
 Reports from 1958, 1959; XXI/2, file 11, fond SC, XVII/5, Central Archives of the Evangelical
Church of Czech Brethren Prague (CA ECCB).
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as possible.²⁴ As a “logical” outgrowth of this policy, applications by devout stu-
dents for study programs at pedagogical faculties were systematically turned
down. The justification was that a teacher in a socialist society must be wholly
identified with a “scientific world view” that was incompatible with a religious
confession.²⁵
In addition to these negative, discriminatory measures, which reduced the
social influence of believers, the “positive” side of the social-engineering effort
to “finish the cultural revolution” was the cultivation of “scientific atheists”
through education and propaganda. The Politburo decided to systematically sup-
port the institutionalization of a new field of research, “scientific atheism.” Its
mission was to educate experts who could produce and disseminate “scientifi-
cally based propaganda” and, last but not least, “plan necessary steps in the
process of finishing the cultural revolution.”²⁶
Thanks to generous state funding, several research groups appeared in the
field of “scientific atheism” in the late 1950s. Two centres gradually acquired
dominant positions: the Department of Scientific Atheism at the Czechoslovak
Academy of Sciences, headed by Erika Kadlecová (born 1924),²⁷ and the Depart-
ment of Philosophy at the Faculty of Arts of Charles University, where an assis-
tant professor, Milan Machovec (1925–2003), began to publish numerous writ-
ings on “methods of education in atheism.”²⁸ These “experts” systematically
collaborated with the KSČ apparatus, which substantially increased their politi-
cal and social impact and at the same time allowed KSČ officials to claim the
“scientific legitimation” of their positions in the field of religion and the policies
they implemented.²⁹
In this regard, Czechoslovakia’s communist dictatorship basically followed a
wider European pattern of pursuing social and economic development. In an era
 Karel Kaplan, Kronika komunistického Československa. Doba tání 1953– 1956 (Brno: Barrister
& Principal, 2005), 630–631.
 Draft of a letter to the regional committees of the CPC about current ecclesiastical situation,
27 September 1958, f. 132, a.u. 232, p. 18, fond 1261/0/14 (Secretariat of the Central Committee of
the CPC 1954–1962), NA Prague.
 More on this institutionalization in Ondřej Matějka, “Between the Academy and Power:
Czech Marxist Sociology of Religion (1954– 1970),” in Sociology and Ethnography in East-Central
and South-East Europe. Scientific Self-Description in States Socialist Countries, ed. Ulf Brunnba-
uer, Claudia Kraft and Martin Schulze Wessel (Munich: Oldenbourg, 2011), 107– 133.
 See also Zdeněk R. Nešpor, Ne/náboženské naděje intelektuálů: vývoj české sociologie ná-
boženství v mezinárodním a interdisciplinárním kontextu (Praha: Scriptorium, 2008), 293–313.
 The most extensive text of this kind is Milan Machovec, “O metodách ateistické výchovy,”
Filosofický časopis 5 (1959): 678–694.
 Ladislav Prokůpek, interview by Ondřej Matějka, 20 October 2007.
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of “planned modernization,” expert solutions were fundamental sources of so-
cial and political legitimacy.³⁰ Hence, in the 1950s and 1960s, the Czechoslovak
communist leadership sponsored various “expert committees” focused on anal-
ysis of all sorts of economic, social and political issues.³¹ The histories of these
committees follow an almost universal pattern. In the first phase, experts where
chosen on the basis of their loyalty to the original framework devised by the KSČ
Politburo. Then, the experts progressively emancipated themselves and, to the
dismay of the conservative Party leadership, began to spread an independent
and critical discourse in their field of expertize, thanks to their access to forbid-
den literature and their contacts with Western science. Ota Šik’s team in econom-
ics, Zdeněk Mlynář’s team in political science and Radovan Richta’s group devot-
ed to “scientific and technological revolution”³² all actively prepared the way for
the reformist Prague Spring.
So did the above-mentioned “scientific atheists.” After a period of docile ful-
filment of the tasks formulated for them by the Ideological Committee of the
KSČ, Kadlecová, Machovec, Sviták, Hranička and other scientific atheists
began to reflect in an independent way upon the alienating effects of social en-
gineering initiatives in the field of religion.With their ambitions to scientifically
understand social reality, they launched a project for a standardized sociological
survey on the religiosity of Czech population (carried out in 1963). This survey
provided a background for reflection on the paradoxical outcomes of social plan-
ning in the sphere of human consciousness carried out in the 1950s.³³ Unsurpris-
ingly, these growingly independent thinkers soon attracted the attention of their
former “ideological opponents” on the Christian side, who eventually formed a
stable coalition with them and a “channel” that created space for mutual ex-
change of ideas, as well as useful contacts and support.
 Peter Wagner and Hellmut Wollmann, “Social Scientists in Policy Research and Consulting:
Some Cross-National Comparisons,” International Social Science Journal 4 (1986): 601–617. See
also the introduction to this volume.
 Zdeněk Mlynář, Nightfrost in Prague: The End of Humane Socialism (New York: Karz Publish-
ers, 1980), 57.
 A research project has been recently completed at the Institute for Contemporary History of
the Czech Academy of Sciences, funded by the Czech Science Foundation: History of Czechoslo-
vak Scientific Interdisciplinary Teams in the 1960s (principal investigator: Jiří Hoppe).




Formation of the national channel
In order to understand the logic of rapprochement between the Marxist and Prot-
estant intellectual elites in the late 1950s in the Czech lands, it is first important
to retrace the principal turning points in the trajectory of the communist “scien-
tific atheists.” Thanks to their strong social and political capital inside the dic-
tatorship, they were able to secure and institutionalize space for Christian-Marx-
ist exchanges at the national level.
Most of the scientific atheists started their intellectual journeys as enthusi-
astic young Stalinists, replacing the “old bourgeois cadres” in philosophy de-
partments and sociological institutes from the late 1940s onward – often after
participating in extensive University purges in the early 1950s. They entered aca-
demia with a firm belief in the omnipotence of the Party, the universal validity of
Marx-Leninist teachings and the unlimited potential of social engineering prac-
tices in all spheres of activity. Their motto was “the future of the world is in our
hands” thanks to “scientific planning.”³⁴ This self-confident attitude was com-
plemented by a strong sense of loyalty towards the KSČ, which permitted an oth-
erwise unlikely acceleration of their academic careers. Many of them were sent to
study in the USSR at elite Party institutes in order to be educated at the very
source. Even though they brought back the “seeds of disenchantment” based
on their opportunity to observe closely the dysfunctionality of Soviet social en-
gineering practices,³⁵ they were still considered reliable enough to be given ac-
cess to Western social-scientific literature and forbidden parts of the Marxist
canon (such as Marx’s early writings) in the early 1950s. Their discovery of the
“young Marx” and his 1844 manuscripts, together with Khrushchev’s 1956 reve-
lations (for many of them “a genuine existential earthquake”³⁶) and their con-
tacts with Polish and Yugoslav revisionists, led them to substantially re-evaluate
their own self-image and the socialist project.³⁷
Nevertheless, the scientific atheists did not renounce that project altogether.
Quite to the contrary, they invested enormous energy into trying to find out
“what went wrong,” in part because they remained deeply identified with social-
 Ibid, 256. Erika Kadlecová, interview by Ondřej Matějka, 15 January 2008.
 Mlynář, Nightfrost in Prague.
 Erika Kadlecová, interview by Ondřej Matějka, 15 January 2008.
 Ivan Sviták, Devět životů: konkrétní dialektika (Praha: SAKKO, 1992).
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ism and felt personal responsibility for its failures in the Czech context.³⁸ In their
field of expertize, based on intense study of Eastern and Western sociological lit-
erature, they carried on frequent debates with colleagues from other socialist
countries. Because of their opportunities to observe what was going on at the
local level,³⁹ they became persuaded that social engineering with the objective
of hastening the demise of religious faith simply did not work, and furthermore,
sometimes was outright alienating to believers.
That critical reflection found its way into the national media and reached a
wider public. This was possible because of the solid social and political capital
the scientific atheists had accumulated in the first years of the socialist regime,
and because the post-Stalinist moment opened a wholly new discursive space
where criticism of “the remnants of the cult of personality” was expected.
Hence, the scientific atheists were authorized to publish in influential reviews
such as Nová mysl or Filosofický časopis their revisionist thoughts about the in-
efficiency of “bureaucratic methods” used in the process of “finishing the cultur-
al revolution” and the problem of “producing a sense of life” in a highly devel-
oped, centrally planned society.⁴⁰
Protestant intellectual elites who suffered from the socially marginalizing
measures of social engineering aimed at “finishing the cultural revolution”
were quick to react. The first contact with Machovec was established by two
young Protestant pastors, Karel Trusina and Milan Opočenský, who began at-
tending Machovec’s seminars at the Faculty of Arts in the late 1950s. They
soon proposed arranging a discussion for Machovec with professor Josef L. Hro-
mádka, dean of the Comenius Protestant Theology Faculty in Prague.⁴¹ In this
encounter, Machovec made a “great discovery” that “influenced the rest of his
life.”⁴² He met a group of Christian intellectuals holding dogmatically sound
 For deeper reflection on this aspect, see Ondřej Matějka, “We are the Generation that Will
Construct Socialism: The Czech 68ers Between Manifest Destiny and Mark of Cain,” in Talkin’
’Bout my Generation. Conflicts of Generation Building and Europe’s 1968, ed. Anna von der
Goltz (Göttingen: Wallstein Verlag, 2011), 118–139.
 They were employed by the KSČ apparatus as lecturers for regional officers responsible for
church policy. Ladislav Prokůpek, interview by Ondřej Matějka, 20 October 2007; Erika Kadleco-
vá, interview by Ondřej Matějka, 15 January 2008.
 Some examples: Erika Kadlecová, “Ateismus bojovný a trpělivý,” Nová mysl 10 (1962): 1254–
1262; Machovec, “O metodách;” Milan Machovec, “Je naše vědeckoateistická výchova správně
orientována?” Filosofický časopis 3 (1964): 354–361.
 Olga Nytrová and Milan Balabán, “Rozhovor s profesorem Milanem Machovcem. Jak tomu
bylo s vaším křesťanstvím a marxismem?” Křesťanská revue 7 (2000): 176; Diaries 1958– 1959,
J. L. Hromádka papers, Archives of Evangelical Theological Faculty.
 Nytrová and Balabán, “Rozhovor,” 176.
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theological principles who nonetheless sincerely identified with the socialist
project and had been well-acquainted with Marxist thought since the 1920s.⁴³
Furthermore, the Protestants’ contacts and connections in the West opened a
new and attractive space for the predominantly Eastern-oriented Marxist think-
ers.
In the late 1950s, the first Christian-Marxist conversations took place regard-
ing principally specific religious topics. For example, Machovec was working on
a research project on Barthian dialectic theology and he found in his Protestant
counterparts excellent informants and discussion partners.⁴⁴ Progressively, how-
ever, the growing group of Marxists and Christians that formed around Hromád-
ka and Machovec cleared common ground for debate on more general topics,
most notably about the alienation and dehumanization evoked by the then-cur-
rent phase of Czechoslovak socialism. Personal experience with social engineer-
ing operations constituted an important reference point for them all. In the
words of Jan Milíč Lochman, one of the main Protestant participants, the topic
they examined with the most passion was the place of man “within the alienat-
ing structures of institutional manipulations as they evidently appeared within
the centralized structure of socialist society.”⁴⁵
Christian intellectuals did not contest the fact that “a house for a new soci-
ety was being built” or that Marxism offered “knowledge of social laws enabling
effective management of social development.”⁴⁶ Nevertheless, they shared a
common concern with their atheist counterparts about the “manifold alienation
of modern man [that] has not yet been overcome by the socialist structure of so-
ciety.”⁴⁷ The revisionist Marxists agreed that regulation and planning of different
dimensions of social life often produced “fatalism,” especially when such poli-
cies were carried out with “bureaucratized indifference,” and thus could result in
a “dehumanized world” where man played only the role of “a cog in a vast ma-
chine.”⁴⁸
 On this aspect, see for instance Jiří Hájek, Paměti (Praha: Ústav mezinárodních vztahů, 1997).
 As a result of this project, Milan Machovec published a book entitled O tak zvané “dialek-
tické” teologii současného protestantismu (Praha: ČSAV, 1962).
 Lochman, Church. See also Josef Lukl Hromádka, Gospel for Atheists (Geneva: WCC–Youth
Department, 1965).
 Milan Machovec, O smyslu lidského života (Praha: Orbis, 1957), 81.
 Milan Opočenský quoted in Paul Mojzes, Christian-Marxist Dialogue in Eastern Europe (Min-
neapolis: Augsburg Publishing House, 1980), 119.
 Milan Machovec, “Dialog v procesu humanizace člověka,” Osvětová práce 15 (1965): 10– 11;
Lochman, Church, 192.
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Since the early 1960s, these discussion partners became more attached to
each other as they formed a coalition against the conservative Party apparatus.
Its representatives observed, with a sense of shock, how the former brain trust of
the atheization campaigns had become a nest of well-thought-out criticism of all
attempts at “bureaucratic” social engineering in the field of religion.⁴⁹ Macho-
vec, Prokůpek, and Kadlecová were furthermore ready to support Protestant pro-
tests against repressive measures aimed at limiting church activities. They also
opposed social discrimination against believers, for example in admission pro-
cedures to the university.⁵⁰
From the mid-1960s, the scope and resonance of this continuing dialogue
widened and became even more general. Machovec, for instance, explicitly
began to refuse to acknowledge social engineering attempts as a “so-called his-
torical necessity” (related to the “inevitable march” towards a communist society
without religion) and as an infallible guarantee of a brighter future. Quite the re-
verse. Referring to incidents of forced atheization, he contended that the idea
that “the future human being can be planned in every respect” was “something
quite crude and vulgar.”⁵¹ Machovec formulated sophisticated hypotheses about
the origin of specific forms of alienation produced by the construction of social-
ism and called for deep reflection about the need for a “sense of life” in a society
that was on its way toward communism.⁵²
Machovec found his main source of inspiration in the work of the Marxist
psychoanalyst and philosopher Erich Fromm, with whom he met for the first
time in the context of the Christian-Marxist dialogue in Prague in the mid-
1960s.⁵³ After that, Machovec and his Christian friends became ardent propo-
nents of Fromm’s ideas about what he called a “historical irony,” where the “spi-
rit of capitalism, the satisfaction of material greed,” so typical of Western con-
sumer societies, was infecting the socialist countries of East-Central Europe as
 See the angry reports by Karel Hrůza from 1962–1963, fond IV ČCE, Archives of Ministry of
Education, Prague.
 Erika Kadlecová, “Socialismus a náboženství,” Rudé právo, 28 May 1968.
 Machovec, quoted in Hans-Joachim Girock, Partner von morgen? (Stuttgart: Kreuz-Verlag,
1968), 67; Milan Machovec, “Die Zukunft als Drohung und Chance,” Der Kreis, Sonderreihe, 5
(1966): 31.
 The first edition of Machovec’s O smyslu lidského života from 1957 was followed by an en-
larged version with a chapter on the dialogue in 1965: Milan Machovec, Smysl lidského života:
studie k filosofii člověka (Praha: Nakladatelství politické literatury, 1965).
 Benjamin B. Page, “Dialogues…,” in Mistr dialogu Milan Machovec. Sborník k nedožitým osm-
desátinám českého filosofa, ed. Kamila Jindrová, Pavel Tachecí, and Pavel Žďárský (Praha: Ak-
ropolis, 2006), 148– 150.
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well.⁵⁴ Fromm understood the logic of this process in the following way: the ma-
terial success of capitalism was immensely impressive to poorer countries in Eu-
rope where communism triumphed. The attractiveness of socialism had become
identified with its success in the competition with capitalism. According to
Fromm and his followers, this competition was, nevertheless, being taking
place on capitalist terms. Fromm warned that socialism “with its planned econ-
omy was in danger of deteriorating into a system which can accomplish the in-
dustrialization of poorer countries more quickly than capitalism, rather than of
becoming a society in which the development of man, and not that of economic
production, is the main goal.” According to Fromm, but also Machovec, this dan-
ger was becoming ever more acute as Eastern regimes accepted a “crude version”
of Marxism, divorced from “the humanist spiritual tradition of which Marx was
one of the greatest representatives.” What followed from this distortion, as diag-
nosed by Fromm in both East and West, was a society managed and planned “by
giant enterprises, giant industrial, governmental, and labour bureaucracies”
which produced alienated individuals.
The French philosopher Roger Garaudy (a member of the politburo of the
French Communist Party between 1956 and 1970) was another key source of in-
spiration for Czech revisionist Marxists and their Christian counterparts. Garaudy
gradually sharpened his criticism of the “Stalinist techno-bureaucracy” over
time. He contended that it reproduced (and at times enforced) a “dualist struc-
ture” of governing/governed, dominating/dominated, and limited socialism to
“a specific system of economic planning.”⁵⁵ His critiques encountered an enthu-
siastic response in Prague among proponents of the Christian-Marxist dialogue.
In the early 1960s, he repeatedly went there to present his thoughts on socialism
as “a project of civilisation” leading to “a richer and more creative” life. This
opinion was very much in tune with the reformist thinking then mushrooming
in Prague, which Garaudy himself had already in 1963 baptized as the “Prague
Spring.”⁵⁶
At that time, Fromm and Garaudy were frequently referenced by the contin-
uously expanding Czech circle of dialogical Marxists and Christians. It is possi-
ble to observe the progressive institutionalization of their debate in two places
where the basic contours of the Christian-Marxist “channel” on the national
level were being defined. On the one hand, more theologically oriented discus-
 All quotes in the following paragraph come from Erich Fromm, Socialist Humanism: An In-
ternational Symposium (New York: Doubleday, 1965), 214–216.
 Garaudy, L’Alternative, 76–77. But see also Roger Garaudy, From Anathema to Dialogue: The
Challenge of Marxist-Christian Cooperation (London: Collins, 1967).
 Roger Garaudy, “Kafka et le Printemps de Prague,” Lettres françaises 981 (1963): 1.
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sions, which had started in Hromádka’s apartment in the late 1950s,⁵⁷ moved to
the Protestant theological faculty in the autumn of 1963. There, several dozen
Protestants, Catholics and Marxists who were open to dialogue met every
other Thursday in the refectory of the faculty. The topics they presented and dis-
cussed ranged from medieval theology to the issue of alienation in socialist so-
ciety.⁵⁸
The second space, more philosophically oriented, originated in discussions
which first took place in Machovec’s apartment in Košíře. The main participants
were Hromádka’s students Opočenský and Trusina, Machovec, and some of Ma-
chovec’s closest philosophical partners, like Zbyněk Fišer. According to Milan
Opočenský, “our debates were exciting, honest and often tough. I remember
that we encouraged ourselves by reflecting on the fact that dialogue helps us
not only in finding a way towards other people but also in engaging in dialogue
with ourselves and with our mortal essence”.⁵⁹
Profoundly spiritual debates were soon to be confronted with more earthly
preoccupations. After the birth of Machovec’s second child in 1963, Mrs. Macho-
vec presented her husband with a clear ultimatum: either Machovec, Opočenský,
Trusina and their growing circle of Christian and Marxist partners would find a
more suitable space for their noisy encounters than the Machovec family’s kitch-
en or they would have to stop.⁶⁰ At that critical moment, Machovec decided to
transfer the debates onto academic territory. In that way, he founded the “Mon-
day Dialogic Seminar” at the Faculty of Arts, which later became famous and
through the end of the 1960s attracted students and intellectuals from all facul-
ties of Charles University and the Academy of Sciences.⁶¹
 Diaries 1957– 1959, fond J. L. Hromádka, Archives ETF Prague.
 Reports from 1964– 1966, File Jiří Němec, Archives of security services Prague.
 Milan Opočenský, “Velice jsem po tobě teskliv,” in Mistr dialogu Milan Machovec. Sborník k
nedožitým osmdesátinám českého filosofa, ed. Kamila Jindrová, Pavel Tachecí, and Pavel Žďárský
(Praha: Akropolis, 2006), 215.
 Pavel Žďárský, “Milan Machovec a jeho filosofická antropologie v 60. letech 20. století” (PhD
Diss., Charles University in Prague, 2011), 51.
 Jiřina Šiklová, “Dialogický seminář na Filozofické fakultě UK v šedesátých letech,” in Mistr
dialogu Milan Machovec. Sborník k nedožitým osmdesátinám českého filosofa, ed. Kamila Jindro-
vá, Pavel Tachecí, and Pavel Žďárský (Praha: Akropolis, 2006), 50, 56.
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The dialogue goes global
Despite Hromádka’s and Machovec’s adroit manoeuvring in the context of com-
munist dictatorship (and family dynamics), the Czech Christian-Marxist channel
did not remain unnoticed by the conservative wing of the KSČ leadership and the
secret police (Státní bezpečnost [StB]). This was partly because of its subversive
political rhetoric but even more because of its progressive internationalization.
StB files document in great detail the growing number of international observers
and participants attracted by these Prague dialogues. They also show how StB
officers continuously sounded the alarm for the upper levels of the KSČ about
what they considered a danger of “foreign ideological infiltration.”⁶²
In this particular case, the reports of the agents and collaborators of the secret
police, despite a frequent tendency to produce conspiracy theories and interpret
the world in terms of the games of intelligence agencies, probably did not overes-
timate the rapid internationalization of the religious dialogue. The dialogue was
undoubtedly closely linked to a global context: in the mid-1960s, Christian-Marxist
dialogues “broke out” almost simultaneously in a number of European countries,
including Czechoslovakia, Italy, West Germany, and France.⁶³
The Czech group became an intensely courted partner for Western partici-
pants. It was attractive because it had grown up autonomously in the Eastern,
socialist part of the European continent, thus constituting a sort of “laboratory.”
It offered Western counterparts original and “indigenous” thinking from the
“Second World” about problems of alienation that were relevant to modern bu-
reaucratic societies, where new forms of social regulation and management (as
interpreted by Fromm) were being introduced.⁶⁴ The group’s members’ influence
also rested on their “impressive intellectual performance,” which was reported
with a sense of admiration not only by political allies like Garaudy and
Fromm but by critical observers and opponents of communism as well, such
as those from Radio Free Europe.⁶⁵ Furthermore, in its conquest of Western au-
diences, the Czech dialogic group enjoyed a unique advantage: the international
 General report for the CC – 1965, Archives of security services Prague.
 Leonard Swindler, The Age of Global Dialogue (Eugene: Pickwick Publications, 2016), 297.
 For a further instrumentalization of the Czechoslovak reformist experience, see Garaudy,
L’alternative.
 Christians and Marxists in Marianske Lazne, 10 July 1967, 300–8–3– 13449, Records of
Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Research Institute, Publications Department, Background Re-
ports, Open Society Archives at the Central European University, Budapest.
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social capital of Czech Protestants, who had traditionally possessed close con-
nections to the West.
From the very beginning of Cold War détente, Czech Protestant elites were
able to rapidly (re‐)establish contacts and networks and even enlarge them.
The scientific atheist Machovec’s career trajectory constitutes a perfect example
of the benefits. “The Protestants made me leave my Prague quietness and forced
me to start travelling,” he amusedly confessed in the 1970s.⁶⁶ In fact, thanks to
the Protestants’ recommendations, Machovec was invited to several internation-
al Christian debating fora in the early 1960s. In the wake of his first Western trip,
to Graz for the World Student Christian Federation conference in 1962, he be-
came “a genuine dialogue magnet.” His foreign lectures and discussion tours,
which emphasized the alienating impact of modernization in both the East
and the West, always met with great success.⁶⁷
Machovec was not alone in profiting from the dynamics of international in-
terfaith dialogue as Protestant networks opened the gates to the West. In the sec-
ond half of the 1960s, his Marxist colleagues Vítězslav Gardavský and Julius
Tomin were “exported” to the USA, thanks to sponsorship by the National Coun-
cil of Churches, in order to inform the overseas intellectual public about the
Christian-Marxist dialogue. Tomin even earned a visiting professorship at the
University of Hawaii as an outcome of that trip.⁶⁸ Thanks to Protestant connec-
tions, Ladislav Prokůpek, a member of Kadlecová’s Department of Scientific
Atheism at the Czechoslovak Academy of Sciences in the 1960s, obtained a
scholarship from the World Council of Churches and spent a semester in Geneva
in the academic year 1969–70.⁶⁹
These increasingly more intense exchanges gradually led to the establish-
ment and stabilization of spaces for dialogue at the international level. Regular
international dialogic conferences organized by the Paulus Gesellschaft probably
represented the earliest manifestation of this stabilization in the 1960s. The West
German association, whose name refers to the Apostle Paul’s mediation efforts
 Opočenský, “Velice jsem po tobě teskliv,” 213.
 Helmut Beth, “Im Dialog mit Milan Machovec,” in Mistr dialogu Milan Machovec. Sborník k
nedožitým osmdesátinám českého filosofa, ed. Kamila Jindrová, Pavel Tachecí, and Pavel Žďárský
(Praha: Akropolis, 2006), 184– 199. Opočenský, “Velice jsem po tobě teskliv,” 213. Petr Pokorný,
“Vzpomínky na Milana Machovce,” Ibid., 208–209. The first book introducing Machovec’s
thought in the West, Marxismus und dialektische Theologie: Barth, Bonhoeffer und Hromádka
in atheistich-kommunistischer Sicht, was published in 1965 in Zurich by the Evangelische Verlags
Zollikons (EVZ). Its translator, Dorothea Neumärker, was a German Protestant participant in the
Prague-based Christian Peace Conference and the author of a monograph on Hromádka.
 Lubomír Miřejovský, Dopisy z XX. století (Praha: Nuga, 2004), 312, 316–325.
 Ladislav Prokůpek, interview by Ondřej Matějka, 20 October 2007.
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between the Jews and the Gentiles, was founded in 1956 by Erich Kellner, a West
German Catholic priest and theologian who was interested in re-thinking the po-
sition of Christianity in the “scientific age.” In the early 1960s, Kellner noticed
the new intellectual movement among East European Marxists and decided to
offer Paulus Gesellschaft as a mediator and moderator of discussions between
the two ideological camps. The first East European who was authorized to attend
a Paulus Gesellschaft conference was the Polish philosopher Adam Schaff in
1964.⁷⁰ In the following years, the Paulus initiative continued to develop. In
1965, a much more numerous delegation of Eastern Marxists came to Salzburg
to discuss the theme of the “Christian and Marxist Future.” They returned
again in 1966 to Herrenchiemsee, where they compared “Christian Humanity
and Marxist Humanism.”⁷¹
The international reputation of these encounters grew with every meeting
and it seemed only logical to try to organize one in the East. It is significant
that the Czech team of Marxist sociologists, headed by Erika Kadlecová, offered
to co-sponsor the 1967 Paulus Gesellschaft congress. It took place in the Czech
resort town Mariánské lázně (Marienbad) and marked the apogee of the dialogic
movement with over 220 participants and extensive media coverage (mainly in
the West).⁷²
The central topic of the debate in Marienbad was “Creativity and Freedom in
a Human Society.” This clearly marked a continuation of East-West reflection on
the alienating effects of bureaucratically-managed societies in high modernity
and the limited possibilities for development of freedom and creativity in such
contexts. The participants, irrespective of the ideological camp from which
they came, agreed that it was necessary “to protect the individual against all at-
tempts to reduce him merely to a medium for the construction of a technologi-
cally over-rationalized future” and warned against “new forms of alienation”
in developed capitalist and socialist societies. At the end of their deliberations,
they tried to strengthen their message by asserting that they represented “the
two most important ideologically-oriented groups [i.e. Christians and Marxists]
in modern society”, which felt “a special responsibility for the future of man.”⁷³
Who contributed most to such an ambitious claim? On the one hand, there
were leading Catholic and Protestant theologians such as Karl Rahner, Johann
 Katja Naumann introduces Schaff more extensively in her contribution to this volume.
 Mojzes, Christian-Marxist Dialogue, 158 ff.
 “Christians and Marxists in Marianske Lazne,” 10 July 1967.
 “Christians and Marxists in Marianske Lazne,” 10 July 1967. Nevertheless, the two groups
were also systematically presented as “minority sects” in a “sea of indifference” (Lochman,
Church, 192).
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Baptist Metz, Giulio Girardi, Yves Congar, Jürgen Moltmann and Georges Casalis.
On the other hand, the most active Western European participants from the
Marxist field included Manuel Azcarate, a respected member of the Spanish
Communist Party in exile, Lucian Gruppi, the head of the Ideological Section
of the Central Committee of the Italian CP,Walter Hollitscher, a professor of phi-
losophy at the University of Leipzig and a consultant to the Central Committee of
the Austrian Communist Party, and of course, Roger Garaudy.
The encounters facilitated by the Paulus Gesellschaft produced even more
offspring, which further enhanced the East-West channel of communication. In
particular, two journals became spaces for intense intellectual exchange on var-
ious topics opened up by the Christian-Marxist dialogue. The Austrian journal
Neues Forum started to play a role as the “official review” for Christian-Marxist
dialogue in the mid-1960s. Ironically, it was first financed by the decidedly anti-
communist North American “Congress for Cultural Freedom.” As it emancipated
itself and added a subtitle, “International Review for Dialogue,” it became one of
the liveliest journals specializing in East-West dialogue. It had wide recognition
in Europe, and was led by an international editorial committee staffed by “dia-
logic stars” from both sides of the Iron Curtain, including Moltmann, Bloch,
Metz, Fromm, Hromádka, Machovec, and also Eric Hobsbawm.⁷⁴
In 1967, the prominent Catholic theologian Karl Rahner founded yet another
journal with a similar background and purpose. It was entitled the Internationale
DIALOG Zeitschrift and first appeared in 1968. It constituted a more theologically
oriented platform for continuing exchange between Christians and Marxists with
an international audience.⁷⁵
It is possible to identify even lower-level ramifications of the Christian-Marx-
ist channel between Eastern and Western Europe, which had a concrete impact
on the ground of academia. Exchanges between the Collegium Academicum of
the University of Heidelberg and Charles University offer such an example. In
fact, thanks to his growing fame in West European Protestant circles after the
Graz conference in 1962, Milan Machovec (together with Czech Protestant histor-
ian Amadeo Molnár, another proponent of the dialogue) was invited to the annu-
al conference of the Evangelische Akademie Berlin in September 1963, to contrib-
ute to the topic “Neighbours in the Centre of Europe.” In the early 1960s, this was
still quite a unique opportunity for dialogue with the West German students who
were members of the Collegium Academicum of Heidelberg. Representatives of
 Neues Forum – Dialog (1968–1969); David McLellan, “Christian-Marxist Dialogue,” New
Blackfriars 577 (1968): 462–467.
 Svein Rise, “Karl Rahner,” in Key Theological Thinkers: From Modern to Postmodern, ed.
Staale Johannes Kristainsen and Svein Rise (London: Routledge, 2013), 225–238.
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this academic association decided to use their newly formed contacts to gain an
invitation for 15 students to stay in Prague in 1964. In the months that followed,
they established a regular series of semester-long exchanges between Heidelberg
and Prague for a dozen students, which lasted until the end of the Prague Spring
and allowed a much wider circle of students to enjoy opportunities originally
only available in the Christian-Marxist channel.⁷⁶
Finally, in the mid-1960s, the public importance of these encounters, as well
as the influence of certain Czech actors in the World Council of Churches, attract-
ed the WCC’s attention to the dialogue.⁷⁷ We can observe a double motivation for
the organization’s interest. First of all, the early 1960s were marked by the WCC’s
effort to find new ways to legitimize its existence and purpose in an ever more
secularized Euro-Atlantic context (which still remained the centre of gravity of
the WCC).⁷⁸ At the same time, the WCC was looking for more intense connections
to the Second and Third Worlds. Both of these logics converged at the moment
the WCC was preparing to hold a “Conference on Church and Society” in Geneva
in 1966.⁷⁹ Of the 420 participants, about equal numbers came from the Third
World, socialist countries, North America and Western Europe, making it the
first large ecumenical conference in which the participants from the Western
countries were not in a majority.
One of the outcomes of the conference (co-organized and co-chaired by
Czech dialogic theologian Lochman) that was explicitly emphasized in the
final report for the WCC’s Central Committee, was an accent on the necessity
to develop all kinds of dialogic initiatives, with a special focus on contacts
with Marxism. “We urge that the WCC seek to initiate a formal dialogue with
Marxists on an international basis, in each region of the world.”⁸⁰ The justifica-
tion for that effort underlined the fact that “many Christians and Marxists have
common social concerns,” arising from “the emergence of a pluralistic and tech-
nological society in both East and West.”⁸¹
 Beth, “Im Dialog mit Milan Machovec,” 185– 193.
 File 42.11.04, WCC archives Geneva.
 File 994.3.50.12, WCC archives Geneva. One of the principal coordinators of the dialogue in
Geneva, Lukas Vischer, insisted that “the World Council’s Church and Society Conference,
and the Christian Peace Conference are shattering the chains of the Constantinian era in
which the church was considered the champion of the existing order whatever it might be.
The church is vitally interested in the thoughts and problems of THIS world”.
 For more on this conference, see Katharina Kunter and Annegreth Schilling, Globalisierung
der Kirchen: der Ökumenische Rat der Kirchen und die Entdeckung der Dritten Welt in den 1960er
und 1970er Jahren (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2014), 38–41.
 Minutes of Central Committee 1967 (205), WCC archives Geneva.
 Ibid.
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On the basis of that suggestion (symbolically presented to the Central Com-
mittee of the WCC by Lochman himself), the WCC decided to co-finance a series
of Christian-Marxist meetings. It also tried to actively contribute to the spread of
dialogue among students – for instance, by co-organizing dialogic seminars in
Geneva. Unsurprisingly, one of the first invitees came from Prague. In 1967,
Josef Smolík, a professor of Protestant systematic theology and an active partic-
ipant in the Prague Christian-Marxist meetings, used the seminars to introduce,
together with his colleague Richard Shaull (a professor at the Princeton theolog-
ical seminary deeply influenced by Josef L. Hromádka during his studies⁸²), elab-
orate thinking on the dangers (and challenges) of the computerized cybernetic
society then arising both in the West and in the East as the result of the “scien-
tific and technological revolution.” Smolík analyzed the “introduction of cyber-
netic models for management of economic and social life” and explicitly argued,
in line with ideas discussed at Marienbad and in the Neues Forum, that “the dan-
ger that cybernetics represents consists of stealing the fundamental dimensions
of humanity from a man,” which “leads to the complete disintegration of the
human being deprived of his freedom.” Shaull warned, in quite the same vein,
that the danger of a “technicisized civilization,” characterized by ever more ra-
tionalized and computerized management, was resulting in “a new form of slav-
ery.” The only way out that Shaull and Smolík could imagine required a “new
revolution” substantially inspired by emancipatory movements in the Third
World.⁸³
This line of thought, which consistently emphasized connections with the
South and consequently globalized the whole dialogic enterprise, dominated
the most important international manifestation of the Christian-Marxist channel.
This was the conference organized by the WCC in Geneva in April 1968 men-
tioned in the introduction of the chapter. The organizing committee invited
speakers with special care, including representatives from South America, Africa
and Asia. The WCC then announced with triumphant jubilation that its confer-
ence was the first occasion when theologians and philosophers coming from
the First, Second, and Third Worlds would simultaneously take part in debates.⁸⁴
The organizers stated with great satisfaction that the conference dialogue
“reached global proportions” and engaged with “pressing and practical prob-
 Angel D. Santiago-Vendrell, Contextual Theology and Revolutionary Transformation in Latin
America (Pickwick Publications: Eugene, 2010), 17.
 Josef Smolik and Richard Shaull, Consommateurs ou révolutionnaires (Association du Foyer
John Knox: Genève, 1967), 12–13, 18.
 WCC Information, 16 April 1968, file 994.3.50.12, WCC Archives Geneva.
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lems” on the world level – most importantly, the issue of the dehumanizing con-
sequences of scientifically managed social and economic development.⁸⁵
Conclusion
Geneva 1968 can thus be seen as the conference that confirmed the globalization
of the dialogic enterprise, which had grown out of several sources. In this chap-
ter, we followed one of those sources, reaching back to the Czechoslovakia of the
late 1950s. There, observation of the dysfunctionality of social engineering prac-
tices in the sphere of religion (and a common interest among Christians and
Marxists alike in finding a remedy for this situation) brought together elite Marx-
ists and Protestant theologians. They progressively began to share their reflec-
tions on wider issues connected with rationalized scientific management and
the planning of social life in developed industrial societies, along with the alien-
ating effects of such phenomena. The national dialogue in Czechoslovakia found
enthusiastic partners and supporters in the West and thus became a space of in-
teraction, a channel through the Iron Curtain.
Nevertheless, the April 1968 Geneva meeting marked the limits of this chan-
nel. The attempt to integrate the South into the East-West debates backfired in
the end. Critical observers rightly stated that although it was certainly impressive
to see how smoothly Czech and Hungarian Marxists communicated with Western
Christians about social engineering and alienation, the presence of Third World
delegates only accentuated the declining relevance of this European intellectual
harmony in a global context. The Indian delegate to the conference put it in
blunt terms when he noted that original solutions to “the old East-West ideolog-
ical conflicts do not bring anything interesting for contemporary Indians.”⁸⁶ Rep-
resentatives of the South therefore systematically attempted to turn the focus to-
wards the problems relevant to them: revolution and liberation struggles in the
Third World, and ambiguous theological justifications for violence. This “revolu-
tionary arrogance,”⁸⁷ which scandalized both Eastern and Western habitués of
the dialogue channel, was a clear signal to the leadership of the WCC. In the fol-
lowing years, they shifted their focus to debates on revolutionary and liberation
 “Bilan et perspective du dialogue” (by Roger Garaudy, May 1969), file 994.3.50.12, WCC Ar-
chives Geneva.
 “Dialogue entre chrétiens et marxistes à Genève” (by Van der Bent, 1968), file 994.3.50.12,
WCC Archives Geneva.
 Ibid.
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theology. After one more attempt to continue the global Christian-Marxist dia-
logue in 1969, the WCC ceased to support that kind of activity.
The rapid end of the dialogic effort in the international ecumenical arena
was closely connected with its decline in the national (Czech) context as well.
The Geneva meeting took place only four months before the invasion of Czecho-
slovakia by Warsaw Pact troops, which crushed the Prague Spring. Czech actors
in the dialogue all identified with the reformers’ attempt to find a “third path”
between socialism and capitalism, and so their fate was sealed once “normali-
zation” in occupied Czechoslovakia picked up speed. At the beginning of the
1970s, Machovec, Kadlecová, Prokůpek and their colleagues were singled out
as proponents of a “theological form of the anti-communist theory of conver-
gence.”⁸⁸ They lost their jobs in the academic sphere and spent the following
20 years in the dissident intellectual underground.⁸⁹ In a sense, however, the
channel opened up by the Czechoslovak dialogic encounters of the late 1950s
bore helpful fruit in the 1970s. Ironically enough, Milan Machovec (one of the
founding fathers of Czech scientific atheism in the early 1950s) earned most of
his income for the greater part of the 1970s from his part-time job as the organist
at Saint Antonin’s church in Prague-Holešovice, which he obtained thanks to his
dialogic reputation in Catholic circles.
 Ladislav Hrzal and Jakub Netopilík, Ideologický boj ve vývoji české filozofie (Praha: Svoboda,
1983), 376.
 Their intellectual heritage continued to be praised in certain Western intellectual circles in
the following decade: Roger Garaudy for instance referred to the Prague Spring and the Christi-
an-Marxist dialogue in his synthesis L’Alternative, published in the early 1970s. He used the Cze-
choslovak version of “humanized socialism” from the 1960s as an inspiration for the future
(which he connected to the project of auto-gestion). On the Yugoslav dimension of this phenom-
enon, see Benedetto Zaccaria in this volume.
186 Ondřej Matějka
Simon Godard
The Council for Mutual Economic
Assistance and the failed Coordination of
Planning in the Socialist Bloc in the 1960s
Planning has long been deeply associated with socialist economies, although
capitalist countries have been influenced by this idea and have experimented,
to different degrees, government interventionism in the economy over the
short twentieth century.¹ Thus planning the economy is not a specifically social-
ist idea, and even though central planning was a shared characteristic of most
Eastern European countries during the Cold War, the entanglement between
planning and socialism can still be questioned. Already in the 1960s, Polish
economist Wlodzimierz Brus considered the association of economic planning
and socialism “not as a definitive solution, but as a choice among possible alter-
natives.”²
Even though the Gosplan was established in the USSR soon after the October
Revolution, the first five-year plan was only adopted in 1928. A model of socialist
planning was indubitably shaped in the USSR, but never remained unchal-
lenged³ nor incapable of evolution.⁴ The persistence of market-like institutions
in the Stalin era, analyzed by Paul Gregory and Mark Harrison,⁵ or the Yugoslav
path to economic development after 1948, show how misleading and inaccurate
a strong opposition between centrally planned economies and markets would
be. Indeed, the functioning of the economic system started to be challenged
again in the German Democratic Republic (GDR) in 1956 and in the USSR in
 Secrétariat général de l’ONU, Planification en vue du développement économique (New York:
Nations Unies, 1963); Jan Tinbergen, La planification (Paris: Hachette, 1967), 220–235; Claude
Gruson, Origine et espoirs de la planification française (Paris: Dunod, 1968).
 Wlodzimierz Brus, “Rapports entre politique et économie en régime socialiste,” L’Homme et la
société 6 (1967): 70; see also Wlodzimierz Brus, Problèmes généraux du fonctionnement de l’éco-
nomie socialiste (Paris: Maspéro, 1968), 36–46.
 Naum Jasny, Soviet Economists of the twenties. Names to be remembered (Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press, 1972); Alessandro Stanziani, L’économie en révolution. Le cas russe,
1870– 1930 (Paris: Albin Michel, 1998).
 Jacques Sapir, “L’économie soviétique: origine, développement, fonctionnement,” in Retour
sur l’URSS. Économie, société, histoire, ed. Jacques Sapir (Paris: L’Harmattan, 1997), 99–144.
 Paul Gregory and Mark Harrison, “Allocation under Dictatorship: Research in Stalin’s Ar-
chives,” Journal of Economic Literature 43, no. 3 (2005): 721–761.
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1957.⁶ The centrally planned economy, which had been considered a monolithic
model by the Western European countries and the USA, proved to be more flex-
ible in the 1960s than had been assumed. Following the liberalization initiated
by the USSR, most of the people’s democracies in Eastern Europe engaged in
economic reforms. Central planning was strengthened but limited to the estab-
lishment of major macro-economic indicators, whereas basic economic actors
– such as the enterprises – were given more room for manoeuvre, in order to
allow them to implement the plan at their level and to coordinate themselves
with other economic actors involved in the production process.⁷
Defining a common model for the socialist economy in the 1960s proves to
be more difficult, as market incentives were being reintroduced in the planned
economy by these national economic reforms.⁸ However, under the combined in-
fluence of destalinization and Western European integration, the USSR and the
people’s democracies engaged in redefining their international cooperation in a
more multilateral way during this decade, in order to tackle the decline of devel-
opment strategies based on extensive growth. Thus the 1960s at the Council for
Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON) start and end with two major debates
over attempting to create a regional economic integration that could have shap-
ed a transnational socialist economic model. This contribution analyzes how the
socialist countries members of the COMECON, who officially shared a common
economic model, dealt with the specific issue of the international coordination
of their economic plans. In spite of the adoption of the “basic principles of
the international socialist division of labor” in 1962, and the setting of the “inte-
gration” of the national economies as the Council’s main goal in 1971,⁹ various
economic and political actors in the socialist world doubted that a common in-
ternational plan and regional integration would be the most promising way to
develop their national economies. Eventually, parallel evolutions towards plan-
ning the economy at national level led neither to a convergence of these econo-
 Helmut Steiner, “Das Akademie-Institut für Wirtschaftswissenschaften im Widerstreit wissen-
schaftlicher, ideologischer und politischer Auseinandersetzungen,” Sitzungsberichte der Leibniz-
Sozietät 36, no. 1 (2000): 89– 109 ; Peter C. Caldwell, “Productivity,Value and Plan: Fritz Behrens
and the Economics of Revisionism in the German Democratic Republic,” History of Political
Economy 32, no. 1 (2000): 103– 137.
 Michael Kaser, The Economic History of Eastern Europe. 1919– 1975, volume III (Oxford: Clar-
endon Press, 1986).
 Bernard Chavance, “La théorie de l’économie socialiste dans les pays de l’Est entre 1917 et
1989,” in Nouvelle histoire de la pensée économique, vol. 2, ed. Alain Béraud and Gilbert Faccar-
ello (Paris: La Découverte, 1993), 235–262.
 Jozef Van Brabant, Economic Integration in Eastern Europe. A Handbook (New York, London,
Toronto: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1989), 63–102.
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mies, nor to the international coordination of their development within the
framework of the COMECON. There the transnational approach and international
comparison allow to challenge Paul Gregory’s hypothesis about Stalin’s econom-
ic policy, according to which political dictatorship was intrinsically rooted in the
structure of planned economies since the system could only be functional with
political coercion over the economy.¹⁰ What might have been true for Soviet eco-
nomics under Stalin may be interpreted differently while looking at the interna-
tional coordination of planned economies.
Most of the historiography on the international organization focuses on its
failure to develop a teleological argument. Since the international coordination
of planning at the COMECON indeed failed, it would be the sign that socialist
economies were unable to promote an attractive development model at interna-
tional level.¹¹ Thus the organization would be deemed a mere empty shell estab-
lished by the Soviet Union to ensure its power over the bloc. The following anal-
ysis argues that the COMECON was not a mere transmission belt for the USSR,
aiming at transferring its economic model to the socialist countries in Eastern
Europe.¹² Rather than concentrating on the meager results of the multilateral at-
tempts at coordinating economic planning within the COMECON, in order to dis-
close structural weaknesses of the system and explain the allegedly impossible
enforcement of economic common planning in the socialist world, I will consider
the reasons why the COMECON failed, while looking at how the coordination
process of the national plans of its member states took place. Following the in-
ternational negotiation process in its different steps allows a reinterpretation of
the so-called “failure” of the Council. Indeed, planning cannot be reduced to its
economic dimension in the socialist world, nor exclusively be considered a tech-
nical process intended to rationally allocate scare resources.¹³ It is also a political
statement of sovereignty. Beyond the apparent economic failure of the COME-
CON, a political process of constant negotiation ought to be highlighted, during
 Paul Gregory, The Political Economy of Stalinism (New York: Cambridge University Press,
2004).
 André Steiner, “The Council of Mutual Economic Assistance – An Example of Failed Eco-
nomic Integration?,” Geschichte und Gesellschaft 39 (2013): 240–258.
 For the first analysis of a complex balance of power within COMECON, see Randall Stone,
Satellites and commissars: Strategy and Conflict in the Politics of Soviet-Bloc Trade (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1996); See also Martin Dangerfield, “Sozialistische Ökonomische In-
tegration. Der Rat für gegenseitige Wirtschaftshilfe (RGW),” in Ökonomie im Kalten Krieg, Studien
zum Kalten Krieg, Band 4, ed. Bernd Greiner, Christian Müller, and Claudia Weber (Hamburg:
Hamburger Edition, 2010), 350.
 Andrew Sloin and Oscar Sanchez-Sibony, “Economy and Power in the Soviet Union, 1917–
1939,” Kritika 15, no. 1 (2014): 22.
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which the governments of the people’s democracies needed the failure of inter-
national cooperation in order to promote a paradoxical discourse on the neces-
sity to reform and empower the Council. Thus failure was manipulated in order
to shift the balance of power within the Eastern bloc and to favor the people’s
democracies.¹⁴ The multilateral forum established by the COMECON was a show-
case of socialist solidarity and efficiency during the Cold War competition, and
constituted a configuration of international relations much more beneficial to
the smaller states than the bilateral negotiations with the Soviet Union, allowing
the former to safeguard some room for manoeuvre in shaping their economic de-
velopment.
Eventually, the failed coordination of economic planning at the COMECON
seems to have had an economic, as well as a political interest for several actors
in the socialist world.¹⁵ In order to analyze this strategic manipulation of failure,
I will explain how the debate on supranational planning at the COMECON failed
in the first half of the 1960s, before going on to analyze the parallel transnational
economic networks that emerged out of this failure. Lastly, I will show how the
“economicization” of international relations, as well as other concepts borrowed
from the Western European regional integration process were introduced, before
being circulated through the East, as a means to depoliticize a very political
game played by the people’s democracies in order to control their own economic
development.
The failed supranational turn of the COMECON
After the establishment of the communist regimes in Eastern Europe, all coun-
tries of the socialist bloc had turned to a planned model of economic develop-
ment. In the second half of the 1940s and in the 1950s, planning was not specific
to the socialist world, and neither did sharing the same model favor internation-
al co-operation among socialist countries. Each communist government under-
stood planning as a tool for a global transformation of the new socialist society:
it had to promote the industrialization of mostly agricultural countries, and to
 For an analysis of power relations between the USSR and the people’s democracies within
COMECON, see also: Suvi Kansikas, “Room to manœuvre? National interests and coalition-build-
ing in the CMEA, 1969– 1974,” in Reassessing Cold War Europe, ed. Sari Autio-Sarasmo and Ka-
talin Miklossy (London: Routledge, 2011), 193–209.
 Natacha Coquery and Matthieu de Oliveira, L’échec a-t-il des vertus économiques (Paris: Com-
ité pour l’histoire économique et financière de la France, 2015).
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create the proletarian basis needed by the regime to legitimate its policy.¹⁶ Under
these circumstances, co-operation in the field of economic planning could only
be understood, at first, as an unacceptable loss of sovereignty by the COMECON
member states. Even though the people’s democracies stood, after 1945, under
the strong influence of the Soviet economic model of the 1920s¹⁷ and of its evo-
lution into a planned economic system in the 1930s, plans remained elaborated
in a national framework. The adoption of a socialist regime, economic planning,
and forced industrialization were considered a magic tool that would equalize
the development levels of the different COMECON member states. According to
the less developed countries, such as Romania, a discourse on the economic ir-
rationality of the parallel development of industrial capacities at national levels
was unacceptable. Despite the diffusion of the Soviet planning model, any plan-
coordination had to take into account the political rationale of national develop-
ment strategies, until each member state had reached an equal level of develop-
ment. In July 1966, Nicolae Ceaușescu still stated that “mission is given to the
socialist world-system to develop interstate relations based on mutual respect,
and on the preservation of the reciprocal interests. The socialist world-system de-
velops as a system of national economies.”¹⁸
Besides, the organization was founded in January 1949 as a direct answer to
the Marshall Plan. It represented a political answer to the OEEC and had not
been initially conceived as an alternative and integrated economic area. The
first topic on the agenda during the formative years of the COMECON was the co-
ordination of its member states’ foreign trade toward the West, in order to foster
East-West economic relations.¹⁹
However, in spite of the original rejection of any plan coordination by the
Polish representative at the bureau of the Council in 1950, Moscow managed
to transform it into the main goal of the organization after 1954. This indicates
how economic cooperation among socialist countries was progressively regarded
as a possible stimulus for economic development. Its members never considered
 Peter Rutland, The Myth of the Plan (London: Hutchinson, 1985).
 Lars Haga, “Imaginer la démocratie populaire: l’Institut de l’économie mondiale et la carte
mentale soviétique de l’Europe de l’Est (1944–1948),” Vingtième Siècle. Revue d’histoire 109
(2011): 13–30.
 Bundesarchiv (German Federal Archive, hereafter BArch) BArch DC 20–19575, Entwicklung
der Arbeit im Rat für gegenseitige Wirtschaftshilfe. 1964– 1969, “Information über den Meinung-
saustausch der Ersten Sekretäre der kommunistischen und Arbeiterparteien und der Vorsitzen-
den der Ministerräte zu Fragen der Arbeit des Rats für gegenseitige Wirtschaftshilfe,” 1966, f. 19.
 BArch DE 1–21734, Protokolle und Berichte des Ständigen Vertreters der DDR im RGW über
Beratungen des Büros des RGW vom 8.12. 1950 bis zum 27. 11. 1955.
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the COMECON an exclusive and alternative economic area in Europe, and the
Council started with the sole ex-post coordination of foreign trade plans. Yet
its importance grew stronger for the socialist countries in the second half of
the 1950s. Thanks to the implementation of a multilateral clearing agreement,
the elaboration of model contracts for foreign trade, the institutionalization of
multilateral co-operation with the creation of standing commissions responsible
for different fields of the production or dealing with transversal issues – such as
currencies, foreign trade, etc. – the COMECON achieved a real reorientation of
trade flows in Europe until the mid-1960s. East-West trade still represented
49% of the foreign trade of the people’s democracies in 1948, before East-East
trade became dominant in the foreign trade balances of the COMECON member
states. It accounted for two-third of their exports in 1953, 55% in 1956, before it
stabilized at a little over 60%.²⁰ In parallel, the Council’s institutions increased
their role in the international co-ordination of economic planning. From 1955 on-
wards, the COMECON was indeed given the task of coordinating the five-year
plans of its member countries.²¹
Economic historians have explained why this co-operation was doomed to
fail from an economic point of view.²² The differences in the levels of economic
development of the member countries were too pronounced, and the most indus-
trialized members, such as the GDR or Czechoslovakia, were reluctant to subsi-
dize the industrial development of future competitors within the bloc, while ac-
cepting low quality products in return. The USSR was not willing to subsidize the
development of its allies at its own costs, especially from the 1970s onwards.²³
Eventually, the coordination remained mostly limited to foreign trade plans
and did not promote the elaboration of transnational production cycles. Due
to the state monopoly on foreign trade and to the lack of real economic compe-
tition induced by the missing convertibility of prices and currencies, the COME-
CON was thus unable to shape a regional model and to integrate the national
economies of its members the way the EEC did.
This analysis, which mainly focuses on the late 1960s and on the 1970s, over-
shadows the vivid debates about the goals and the methods of multilateral eco-
 Wlodzimierz Brus, Histoire économique de l’Europe de l’Est (1945– 1985) (Paris: La Décou-
verte, 1986), 154.
 Tibor Kiss and George Hajdu, “International Cooperation in Planning within COMECON,”
Eastern European Economics 14, no. 4 (1976): 12.
 Steiner, “The Council of Mutual Economic Assistance”; Ralf Ahrens, “Spezialisierungsinter-
esse und Integrationsaversion im Rat für Gegenseitige Wirtschaftshilfe: Der DDR-Wekrzeugma-
schinenbau in den 1970er Jahren,” Jahrbuch für Wirtschaftsgeschichte 2 (2008): 73–92.
 Marie Lavigne, “The Soviet Union inside COMECON,” Soviet Studies XXXV/2 (1983): 135–153.
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nomic co-operation, which regularly animated the COMECON. Most of these de-
bates mirrored the discussions on the evolution of the EEC in the West, and
ended up with no practical and measurable outcome at the COMECON.²⁴ Leaving
the field of the sole quantitative measurement of the success or the failure of
multilateral economic co-operation, we can raise other issues.Which theoretical
and political contents were at the core of these economic debates? Is it possible
to identify failure as a logical outcome, intended by some actors pursuing a po-
litical goal, rather than an economic rationale through economic discourses?
This contribution is not looking for the economic explanation of the failure of
plan coordination, but for the strategic process of negotiation, which led to
this failure, as well as its impact on shaping international relations within the
socialist bloc.
In the early 1960s, the construction of the Berlin Wall and the missile crisis
in Cuba led to a closing off of the socialist bloc. Confronted with this evolution of
the international context, which affected their economic relationship with capi-
talist countries, the members of the COMECON were forced to close ranks and to
commit to the organization in order to find new impulses, which would sustain
their economic growth. This diplomatic framework, as well as the new spirit of
multilateral co-operation with the allies following the destalinization in the
USSR, were decisive in the adoption by the Council’s members in 1961/1962 of
the “basic principles of the international socialist division of labor”, which
had been discussed since 1957.²⁵ According to the “basic principles,” the USSR
and its partners would engage in the so-called “specialization” of their produc-
tions and progress toward an economically rational division of labor at bloc
scale. Khrushchev used this important turn, and the deepening of multilateral
co-operation it promoted, in order to formulate, in a speech delivered to the Cen-
tral Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in November 1962, a
concept for the evolution of the COMECON.
While discussing the Soviet economic reforms implemented since 1957,
alongside their implications in terms of international co-operation, the Soviet
leader mentioned his project to turn the COMECON into what he called a “unified
 Suvi Kansikas, “Acknowledging Economic Realities: The CMEA Policy Change vis-a-vis the
European Community, 1970– 1973,” European Review of History 21, no. 2 (2014): 311–328; Angela
Romano, “Untying Cold War Knots: The EEC and Eastern Europe in the long 1970s,” Cold War
History 14, no. 2 (2014): 153– 173.
 Van Brabant, Economic Integration in Eastern Europe, 66–71; The text of the “basic princi-
ples” is reproduced in Alexander Uschakow, Integration im RGW. Dokumente (Baden-Baden:
Nomos, 1983), 1018–1036.
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planning organ.”²⁶ Khrushchev saw his proposal as a twofold opportunity. The
transformation of the COMECON into a “unified planning organ” would lead to
the strengthening of the Council and its institutions. Thus, the international or-
ganization would be appropriately staffed and able to conduct its own economic
expertize, without having to subcontract it to the Gosplan. This would dismiss
direct criticism against any “imperial” influence of Soviet planning over the
other member states. Instead, the Soviet Union would keep an indirect influence
through the quantitative domination of Soviet experts in the international staff,
as well as through its tradition to educate the elites of other member states, some
of whom were delegated to work for the COMECON.
For a moment, between 1962 and 1964/1966, the coordination of economic
planning within the socialist bloc was genuinely a priority on the COMECON’s
agenda. However, even though the people’s democracies, except for Romania,
officially endorsed the Soviet proposal, the debate immediately escalated at
the cost of the USSR itself. For different reasons, but using the same methods,
Bucharest and the other Eastern European countries manipulated the debate,
and managed to shift the balance of power within the bloc in their favor,
while playing on the failure of common economic planning. The Romanian del-
egation in the Council voluntarily rephrased Khrushchev’s proposal as an evolu-
tion toward “supranational planning.” Even though Khrushchev himself partici-
pated in the Executive Committee meeting of the COMECON in February 1963, in
order to clarify what he meant by “unified planning organ,” the actors would
discuss for the next two years the opportunity of empowering the COMECON
to organize supranational planning.
The semantics used by the Romanians and other Eastern European countries
transformed the issue of plan coordination from a technical one, related to eco-
nomic rationality, into a political one. Since the COMECON was a showcase for
socialist international solidarity in the Cold War competition, the USSR could not
afford to impose its will to the organization, as long as its partners were putting
the whole legitimacy of the socialist world at stake in the debate. As a means to
pre-empt the transformation of the Council into a supranational plan commis-
sion, Romania adopted the opposite strategy to the one that France chose, con-
fronted with the strengthening of the EEC Commission’s powers in the mid-1960s.
While De Gaulle opened the “empty chair” crisis to resist the evolution of the
 Stiftung Archiv der Parteien und Massenorganisationen der DDR (Foundation for the ar-
chives of the parties and mass organizations of the GDR, hereafter SAPMO-BArch) DY 30–
3407, Protokoll und Anlagen der XVII. Tagung des RGW, “Bericht über die wichtigsten Fragen
der XVII. Tagung, der 3. Sitzung des Exekutivkomitees und der 3. Sitzung des Büros des Exeku-
tivkomitees,” 12.1.1963, f. 95–96.
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EEC, Romania engaged in a very legal guerrilla warfare and participated in as
much co-operation projects as it could, in order to bloc them. Bucharest’s repre-
sentatives referred to all COMECON legal documents: mostly the founding com-
muniqué of 1949 and the charter adopted in 1959, to highlight the recognition of
each member state’s sovereignty, guaranteed by the USSR since 1949. Underlin-
ing the equality of all partners proclaimed by the charter, Romania made great
use of the so-called “principle of interest” which governed the negotiations at
the COMECON. According to this rule, no country could be obliged by its part-
ners to participate in a common project. However, when it had proclaimed its in-
terest in participating, any agreement had to be achieved unanimously. In de-
claring its interest in all projects dealing with common planning, Romania de
facto gained the right to veto all decisions agreed upon by its partners.
Transforming the economic issue of international plan coordination at the
COMECON into a political game played a great role in shaping room for manoeu-
vre for Romania in its “national communist” course in the 1960s.²⁷ Significantly,
Ceaușescu used the same strategy to veto the evolution of the Warsaw Pact into a
more integrated and formalized alliance in the second half of the decade.²⁸ Bu-
charest used the socialist international organizations during the Cold War to in-
strumentalize their constant failure to its own benefit, while officially advocating
the respect of the COMECON and the Warsaw Pact’s procedures²⁹. The USSR,who
needed to present socialist solidarity in public discourses on the international
stage, could uneasily denounce the Romanian legalist strategy.
Confronted with a debate which revealed diverging opinions on suprana-
tional planning and the rationale – economic or political – to be put forward
in the cooperation taking place at the COMECON, Moscow was risking disqual-
ifying the legitimacy of the socialist alliance with the failure of the organization.
Consequently, the USSR soon withdrew from the supranational planning debate,
to the great dissatisfaction of its closest allies, such as the GDR and Poland. As
early as 1963, East-Germans experts of the COMECON wrote a confidential report
on the situation at the Council according to which,
 John Michael Montias, “Background and origins of the Rumanian dispute with COMECON,”
Soviet Studies XVI, no. 2 (1964): 125– 151; Irina Gridan, “Du communisme national au national-
communisme. Réactions à la soviétisation dans la Roumanie des années 1960,” Vingtième Siècle.
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 Laurien Crump and Simon Godard, “Reassessing Communist International Organisations: A
comparative Analysis of COMECON and the Warsaw Pact in relation to their Cold War Compet-
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no steps have been taken towards common planning, proposals for the establishment of
interstate unions [of production] . . . have not been adopted . . . The Soviet party always
tries to conciliate the other parties and not to contradict anyone . . . After the communist
parties’ meeting of July 1963, the Soviet representatives were very cautious . . . The greatest
confrontations happen between the representatives of the people’s democracies, without
any active support from the Soviet comrades.³⁰
The East-German deputy secretary of the COMECON even stated that, if the USSR
had such a passive attitude in the debate, it was because the Soviets “probably
had no concept for the improvement of the work at the Council.”³¹ Eventually,
Moscow officially renounced its proposal in 1964, but in the meantime other
countries, especially the GDR and Poland, had engaged in the conflict with Ro-
mania. Berlin and Warsaw used the same strategy as Bucharest and inclined to
use legal arguments in their statements. They insisted on defining more clearly
the “principle of interest.” In 1966, Gomulka referred to article four of the statute
of the COMECON in front of its counterparts from the USSR and the people’s de-
mocracies, in order to deny any country a veto right.³² He directly tackled Roma-
nia and even officiously threatened the USSR with a withdrawal of Poland from
the COMECON, if the organization “did not satisfy the legitimate interest of the
majority of its countries.”³³
For different reasons, but with the same methods, all people’s democracies
played the failure of common planning at the COMECON against the superpower
of the Soviet Union within the bloc in the first half of the 1960s. They manipu-
lated the debate on the international coordination of economic planning, not
while aiming at its failure in the short term, but in the longue durée. An imme-
diate break with the COMECON could have caused the exclusion of a country
from the bloc, which was an outcome that neither the people’s democracies,
nor the USSR could afford shortly after the Sino-Soviet split in 1961. On the con-
trary, the long debate on supranational planning and its organized failure had an
economic and political interest. It helped the smaller allies develop a legal strat-
egy that would challenge the solidarity of the socialist bloc, while officially seek-
ing its strengthening. Thus fighting for the failure of supranational planning was
 BArch DC 20–19577, Wirtschaftliche und technische Zusammenarbeit im Rat für gegenseitige
Wirtschaftshilfe. 1964– 1969, “Einige Probleme der Zusammenarbeit der Länder im Rahmen des
RGW in den letzten zwei Jahren,” f. 9–12, f. 16.
 SAPMO-BArch DY 3023–801, Zusammenarbeit mit dem Rat für gegenseitige Wirtschaftshilfe.
1962– 1963, “Zu einigen Hauptfragen der Arbeit des Rats für gegenseitige Wirtschaftshilfe,” 8.01.
1965, f. 221.
 BArch DC 20– 19575, Entwicklung der Arbeit im RGW, 1964– 1969, f. 25–28.
 SAPMO-BArch DY 3023–795, Tagungen von Fachorganen des RGW, 1966– 1967, f. 100– 106.
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not proving incompatible with a discourse advocating more planning, but refus-
ing the dominant influence of the Soviet model, while remaining within the CO-
MECON framework. The USSR had to make compromises in order to maintain its
role as a global Cold War player, which was partly legitimized by the cohesive
image of the socialist bloc that the COMECON was embodying.³⁴
Scales and spaces of transnational economic
planning in the socialist world in the 1960s
In order to legitimate their criticism about supranational planning, without
being accused of causing the failure of the socialist model of development,
the governments of the COMECON member states agreed upon strengthening
the organization’s institutional structure and its staff of international civil serv-
ants. Between 1962 and 1968, the secretariat’s staff increased from less than 100
to a little more than 600 international civil servants. The great majority of these
specialists were recruited for their technical expertize in planning, in different
industrial fields, in finance, and their knowledge of Russian, the working lan-
guage of the Council. They were no trained diplomats and formed, in the tech-
nical divisions of the secretariat, a series of epistemic communities.³⁵
Until the international secretariat was appropriately staffed, Soviet institu-
tions clearly influenced the practice of plan coordination within the organiza-
tion. In 1957, the ambassador of the Polish government at the Council, Piotr Jar-
ozsewicz, still expressed a critical opinion about the working arrangements of
the COMECON. According to him, “in view of formal considerations, the comple-
tion of the work on the coordination of the national economic plans by the Gos-
plan of the USSR, and not by the apparatus of the COMECON, was not entirely
appropriate.”³⁶
What has been the real impact of this major criticism, not only on the plan-
ning practice but also on the planning culture of the Council, as well as on the
 A similar process characterizes the contemporary evolution of the Warsaw Pact, see Crump,
The Warsaw Pact Reconsidered.
 Simon Godard, “Le Conseil d’aide économique mutuelle et la construction d’une diplomatie
économique parallèle dans l’Europe socialiste (1962– 1989),” in Réinventer la diplomatie. Socia-
bilités, réseaux et pratiques diplomatiques en Europe depuis 1919, ed. Vincent Genin, Mattieu Os-
mont, and Thomas Raineau (Brussels: Peter Lang, 2016), 171–187.
 BArch DE 1–21257, Arbeitsweise der Ratsorgane und wissenschaftlich-technische Zusamme-
narbeit 1956– 1959, “Brief von P. Jaroszewicz an A. A. Pawlow, Sekretär des RGW,” 12.04.1957,
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ultimate meaning of the success or the failure of its coordination of national
plans? The fact that the secretariat of the Council internalized sufficient econom-
ic expertize in the first half of the 1960s helped the international organization
move away from its practical dependency on the technical support of Soviet in-
stitutions. However, a question still remained partially unanswered: What about
the influence of national planning cultures in the work of the COMECON? Could
the project of plan coordination only be successful under the condition that a
new transnational planning culture would be established in the Council? To
what extent did the international organization actually favor the re-branding
of the Soviet planning model as a common model for the whole socialist
camp and in whose interest?
From the 1960s onwards, most experts delegated by the people’s democra-
cies to work for the COMECON in Moscow belonged to a small elite of former for-
eign exchange students, who had studied in the Soviet Union.³⁷ This internation-
al socialization acquired prior to the delegation at the COMECON explains why
the majority of the experts, coming from different national spaces with their own
specificity in defining planning and in planning economic development, had no
difficulties working together in the framework of the international organization.
Whether in the permanent representations of the member states at the COME-
CON or in the technical divisions of the secretariat, “one knew each other,” as
a former East-German specialist said. Peter H., one of the most important brokers
between the GDR and the COMECON,who was in charge of the cooperation of his
country with the international organization between 1962 and 1990, even talks
about the milieu of international civil servants as a “mafia.” This socialization,
as well as the common working and living experience in Moscow, proved crucial
in shaping a transnational culture among the COMECON experts. In the 1960s,
these claimed public recognition by their governments of some room for ma-
noeuvre for the international secretariat and the permanent representations,
which would allow them to develop transnational projects involving plan coor-
dination. In 1963, the leaders of the basis organization of the East-German ex-
perts at the COMECON wrote in their report on past activities that “the perma-
nent representation of the GDR at the COMECON cannot be considered as a
mere ‘post office’ . . . but should be [considered as] an international office of
 Simon Godard, “Une seule façon d’être communiste? L’internationalisme dans les parcours
biographiques au Conseil d’aide économique mutuelle,” Critique internationale 66, no. 1 (2015):
69–83.
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the GDR, active in the field of economic policy, which has to complete important
political and economic tasks.”³⁸
This statement, which can be considered a direct criticism of the way COME-
CON experts were treated by their national authorities, advocated more autono-
my for the international civil servants and the recognition of the importance of
their job. Two years later, the Polish ambassador at the COMECON, Piotr Jarosze-
wicz, emphasized this analysis in stating in front of its counterparts: “We do not
delegate our comrades to the secretariat so that they defend the interests of our
country, but in order for them to analyze objectively the issues raised by our co-
operation.”³⁹
Most of the international civil servants working for the COMECON’s institu-
tions in Moscow were really eager to coordinate economic planning in their field
of expertize and to elaborate multilateral co-operation projects. They enjoyed a
form of “autonomy by abandonment.” Regular and up to date inputs from the
member states’ planning organs and governments were rare. COMECON agents
repeatedly mentioned their disappointment with the fact that they often had
to act without knowing what the position of their country would be on a co-op-
eration project. According to the same Jaroszewicz, “most of the time, the collab-
orators of the secretariat are not aware of the actual opinions of the member
countries, particularly how far they can go to bear compromises. Eventually,
they more or less defend their personal opinion, hoping that it will match the
official opinion of the country concerned.”⁴⁰
However, this situation of abandonment, in which the governments antici-
pated at best no positive outcome of planning coordination at the COMECON,
and consequently cared very little about it, gave the opportunity to the Council’s
experts to engage in the relatively autonomous elaboration of such projects for
common planning.
 SAPMO-BArch DY 30 – IV A 2–20– 193, SED-Grundorganisation Rat für gegenseitige Wirt-
schaftshilfe, “Rechenschaftsbericht der Parteileitung der APO der SED im RGW in Moskau,”
18.4.1964, f. 7.
The “basis organization” is a party organ that united all party members in the workplace to
organize and control their political and social life. In 1961, the group of East German experts at
the COMECON (working for the permanent representation as well as in the international secre-
tariat) split from the “basis organization” of the GDR embassy in the USSR to found an auton-
omous basis organization, acknowledging and defending the specificity of their work in Mos-
cow.
 BArch DE 1–51766, Schriftwechsel betreffend Rat für gegenseitige Wirtschaftshilfe, “Bericht
über die Tätigkeit des Sekretariats des RGW in Moskau,” 25.5.1965.
 Ibid.
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Although they were able to reflect on the economic rationale of plan coordi-
nation at bloc scale, COMECON experts were never able to transfer their transna-
tional acculturation to the planning organs at national levels. There, internation-
al plan coordination was always being considered an extra amount of work.⁴¹
International planning agreements, which, until 1966, were only coordinated
ex-post by the COMECON after the completion and the adoption of the different
national plans⁴² – not to speak of supranational planning – were perceived by
the national planning organs as having a disturbing and restrictive influence
on the smooth execution of the plan at national level. This attitude did not
favor the development, over the years, of a common planning culture among
the socialist countries members of the Council. The brigade commissioned by
the Central Committee of the Unified Socialist Party of the GDR (SED) to evaluate
the activity of the basis organization at the COMECON noted in its report in 1964
that “the reports, analyses, etc. sent to Berlin [by COMECON experts] to the plan
commission, the council of the national economy or the ministry for foreign and
intra-German trade find virtually no resonance.”⁴³
All in all, debates about the necessity and opportunity of a multilateral co-
ordination of economic planning were not completely evacuated at the COME-
CON. Even though this coordination failed because of a political strategy pur-
sued by several people’s democracies’ governments and aimed at
manipulating the international organization, in order to shape room for manoeu-
vre allowing them to control their own economic development, plan coordina-
tion was discussed at the Council. Only the micro-level analysis of the debates
held by its servants allows us to describe a transnational public space, where
the convergence of national plans was conceived.
In the strategic field of nuclear energy for example, mutualized investments
and a coordination of the production plans of several national industries would
have been economically rational at COMECON level. However, common planning
in the nuclear industry always remained limited, despite the establishment in
1960 of a standing commission on the peaceful use of the atomic energy and
 An actor-based description – from the factories’ chief planners to the Kremlin’s administra-
tion – of the planning process in the USSR, unwrapping the intertwining of its political and eco-
nomic rationale and the difficulty of articulating national planning and international plan coor-
dination is provided in the fascinating historical novel by Francis Spufford: Francis Spufford,
Red Plenty (London: Faber and Faber, 2010).
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200 Simon Godard
the relative success of common investment projects organized by the COMECON
in the late 1970s in two nuclear plants in Ukraine, intended to share their pro-
duction between the participating countries.⁴⁴ The participation in these techni-
cal projects often required massive investments in developing an industrial sec-
tor in the people’s democracies and was obtained under Soviet pressure, since it
disturbed the global architecture of national development plans. Nevertheless,
Heidelore K., who worked as an expert for nuclear energy in the secretariat of
the Council in the 1980s, explained how her general direction developed on
its own initiative a project for the common planning of the decommissioning
of nuclear plants. Since national governments were only interested in building
an industry on their own territory, COMECON experts identified the field of de-
commissioning these production units as an opportunity for the international or-
ganization to conceive a common plan at the level of the socialist bloc, without
being challenged by the governments of its member countries.
In the end, COMECON experts lacked the necessary networks of influence in
their own countries, which would have allowed them to enforce the idea of plan-
ning coordination at bloc scale and to promote the role of the international or-
ganization in this process. However, if the Council failed to establish itself as
the legitimate actor who would define a common and European model of social-
ist economic development, it did not completely fail to create a transnational
economic space.
Focusing on the fiasco of the supranational planning debate or the resist-
ance of the national planning organs to engage in the “integration” of their
economies under the auspices of the COMECON, recent historiography⁴⁵ on the
organization overshadowed the necessary analysis of the moving and blurry bor-
ders of the COMECON system. In 1963, confronted with the Romanian obstruc-
tion to any supranational coordination of plans at the COMECON, the ambassa-
dors to the Council proposed to the first secretaries and heads of government of
the member countries the creation of “industrial production unions” or “joint
companies.”⁴⁶ Even though the principle of joint companies was soon rejected,
the idea of transnational production networks at the level of the socialist enter-
prises, associated to the COMECON but not integrated into the organization as
 Sonja D. Schmid, “Nuclear Colonization?: Soviet Technopolitics in the Second World,” in En-
tangled Geographies. Empire and Technopolitics in the Global Cold War, ed. Gabrielle Hecht (Cam-
bridge: MIT Press, 2011), 125–154.
 Steiner, “The Council of Mutual Economic Assistance”; Ahrens, “Spezialisierungsinteresse
und Integrationsaversion.”
 BArch DC 20– 19575, Entwicklung der Arbeit im Rat für gegenseitige Wirtschaftshilfe. 1964–
1968, “Kurze Information über die Tagung des Exekutivkomitees,” f. 10– 13.
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working bodies, lived on. This decentralized form of international co-operation,
based on an economic rationale and on the coordination of the production be-
tween enterprises working in the same industrial field, matched the spirit of
the national economic reforms of the 1960s in the socialist countries.
In 1964, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Poland, the GDR, and Bulgaria, soon
joined by the USSR, created the first Economic International Organization
(EIO), whose aim was to coordinate the production of rolling bearings. A few
months later, the same members extended their co-operation and created Inter-
metall.⁴⁷ This time, the EIO did not deal with a single product but with issues
related to the whole sector of the steel industry. In 1967, all COMECON countries,
except Romania, started to discuss the creation of an EIO in the field of chemical
industry, Interchim, which was finally founded in 1970. In the second half of the
1970s, the EIOs had become influent purchasing organizations, steering the for-
eign trade of their partners and entrusted with the duty to improve the supply of
their industrial sector, which would promote the equitable sharing of moderniza-
tion efforts, in order to increase the production and to reduce the dependency on
Western markets, while also promoting exchanges with Western Europe.⁴⁸ Even
though they dealt essentially with the coordination of foreign trade, as well as
research and development, but not directly with the production plans, the
EIOs became successful competitors of the COMECON standing commissions.
They mirrored the international organization’s structure and sometimes even
hired members of its staff. Yet they were positively considered by the national
governments, whereas multilateral coordination of planning within the COME-
CON made little progress. Confronted with the possible overlapping of the Coun-
cil’s and the EIOs’ activities, the Soviet deputy ambassador at the COMECON ac-
knowledged a great autonomy for the latter: “The Council’s organs should use
the results achieved by the EIOs for their own work. As far as the EIOs are con-
cerned, it is sufficient for them to make use of the Council in working under its
general principles.”⁴⁹
Eventually, during the debate on the creation of Interchim in the late 1960s,
the leader of the East-German delegation clearly explained the difference be-
tween plan coordination at the COMECON and in the EIOs:
 On the impact of the EIOs in networking the socialist bloc, see Dagmara Jajesniak-Quast,
“‘Hidden Integration’. RGW-Wirtschaftsexperten in europäischen Netzwerken,” Jahrbuch für
Wirtschaftsgeschichte 1 (2014): 179– 195 (specifically 186– 190).
 BArch DG 11–1261, Gründungsmaterialien Interchim, “Analyse der Tätigkeit des Intermetalls
und Entwurf über die Verstärkung der Arbeit der DDR innerhalb der Organisation,” 10 Oct.1966.
 BArch DG 11–217, Interchim, Teil 1, “Niederschrift über den Meinungsaustausch zur Tätigkeit
und zur weiteren Richtung der Arbeit der internationalen Industriezweigsorganisationen.”
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With the concept economic organization, as opposed to the usual designation as ‘interna-
tional organization’, we want to express what is new in the forms and methods [of interna-
tional co-operation]. The innovation must consist, amongst others, in that we succeed in
solving all questions and problems first of all with economic methods . . . which does
not mean that we should waive the principle of socialist internationalism or the comradely
mutual assistance.⁵⁰
Thus, putting forward an economic rationale in advocating the coordination of
economic planning in the socialist bloc was not impossible in the 1960s. Even
though they rapidly evolved to embrace entire industrial sectors, EIOs were orig-
inally created to deal with a specific product and kept this focus on micro-level
coordination. This resonated with the spirit of the economic reforms implement-
ed at the national levels by the Soviet Union, the GDR, Czechoslovakia, and later
Poland and Hungary. However, the COMECON was too exposed to constitute the
adequate forum where this form of coordination could be implemented. The peo-
ple’s democracies saw the economic interest of such an international co-opera-
tion in planning, but they engaged in a political manipulation of the COMECON
at the intergovernmental level, using its showcase position in the Cold War. The
EIOs were not as exposed as the Council and delegated the international coordi-
nation of plans to representatives of socialist enterprises themselves, who en-
joyed more flexibility than the governments to develop an economic analysis.
A transnational space for a partial coordination of economic planning, still
limited to foreign trade, was eventually shaped in parallel to the COMECON and
as a necessary diversion, considering the failure of the Council to play this role. If
the COMECON failed, it is also because its members found ways to reach the pos-
itive economic outcomes of plan coordination without having to realize it within
the Council’s institutional system.
Circulation of regional integration models:
the paradoxical ‘economicization’ of
international relations in the socialist world
During the 1960s, the terms of the debate on the international coordination of
planning in Eastern Europe borrowed a lot from the semantics used to character-
 BArch DG 11– 1261, Gründungsmaterialien Interchim, “Thesen und Argumente zum Statut von
‘Interchim.’” Emphasis given by the original report.
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ize the evolution of the European Communities in the West.⁵¹ Two main goals
were successively attributed to the COMECON. The international organization
had to promote the “specialization” of its member states’ national economies
in the first part of the decade, then to achieve their “integration” in the 1970s.
In both cases, progress toward the establishment of a socialist economic
model and the creation of growth incentives within the COMECON area were
to be achieved through international planning coordination. However, a crucial
institution of Western economic theory, which is the free market, was never
openly mentioned within the framework of the COMECON.⁵²
If destalinization and the Soviet willingness to establish a more multilateral
system within the bloc played a role in shaping a favorable environment for this
transformation of the COMECON, the strategic evolutions of the Council never-
theless have to be considered in the light of the EEC’s contemporary evolutions.
Indeed, the latter circulated through the iron curtain and were put forward and
manipulated by the governments of second rank economic powers in the East, in
order to preserve their sovereignty over the elaboration of national economic pol-
icies. The discussions on the International Socialist Division of Labor (ISDL)
started in 1957, when the Common Market was created in Brussels, and led to
the adoption of the “basic principles” of the ISDL in 1962, when the EEC started
to implement its first common policy, the Common Agricultural Policy. With the
ISDL, the socialist countries members of the COMECON expected a positive eco-
nomic effect of international co-operation based on economies of scale and in-
creased productivity of national industries. Each country would have specialized
in the production of several specific products, which it could have traded with its
partners. Economists expected an improvement in the quality of industrial prod-
ucts and decreasing production costs. This analysis shared with the model of re-
gional economic integration elaborated by the EEC the idea that the promotion
of cross-border circulation of industrial goods would have a positive impact on
the modernization of the national economies, which were members of this
trade area. However, unlike the market-based ex-post adjustment of the interna-
 This circulation of knowledge about economics owes a lot to the good relations established
by the COMECON’s secretariat with its counterpart at the United Nations Economic Commission
for Europe, whose role as a bridge between East and West is well analyzed by Daniel Stinsky’s
contribution in this volume. See also Daniel Stinsky, “A Bridge Between East and West? Gunnar
Myrdal and the UN Economic Commission for Europe, 1947– 1957.”
 The reflection on markets is not absent from Eastern European debates at the national levels
and in other frameworks than the COMECON, see Johanna Bockman, Markets in the Name of So-
cialism: The Left-wing Origins of Neoliberalism (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2011).
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tional division of labor that existed in the EEC, the members of the COMECON
believed to be able to achieve the ISDL with ex-ante plan coordination.
Despite economic measures promoting the international circulation of goods
between the COMECON countries, such as the adoption of a common unit of ac-
count (the transferable ruble) in 1963 or massive efforts to elaborate common in-
dustrial standards during the 1960s, intra-COMECON trade lacked a common
price-basis and convertible currencies, which would have allowed it expand in
proportions similar to the increase of the intra-EEC trade. Implementing the
ISDL without market mechanisms, in a time when socialist enterprises were
given more room for manoeuvre in organizing their own process of production,
but never fully controlled foreign trade, was unrealistic.⁵³ This discrepancy be-
tween the new practice of planning the economy at national and at international
level also explains the economic failure of the Council. Nevertheless, the COME-
CON took over the spirit of the economic reforms implemented in its member
countries, which was to “catch up and overtake” capitalist countries in develop-
ing a socialist model of development mirroring the Western model, but suited to
the specific framework of planned economies.⁵⁴
In its attempt at copying Western European economic integration, the COME-
CON relied on several legitimate or illegitimate models. Created as an answer to
the Marshall Plan in 1949, the COMECON was supposed to challenge the OEEC/
OECD, more than the European Coal and Steel Community or the EEC, to which
establishment it did not react at first. However, COMECON documents almost
never mention the OEEC/OECD and focus until the late 1960s on strengthening
the organization’s contacts with the United Nations Economic Commission for
Europe in Geneva (ECE), in order to achieve international recognition with the
help of the UN regional commission. This strategy pursued a diplomatic goal de-
fined by the Soviet superpower and did not take into account the economic in-
terests of the people’s democracies, which developed a growing interest for trade
with EEC members in the 1960s, rather than for the deepening of a technical co-
operation with the ECE. Thus the unofficial declaration by the EEC and the CO-
MECON of their interest in opening reciprocal recognition negotiations in 1971,
followed by the official recognition of the EEC by the socialist countries in
 R. Selucky, “The impact of the economic reforms on the foreign economic relations of the
socialist countries,” Soviet and Eastern European Foreign Trade 4, no. 3 (1968): 72–86.
 For the reverse case study of the influence of socialist economic knowledge on Western Euro-
pean countries, see the contribution by Isabelle Gouarné in this volume: Isabelle Gouarné,
“Mandatory planning versus Indicative planning. Eastern Itinerary of French planners (1960s-
1970s)”.
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1972,⁵⁵ led to two different sets of East-West dialogue.While the EEC Commission
started bilateral commercial negotiations with each COMECON member state in
1974, enforcing its own official recognition and fostering bilateral trade, the CO-
MECON secretariat opened a first round of negotiations with the EEC Commis-
sion in 1975, which was interrupted by Brussels in 1980. The COMECON was
then forced to unilaterally recognize the EEC, which already dealt directly with
its member states’ governments. It managed later to reopen negotiations with
Brussels, leading to mutual recognition of both international organizations in
June 1988, when the COMECON was already crumbling down.⁵⁶
Eventually, the long diplomatic and largely unsuccessful process of mutual
recognition cannot hide a real circulation of goods between the East and the
West, but also of concepts about regional economic integration. Particularly
after 1968, at a time when Soviet opening towards the EEC had made public de-
bate possible, the EEC model worked as the main reference in the discourse on
the necessary evolution of the COMECON.⁵⁷ Polish and Hungarian representa-
tives in particular analyzed the evolution of market coordination within the
EEC and used the perspective of the completion of the custom union by 1968
to urge their partners at the COMECON to progress toward a stronger coordina-
tion of their economies. As the Hungarian ambassador at the COMECON,
Rezsö Nyers, said in 1968, “the integration that is happening in other parts of
the world – especially in Western Europe – is so powerful, that the smaller so-
cialist countries can demonstrate an equivalent economic potential only if they
co-operate closer among each other and with the Soviet Union than has previ-
ously been the case.”⁵⁸
Thus the COMECON, like other international organizations, appeared more
and more as “a resource-place for political leaders, who were aware of the eco-
nomic vulnerability of their country.”⁵⁹ The strategy of the Polish and Hungarian
 Vladislav Zubok, “The Soviet Union and European Integration from Stalin to Gorbachev,”
Journal of European Integration History 2, no. 1 (1996): 85–98; Marie-Pierre Rey, “L’Europe occi-
dentale dans la politique extérieure soviétique de Brejnev à Gorbatchev, évolution ou revolution
?,” Relations internationales 147, no. 3 (2011): 73–84.
 SAPMO-BArch DY30–7090, Tagung des politisch-beratenden Ausschusses des Warschauer
Vertrages, 1988.
 Suvi Kansikas, Socialist countries face the European Community. Soviet-bloc Controversies over
East-West Trade (Fankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 2014).
 SAPMO-BArch DY 3023–804, Zusammenarbeit mit dem Rat für Gegenseitige Wirtschaftshilfe.
1968– 1969, “Brief von Rezsö Nyers an Boleslaw Jaszczuk,” 4.6.1968, f. 249–250.
 Sandrine Kott, “Par-delà la guerre froide. Les organisations internationales et les circula-
tions Est-Ouest (1947– 1973),” Vingtième Siècle. Revue d’histoire 109 (2011): 149.
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governments was twofold.⁶⁰ Since they were increasing their economic relations
with the West at that time, they needed a stronger integration of the socialist eco-
nomic area in order to export their products in the East. This would have helped
them finance the acquisition of Western technologies to modernize their national
economies. Hungary for example took advantage of a COMECON-agreement ach-
ieved in 1963, making the Hungarian factory Ikarus responsible for the produc-
tion of large buses for the whole bloc, to develop its mechanical constructions’
sector and became one of the world’s greatest bus producer.⁶¹ Besides, in push-
ing the international organization to endorse their reformist interpretation of the
socialist economic model (including the development of new foreign trade rela-
tions, more autonomy given to the enterprises and the development of market
incentives within the socialist economies), they were seeking protection against
peer pressure aimed at forcing them to revoke their national economic reforms,
which had been implemented after 1968. In the context following the Prague
Spring, the USSR and its most conservative partners were indeed willing to
block any evolution toward market socialism. While playing the EEC-threat at
the COMECON and the urgent necessity to mirror Western European integration
in the East, Warsaw and Budapest could paradoxically legitimize their national
economic course in presenting it as a declination of multilaterally agreed COME-
CON goals.
Indeed, in 1971, the USSR and its partners engaged the COMECON in the so-
called “global program”, including the task to achieve the “integration” of its
member states’ national economies. The term “integration,” directly borrowed
from the Western European regional model, was deeply controversial and the
agreement purely formal. The members of the COMECON never did manage to
positively define what socialist economic integration should be. Alexei Kosygin
gave a very vague definition of the term in his defense of this new goal of plan-
ning coordination at the 23rd Session of the COMECON in 1971: “The socialist in-
tegration will not be accompanied by the creation of supranational organs . . .We
do not interfere [in national planning], no supranational organs . . . Thus it is
 P. G. Hare and P. T. Wanless, “Polish and Hungarian Economic Reforms – A Comparison,”
Soviet Studies 33, no. 4 (1981): 491–517.
 The political rationale behind this strategy and its economic failure for the global modern-
ization of the Hungarian economy is analyzed in Zsombor Body, “Enthralled by Size: Business
History or the History of Technocracy in the Study of a Hungarian Socialist Factory,” The Hun-
garian Historical Review 4, no. 4 (2015): 964–989.
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different from the integration that is carried out nowadays in the capitalist coun-
tries”.⁶²
In associating the memory of the supranational debate with the idea of eco-
nomic integration, in order to distinguish these two more clearly, the Soviet gov-
ernment tried to overcome the failure of the coordination of economic planning
at the COMECON, which had characterized the 1960s. However, the concept of
“integration” remained alien to the socialist world. According to Mikhaïl Lipkin:
“The term ‘integration’ itself, which was before something like a swear word, in
the official Soviet lexicon at least, associated with NATO, arms race and monop-
olistic markets, now became a major tool in the ideological struggle between the
two systems in the environment of détente.”⁶³
Diverging interests converged to impose an ‘economicisation’ of internation-
al relations within the COMECON in the 1960s. The Council, which was created as
a political answer to Western European integration, finally tried to adopt Jean
Monnet’s logic putting forward economic rationality as a means towards enforc-
ing political integration. However, in a bloc where the partners were not politi-
cally equal, dysfunctional economic co-operation and the failure of planning co-
ordination were crucial to the people’s democracies, as they were striving to
shape some room for manoeuvre vis-à-vis Moscow in their national development
strategies. The imitation of the Western European model of economic integra-
tion, which was strongly promoted by the Hungarian and the Polish
governments– seeking the modernization of their national economies through
regional integration and the establishment of a socialist market, eventually ag-
gravated the tensions between socialist economies at the COMECON in the
long run and at the same time promoted their international autonomy in the
short term.
Conclusion
It seems evident that the COMECON was structurally unable to organize an eco-
nomically rational planning coordination among the socialist countries, in order
to elaborate a common planned model of development at bloc scale. Not only
because of internal problems specific to the socialist economic system did it
 SAPMO-BArch DY 30–3415, Protokoll der XXIII. Sonder-Tagung des Rates für Gegenseitige
Wirtschaftshilfe, “Protokollarische Niederschrift der Leiter der Delegationen der 23. RGW-Tagung
am 26. April in Moskau,” f. 55.
 Mikhaïl Lipkin, “The Soviet Union, CMEA and the Question of First EEC Enlargement” (paper
presented at the XIV International Economic History Congress, Helsinki, 2006).
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fail, but also because the organization was pushed by its members to mirror
more and more the evolutions of the EEC’s regional economic integration in
the 1960s.
However, the Council was not doomed to fail because socialist economic
planning was irrational in itself,⁶⁴ or unable to be coordinated at bloc scale. It
failed because the COMECON was created as – and always remained – a political
organization, while officially pursuing economic goals. Oscar Sanchez-Sibony
has shown how Soviet economics has to be analyzed in a global framework, tak-
ing into account the influence of parallel evolutions in the capitalist system.⁶⁵
We have stressed out in a similar way how the Cold War held sway over the shap-
ing of the socialist world-economy after 1949. Considering COMECON’s unique
showcase position in the Cold War, it becomes evident that the USSR, playing
its superpower role, could not afford to let the organization fail. According to
the official equality of all member states, Moscow had to bear compromises
with its partners within the framework of the COMECON, were it to maintain
the image of socialist solidarity on the international stage.
Eventually, the failure of planning coordination at the COMECON was nei-
ther accidental nor structural, but intended and instrumentalized by the peo-
ple’s democracies, in order to create a “dynamics of dissent”⁶⁶ that shaped, with-
in the bloc, political room for manoeuvre for the smaller states against the Soviet
superpower. Romania, the GDR, Poland, Hungary or Czechoslovakia had an eco-
nomic and political interest in nurturing the failure of planning coordination in
the Council, in order to bargain long-term empty agreements against short-term
real bilateral compromises from the Soviet Union. Looking at the learning proc-
ess at stake in international economic cooperation among socialist countries, as
has been done here, helps answer in a new way the question why the COMECON
failed. Considering how international and national agents involved in the COME-
CON co-operation shaped common planning projects, it becomes clear that the
structurally weak interest of economic co-operation does not explain alone the
failure of the Council. Rather, common economic failure and political success
of separate national development strategies were two sides of the same coin.
 For an overview of the debate, see Peter Boettke, Socialism and the Market: The Socialist Cal-
culation Debate Revisited, vol. 5 (London: Routledge, 2000). A critical discussion of the strategic
academic use of this debate in the capitalist world is provided in Johanna Bockman and Gil
Eyal, “Eastern Europe as a Laboratory for Economic Knowledge: The Transnational Roots of Ne-
oliberalism,” The American Journal of Sociology 108, no. 2 (2002): 317–323.
 Oscar Sanchez-Sibony, “Depression Stalinism. The Great Break Reconsidered,” Kritika 15,
no. 1 (2014): 23–49.
 Crump, The Warsaw Pact Reconsidered.
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Western Europe and the Myth
of Self-Management (1968– 1975)
This chapter focuses on Western European reception of the Yugoslav model of
self-management, based on social ownership of the means of production and
the self-government of working people.¹ The self-management system, as it de-
veloped in Yugoslavia since the early 1950s – when it was first introduced – pos-
ited the decentralization of the state’s functions to the largest possible degree.
This system therefore distinguished itself from the Soviet model of state owner-
ship which had characterized Yugoslavia’s economy between the end of World
War Two and the split between Tito and Stalin (1948): self-management was in-
deed not compatible with central planning. The self-managed system proposed
an alternative vision of planning which represented a “third way” between the
socialist and capitalist models.² Focusing on the management of enterprises,
the Yugoslav leadership aimed at re-shaping the relationship between the
state and the economic system. Starting from the 1950s, Yugoslavia gradually de-
veloped a model of “social planification” from “below,” which was to be – at
least in theory – an outward reflection of the preferences of producers and con-
sumers. “Social planification” meant a shift from central planning to an “indica-
tive” planning which, since the mid-1960s, had to provide forecasts and set forth
the objectives to be pursued by government through non-administrative meas-
ures, without imposing legal or mandatory obligations to enterprises.³ The
bases of the “indicative” system of planning were to be the preferences of the
enterprises which, maximizing their income according to the principles of the
market economy and avoiding workers’ alienation, would further the general in-
 On the economic dimension of self-management, see Jaroslav Vanek, The Participatory econ-
omy: an evolutionary hypothesis and a strategy for development (Ithaca and London: Cornell Uni-
versity Press, 1971).
 For an overview on the divergence between theory and practice of Yugoslav self-management,
see Vladimir Unkovski-Korica, “Self-management, development and debt: the rise and fall of the
‘Yugoslav experiment’,” in Welcome to the Desert of Post-Socialism: Radical Politics After Yugo-
slavia, ed. Igor Štiks and Srećko Horvat (London: Verso, 2015), 21–45.
 On simultaneous debates on social planning in the Soviet bloc, and in particular in Czecho-
slovakia, see Vítězslav Sommer’s chapter in this volume.
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terest.⁴ The notion of “self-management planning” was definitively sanctioned
by the 1974 Yugoslav constitution, which sanctified self-management as Yugosla-
via’s cornerstone also in view of the death of its leader and symbol – Josip Broz
Tito.⁵ Self-managed planning had to be developed within and among enterprises:
coordination of individual plans was to be legally required, and such co-ordina-
tion was to be codified into legally binding agreements between the enterprises
on specific obligations and undertakings. Self-management planning therefore
posited that the harmonious development of the country’s economy was to be
based on labor-managed firms.
In recent years, several studies have highlighted the political and economic
origins of self-management and its role in shaping the history of Yugoslavia dur-
ing the Cold War.⁶ However, little attention has been paid to the influence of self-
management beyond Yugoslav borders, and to the relationship between manage-
ment and planning.⁷ This essay offers a preliminary historical analysis on how
“labour management” came to be perceived in Western Europe as an alternative
socialist way of planning, particularly in the domain of manpower. It also shows
that the self-management model overcame the ideological boundaries of the
Cold War through scholarly and intellectual networks, encouraged by the Yugo-
slav leadership, which influenced the zeitgeist of the late 1960s and early 1970s
and, consequently, the agenda of policy-makers in Western Europe. This chapter
is structured around three sections. The first focuses on the emergence of social
and political unrest in Western Europe in the late 1960s, and the consequent
need, for Western European policymakers, to look for new models of industrial
relations. The second section deals with the role of Yugoslav scholars and intel-
 Milojko Drulović, L’autogestion à l’éprouve (Paris: Fayard 1973); Cyrus Ardalan, “Workers’ Self-
Management and Planning: The Yugoslav Case,” World Development 8 (1980): 623–638.
 See Edvard Kardelj, Pravci razvoja političkog sistema socijalističkog samoupravljanja (Beograd:
Komunist, 1978); Stefano Bianchini, La Diversità socialista in Jugoslavia. Modernizzazione auto-
gestione e sviluppo democratico dal 1965 a oggi (Trieste: Editoriale Stampa Triestina, 1984).
 On the origins of “self-management” see the recent contribution by Vladimir Unkovski-Kori-
ca, “Workers’ Councils in the Service of the Market: New Archival Evidence on the Origins of
Self-Management in Yugoslavia, 1948– 1950,” Europe-Asia Studies 66 (2014): 108– 134.
 The external influence of the Yugoslav model has been analyzed in connection with the Soviet
bloc countries by Johanna Bockman, Markets in the Name of Socialism: The Left-Wing Origins of
Neoliberaism (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2011). For the French reception, see Frank
Georgi, “A la recherché de l’autogestion. Les gauches françaises et le “modèle yougoslave
(1948– 1981)” https://lms.hypotheses.org/288 (accessed January 2018). On the link between
management debates and the question of planning, see Vladimir Unkovski-Korica, The Econom-
ic Struggle for Power in Tito’s Yugoslavia: From World War II to Non-Alignment (New York: I.B.
Tauris, 2016); Dennison Rusinow, The Yugoslav Experiment, 1948– 1974 (London: C. Hurst for
the Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1977).
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lectuals in spreading in the West the idea that Yugoslavia’s self-management sys-
tem might be the solution to the improvement of democracy in industrial rela-
tions. The third and final section points at how the Yugoslav experience was a
constant source of inspiration for the reforms on the labor market which were
implemented in Western Europe throughout the 1970s.
Looking for a third way
On 17 December 1972, the President of the European Commission, Sicco Man-
sholt, went to the island of Brioni for an official visit to Yugoslavia’s leader,
Tito, and Edvard Kardelj, the main ideologue of the Yugoslav regime and the pu-
tative “father” of self-management. The visit was supposed to set the seal on the
renewal of the trade agreement which the European Economic Community (EEC)
and Yugoslavia had concluded in 1970 – the first to be signed between the Com-
munity and a socialist country since the constitution of the EEC in 1957. For the
Yugoslav regime, affected as it was by the centrifugal tendencies which had
emerged during the “Croatian Spring” of 1971 and its successive repression,
the renewal of the 1970 agreement was of major economic importance, as it
was meant to signal the EEC’s willingness to open its markets to Yugoslav agri-
cultural and industrial produce, thereby offering a guarantee to its future eco-
nomic growth. The renewal of the agreement also had a political meaning, to
confirm the Community’s willingness to support the political stability of the Yu-
goslav federation: the 1970 agreement had indeed been negotiated in the after-
math of the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, which had aroused Western
fears about Soviet expansionism towards the Balkans. In other words, the
1970 agreement and its renewal – still under negotiation at the very moment
when Sicco Mansholt arrived in Yugoslavia to meet Tito and Kardelj – were
the means of keeping the Balkan country, once again, “afloat”.⁸ Yugoslavia
was therefore the demandeur of trade concessions which the EEC, although re-
luctant due to its traditional agricultural protectionism, was ready to accept
for political reasons.⁹
 Yugoslavia had been supported by the West after the 1948 Tito-Stalin split through military
and economic aid. See Lorraine M. Lees, Keeping Tito Afloat: The United States, Yugoslavia
and the Cold War (University Park, PA: Penn State University Press, 1997), 43– 119.
 On the origins and development of EEC-Yugoslav relations during the 1970s, see Benedetto
Zaccaria, The EEC’s Yugoslav Policy in Cold War Europe, 1968– 1980 (London: Palgrave Macmil-
lan, 2016).
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However, Mansholt’s visit was somehow paradoxical. Despite Yugoslavia’s
clear economic weakness, talks focused only partially on economic relations be-
tween Belgrade and the EEC. Instead, special attention was paid to the Yugoslav
system of self-management. During the bilateral meetings with Tito and Kardelj,
Mansholt praised the Yugoslav model of industrial relations which, in his opin-
ion, represented an expression of genuine workers’ democracy. After exalting the
political and social virtues of the “Yugoslav model”, Mansholt – a member of the
Dutch Labour Party – also discussed the possible application of the self-manage-
ment system to solve social conflicts in Western Europe. Ironically enough,Yugo-
slavia, which had requested the EEC’s economic help in terms of trade and co-
operation, was depicted by Mansholt as a valuable model of economic
organisation.¹⁰
Why did Mansholt praise Yugoslavia? Was his admiration sincere, or was it
the mere expression of diplomatic politeness vis-à-vis one of the oldest and high-
ly influential leaders of the socialist and non-aligned worlds? The answers to
these questions must be sought in a general trend of admiration for Yugoslavia’s
position in the international arena and its innovative socio-political model. As
regards its international position, since the late 1940s Western diplomatic circles
had recognised Yugoslavia’s national “road to Communism” as a precious asset
in terms of ideological confrontation with Moscow – the Tito-Stalin split in 1948
was in fact the first challenge to Stalin’s hegemony in East-Central Europe¹¹ – but
also in terms of prevention of Soviet influence in the Balkans and the Adriatic. In
addition, Western diplomats and policy-makers recognised and admired Tito’s
role in making Yugoslavia – a country which lacked real economic and military
weight – one of the leading and most influential countries within the Non-
Aligned Movement.¹² As previously noted, in the course of the 1960s, Belgrade
had also been able to play a winning card in the Moscow-Belgrade confrontation
in developing relations with the EEC and its member states. This was particularly
the case of Italy which, after the establishment of the first center-left coalition in
1963, had improved its relations with Belgrade, regarded as a precious political
and economic partner in the Balkans. The Socialist Party of Pietro Nenni, an ad-
 Arhiv Jugoslavije (AJ), KPR, I-3-b/42, Zabeleška o razgovoru Predsednika Republike sa g.
Sicco Mansholtom, predsednikom Komisije EEZ, na Brionima, 17.12.1972; Zabeleška o razgovoru
druga E. Kardelja sa Sikom Manšholtom, predsednikom Izvršne komisije Evropske ekonomske
zajednice, 17.XII 1972. godine na Brionima.
 See Jeronim Perović, “The Tito-Stalin Split: A Reassessment in Light of New Evidence,” Jour-
nal of Cold War Studies 9 (2007): 32–63.
 On Yugoslavia’s non-alignment, see Tvrtko Jakovina, Treća Strana Hladnog Rata (Zaprešić:
Fraktura, 2014).
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mirer of Yugoslavia’s road to socialism, played quite an important role in favour-
ing Italian-Yugoslav relations in the late 1960s.¹³ A similar role had been played
by the Christian Democrats led by Aldo Moro, the first Italian Prime Minister to
visit Yugoslavia in 1965.¹⁴ And West Germany too had recognized the geopolitical
asset represented by Tito’s Yugoslavia after the entry of the Social-Democratic
Party (SPD) into the coalition government and the demise of the Hallstein Doc-
trine.¹⁵ The European Commission, the Community institution in charge of nego-
tiating trade agreements by virtue of the Common Commercial Policy envisaged
by the Treaty of Rome (1957), had recognised the political value of Yugoslavia as
the first socialist country to enter into direct relations with the EEC (which the
Communist rhetoric had traditionally depicted as an imperialist reality) and
also for the importance attached by the Community to establishing good rela-
tions with developing countries within the G77. Mansholt himself, as the Europe-
an Commissioner for Agriculture, had sponsored the establishment of the System
of Generalised Preferences for members of the G77, including Yugoslavia.¹⁶ In ex-
pressing his admiration for Tito’s Yugoslavia, Mansholt was therefore following a
well-established tradition of diplomatic admiration for the country’s internation-
al status which eclipsed the reality of a weak federation characterized by a se-
vere commercial deficit and centrifugal tendencies.
And yet, Mansholt’s admiration for the Yugoslav model envisaging “indica-
tive” state planning on the basis of enterprises’ preferences and indications was
not limited to a tradition of diplomatic regard for Yugoslavia’s international role.
In fact, it was linked to the socio-economic crisis undergone by Western Europe-
an societies during the 1960s. Social and political unrest, mainly driven by stu-
dents’ and workers’ protests, was a product of the Trente glorieuses – a period
characterized by widespread social peace and marked economic growth – and
started a process of change in social and political paradigms. Catchwords like
 See Massimo Bucarelli, “Roma e Belgrado tra Guerra Fredda e Distensione,” in La politica
estera italiana negli anni della Grande Distensione (1968– 1975), ed. Pier Giorgio Celozzi Baldelli
(Roma: Aracne, 2009), 144– 157.
 See Karlo Ruzicic-Kessler, “Italy and Yugoslavia: from distrust to friendship in Cold War Eu-
rope,” Journal of Modern Italian Studies 19 (2014): 641–664.
 See Milan Kosanović, “Brandt and Tito: Between Ostpolitik and Nonalignment,” in Ostpoli-
tik, 1969– 1974: European and Global Responses, ed. Carole Fink and Bernd Schaefer (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2009), 232–242. On the “Hallstein Doctrine” see Werner Kilian, Die
Hallstein-Doktrin. Der diplomatische Krieg zwischen der BRD und der DDR 1955– 1973 (Berlin:
Duncker & Humblot, 2001), 52–65.
 On Sicco Mansholt’s attitude towards the G77, see Giuliano Garavini, After Empires: European
Integration, Decolonisation, and the Challenge from the Global South 1957– 1986 (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2012).
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“freedom” and “self-determination” spread throughout the world – from Califor-
nia to Mexico, to Poland, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia – through the powerful
influence of the media and communication networks among activists. Tradition-
al societal and economic practices were overwhelmed by new concepts concern-
ing the place of individuals in society: protest movements across Europe called
for new social and political rights.¹⁷
Reactions to the waves of political unrest affecting the Western hemisphere
differed greatly. In the socialist bloc, the search for a new course of social and
political relations was harshly repressed by communist élites – as epitomized
by the Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia in August 1968 – whereas in West-
ern Europe political leaders were obliged to find a modus vivendi with the ap-
peals for new education rights and improved working conditions which stemmed
from their own societies. Social and political change obliged Western European
élites at all levels – political, economic, academic – to search for new models of
relations in society and, more in particular, in the education systems and work-
places.¹⁸
In the sphere of higher education, the 1968 movement and its aftermath
spurred the governments of the EEC member states – the “Nine,” after the
entry of Great Britain, Ireland and Denmark in 1973 – to launch the first Com-
munity initiatives, for both education¹⁹ and vocational training.²⁰ Instead, as re-
gards labor, the Western European leaderships were confronted with the need to
improve working conditions in the Common Market, from health to mobility.
Within this framework, the idea developed of widening workers’ rights and de-
cisional powers in enterprises. This clearly emerges from the conclusions of the
 On the global implications of the 1968 movement, see Carole Fink, Philipp Gassert and Det-
lef Junker, 1968: the world transformed (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998). See also
Valentine Lomellini and Antonio Varsori, Dal Sessantotto al crollo del Muro: i movimenti di pro-
testa in Europa a cavallo tra i due blocchi (Milano: FrancoAngeli, 2014).
 On the origins of the EEC social policy and its developments between the late 1960s and the
early 1970s, see Antonio Varsori, “Alle origini di un modello europeo: la Comunità europea e la
nascita di una politica sociale (1969– 1974),” Ventunesimo Secolo 9 (2006): 17–47.
 See Simone Paoli, Il sogno di Erasmo. La questione educativa nel processo di integrazione eu-
ropea (Milano: FrancoAngeli, 2010), 70– 125; Anne Corbett, Universities and the Europe of Knowl-
edge: Ideas, Institutions and Policy Entrepreneurship in European Union Higher Education Policy,
1955–2005 (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), 60–96.
 Lorenzo Mechi, “Du BIT à la politique sociale européenne: les origines d’un modèle,” Le
Mouvement Social 3 (2013): 17–30; Antonio Varsori, “La formazione professionale e l’educazione
nella costruzione europea e il Cedefop,” in Sfide del mercato e identità europea. Le politiche di
educazione e formazione professionale nell’Europa comunitaria, ed. Antonio Varsori (Milano:
FrancoAngeli, 2006), 173–212; Francesco Petrini, “The common vocational training Policy in
the Eec from 1961 to 1972,” Vocational Training 32 (2004): 45–54.
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International Political Science Association (IPSA) round table held in Salzburg in
1968, according to which “one of the trends of the coming modernisation of pol-
itics is the trend towards increased participation in decision and policy-making
processes.”²¹ Indeed, the late 1960s and early 1970s saw the rise of debate re-
garding the concept of industrial democracy, that is to say, the reproduction of
democratic practices within companies, in order to allow workers to participate
in governing bodies.²² These developments were closely linked to the concept of
“planning”, i.e. the direct intervention of the state in the industrial domain, in
order to regulate the relationships between employers and employees. It is there-
fore not surprising that academic and intellectual debates on how to reform in-
dustrial relations examined models of economic organization stemming from the
Socialist world.²³ In terms of industrial relations, had socialist countries in Cen-
tral and Eastern Europe something to teach in terms of economic planning which
could also be applied to capitalist societies? The answer to this question indicat-
ed the Yugoslav experience of self-managed planning.
Spreading the Yugoslav model
in Western academic circles
International interest in the Yugoslav model was effectively spurred thanks to the
International Labour Organisation (ILO).²⁴ Within the ILO, debates on industrial
management had been developing since the 1920s, and resulted in a series of in-
ternational instruments covering certain aspects of industrial relations, includ-
ing the “Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise Conven-
tions” in 1948, the “Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining Convention” in
 Historical Archives of the European Union, Florence (HAEU), Alexandre Marc papers (AM),
Box. 488.
 See Campbell Balfour, Participation in Industry (London: Croom Helm, 1973); Walter Kolven-
bach, Partecipazione e governo dell’impresa. I modelli europei (Roma: Edizioni Lavoro, 1984); Et-
tore Maraschi, “Democrazia industriale e organizzazione del lavoro,” L’Impresa 5 (1977): 491–
496.
 See Théofil I. Kis, “État des travaux sur la problématique de la convergence: théories et hy-
potheses,” Études internationales 2 (1971): 443–487. On the positive attitude of French intellec-
tuals towards the Soviet model, see, for example, Georges-Henri Soutou, “Teorie sulla conver-
genza nella Francia degli anni Sessanta e Settanta,” Ventunesimo Secolo 9 (2006): 49–77.
 On ILO’s role in the exchange and circulation of expertise in the field of management be-
tween Western and Eastern Europe during the 1960s and 1970s, see Sandrine Kott’s chapter
in this volume.
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1949, and the “Voluntary Conciliation and Arbitration Recommendation” in 1951.
These instruments were supplemented in 1952 by the “Co-operation at the Level
of the Undertaking Recommendation,” which dealt with labor relations at enter-
prise level at a time when the term “workers’ participation” was not yet a topical
concept.²⁵ However, the ILO had not managed to draw definite conclusions from
such recommendations, due to the great variety of national practices and ap-
proaches to the problem of workers’ participation in the organization’s member
states. In the early 1960s, ILO rephrased the question of industrial democracy. In
1962, it financed a study on workers’ management in Yugoslavia, in the conclu-
sions of which it claimed that self-management had “undoubtedly strengthened
the position of the collective vis-à-vis the management.”²⁶ In 1966, the ILO adopt-
ed a new resolution concerning workers’ participation in enterprises, as a result
of which a technical meeting was convened in 1967, covering “methods used
throughout the world to enable workers to participate in decisions within under-
takings.”²⁷ The meeting concluded that worker’s participation was of prime im-
portance and should constitute one of the ILO’s long-term commitments. ILO
sponsored the launch a major research project on “Worker participation in com-
pany management,” which was carried out by the International Institute for La-
bour Studies (IILS) which the ILO had established in Geneva in 1960. The longest
project ever carried out by the Institute, it became the top priority of IILS’s re-
search work for more than 20 years. The aim of this study was a critical and com-
parative examination of solutions to the main social and economic problems
which had already emerged or were about to emerge in the spheres of economic
development, job satisfaction, social welfare and industrial organization.²⁸ In
1967, Robert Cox, the Director of IILS, concluded that workers’ participation in
factories was a crucial element in the future development of Western societies.²⁹
Yugoslav experts had been actively involved in the definition of the working pro-
gram since the early stages of the project. The first International Seminar on
Workers’ Participation in Decisions within Undertakings held within the IILS
 Walter Kolvenbach, Partecipazione e governo dell’impresa, 14.
 International Labour Office. Workers’ Management in Yugoslavia (Geneva: International La-
bour Office, 1962).
 See Maryse Gaudier, The International Institute for Labour Studies: its research function, ac-
tivities and publications, 1960–2001. www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/—dgreports/—inst/
documents/genericdocument/wcms_194523.pdf (last accessed 31 January 2017).
 Ibid.
 Robert Cox, “La participation des travailleurs à la gestion des entreprises. Etat et avance-
ment du projet. I – Un champ d’enquête fertile,” Bullettin de l’Institut international d’études so-
ciales 2, February 1967.
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project took place in Belgrade – upon the invitation of the Yugoslav government
and in cooperation with the Yugoslav Commission for the ILO – in December
1969 and confirmed the prominent role of the “Yugoslav model” in policy de-
bates on industrial relations.³⁰ The ILO research project stimulated the interest
of international scholars on the Yugoslav model. The Czech sociologist Jan
Vanek, who devoted many years to the study of Workers’ Councils in Yugosla-
via,³¹ stimulated the interest of his brother, Jaroslav Vanek who, as a professor
of economics at Cornell University, was to become one of the most influential
scholars in the field of “labor managed economy” in the course of the 1970s.³²
Following ILO’s initiatives, Yugoslav scholars made great contributions to
the creation of a critical networking system for international researchers and
practitioners,³³ a pivotal role being played by Branko Horvat, the Yugoslav econ-
omist. Horvat was in fact a scholar with solid institutional links to the Yugoslav
regime, which actively contributed to support his own efforts to make Yugosla-
via’s self-management a reference model for discussions on industrial democra-
cy in Western Europe. This attitude has to be contextualized within Yugoslavia’s
aim at enhancing its relations with Western Europe in order to escape from the
economic stagnation of the country and its serious commercial deficit. In 1965,
Yugoslavia’s ruling party, the League of Communists of Yugoslavia (LCY) had in-
deed taken a “liberal” turn, which consisted of a gradual process of economic
liberalization in order to develop and modernise the country’s industrial appa-
ratus and link it to the Western European system.³⁴ Merging socialist and market
principles, Belgrade aimed at reflecting the idea of “socialism with a human
face” distinguishing itself from the Soviet model³⁵.
 Activities of the ILO 1969. Report of the Director-General (Part 2) to the International Labour
Conference, Fifty-fourth Session, 1970. International Labour Office, Geneva, 1970, 66. (www.i-
lo.org/public/libdoc/ilo/P/09383/09383(1970–54-part2).pdf (accessed 2 June 2017). See also:
ILO Report on International Seminar (Belgrade, 1969) on Workers’ Participation in Decisions
within Undertakings, Geneva, 1970.
 Jan Vanek, The Economics of Workers’ Management: A Yugoslav Case Study (London: Allen
and Unwin, 1972).
 See the author’s preface in Jaroslav Vanek, The General Theory of Labor-Managed Market
Economies (Ithaca, London: Cornell University Press, 1970).
 Steven Deutsch, “A Researcher’s Guide to Worker Participation, Labor and Economic and In-
dustrial Democracy,” Economic and Industrial Democracy 26 (2005): 645–656.
 Ivan Obadić, “A troubled relationship: Yugoslavia and the European Economic Community
in détente,” European Review of History 21 (2014): 329–348.
 Archivio della Presidenza della Repubblica, Rome, Box 130, Jugoslavia, Appunto per il Pres-
idente della Repubblica, 20 settembre 1968; See Ukandi G. Damachi, Hans Seibel, and Jeroen
Scheerder, Self-Mangement in Yugoslavia and the Developing World (London and Basingstoke:
The MacMillan Press, 1982), 1–5.
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After studying economics, sociology and philosophy in Zagreb, Manchester
and London, Horvat had become Research Director at the Federal Planning Bu-
reau in Belgrade (1958– 1963) and, between 1963 and 1970, had been the Director
of the Institute of Economic Sciences, again in Belgrade. In 1967, he had founded
the journal Economic Analysis and Worker’s Self-Management,³⁶ which was to be-
come the official journal of the International Association for the Economics of
Self-Management (IAFESM), later officially established in Dubrovnik in 1978.
Horvat made a great contribution towards stimulating the debate on workers’
participation in Western universities, as a professor at the University of Michigan
(1968), University of Florida (1970) and the American University in Washington
(1970, 1972 and 1974). One of his first, major contributions was a journal article
published as a supplement to the American Economic Review in 1971, entitled
“Yugoslav Economic Policy in the Post-War Period: Problems, Ideas, Institutional
Developments”.³⁷ The article followed the mainstream idea of the “convergence
of systems” – widespread among intellectual and political élites in both the West
and the East, which posited the convergence between capitalism and socialism.³⁸
Indeed, Horvat argued that the Yugoslav model of economic and social planning
could offer a number of advantages to Western enterprises, for at least three rea-
sons:
(1) it reduces uncertainty which is the basic restriction on free decision-making; (2) it in-
creases the rate of growth, the market expands and so the number of available alternatives
increases; (3) it equalizes success of a producer less dependent on external conditions
which he cannot control and which are economically and socially irrational.³⁹
Horvat’s main conclusion concerned the “experimental” nature of the Yugoslav
model, which could offer a solution to the “fallacious” dichotomy between plan-
ning and market.⁴⁰ His work reflected an impressive wave of scholarly contribu-
tions focused on what Horvat defined as the “Yugoslav social laboratory.”⁴¹ In
 Milica Uvalić, and Vojmir Franicević, “Introduction: Branko Horvat – Beyond the Main-
stream,” in Equality, Participation, Transition: Essays in Honour of Branko Horvat, eds.Vojmir Fra-
nicević and Milica Uvalić (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), XI.
 Branko Horvat, “Yugoslav Economic Policy in the Post-War Period: Problems, Ideas, Institu-
tional Developments,” The American Economic Review 61 (1971): 71–169.
 See Isabelle Gouarné’s chapter in this volume.
 Horvat, ‘Yugoslav Economic Policy’, 159.
 Ibid., 159– 161.
 See the literature review offered by Phillip I. Blumberg, “Selected Materials on Corporate So-
cial Responsibility,” The Business Lawyer 27 (1972): 1275– 1299. See also Ichak Adizes, Industrial
Democracy: Yugoslav Style (New York: Free Press, 1971); Deborah D. Milenković, Plan and Market
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parallel with Horvat’s activism in spreading the notion of self-management in
the Western intellectual world, other Yugoslav scholars where engaged in an
analogous mission. This is particularly the case of the Dean of the Faculty of Po-
litical Science in Belgrade – Nadjan Pašić – who, in the early 1970s, praised the
virtues of the Yugoslav model in several international seminars in the United
States and Western Europe⁴².
Needless to say, the stream of academic debate regarding the Yugoslav
model did also include critical views, which expressed scepticism about the ap-
plicability of the self-management system to Western capitalist economies. As
Ellen Turkish Comisso was to argue in her comprehensive 1979 study on the
country’s self-management, discussion on the self-managed economy too often
appeared “more intent on evaluating than in understanding, more anxious to
package the Yugoslav experience with a seal of approval or disapproval than
to explain and analyse its operation.”⁴³ In this regard, the renowned American
political scientist Robert Dahl was well aware of the unlikeliness of Western la-
bor’s support for any system of worker-owned industry.⁴⁴ And yet, in an article
published in The New York Review of Books in 1970, Dahl himself argued that,
Yugoslavia is the only country in the world where a serious effort has been made to trans-
late the old dream of industrial democracy into reality – or into as much reality as dreams
usually are. Let me add at once that in the government of its state apparatus, Yugoslavia is
not, of course, a representative democracy. . . . Yet if Yugoslavia is less democratic than the
United States in the government of the state, it is more democratic in the way industries
and other enterprises are governed.⁴⁵
in Yugoslav Economic Thought (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1971); A. Ross Johnson, The
Transformation of Communist Ideology: The Yugoslav Case. 1945– 1953 (Cambridge, Mass.& Lon-
don: The MIT Press, 1972); Gerry Hunnius, G. David Garson and John Case, Workers’ control: A
Reader on Labor and Social Change (New York: Vintage Books, 1973); Duncan Wilson, “Self Man-
agement in Yugoslavia,” International Affairs 54 (1978): 253–263; Joop Ramondt, “Workers’ self-
management and its constraints: The Yugoslav experience,” British Journal of Industrial Relations
1 (1979): 83–94.
 See, for example, Marius J. Broekmeyer, Yugoslav Workers’ Self-Management. Proceedings of
a symposium held in Amsterdam, 7–9 January, 1970 (Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing Company,
1970); G. David Garson, “Models of Worker Self-Management: The West European Experience,”
inWorker Self-Management in Industry: The West European Experience, ed. G. David Garson (New
York: Praeger Publishers, 1977), 206.
 Ellen Turkish Comisso,Workers’ Control under Plan and Market: Implications of Yugoslav Self-
Management (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1979).
 Robert A. Dahl, After the Revolution: Authority in a Good Society (Yale: Yale University Press,
1970), 134– 136.
 Robert A. Dahl, “Power to the Workers,” The New York Review of Books 15 (1970): 20–24.
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1975 marked the apex of Western scholarly interest in the Yugoslav model of self-
management. The Yugoslav leadership had just approved a new constitution
(1974) which had brought a series of fundamental changes for the management
of its economy which were based on a “self-management planning” requiring
continuing participation by all economic and socio-political entities in the coun-
try. This new constitution had followed a period of profound instability in the
country, due to the emergence of centrifugal tendencies in Croatia (1971), a severe
economic crisis after the 1973 Oil Shock, and the still open question of Tito’s suc-
cession. It was the aim of the Yugoslav leadership to exalt the model of self-man-
agement – one of the two pillars on which the Yugoslav federation was built, to-
gether with non-alignment – as a system which, in Pas ̌ić’s words, may “offer a
historical alternative to the trend of bureaucratization, an alternative for many
millions of people who today are helpless in the face of huge bureaucratic organ-
izations which determine the conditions of their lives’⁴⁶.
In 1975, the Executive Committee of the International Political Science Asso-
ciation (IPSA) decided to entrust to the Yugoslav Political Science Association the
organization of a Round Table, to be held in Dubrovnik from 9 to 13 September.
The objectives of the conference were: a) Participatory and Industrial Democracy
and self-management as factors of modernisation of political systems; b) Nation-
al and class interests in multi-ethnic societies. The Yugoslav model was therefore
at the very core of the debate. Belgrade used the meeting to confirm self-manage-
ment as a reference point for the question of industrial democracy to the many
leading international political scientists gathered in its capital. The Yugoslav gov-
ernment took this opportunity for praising the system of self-management plan-
ning. As claimed by the regime’s ideologue, Edvard Kardelj, at the inaugural
speech of the round table:
The very fact that the issue concerning the influence of self-management and participation
on the development of contemporary political systems has attracted the attention of a large
number of scientists from many different countries is a sufficient proof that this topic is re-
flecting one of the salient problems of the mankind. . . . Self-management theory and prac-
tice can, beyond any doubt, affect considerably further evolution of the social and demo-
cratic political systems in the world.⁴⁷
 See Ichak Adizes, and Elisabeth Mann Borgese, Self-Management: New Dimensions to Democ-
racy (Santa Barbara and Oxford: Clio Press, 1975), 118.
 HAEU, AM 488, Opening address by Edvard Kardelj at the Round Table Meeting, Dubrovnik,
9 September 1975.
224 Benedetto Zaccaria
From theory to practice?
Did any move from theory to practice in fact take place? Reforms in the field of
labor in Western Europe suggest that the answer to this question is negative: no-
where these reforms tended towards a system of “socially-owned” enterprises
according to the Yugoslav experience.⁴⁸ Conversely, they led to the introduction
of the less-radical concepts of “participation” and “codetermination,” which im-
plied that decision-making power was shared with the management or the
state.⁴⁹ However, the spread of academic works and debates on self-management
described above did contribute towards bringing the problem of “labor manage-
ment” to the top of the political agenda of Western European policy-makers.
What could the West learn from the Yugoslav experience? The Yugoslav experi-
ence indicated that the state, through its normative intervention, could plan
the role and prerogatives of manpower, and make it a driving force in the man-
agement of enterprises to solve social conflicts.
Who were the real promoters of the Yugoslav model? As suggested in previ-
ous section, the Yugoslav government played a crucial role in consciously export-
ing the self-management model in Western academic and intellectual circles. The
impressive number of scholarly works, conferences and symposia addressing the
issue of workers’ participation with the direct involvement of Yugoslav leading
ideologists – in primis Edvard Kardelj – shaped discussion of the crucial question
on how to reform industrial relations in Western Europe.
Indeed, in the EEC member states, references to the Yugoslav model fre-
quently recurred in political debates between governing and opposition parties,
concerning in particular the development of industrial democracy. In West Ger-
many, the constitution of the “Grand Coalition” in 1967 revived the debate on
workers’ participation, in order to expand the steel and coal discipline of co-de-
termination (established in 1951) to all sectors of the economy. The Biedenkopf-
Kommission, established at governmental level in 1968, confirmed the need to
expand the practice of co-determination.⁵⁰ The Yugoslav model featured promi-
nently in the West German debate on this topic, also as a consequence of the Ost-
 On the US experience, see Christopher Eaton Gunn, Workers’ Self-Management in the United
States (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1984).
 For a general overview on the evolution of labour relations in Western Europe in the mid
1970s, see Johannes Schregle, “Labour Relations in Western Europe: Some Topic Issues,” Inter-
national Labour Review 109 (1974): 1–22.
 David T. Fisher, “Worker participation in West German industry,” Monthly Labor Review 101
(1978): 59–63.
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politik launched by the FRG Chancellor Willy Brandt. The termination of Hall-
stein Doctrine meant the re-activation of diplomatic relations between Yugosla-
via and the FRG, which had been interrupted in 1957 after Tito’s decision to rec-
ognize the German Democratic Republic. Yugoslavia was therefore seen under a
new light in Federal Germany.What was stressed by the Social Democratic party
was its peculiar role as a bridge between East and West, and a representative of
the non-aligned movement.⁵¹ It is therefore not surprising that the Yugoslav
model became a benchmark for the evolution of industrial relations in the coun-
try, being praised by the very political elites which were engaged in the Ostpolitik
in the late 1960s and early 1970s. Needless to say, Yugoslavia’s example spurred
animated discussions in the country.⁵² On one hand, self-management was re-
peatedly quoted by the representatives of the Christian-Democratic Party
(CDU) and by the employers’ associations as a threat to the FRG’s economic
and social order. On the other, large sectors of the Social Democrat Party
(SPD), headed by the party’s chairman at the Bundestag, Herbert Wehner, de-
clared themselves as being inclined towards the Yugoslav model of socialism.⁵³
After the electoral success in 1969, Willy Brandt’s SPD set the expansion of co-
determination as one of its top priorities. During the party congress in Saarbruck-
en in 1971, the Young Socialist faction of the party used the Yugoslav model as a
reference point, pleading for the introduction of Yugoslavia’s model of workers’
self-administration. The result of this debate was a compromise between the
above-mentioned views. The government coalition eventually agreed, in 1974,
on a co-decision system – which came into force on 1 July 1976 – which also en-
visaged parity in the Supervisory Board of enterprises even beyond the coal and
steel sector.⁵⁴
However, it was in Italy and France that, between the late 1960s and early
1970s, leftist parties and trade unions stimulated an unprecedented debate on
the self-management system. In fact, scholarly attention of the Yugoslav model
in Italy and France had originally developed in the late 1960s due to a number
of representatives of the European federalist movement, which viewed self-man-
 See Hans-Dietrich Genscher, Rebuilding a House Divided (New York: Broadway Books, 1997),
488.
 See, for example, Roggemann Hervig, Das Modell der Arbeiterselbstverwaltung in Jugoslawien
(Frankfurt am Main: Europaische Verlagsanstalt, 1970). This volume considered the Yugoslav sol-
utions in relation to the problems arising in West Germany.
 ‘Jugoslawien – Kein Modell für Uns’, Spiegel-Gespräch mit Dr. Hanns Martin Schleyer, Vor-
standsmitglied der Daimler-Benz AG Der Spiegel, 25.05.1970. See magazin.spiegel.de/EpubDeliv-
ery/spiegel/pdf/44906260 (accessed on 30 January 2017).
 Fisher, “Worker participation,” 59–63.
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agement as a system grounded on the political values of federalism. In Italy, the
search for a third-way between political democracy and individual freedom was
cultivated by Adriano Olivetti, a sui generis figure of industrialist wishing to
change the paradigms of capitalist society. Olivetti’s political thought was in
line with that of another leading figure of the European federalist movement,
namely the French philosopher and political activist Alexandre Marc.⁵⁵ The latter
appreciated the decentralization of power to self-managed enterprises and the
autonomy of workers’ communities. For him, self-management coincided with
the basic principle of federalism, namely autonomy. From his view point, the Yu-
goslav model challenged the Soviet model of almighty “State”, replacing it with
that of “Society.” For Marc, this was an experiment to be followed with great at-
tention.⁵⁶ Italian federalists had also started reflecting on the need to link the Eu-
ropean ideal to an organic social and political doctrine starting from the first
issue of the journal Democrazia integrale, first published in 1963. During its
first years, this journal had concentrated on the experience of self-government
in different contexts, including Yugoslavia’s self-managed enterprises.⁵⁷ The sci-
entific legacy of Democrazia integrale was in fact the deepening and develop-
ment of analyses on the Yugoslav experience. One of the first thorough assess-
ments of the Yugoslav self-management to be published in Italy – in 1965 –
was indeed the work of the then young political scientist Tito Favaretto, one
of the first collaborators of Democrazia integrale.⁵⁸ Favaretto would later became
the Director of ISDEE – Istituto di Studi e Documentazione sull’Est Europeo in
Trieste which, in the early 1970s, conducted a major comparative research on
workers’ participation in enterprises in Italy and Yugoslavia which aimed at in-
creasing the knowledge of Yugoslavia’s self-management in the Italian political
scenario.⁵⁹ In late 1960s, scholarly interest on the Yugoslav model matched
with the rise of collective bargaining as a consequence of the emergence of social
unrest in the two countries.
 See Ferdinand Kinsky and Franz Knipping, Le fédéralisme personnaliste aux sources de l’Eu-
rope de demain, hommage à Alexandre Marc (Baden Baden: Nomos, 1996); Gilda Manganaro Fa-
varetto, Il federalismo personalista di Alexandre Marc (1904–2000) (Milano: FrancoAngeli,
2006).
 Alexandre Marc, “Faillite de l’autogestion?,” Europe en Formation, no. 141, 1971.
 Tito Favaretto, “Autonomia e potere nella Repubblica Federativa Jugoslava,” Democrazia In-
tegrale 6 (1965): 4–24 and 7(1965): 3–21.
 Ibid.
 The result of this research, started in 1971, were later published in Cecilia Assanti, Luigi Me-
neghini and Rudi Kyovski, La Partecipazione dei lavoratori alla disciplina dei rapporti di lavoro in
Italia e Jugoslavia (Trieste: ISDEE, 1976).
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In Italy, the center-left coalition headed by the Christian Democrat and So-
cialist parties looked for new models of industrial relations also to face, at the
same time, the rise of radical, leftist groups – included Autonomia operaia
and Lotta Continua – which seemed to be able to gain control of workers’ pro-
tests.⁶⁰ The Socialist Party– traditionally an admirer of Yugoslavia’s non-aligned
policy and self-managed system⁶¹ – played a pivotal role in re-defining industrial
relations in Italy together with the country’s main trade unions, which feared
that workers’ participation in enterprises might endanger their own raison
d’être⁶². Within this framework, the example of labor managed economy offered
by Yugoslavia – already present in the country’s debates since the mid-1960s –
featured prominently. The Italian Communist Party (PCI) was to increase its at-
tention towards the Yugoslav model after the appointment of Enrico Berlinguer
as Secretary General in 1972 and the consequent, gradual emancipation of the
party from the Soviet influence.⁶³ As noted by some of its leading figures, Giorgio
Amendola and Giorgio Napolitano, the issue of labor-managed enterprises went
back to the political thought of Antonio Gramsci with regard to the role of work-
ers in enterprises.⁶⁴
Union-controlled factory delegate councils emerged as a platform for work-
ers’ control demands, as stated in the Law on Workers’ Rights, approved by the
Italian Parliament in 1970 with the support of the Socialist Party and left-wings
elements among the Christian Democrats.⁶⁵ Within this framework, the three
major labour groups – CGIL (Confederazione Generale Italiana del Lavoro),
CISL (Confederazione Italiana Sindacati Lavoratori) and UIL (Unione Italiana
del Lavoro) concluded a Trade Union Agreement stating that workers’ councils’
function was to negotiate industrial agreements.⁶⁶ This marked the overcoming
of reserved managerial prerogatives. For instance, as noted by G. David Gerson,
a prominent American scholar of self-management models during the 1970s, the
 Silvio Lanaro, Storia dell’Italia repubblicana. L’economia, la politica, la cultura, la società dal
dopoguerra agli anni ’90 (Venezia: Marsilio, 1992), 364–386; Bruno Trentin, “L’autogoverno
nella fabbrica e nella società,” Mondoperaio 32 (1979): 109– 114.
 See the documents stored at Fondazione di Studi Storici Filippo Turati, Firenze, Fondo Mario
Zagari, serie 5: Affari Esteri, “Yougoslavie,” 31–03– 1973/09–10/1973.
 See Gino Giugni, Diritto sindacale (Bari, Cacucci editore, 1986), 45–46; Gian Primo Cella, Di-
visione del Lavoro e Iniziativa Operaia (Bari: De Donato, 1972).
 Silvio Pons, Berlinguer e la fine del comunismo (Torino: Einaudi, 2006).
 Giorgio Amendola, Antonio Gramsci nella vita culturale e politica italiana (Napoli: Guida Ed-
itori, 1978); Giorgio Napolitano, Intervista sul PCI (Roma-Bari: Laterza, 1976), 51–73.
 See Paolo Mattera, Storia del PSI 1892– 1994 (Roma: Carocci, 2010), 192– 196; G. David Gar-
son, “Models of Worker Self-Management,” 17.
 See Autogestione e lotta per il lavoro (Roma: Nuove Edizioni Operaie, 1976).
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labor contract regulating employees’ rights in FIAT (Fabbrica Italiana Automobili
Torino) “asserted unprecedented control affecting not only working terms and
conditions but also location of investments and the basic plan of production .
. . In general, the factory delegate system has brought about decentralised, de-
tailed negotiations for collective agreements of unprecedented scope.”⁶⁷
After the spectacular events of May 1968, self-management became a central
element in the political agenda of French unions and leftist parties. To seize
upon the issue of workers’ participation, the Government promoted a substantial
expansion in the contents of collective agreements, combined with a trend to-
wards “multi-industrial” bargaining at national level. This produced major
agreements on job security (1969), training (1972) and guaranteed income for em-
ployees over 60 years of age without employment (1972).⁶⁸ The Yugoslav model
echoed in French public debates on the issue of industrial democracy.⁶⁹ As noted
by the French Foreign Ministry in March 1972: “French public opinion follows
with sympathy the original experiment of Yugoslav socialism as some political
groups are particularly interested in the possibilities opened by self-manage-
ment”.⁷⁰ These milieus – which gained large visibility in France and abroad
after the strike at the LIP watch factory and the consequent attempt to install
a self-managed rule in the firm – encompassed in particular the representatives
of the French Socialist Party. The latter invoked a vision of “another society”
making continuous references to the models proposed by Yugoslavia and,
later, Algeria – a country which was emerging from France’s recent colonial
rule.⁷¹ Like in Italy, a prominent role was played by the country’s largest trade
unions, such as the communist Conféderation general du travail (CGT) and, in
 G. David Garson, “Models of Worker Self-Management.”
 Jacques Chazal, “La participation des travailleurs aux décisions dans l’entreprise en
France,” Revue syndicale suisse: organe de l’Union syndicale suisse 66 (1974): 326–333.
 Marie-Geneviève Dezès, “L’utopie réalisée: Les Modèles étrangers mythiques des autoges-
tionnaires français,” in Autogestion: La dernière utopie, ed. Frank Georgi (Paris, Publications
de la Sorbonne, 2003), 30–54. On French literature on self-management during the 1970s, see
also Pierre Rosanvallon, L’Age de l’autogestion (Paris, Le Seuil, 1976); Edomond Maire, Demain
l’autogestion (Paris: Seghers, 1976).
 “L’opinion publique française suit avec sympathie l’expérience originale du socialisme you-
goslave, certains milieux politiques s’intéressant particulièrement aux possibilités ouvertes par
le système de l’autogestion”. See Archives du Ministère des Affaires Étrangères, La Courneuve,
Europe 1971–1976, 3766, Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, Direction des Affaires Politiques,
Note, La France et la Yougoslavie, Paris, 24 March 1972.
 Stephen Bornstein and Keitha S. Fine, “Worker Control in France: Recent Political Develop-
ments,” Worker Self-Management in Industry, 152–191.
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particular, the Confédération française démocratique du travail (CFDT).⁷² The
CFDT played a particularly important role in proposing a system of socialisme au-
togestionnaire, which developed out of close contacts with representatives of Yu-
goslav trade unions which would continue throughout the 1970s.⁷³ The campaign
promoted by the CFDT was to shape the national debate on workers’ representa-
tion in enterprises. According to a Report published by the Sudreau Commission,
established in 1974 on the initiative of the French President Valéry Giscard d’E-
staing to cope with popular response to the unions’ platforms, a larger field of
application was to be left to collective bargaining. The governmental Centre
for the Coordination of Research on Self-Management (CICRA) played a strong
role of advocacy which echoed the general call by the Socialist Party, firstly
the opposition leader François Mitterrand, for self-management.⁷⁴
In the mid-1970s, debates on industrial democracy in Great Britain were in-
fluenced by extensive reforms in the field of workers’ participation in Europe,
particularly in Yugoslavia⁷⁵. The Employment Protection Bill, which came into
force on 31 January 1975 at the initiative of the Labour Party, envisaged the
right for trade unions to bring recognition disputes before a governmental au-
thority, the Conciliation and Arbitration Service, which could recommend recog-
nition by employers.⁷⁶ Within the Labour Party, debates on workers’ participa-
tion took the Yugoslav model into serious account. This is shown, for
example, by the role played by the Fabian Society – to which some of the Party’s
leading figures such as Harold Wilson and Roy Jenkins were politically close – in
favoring debates on self-management. As maintained by Jeremy Bray and Nich-
olas Falk in the periodical Fabian Tract:
Any discussion of workers’management is bound to take account of Yugoslav experience. It
is impossible to transplant institutions from one society to another, differing in history, cul-
ture, psychology, education, state of development and political system. But the Yugoslav
 Daniel Chauvey, Autogestion (Paris: Editions de Seuil, 1970).
 On the CFDT’s stance on self-managed enterprises, see Albert Detraz, Alfred Krumnov and
Edmond Maire, La CFDT et l’autogestion (Paris: Les Editions du Cerf, 1974); See also Archives
de la CFDT, Paris, CH/7/715, Relations entre la CFDT et la Confédération des Syndicats Yougo-
slaves, 1967– 1970.
 Albert Deutsch, “Researcher’s Guide,” 4. François Mitterrand’s support for self-management
was highlighted by Sicco Mansholt to Edvard Kardelj during the December 1973 meeting quoted
above.
 Derek C. Jones, “Worker Participation in Management in Britain: Evaluation, Current Devel-
opments, and Prospects,” in “Worker Self-Management in Industry,” 145.
 “Employment Protection Bill,” House of Commons Bill 119, 25 March 1975. See also “The Com-
munity and the Company.” Report of a Working Group of the Labour Party Industrial Policy Sub-
Committee, 1974.
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experience raises important questions, and has served as a focus for an increasing volume
of criticism and analysis of the economics of workers’ control.Workers’ management in Yu-
goslavia developed not as the application of an ideological blue-print, but as the practical
means of industrial development of a country with strong internal antagonisms and well
founded suspicions of central control, lacking an established industrial structure. This
makes it more remarkable as a politico-economic invention.⁷⁷
The developments described above constituted clear evidence of the increasing
governmental recognition of the inadequacy of industrial relations systems and
the need to avoid social confrontation. With hindsight, the increasing interven-
tion of the state in regulating industrial relations confirms that Mansholt’s praise
of the Yugoslav system of self-management described at the beginning of this
chapter was, in fact, not an isolated or exceptional attitude. In addition, Man-
sholt’s words were set within the context of a general debate which took place
at Community level about the problem of workers’ democracy in the early
1970s. The importance of social provisions in this field was officially confirmed
at the Conference of the Heads of State and Government held in October 1972 in
Paris. In its “Guidelines for a Social Action Programme,” presented to the Coun-
cil on 18 April 1973, the European Commission declared that improvements in liv-
ing and working conditions were the basic objectives of the Community.⁷⁸ Partic-
ipation and industrial democracy was one of the three priority themes of the
program. Indeed, one of the first effective decisions to be sponsored by the Man-
sholt Commission was the establishment of the European Foundation for the Im-
provement of Living and Working Conditions (EUROFOUND) in December 1973.⁷⁹
To draft its proposals in the sphere of labor, the Commission relied on a vast net-
work of academic experts, which the institution consulted regularly during inter-
national round tables and conferences. This is the case, for example, of the Con-
ference on Work Organisation, Technical Development and Motivation of the
Individual, held in Brussels on 5–7 November 1974. In these circumstances,
the Yugoslavia’s Workers Councils had been quoted and discussed as reference
points on the virtues of workers’ participation by several researchers, including
 Jeremy Bray and Nicholas Falk, “Towards a worker managed economy,” Fabian Tract 430
(1974): 1–30.
 Supplement 4/73 to the Bulletin of the European Communities, 1973. On the origins of the
Social Action Programme see Varsori, “Alle origini di un modello europeo,” 17–47; Jean De-
gimbe, La politique sociale européenne du Traité de Rome au Traité d’Amsterdam (Bruxelles: In-
stitut Syndicale Européen, 1999), 20.
 HAEU, BAC-COM(1973)2026, Création d’une fondation Européenne pour l’amélioration des
conditions de vie et de travail (Communication et proposition de la Commission au Conseil),
Bruxelles, 5 December 1973.
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Kenneth Walker of the IILS in Geneva.⁸⁰ In the following years, the European
Commission published a number of documents affirming the need to create a
Community discipline in the sphere of industrial democracy. On 12 May 1975,
the Commission also presented a proposal for a Council Regulation on the Stat-
ute for an envisaged “European Company” to regulate, for the first time, workers’
participation at European level.⁸¹ The Commission’s proposal included the crea-
tion of European “Work Councils,” representing all the employees of “European
Companies” with offices in various member states.⁸² A few months later, the
Commission also published a Green Paper on Employee Participation and Com-
pany Structure in the European Communities (the “Gundelach Report”), which
sought to give new impetus to the continuing debate on the decision-making
structures of industrial and commercial enterprises.⁸³ One year later, in 1976, a
European Commission Communication on the Humanisation of Work insisted
on the need to combat alienation in the workplace through the involvement of
workers in decision-making processes: “The reform of work organisation is a
continuing process, the full potential of which cannot be appreciated a priori,
given that, essentially, it implies by definition a genuine participation of the em-
ployees and an increase in the value of their contribution to the smooth running
of the enterprise.”⁸⁴
At Community level, the question of workers’ participation was to represent
a continual theme for discussion until the end of the decade, culminating in the
proposition of the “Vredeling Directive” in October 1980. However, the attempt
by the European Commission to harmonise rules concerning industrial relations
at European level were doomed to fail. The Council of Ministers of the EEC took
no decisive measures to create one single form of undertaking under company
law in Europe; on the contrary, at the time the Commission’s proposed “Statute”
met with severe criticism from employers’ associations and European trade un-
ions. Only in September 1994, after more than 20 years of debate, did the Council
 Archive of European Integration, University of Pittsburgh, (AEI), Commission of the Europe-
an Communities, Conference on Work Organisation, Technical Development and Motivation of
the Individual, Brussels, 5–7 November 1974, http://aei.pitt.edu/39679/1/A3935.pdf (Accessed
10 February 2018).
 Supplement 4/75 to the Bulletin of the European Commission, 1975.
 Jorn Pipkorn, “Employee Participation in the European Company.” Paper for the Internation-
al Conference on Trends in Industrial and Labour Relations, Montreal, Canada, 26 May 1976.
 HAEU, European Commission Green Paper on Employee Participation and Company Struc-
ture in the European Communities, COM(75)570.
 HAEU, Commission of the European Communities, Reform of the organisation of work (Hu-
manisation of Work), Communication from the Commission to the Council, COM(76) 253 final.,
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of Ministers adopt a Directive on the Establishment of a European Works Council
for the purposes of informing and consulting employees.⁸⁵
Indeed, the late 1970s witnessed a radical change in the models of socio-eco-
nomic relations in Western Europe, as the focus of policy-makers shifted from
industrial democracy to the fight against inflation and financial stability. At
the same time, with the only exception of Mitterrand’s first mandate as French
President, the 1980s witnessed a reduction in national interventionism, which
began in favor of greater liberalization of the economy, corresponding to the
entry on the international scene of Ronald Reagan in the United States and Mar-
garet Thatcher in the United Kingdom.⁸⁶ These international developments
meant the decline of the age of industrial democracy and the gradual removal
of this subject from the agenda of policy-makers. Such a political and cultural
shift was paralleled by the simultaneous waning of Yugoslavia as a model of eco-
nomic organization in Western European political debate, as the economic de-
cline undergone by the country in the late 1970s and the acceleration of centri-
fugal trends in the federation after the death of Tito in 1980 emphasized the
limitations of self-management.⁸⁷ In the early 1990s, the Yugoslav wars would
turn the Yugoslav “dream” into a “nightmare.”⁸⁸
In fact, the academic literature on “labor management” and Yugoslavia’s
role in it continued to flourish.⁸⁹ What was the reason for such persistence?
 On the Vredeling Directive, see Laurent Warlouzet, Governing Europe in a Globalizing World
(New York: Routledge, 2017), in particular Chapter 3; Francesco Petrini, “Demanding Democracy
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nationals,” in Societal Actors in European Integration. Polity-Building and Policy-making 1958–
1992, ed. Wolfram Kaiser and Jan-Henrik Meyer (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), 151– 172;
Jean-Jacques Danis and Reiner Hoffman, “From the Vredeling Directive to the European
Works Council Directive – some historical remarks,” Transfer: European Review of Labour and
Research 1 (1995): 180– 187; Michael Nelson, “The Vredeling Directive: The EEC’s Failed Attempt
to Regulate Multinational Enterprises and Organize Collective Bargaining,” New York Journal of
International Law and Politics 20 (1988): 967–992.
 See Richard Aldous, Reagan and Thatcher: The Difficult Relationship, (London: Hutchinson,
2012).
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 See, for example, Nadjan Pašić, Stanislav Grozdanić and Milorad Radević, Workers’ manage-
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versity Press, 1983); Chris Rojek and David Wilson, “Workers’ self-management in the world sys-
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The answer to this question is linked to the fact that the Yugoslav model was an
abstract reference used to construct theoretical models which, in the end, were
not tested in reality.⁹⁰ However, as shown in this chapter, Yugoslavia’s self-man-
agement became an Idealtypus which, although not claiming validity in terms of
correspondence with social reality, emerged as a reference point for the evolu-
tion of industrial relations in Western Europe.
Conclusion
In the late 1960s,Western Europe underwent a period of social and political tur-
moil which marked the end of the Trente glorieuses. To face social discontent,
Western European leaderships looked for new models of relations in the field
of labor: the idea of enhancing “labor management” was developed, in order
to improve democracy at industrial level and reduce workers’ alienation. Such
reformist zeal developed out of an intense period of academic and political de-
bate over the best way to reform industrial relations.Within this debate, the Yu-
goslav model of self-management featured prominently.Western European élites
at all levels – political, economic and academic – focused in particular on a sys-
tem of “self-management” based on direct participation of workers in the man-
agement of socially-owned enterprises. International organizations such as the
ILO and academic networks focusing on the Yugoslav model contributed towards
bringing the problem of “labor management” to the forefront of the political
agenda of Western European leaders, as demonstrated by the exponential rise
in state interventionism in the fields of manpower and industrial democracy. Al-
though the constitutive principles of self-management were not applied in West-
ern Europe, the Yugoslav experience frequently recurred in the political debate
which surrounded the introduction of such new normative measures.
This chapter concludes that the Yugoslav model taught Western Europe a
useful lesson, pointing to the “ideal” virtues of self-management planning in
order to improve industrial relations. The impact of Yugoslavia’s self-manage-
ment was therefore mainly theoretical: it favored debates on industrial democra-
cy and shaped Western European cultural and political zeitgeist of the early
1970s in the labor field. Yugoslavia represented a genuine “social laboratory”
where self-management could be tested and implemented. The fortune of the Yu-
 See Saul Estrin and Milica Uvalić, “From Illyria towards Capitalism: Did Labour-Management
Theory Teach Us Anything about Yugoslavia and Transition in its Successor States?,” Compara-
tive Economic Studies 50 (2008): 663–696.
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goslav-style managed economy was not linked to its performance – which retro-
spectively proved to be weak – but to the very fact that it proposed, at least in
theory, a new way of planning which refused at the same time the centralised
Soviet model and the indicative Western measures. However, as all theoretical
models it was affected by the evolution of debates on industrial democracy,
being overcome when the nouvelle vague of economic liberalism became the
new reference model in the Western world, and Yugoslavia, due to its internal
contradictions, foundered into its fatal crisis.





in the 1960s and 1970s¹
The first issue of the Czechoslovak management studies journal Modern manage-
ment (Moderní řízení) from March 1966 opened with an editorial stressing that
the introduction of more efficiently organized management in socialism required
the need “to know more.”² In the 1960s, the effort to establish the so-called “new
system of planned management of national economy” was a substantial part of
economic reform strategies. Czechoslovak economists and reform communists in
general shared the conviction that state-owned enterprises should have more in-
dependence in their decision-making and require more qualified and competent
management staff.³ Although a source of controversy among reformers was the
relationship between hierarchical managerialism and horizontal self-manage-
ment, all reform-oriented scholars and politicians accepted that a state socialist
economy suffered from the lack of efficient techniques of management and or-
ganization.⁴ In order “to know more” about planning and management, experts
from such diverse fields as sociology, economics or psychology developed quite
an extensive apparatus of expert knowledge production during the 1960s.
However, the Warsaw Pact invasion into Czechoslovakia in August 1968 and
the subsequent introduction of the consolidation regime substantially affected
this attempt to promote and implement up-to-date management techniques.
This field of expertize, which aimed to be among the flagships of reform commu-
nist social and economic innovations, transformed itself into an important part
 This chapter was researched and written with the support of the Czech Science Foundation
(GAČR) as a part of the project GJ15– 19437Y entitled “The Road to Technocratic Socialism: Con-
cepts of Governance in Czechoslovakia (1953– 1975)”.
 “Úvod,” Moderní řízení 1, no. 1 (1966): 1–2.
 For policy documents, see primarily “A resolution of the Central Committee of the CPC, con-
cerning the main trends in improving the planned management of the national economy from
January 29, 1965,” in Prameny k dějinám československé krize 1967– 1970, Vol. 10, Ekonomická re-
forma 1965– 1969, ed. Jitka Vondrová (Prague and Brno: Ústav pro soudobé dějiny AV ČR – Dopl-
něk, 2010), 25–35.
 For the controversy between proponents of managerialism and self-governance, see for exam-
ple Lubomír Mlčoch, “Symposium o podniku,” Politická ekonomie 17 (1969): 278–281, or Jaroslav
Vostatek, “Čtyři typy podniku a socialistické odměňování,” Politická ekonomie 17 (1969): 307–
321.
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of late socialist governance and aimed to reflect recent development of manage-
ment studies in the Eastern Bloc as well as in the West while conforming to the
political economy based on central planning, industrial production, authoritar-
ian governance and specific late socialist welfare policies. This chapter explores
how Czechoslovak experts discussed management and organization in the 1960s
and 1970s and how they situated their field of expertize in the broader context of
state socialist governance. The first part of this text explores the rise of manage-
ment studies in the 1960s as a part of market-based reform policies. In the sec-
ond part I will address the specific topic of social planning. As I will show below
in more detail, late socialist social planning was a specific planning project
aimed at expanding planning activities from the economic to the social sphere.
According to the promoters of social planning, the industrial economy of “ad-
vanced socialism” had resources to further develop socialist society by means
of sophisticated and detailed planning methods. The idea was that in socialism
the society, including its culture and beliefs, should be planned according to
fixed goals and targets. The central unit of social planning was industrial enter-
prise which was in charge to apply social planning to its employees, their fam-
ilies and surrounding towns and regions. Since the early 1970s management
studies were in charge to invent and promote management techniques conform-
ing to the welfare obligations of socialist firms. It thus mirrored the technocratic
and authoritarian aspects of late socialism and simultaneously posed a serious
challenge to managerial thought. Moreover, this concept of planning seemed to
be tailored to the specific conditions of post-1968 Czechoslovakia when the strug-
gle for the economic efficiency of socialist industrialism was closely interwoven
with the effort to achieve social and political stability by means of welfare pol-
icies and hierarchical planning. This text analyzes two subsequent stages in the
history of management studies in Czechoslovakia and covers the transition be-
tween two distinct forms of managerial thought – from the entrepreneurial dis-
course of the market-oriented reform towards renewed emphasis on central plan-
ning after 1968. The aim of this chapter is to discuss how this particular expert
community responded to political and socio-economic challenges of the time
and which roles the expertize dealing with the relationship between manage-
ment and planning played in this development.
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Management Studies in socialist Czechoslovakia
as a subject of historiographic research
The potential for analyzing concepts elaborated by management studies scholars
as a means to enable the study of governmental rationality behind particular po-
litical and economic regimes was successfully demonstrated by Luc Boltanski
and Eve Chiapello⁵, who studied managerial literature not as texts depicting
the reality of how capitalist enterprises functioned but as works aiming to formu-
late normative concepts of organization and decision-making. Management stud-
ies literature is, according to them, of a primarily prescriptive nature, frequently
relying on morally based arguments and thus “one of the main vehicles for the
diffusion and popularization of normative models in the world of enterprise.”⁶
Given the pivotal role of industrial production for the functioning of modern so-
cieties, texts on management may be used as a source of knowledge about much
more general ideas of economic order, organization of production and economic
efficiency in the era of high modernity.
Managerial literature thus does not focus on the actual functioning of an en-
terprise but rather strives to describe what an ideal organization and process of
decision-making should look like and what the channels to achieve such a goal
are. Therefore, it is a significant source for studying the rationality of organiza-
tions and decision-making. In spite of the fact that Boltanski and Chiapello char-
acterize thought on management as an intellectual production typical for capi-
talism and capitalist thinking on economy and labor, study of the texts that
arose in the context of Czechoslovak management studies shows that this type
of source could also be used to study how the “spirit of socialism” was trans-
forming. The Czechoslovak management science, just like its Western counter-
part, strived to create normative concepts of rational organization. The intended
result was the establishment of more a sophisticated organizational culture, as
well as the development of the education of managers, which was meant to
focus not only on deepening their expert skills but also on cultivating their
daily work habits and life-style. Management studies, termed in the Czech lan-
guage of the time teorie řízení (theory of management), studied a wide range
of topics and offered a comprehensive picture of the organizational rationality
of the socialist economy. In addition, this field of expertize had a distinct critical
potential. Given the very narrowly defined target group of professional recipients
 Luc Boltanski and Eve Chiapello, The New Spirit of Capitalism (London: Verso, 2007), 57–62.
 Ibid., 58.
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this literature focused on and the strong orientation on the practical use of
knowledge in managerial praxis, management studies provided a relatively crit-
ical image of the issues faced by Czechoslovak managers confronting the bleak
reality of a centrally planned economy.
Any exploration of management studies in Czechoslovakia of the 1960s and
1970s should reflect the longer historical continuities of scientific management
in state socialism. The idea of using contemporary scientific knowledge for the
organization of work and production already resonated before World War One
in the milieu of Russian social democracy and also appealed, for a long period,
to Lenin and Trotsky.⁷ The interest in management was apparent during the Rus-
sian civil war when the emerging Soviet state strived to tackle growing issues re-
lated to industrial production. In the course of time, an age-long controversy
flared up over the relationship between scientific management and socialism,
which was connected both with the issue of decision-making authority in a na-
tionalized economy and with the power struggles buffeting the Soviet state
throughout the 1920s. Issues such as the bureaucratization of the regime, estab-
lishment of the rationalization movement, the role of workers’ self-management
bodies, education of managerial staff, the power of managing directors or the ex-
tent to which capitalist methods of management could be adopted belonged to
the central points of controversy in Soviet debates. In spite of the fact that sci-
entific management had numerous opponents and practical application of the
management methods met with considerable resistance, in the second half of
the 1920s the Soviet Union had the third biggest base for research on scientific
management after the USA and Germany.⁸
In the course of the 1930s, Soviet studies of scientific management were al-
most destroyed by Stalin’s assault on bureaucracy and the so-called bourgeois
specialists. The rejection of scientific management was connected to an econom-
ic policy focused on extreme increases in the volume of industrial production, a
mobilizatory approach to management and a tightening of work discipline. As
was the case with other Stalinist campaigns, the destruction of Soviet manage-
ment studies had its roots not only in power struggles but also in the political
and economic theory of Stalinist Marxism–Leninism. In particular, Mark Beis-
singer points out the adoration of the “school of life” with its emphasis on the
acquisition of management skills not just by way of acquiring expert knowledge
but through gaining practical experience on a daily basis by taking active part in
 Mark Beissinger, Scientific Management, Socialist Discipline, and Soviet Power (Cambridge,
Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1988), 20–58.
 Ibid., 59.
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the building of socialism. The emphasis on the immediate performance and mo-
bilization of all available resources completely outweighed the need to introduce
organizational and decision-making methods on the basis of findings by interna-
tional management science.⁹
Although Stalinist industrialization could boast impressive indicators of
economic growth, fascinating to a good many Western observers, its characteris-
tic feature was also the persistent failure of central planning and its striking in-
efficiency.¹⁰ The crisis of state socialist regimes in the mid-1950s thus opened the
issue of change in the organization of production and the seeking of alternatives
to the Stalinist approach to management. Soviet authorities began prioritizing
management efficiency at the expense of simple extensive enhancement of the
volume of production.¹¹ The rediscovery of scientific management was, however,
no return to the management science of the 1920s. The field of cybernetics,which
had been dismissed as a “bourgeois science” during the period of Stalinism,
played a key role in this development as the fittest instrument for implementing
the reforms leading to decentralization and to the consequent higher perform-
ance of the Soviet economy. By focusing on the interaction of systems and infor-
mation, cybernetics not only provided a new perspective on the issue of efficient
management but also a new language for discussing these issues and writing
about them. Soviet authors thus emphasized the significance of “optimal plan-
ning and control” as a central motif of post-Stalinist reforms.¹²
Representatives of the so-called economic cybernetics viewed the economy
as a centralized system which could be managed and controlled by means of
mathematical methods, computer technology and tools provided by the manage-
ment studies of the time. The “optimal planning” theory proclaimed that com-
puters can simulate a “quasi-market” and provide all the information needed
for the efficient management of the socialist economy.¹³ State socialism seemed
to be a political regime that enabled the full application of the cybernetic ap-
proach to the management of the economy – more than capitalism, which, on
the one hand, was making great use of economic planning and of state regula-
tions, but on the other hand also had to respect the particular interests of private
 Ibid., 150.
 Stephen Kotkin, “Modern Times: The Soviet Union and the Interwar Conjuncture,” Kritika:
Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History 2 (2001): 111– 164.
 Beissinger, Scientific Management, 160.
 Slava Gerovitch, From Newspeak to Cyberspeak: History of Soviet Cybernetics (Cambridge,
Mass.: The MIT Press, 2002), 256.
 Ibid., 270 and 274–275.
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owners.¹⁴ Cybernetics also emphasized the significance of feedback which ena-
bled the self-management of individual system components and the achieve-
ment of economic efficiency by way of decentralization and technical progress.
As such, it had significant reforming potential.¹⁵
The approach to management changed considerably at the turn of the 1960s
and the 1970s when the Soviet Union and several Eastern Bloc countries such as
Czechoslovakia saw a turn away from reforming efforts to the gradual establish-
ment of consolidation regimes. The renewed emphasis on centralization and on
a strictly hierarchical organization of economic and political life had a consider-
able impact on cybernetics and research on scientific management, too. As
pointed out by Slava Gerovitch, with the end of the reforms cybernetics was
transformed from the tool of reform to the “pillar of the status quo.”¹⁶ The
ideas of “optimal planning” and of managing the economy by means of automa-
tion and extensive introduction of computer technologies now helped to rein-
force central planning even more.¹⁷ Management studies met a similar fate. Start-
ing from the late 1960s, this expertize aimed to bring “rationalization without
reform” – enabling an increasing efficiency in the socialist economy without
the necessity of introducing decentralization reforms relying on the deeper au-
tonomy of enterprises and the introduction of the market.¹⁸
 Ibid., 271. For the history of the information network project designed by Soviet cyberneti-
cians, see Benjamin Peters, How Not to Network a Nation: The Uneasy History of the Soviet Inter-
net (Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 2016). For the relationship between cybernetics and Soviet
mathematical economics, see Adam Leeds, “Dreams in Cybernetic Fugue: Cold War Technos-
cience, the Intelligentsia, and the Birth of Soviet Mathematical Economics,” Historical Studies
in the Natural Sciences 46 (2016): 633–668 and Ivan Boldyrev and Olessia Kirtchik, “The Cultures
of ‘Mathematical Economics’ in the Postwar Soviet Union: More than a Method, Less than a Dis-
cipline,” Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, Part A 63 (2017): 1– 10. For the attempt to
establish a cybernetic system of economic governance in Chile under Salvator Allende, see Eden
Medina, Cybernetic Revolutionaries: Technology and Politics in Allende’s Chile (Cambridge, Mass.:
The MIT Press, 2011).
 For the analysis of cybernetics as a part of liberalization policies in the Eastern Bloc coun-
tries, see Egle Rindzeviciute, The Power of Systems: How Policy Sciences Opened Up the Cold War
World (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2016) and Peter C. Caldwell, Dictatorship, State Planning,
and Social Theory in the German Democratic Republic (New York: Cambridge University Press,
2003).
 Gerovitch, From Newspeak to Cyberspeak, 279.
 Pekka Sutela, Economic Thought and Economic Reform in the Soviet Union (Cambridge, UK:
Cambridge University Press, 1991), and Philip Hanson, The Rise and Fall of Soviet Economy: An
Economic History of the USSR from 1945 (London and New York, Routledge 2014).
 Beissinger, Scientific Management, 182 and 185.
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In search of socialist manager:
Czechoslovak management studies in the 1960s
The post-Stalinist vision of the “scientization” of governance by way of techno-
logical and scientific progress was a suitable intellectual framework for the un-
precedented boom in management studies in Czechoslovakia. Instead of the re-
storation of the interwar tradition based on Taylorism and related concepts,
Czechoslovak scholars of industrial organization established their field on the
knowledge borrowed from both Eastern and Western cybernetics, organizational
science, and economics.¹⁹ The CPC leadership reflected this shift in its policy
strategies. The resolution of the CPC’s June 1956 national conference paid a
great deal of attention to the issues of organization and management of the Cze-
choslovak economy by way of its decentralization.²⁰ If “rigid centralization in
management and planning played its role” in the first stage of the socialist con-
struction, the era of advanced socialism required a different organizational cul-
ture. According to Party authorities, the economy was supposed to rely on the
“perfection of planning and management” leading to the growth of labor pro-
ductivity, “the maximum extent of introducing and using top technologies”
and “the maximum extent of economic efficiency.”²¹
Experts focused on the organization of production connected the issue of de-
centralization with the emphasis on decision-making flexibility and the growth
of managers’ expert skills. They saw a close connection between the greater ef-
ficiency of economy and the expertization of management at all levels of the eco-
nomic hierarchy. Josef Štěpán, deputy minister of heavy industry, stressed that
economic ministries had to be organized as a “small and flexible management
apparatus” that would, within the “maximum decentralization of management,”
transfer a range of decision-making powers to “comprehensively constructed en-
terprises” and their managing directors. The condition for the fundamental reor-
 For the scientific management expertize in interwar Czechoslovakia, see Jan Janko and Emi-
lie Těšínská, Technokracie v českých zemích (1900– 1950) (Prague: Archiv Akademie věd České
republiky, 1999); Otto Smrček, “Vědecká organizace práce a její aplikace ve strojírenství do
konce druhé světové války,” Hospodářské dějiny 13 (1985): 165–223, and Jan Janko, “Technokra-
tické tendence v českých zemích,” in Studie z dějin techniky 25: Postátňování, profesionalizace a
mecenášství ve vědě českých zemí 1860– 1945, ed. Jan Janko (Prague: Institut základů vzdělanosti
UK, 1996), 25–56.
 Celostátní konference Komunistické strany Československa. Zvláštní číslo Nové mysli, červen
1956 (Prague: Rudé právo – vydavatelství Ústředního výboru KSČ, 1956), 246–272.
 Ibid., 248.
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ganization of management was to be a systematic education of all decision-mak-
ers to achieve “increased independence and increased responsibility.” Only pro-
fessionally skilled and sufficiently flexible managers could make use of the key
components of the new approach to management, i.e. “new equipment,” “ad-
vanced technology” and “correct organizational methods” enabling “more eco-
nomical production.”²² Construction of a more independent, more flexible and
professionally more skilled management apparatus was crucial for the imple-
mentation of the most important objective in the upcoming stage of building so-
cialism, i.e. in exceeding capitalism in economic productivity and the living
standard of the population.
The first more significant works on management were published in the late
1950s and focused on automation, cybernetics and computer technologies. Ar-
nošt Kolman, philosopher and leading Marxist-Leninist theoretician, praised cy-
bernetics as a science of the future which was opening new horizons to theoret-
ical thinking on organization and systems, and was promising to achieve a vast
range of application not only in the field of management but also in medicine,
biology, sociology or philosophy.²³ Automation and computers roused an interest
on the part of authors specialized in applying technology in industrial produc-
tion. Jan Auerhan’s and Miroslav Stibic’s books on the automation and use of
computers in administration were the first fundamental domestic works to rely
on detailed knowledge of the issues in question, and also sought to achieve
the objective of the practical use of new technology.²⁴ The same period also
saw the initiation of the discussion about the use of psychology in manage-
ment.²⁵ Authors also explored organizational culture in Czechoslovak industry
including, for example, Jan Prošek, a factory manager with day-to-day manage-
 Josef Štěpán, “V řízení a organisaci uvádět v život usnesení celostání konference KSČ,” Pod-
niková organisace 11 (1957): 1–3.
 Arnošt Kolman, Kybernetika: O strojích vykonávajících některé duševní funkce člověka (Pra-
gue: SNPL, 1957). For the other important Czechoslovak texts on cybernetics published in the
late 1950s, see Josef Metelka, Kybernetika – myslící stroje (Prague: Orbis, 1957), and Š. Figar, V.
Ruml, and A. Špaček, “Problémy kybernetiky,” Nová mysl 11 (1957): 448–463.
 Jan Auerhan, Automatizace a její ekonomický význam (Prague: SNPL, 1959); Vladimír Stibic,
Od mechanisace k automatisaci administrativních prací (Prague: Státní nakladatelství technické
literatury, 1959).
 For the early argument for the introduction of psychology in management expertise, see “Z
resoluce konference československých psychologů,” Podniková organizace 12 (1958): 63–63 and
Jan Raiskup, “Více psychologie do kádrové práce,” Podniková organizace 12 (1958): 143– 144.
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rial experience,who was among those attempting to write the first business man-
agement manuals.²⁶
The 1960s saw further developments in management studies towards it be-
coming an independent field of expertize. Czechoslovak reform communists at-
tempted to introduce policies enabling the elimination of pervasive malfunctions
and incompetence in different layers of governance. They saw the sphere of eco-
nomic planning and management as affected to an extraordinary degree by the
unintended consequences of socialist construction, most importantly due to re-
current problems with coordination and the efficiency of central planning. Al-
though reform-oriented economists like Ota Šik or Karel Kouba saw that encour-
aging more independently acting business enterprises and establishing a
balanced relationship between plan and market as a backbone of economic re-
form, the task to resolve the problem of “cadres” and their functioning in the or-
ganization and control of production was an inseparable part of the reform agen-
da. In 1964 the Czechoslovak Central Control and Statistics Office (the so-called
Central Commission of People’s Control and Statistics) produced a report for the
Communist Party Central Committee’s Economic Commission describing Czecho-
slovak managers as usually undereducated and thus not properly prepared to
work in a reformed economy.²⁷ This report posed the question of whether they
were capable of mastering more sophisticated techniques of management and
planning, and to what extent they could handle greater independence in deci-
sion-making.
As a consequence of the reformist attempts to cope with these problems, the
institutional network of Czechoslovak management studies became quite devel-
oped in the second half of the 1960s and covered a wide range of activities from
academic research to more practically oriented expertize focused on manage-
ment in individual branches of the Czechoslovak economy, the development of
computer technology, or the building of an information infrastructure to deal
with the data necessary for mastering a complex economic reality. The higher
learning institutions, the institutes of the Czechoslovak Academy of Sciences,
 Jan Prošek, Ze zkušeností podnikového ředitele (Prague: SNTL, 1957). Prošek was harshly criti-
cized in the Party journal Život strany (The Life of the Party) which characterized his book as an
anti-Party statement and “harmful book.” See “O jedné škodlivé knížce,” Život strany 5 (1958):
299–301.
 National Archives in Prague, Ekonomická komise ÚV KSČ 1963– 1968, sv. 2, a.j. 6, bod 4, Roz-
bor kvalifikace vedoucích hospodářských pracovníků. For the early critique of management in-
efficiency, see the 1957 report for Czechoslovak Politburo called “Principles of Increasing the In-
dustrial Management Efficiency” in National Archives in Prague, Politické byro ÚV KSČ 1954–
1962, sv. 144, a.j. 190–191, bod 12, Zásady zvýšení ekonomické účinnosti řízení průmyslu.
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or even the research unit at the Party School of Higher Learning at the Central
Committee of the Communist Party covered issues like management and indus-
trial organization.²⁸ In 1965 the Czechoslovak government established the Insti-
tute of Management, a specialized institution concerned with research, consul-
tancy and the education of managers.²⁹ The founder and first director of this
institution was Jaroslav Jirásek, the most prominent Czechoslovak management
studies scholar, who attempted enthusiastically to disseminate the most up-to-
date knowledge about management, organization and decision-making bor-
rowed predominantly from Western literature. Aside from the publication of nu-
merous books and booklets the institute also issued two journals which publish-
ed original as well as translated materials.³⁰ However, the most important task of
the Institute of Management was the organization of various courses and lec-
tures for managers.³¹
In the 1960s management studies included research in the fields of cybernet-
ics, economics, industrial sociology, psychology, the study of industrial organiza-
tion as well as practically oriented consultancy activities. Theoretical research
into the prerequisites for efficient management showed the significant role of cy-
bernetics,³² but management science primarily addressed managerial praxis in
 “Československé instituce zabývající se řízením,” Moderní řízení 1, no. 1 (1966): 89–92; “Čes-
koslovenské instituce zabývající se řízením – pokračování,” Moderní řízení 1, no. 2 (1966):
90–92; “Československé instituce zabývající se řízením – pokračování,” Moderní řízení 1,
no. 3 (1966): 91–92; “Československé instituce zabývající se řízením,” Moderní řízení 1, no. 6
(1966): 90–92.
 The Institute of Management was founded on the basis of the decree of 28 July 1965 issued
by the Czechoslovak government and became operative in the autumn of that year. It consisted
of an expert institution, the so-called Institute for Research and Rationalization of Management,
and an education facility called the Centre for Education of Managerial Staff. See, National Ar-
chives in Prague, Institut řízení, Informační zpráva o Institutu řízení (Návrh zprávy pro sekretar-
iát nebo předsednicvo ÚV KSČ a předsednictvo vlády ČSSR k projednání v řídícím výboru dne 14.
října 1965) and Poslání, pracovní náplň a způsob práce institutu řízení (Výpis z důvodové zprávy
k vládnímu usnesení č. 362 ze dne 28. července 1965)
 The Institute of Management published two journals: Moderní řízení (Modern Management)
and Organizace a řízení (Organization and management).
 “Úvod – Patnáct let Institutu řízení,” Moderní řízení 14, no. 11 (1980): 5– 10.
 The most important theoretical contribution was focused on the theory of information. See
Pavel Pelikán, Člověk a informace (studie o člověku a jeho způsobech zacházení se zprávami) (Pra-
gue: Svoboda, 1967). Pelikán was a visiting scholar at the Centre Européen Universitaire in
Nancy in 1964 and 1965 and was a collaborator of Jacob Marschak and Thomas Marschak. He
was also a visiting fellow at the University of California in Berkeley and Carnegie-Mellon Univer-
sity in Pittsburgh between 1967 and 1969. The outcomes of his research were published in French
as Pavel Pelikán, Homo informationicus: réflexions sur l’homme et l’informatique (Nancy: Centre
européen universitaire, 1967).
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industry. Authors such as Jaroslav Kohout, who became the most important Cze-
choslovak scholar in the field of industrial sociology, discussed the direct appli-
cation of sociology and psychology in management as a tool of social analysis on
the shop-floor, or as a technology enabling the efficient organization of employ-
ees.³³ The more technically-oriented literature covered the organization of daily
operations in industrial enterprises and elaborated detailed organizational blue-
prints and models usable in managerial praxis.³⁴ Czechoslovak authors also dis-
cussed marketing, public relations, human resources management, advertise-
ment or quality management.³⁵ In addition, management studies investigated
personal conduct of managers from the organization of meetings and office
work to life-style and work as well as personal habits.³⁶ The authors of these
self-help manuals, most prominently Karel Pavelka, attempted to create a social-
ist manager as a specific professional identity characterized by particular com-
petencies, professional values and personal qualities.
It was thus not surprising that Czechoslovak management studies discussed
issues related to specific aspects of management in state socialist countries like
planning, forecasting, using computers in central planning, or economic reform.
However, the reception of Western knowledge, mostly from the USA,West Germa-
ny, France and the United Kingdom was extensive. The experts like Jirásek and
many others attempted to actively promote these concepts and to present capital-
ist managerial thought as an example of well-developed expertize contributing
to efficient organization and decision-making both in capitalism and socialism.
They flooded Czechoslovak journals with translations from Western publications
of different sorts, from theoretical texts to more popular accounts.³⁷ Apart from
the Institute of Management, the management studies department at the Party
School of Higher Learning contributed significantly to the dissemination of West-
ern knowledge, most importantly from fields like systems analysis or game theo-
 Jaroslav Kohout, Sociologie a řízení ekonomiky (Prague: Práce, 1967).
 Jiří Řezníček, Vědecká organizace řídící práce: Vybrané kapitoly (Prague: NPL, 1965).
 TheModerní řízení journal published special issues dedicated to marketing and management
of quality. Issues like advertisement, design and human resources management were covered by
this journal as well. For the public relations literature, see Ladislav Hájek, Public Relations: Pod-
nik a veřejnost (Hradec Králové: Institut pro sociální analýzu, 1970).
 Karel Pavelka, Jak lépe řídit (Prague: Svoboda, 1970); Karel Pavelka, Jak lépe rozhodovat (Pra-
gue: Svoboda, 1970); Karel Pavelka, Vedoucí a kolektiv (Prague: Svoboda, 1970); Ladislav Svatuš-
ka, Vedoucí potřebuje informace (Prague: Svoboda, 1971).
 Apart from the rich publication activity of the Institute of Management journals it is primar-
ily the Czech translations of Peter F. Drucker published in 1968 or 1970 that are worth mention-
ing. See Peter F. Drucker, Podnikové řízení a hospodářské výsledky (Prague: Svoboda, 1968); Peter
F. Drucker, Výkonný vedoucí (Prague: Institut řízení, 1970).
Managing Socialist Industrialism 247
ry.³⁸ Czechoslovak experts also had direct experience of Western research on
management thanks to visits by Western scholars to Czechoslovakia or fellow-
ships and research trips to capitalist countries.³⁹ An example of the latter is pro-
vided by Stanislav Vácha, an economist, novelist, and management studies
scholar with personal experience of being a factory manager, who was visiting
fellow at Harvard University in 1969/1970 and authored a book about the organ-
ization of industrial enterprises in the context of capitalism.⁴⁰ Like Vácha, the
economist Lubomír Mlčoch also carried out extensive research on Western theo-
ries of firm. His extensive introduction to the theory of firms under capitalism
was among the most important contributions to the highly topical Czechoslovak
debate about the relationship between enterprise organization and economic ef-
ficiency.⁴¹ It is possible to characterize this patient observation of Western man-
agement as a critical fascination with the ability of capitalism to achieve efficien-
cy by the introduction of various innovations in the spheres of control,
organization and decision-making.⁴²
This rapid development of Czechoslovak management studies, which was
connected to the rise of socialist managerialism, also mirrored a more general
trend closely connected to market-oriented economic reform. Such ideas as
more independent enterprises and the introduction of the market to the socialist
economy meant that a new type of manager was required. The thought that the
objective of economic reform would also consist of the development of entrepre-
neurship in the socialist economy resonated not only in the milieu of manage-
ment science but also at the highest political level. In November 1968, the Cze-
choslovak government debated the “Act on Socialist Enterprise” and the “Act on
 The Party School of Higher Learning published several edited volumes composed of trans-
lations from various fields of research related to management and organization, for example cy-
bernetics, system analysis or game theory. See for example Texty ke studiu teorie řízení. Řada:
Modely konfliktních situací. Část 2., Teorie her a zkoumání sociálního jednání 1 (Prague: Vysoká
škola politická Ústředního výboru KSČ – Katedra teorie řízení, 1967), or Texty ke studiu teorie
řízení. Řada: Aplikace kybernetiky ve společenských vědách. Část 1., Kybernetika a ekonomie (Pra-
gue: Vysoká škola politická ÚV KSČ – Katedra teorie řízení, 1966).
 For the visits by Western scholars to Czechoslovakia, see for example “Jak má pracovat řed-
itel?,” Moderní řízení 3, no. 4 (1968): 16– 18. For the transnational communication between East
and West in the field of management studies, see Sandrine Kott’s chapter in this volume.
 Stanislav Vácha, Moderní kapitalistický podnik a jeho cíl (Prague: Svoboda, 1970).
 Lubomír Mlčoch, Teorie firmy (Prague: Ekonomický ústav ČSAV, 1970).
 This close observation of capitalism was even highlighted by attempts to search for inspira-
tion in the Czechoslovak capitalist past, for example by the reserved appraisal of the most im-
portant example of domestic interwar Fordism, the so-called Baťa management system. See Mir-
oslav Stříteský, Řízení – zvláštní profese (Prague: Svoboda, 1970), 66.
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Conditions of Entrepreneurship,” the goal of this legislation being to create new
“economic conditions” in which enterprises would be transformed “from mere
objects of administration into active entities behaving in an entrepreneurial fash-
ion and making decisions based on their own impetuses.”⁴³ It meant that a man-
ager primarily had to be a socialist entrepreneur rather than a person responsi-
ble simply for the fulfillment of hierarchically imposed plans. The reform was
aimed at connecting “expert and professional management with the growing
democratism of the society” and achieving a situation in which “the entrepre-
neurial and management system exceeds the level of European entrepreneurship
and managerialism.”⁴⁴ The socialist entrepreneurship was a path to both individ-
uals’ and work collectives’ self-fulfillment in a manner that enabled “each work-
er’s work and life to correlate” in accordance with the motto “one should be able
to live in line with the way they work.”⁴⁵ Developing entrepreneurship not only
required a thorough rebuilding of the organizational structure of enterprises but
also an overall change in the approach to managerial work. A managing director
acting as a socialist entrepreneur had to pay more attention to marketing and
public relations, follow international markets and be in the picture regarding
the field of the latest technological innovations. At the same time, an important
part of his activities was to work with his subordinates, which was supposed to
focus on their motivation, development of skills and the further education of em-
ployees in general.⁴⁶ A socialist entrepreneur was a completely different type of
manager than the former managing director of a nationalized enterprise, whose
primary goal was to obediently fulfill the instructions provided by central plan-
ning institutions. The 1960s economic reforms gave birth to a new socialist man-
ager, one capable, by means of modern management science, of running a bui-
ness in a manner that enabled it to succeed in the competitive environment of
domestic and international markets.
 See “Informativní zpráva o stavu a dalším postupu prací na právní úpravě postavení, úlohy a
řízení socialistického podniku a podmínek podnikatelské činnosti, Příloha č. 2: Hlavní principy
postavení a řízení socialistického podniku, 19. listopadu 1968,” in Vondrová, Prameny k dějinám
československé krize 1967– 1970, Vol. 10, 353.
 “Úvod,” Moderní řízení 3, no. 7 (1968): 5.
 Ibid.
 This characteristics of “socialist entrepreneurialism” is based on V. Fencl, “Koncepce podni-
kání, řízení a organizace podniků,” Moderní řízení 3, no. 7 (1968): 35–38. See also “Rozhovor o
družstevním podnikání,” Moderní řízení 4, no. 3 (1969): 7– 11; Jaroslav Schulz, “Klíč k podnikání
je v personální politice,” Moderní řízení 4, no. 3 (1969): 14– 16; Miloslav Benda, “Vnitropodniko-
vé řízení a podnikatelská funkce,” Moderní řízení 4, no. 4 (1969): 47–51; “Rozhovor o podniku,
který podniká,” Moderní řízení 4, no. 6 (1969): 7– 15.
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Consolidation as control of social and economic
development: Management expertize after 1968
After 1968, when the Prague Spring political project collapsed, the subsequent
rapid refusal of market-oriented reforms and a return to central-planning
posed a serious challenge to all expert projects focused on economic gover-
nance. In order to cope with the now denounced legacy of reform communism,
management studies pundits reinvented their field in accordance with politics
calling for the reestablishment of centralized Party control and a Marxist-Lenin-
ist ideological monopoly. It led to attempts to formulate a new theoretical frame-
work of management studies enabling them to emphasize the importance of this
field to the more authoritarian regime.
Czechoslovak management studies managed to adapt to the new political
conditions in spite of the fact that the ideological campaign accompanying the
onset of the consolidation regime also found the roots of the criticized revision-
ism in the reception of knowledge originating from capitalist countries. It was
thus necessary to defend the significance of management science for the new
economic policy and also to prove that it was possible to adopt Western manage-
ment techniques to make them usable under the conditions of central planning.
The policy statements formulating consolidation strategies of management stud-
ies viewed the Prague Spring as a period of political chaos enabling the introduc-
tion of irresponsible and ultimately unsuccessful economic experiments. Howev-
er, the crisis could not be left behind by returning to the outdated centralism of
the Stalinist period.⁴⁷ The programmatic texts of “consolidated” management
studies, mostly anonymous editorials published in the journal Moderní řízení,
called for a renewal of discipline, order and authority in organizing economic
life by means of a deeper interest in the theory and praxis of central planning
and respecting the “leading role” of the Party. The intention was also to further
develop research into the latest management techniques, ones based both on so-
cialist and capitalist experience, but with respect to the decisive role of the plan
and the Party in the socialist economy.⁴⁸
 “Úvod,” Moderní řízení 4, no. 10 (1969): 5–8; “Rozhovor o plánování a řízení československé
ekonomiky,” Moderní řízení 5, no. 1 (1970): 7– 13.
 “Úvod,” Moderní řízení 5, no. 1 (1970): 5–6; “Úvod,” Moderní řízení 5, no. 2 (1970): 5–6;
“Úvod,” Moderní řízení 5, no. 5 (1970): 5–6.
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This authoritative turn was legitimized ideologically as a return to the “Len-
inist approach” to management.⁴⁹ Czechoslovak experts referred to the Soviet
tradition of scientific management and stressed the need to develop a specifical-
ly socialist managerialism.⁵⁰ As the Institute of Management outlined in its early
1970 statement on the new approach to management studies, it was necessary to
keep cultivating Czechoslovak managers’ skills “while learning both from friends
and foes” but also to respect the ideological framework of Marxism–Leninism
and to refuse “such circumstances of managerialism which spring from Western
managers’ class status when controlling the capitalist economy and from the
class composition of the capitalist society.”⁵¹ In accordance with an ongoing
campaign against “revisionism,” management studies scholars refused reform
communists’ ideas and introduced forecasting, management and planning meth-
ods elaborated in other state socialist countries in their field more extensively
than before 1968. However, these authors did not deny the importance of West-
ern knowledge and capitalist techniques of management and organization. They
framed the idea of efficient economic organization using the primacy of central
planning and hierarchical control of the economy. As a consequence, the aim of
management studies was to connect certain methods borrowed from Western au-
thors and observed in capitalist managerial praxis with advanced concepts of
planning and organization tailored exclusively for socialist economies.
The most important change in the conceptualization of management after
1968, one which was also a specific product of socialist management science,
was the strong reception for social planning. Since the early 1970s, Czechoslovak
industrial sociologists, most prominently Jaroslav Kohout and his colleagues
from the sociology and psychology department at the Higher School of Econom-
ics in Prague, promoted social planning as a tool that enabled the coordinated
development of welfare to be pursued in accordance with the objectives of cen-
tral economic planning. This concept of social planning differed fundamentally
from projects under a similar name developed in the context of the Keynesian
welfare state.⁵² It offered a new conceptualization of the relationship between in-
 This emphasis on “Leninism” was extraordinarily present in the writing of authors based on
the Party School of Higher Learning about necessary changes in the management of human re-
sources. See, for example, Karel Kovář, Miloš Hendl, and Karel Fryč, “Obnova leninských zásad
kádrové práce,” Moderní řízení 6, no. 11 (1971): 5– 12, Moderní řízení 6, no. 12 (1971): 5– 11.
 František Machát, “V. I. Lenin a řízení,” Moderní řízení 5, no. 3 (1970): 15–20.
 “Co znamená “manažerství” v našem pojetí?,” Moderní řízení 5, no. 1 (1970): 31.
 For the issue of social planning from the transnational perspective, see Valeska Huber, “In-
troduction: Global Histories of Social Planning,” Journal of Contemporary History 52 (2017): 3–15.
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dustrial production, management and welfare in state socialism that was distinct
from a Stalinist emphasis on mobilizing a workforce based on charismatic lead-
ership and personal sacrifice as well as from reform communists’ experimenta-
tion with the market, entrepreneurship, self-government and decentralization.
The idea of social planning was initially discussed at the 23rd Congress of the
Communist Party of the Soviet Union in 1966, where the Leningrad delegation
proposed organizing social planning in Leningrad’s industrial enterprises and
the Council of Ministers’ Chairman Alexei Kosygin highlighted the necessity of
introducing social planning in the Soviet managerial praxis.⁵³ From this point
Soviet sociologists further developed social planning primarily as a planning ex-
ercise applied at the level of individual enterprises. In the early 1970s it started to
be discussed in Czechoslovakia, for example at the conferences of industrial so-
ciologists, as a new planning technique to “broaden the planning activities from
their present technical and economic approach to the complex planning includ-
ing also social changes.”⁵⁴ The main topics of the 7th ISA World Congress of So-
ciology in Varna (1970) were prediction and social planning, which allowed for a
knowledge exchange which further influenced the reception of social planning
in Czechoslovakia. Apart from the reception of Soviet and other literature on
the topic, Czechoslovak experts participated at international workshops and con-
ferences and took part in the international social planning and forecasting
“working group” together with scholars from Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, GDR
and USSR. This body coordinated and integrated social planning research as a
joint project of scholars from socialist countries.⁵⁵ As a consequence by the
mid-1970s social planning was among the most prominent research topics in Cze-
choslovak sociology whether reflected in the Czechoslovak Academy of Sciences
or in specialized institutions like the Institute for the Research on Labor in Bra-
tislava. The research activities varied from empirical sociological surveys of wel-
fare policies in enterprises, for example in projects by research collectives
around Jaroslav Kohout, to more theoretical accounts of the “programming of so-
The case study of postwar Great Britain is analyzed in Glen O’Hara, From Dreams to Disillusion-
ment: Economic and Social Planning in 1960s Britain (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007).
 Běla Stíbalová, Sociální plánování v ČSSR a SSSR (Prague: ÚVTEI, 1976), 3 and 15.
 Jaroslava Bauerová, Jaroslav Kolář, Jiří Růžička, Jaroslav Kohout, Eva Bidlová, and Miloslav
Tomšík, O sociálním plánování (Prague: Práce, 1972), 3.
 The main outcomes from three conferences organized by the “working group” were publish-
ed in František Kutta, ed., Planning and Forecasting Social Processes: Undertaken within the
Framework of the Problems Committee for Multilateral Cooperation of the Academy of Sciences,
and Dedicated to the 9th World Sociological Congress Uppsala, Sweden 1978 (Prague: Academia,
1978).
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cial processes” promoted by the economist František Kutta. Although the main
field of social planning application was an industrial enterprise, Czechoslovak
sociologists also carried out experiments to plan the “social development” of se-
lected cities and regions in order to “improve the control of socio-economic de-
velopment at the territorial level” and to “contribute to more effective shaping of
socialist life-style in territorial community.”⁵⁶
In the sphere of policy-making the National Planning Committee, federal
government, trade unions and a special committee related to the Communist
Party Central Committee supervised the establishment of social planning pro-
grams.⁵⁷ In 1972 the 7th Trade Union Congress initiated the completion of annual
social plans in enterprises and in 1973 the Czechoslovak government issued a de-
cree encouraging enterprises to implement “experimental” welfare projects. The
implementation of social planning was further promoted in 1975 when the gov-
ernment decided that all Czechoslovak enterprises were obliged to elaborate
“complex welfare programs” for the period from 1976 to 1980.⁵⁸ The enterprises
were also active participants in the social planning activities. For example, in
1974 the Třinec Steel-Works hosted an international conference on the “welfare
activities of socialist enterprise” which gathered sociologist, economists, psy-
chologists as well as factory managers and trade unionists.⁵⁹ The businesses
also organized their own inquiries into social planning in order to find a way
of tayloring welfare programs for the specific environment of particular industri-
al branches or with the respect to local socio-economic conditions.⁶⁰
What kind of rationality stood behind such a strong reception for social
planning after 1968? In the 1970s Czechoslovak experts have formulated at
least two lines of explanation. The first research perspective focuses on the theo-
 František Kutta, ed., Teorie a praxe sociálního plánování a programování v ČSSR (Prague, Svo-
boda, 1981), 61. The Czechoslovak experiments with the application of social planning at the
level of cities and regions are described in Jaroslav Novotný and Miroslav Štráchal, Poznatky
z experimentů v plánování sociálního rozvoje měst a obcí (Ústí nad Labem: Ústav pro filozofii a
sociologii – pobočka Ústí nad Labem, 1980).
 This account of the history of social planning is based primarily on Kutta, ed., Teorie a praxe
sociálního plánování a programování v ČSSR, 51–69, and Stíbalová, Sociální plánování, 43–44.
 For the social planning instructions issued by ministries and trade unions, see “Směrnice a
pokyny federálního a republikových ministerstev práce a sociálních věcí a ÚRO pro sestavení
“komplexních programů péče o pracovníky” na roky 1976 až 1978,” Příloha časopisu Odborář
28, no. 13 (1975): 1–14.
 Mezinárodní konference Péče socialistického závodu o člověka: Sborník přednášek (Třinec: Tři-
necké železárny, 1974).
 Emil Rigo, K niektorým otázkam plánovania sociálneho rozvoja vo Východoslovenských
železarniach,” Plánované hospodářství 26 (1973): 25–35.
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ry of social planning which offered an optimistic and future-oriented narrative
about the role of social planning in so-called advanced socialism. According
to theoretical texts, the main object of social planning was a collective of em-
ployees, and the principal aim was to “overcome the separation between eco-
nomic and social function of enterprise.”⁶¹ This meant that enterprises, which
were owned by the socialist state and thus became specific state institutions,
had to be involved not only in the production of particular goods but also in
the organization of welfare and, more generally, the life-styles of their employ-
ees.⁶² It was thus an attempt to introduce a complex planning technology con-
necting economic planning with welfare policies and strategies that aimed to de-
velop and socially implement specific socialist values, cultural and consumer
preferences or, more generally, a socialist way of life.⁶³ Social planning promot-
ers like Kohout and Kutta recognized this approach to management as a techni-
que that allowed for a broadening of the scope of managerial and planning ac-
tivities from the organization of the labor force to the active shaping of
employees’ “personal structure,” with the aim of achieving “harmonious devel-
opment in all spheres of human life.” Instead of coercion or direct control, social
planning was primarily oriented towards cultivating a worker’s “personal val-
ues” like self-discipline and his or her relationship to work.⁶⁴ The implementa-
tion of social planning had to be enabled by enterprises’ annual social plans. Ac-
cording to the Soviet methodology of social planning, which was translated in to
Czech in 1973, this planning exercise was concerned with the following issues:
the social structure of a collective in an enterprise (mobility of employees, qual-
ifications); working conditions in an enterprise (occupational safety), living stan-
dard of employees; the “communist education” of employees (cultivation of the
work ethics, “aesthetic development of personality,” leisure, working discipline,
youth issues, physical development of personality, further education of employ-
ees) and the cultivation of “socio-psychological” relationships in a collective.⁶⁵
 Bauerová, O sociálním plánování, 15.
 Ibid.
 For total planning in the Soviet context, see Stephen J. Collier, Post-Soviet Social: Neoliber-
alism, Social Modernity, Biopolitics (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2011),
48–64.
 Bauerová, O sociálním plánování, 14.
 D. A. Kerimov, Metodika plánování sociálního rozvoje podniku (Prague: Práce, 1973). Soviet
literature also discussed application of “social norms,” i.e. normatively given targets of social
development. See Vladimir Asejev and Ovsej Škaratan, Sociální normativy a sociální plánování
(Prague: Práce, 1986).
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Apart from these highly theoretical accounts of social planning, the same ex-
pert milieu also offered more realistic and significantly less optimistic arguments
for the need to introduce social planning. Jaroslav Kohout formulated this prag-
matic explanation in the mid-1970s in his examination of sociological surveys
which were conducted in Czechoslovak factories between 1965 and 1975.⁶⁶ Koh-
out discussed the fluctuation of employees as a serious social and economic
problem that destabilized the Czechoslovak economy. He argued that the level
of economic development meant that a disposable labor force was not available
in the country. Moreover, the main sources of economic growth were new tech-
nologies, efficient management and vocational training. These surveys also
showed that the fluctuation of employees was influenced by the everyday run-
ning of Czechoslovak enterprises. Workers were dissatisfied with organizational
malfunctions, workplace conditions and low salaries. The Czechoslovak popula-
tion seemed to be less and less attracted by exhausting and not really very well-
organized employment in the industrial sector which, however, was still the
backbone of the socialist economy. In an economic system without a functioning
labor market and with limited sources of cheap immigrant labor the authorities
and experts had to find policy instruments to stabilize and control the existing
structure of employment. In short, as Kohout showed quite explicitly in his
work, the aim of social planning was to keep employees in industrial companies
and thus secure the functioning of a centrally-planned economy. From this per-
spective, social planning was primarily a form of pragmatic policy intervention
and a specific technique of management. Although its final objective was, at
least theoretically, the development of a socialist society and the cultivation of
socialist values and habits, the practical and less visionary aspect of social plan-
ning was the need to control the labor force in order to achieve a certain degree
of stability in the sphere of industrial production. It was thus an attempt to sta-
bilize a state socialist socio-economic arrangement based on the primacy of in-
dustrial production and central planning. Instead of coercive policies such as
strict labor discipline, which were typical of the era of Stalinism, Kohout and
others emphasized social planning as a certain kind of soft-power – an elaborat-
ed policy instrument based on detailed knowledge of social and economic real-
ity.
The effort to apply social planning as a policy measure leading to social and
economic stability without market-oriented reform (typical of reform commu-
nism of the 1960s) as well as without more direct and repressive control of the
 Jaroslav Kohout, Sociální analýza a řízení socialistického podniku: vznik-pojetí-aplikace
(Práce: Praáce, 1976), 168– 175.
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labor force (typical of Stalinism) was specific to the consolidation regime of the
1970s. For example, while Stalinist recipes for the treatment of labor fluctuations
included the introduction of repressive measures on the shop-floor and the mo-
bilization of workers by aggressive propaganda campaigns, the authors active in
the 1970s highlighted the importance of welfare programs in enterprises and the
significance of “optimal working conditions.”⁶⁷ Similarly, contemporary empiri-
cal research emphasized the need for fundamental technological and organiza-
tional innovation as a precondition for successfully mastering limited supplies of
qualified labor in the Czechoslovak economy.⁶⁸ Welfare policies, which were or-
ganized and supported by individual enterprises, had to be combined with up to
date managerial and organizational methods in order to secure the running of
the centrally-planned economy and, more generally, the existence of the political
arrangement established after 1968. It was a significant shift from the reform
communists’ conception of entrepreneurial management, for which the market
operations of an enterprise were the highest priority. From the early 1970s social-
ist management had to focus not just on the control of production, most impor-
tantly on the fulfillment of hierarchically imposed production plans, but also on
broader welfare objectives.
Conclusion: Late socialist management studies
and the transformation of industrial modernity
The idea of connecting economic planning, management and social planning
posed a certain challenge to managerial praxis. In its theoretical writings Cze-
choslovak management studies underwent a transition from the reform commu-
nist vision of the socialist manager as a more or less independent entrepreneu-
rial actor in the market-oriented socialist economy to a late socialist manager
characterized as an educated, competent and efficient organizer and decision-
maker acting in the centralized planning system. However, from the perspective
of an individual manager, the late socialist concept of management required
mastering the most recent techniques of everyday management, partly borrowed
from Western management theory and capitalist management praxis, and, si-
 For the writing on fluctuation in the early 1950s, see Josef Stýblo and Borek Sýkora, Do roz-
hodného boje proti absenci a fluktuaci a za vysokou pracovní kázeň (Prague: Práce, 1953). For the
late socialist social planning approach, see Pavel Vašák, Fluktuace pracovních sil (Prague: Práce,
1976).
 Lenka Kalinová, Máme nedostatek pracovních sil? (Prague: Svoboda, 1979).
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multaneously, to cultivate managerial competencies based on the knowledge of
social planning. This understanding of management emphasized three essential
qualities of the socialist manager: discipline in the system of central planning,
creativity in the everyday organization of an enterprise, and competencies in so-
cial planning allowing the welfare functions of the socialist firm to materialize.
Late socialist management was in charge of achieving an organizational efficien-
cy comparable with capitalist forms of industrial organization while fulfilling the
welfare strategies of “advanced socialism.”
This conceptualization of management mirrored the centrality of industrial
production for the organization of social and economic life in late socialism. Ac-
cording to many observers on both sides of the “Iron Curtain”, it seemed that the
1960s were a decade when capitalism and state socialism regimes were heading
towards a shared industrial modernity.⁶⁹ This perspective, based on the notion of
“convergence,” highlighted, among others, the importance of industrial produc-
tion for the social and economic order under both capitalism and state socialism.
However, while the economies of Western Europe and the USA underwent sub-
stantial transformations from the 1970s towards de-industrialization, financiali-
zation and flexible organization, late socialism cultivated a certain form of “fro-
zen” industrialism – a social and economic order structured primarily around
central planning and strong connections between welfare and industrial produc-
tion.⁷⁰ Specific late socialist management studies and social planning expertize
thus aimed at producing knowledge that would allow this late socialist industri-
alism to be governed efficiently and with regard to long-term perspectives of
thoroughly planned social and economic development. This case also shows
that the relationship between planning and management studies was complicat-
ed and primarily reflected changes in economic policy. In the 1960s, the reform-
ers saw the application of management studies knowledge as more or less a sub-
stitution of strict central planning. It meant that with more competent, flexible
and independent managers on the shop-floor, the old central planning methods
seemed to be obsolete and superfluous. After 1968, when the Czechoslovak au-
 Alfred G. Mayer, “Theories of Convergence,” in Change in Communist System, ed. Chalmers
Johnson (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1970), 313–341; David C. Engerman, “To Moscow
and Back: American Social Scientists and the Concept of Convergence,” in American Capitalism:
Social Thought and Political Economy in the Twentieth Century, ed. Nelson Lichtenstein (Philadel-
phia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2006), 47–68.
 For the development in Western Europe and the USA, see for example Anselm Doering-Man-
teuffel and Lutz Raphael, Nach dem Boom: Perspektiven auf die Zeitgeschichte seit 1970 (Göttin-
gen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2010); Gretta R. Krippner, Capitalizing on Crisis: The Political Ori-
gins of the Rise of Finance (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2012).
Managing Socialist Industrialism 257
thorities renounced the idea of market socialism and replaced reform-oriented
policies with a renewed emphasis on central planning, management studies
scholars rationalized their expertize as a necessary supplement to central plan-
ning. They characterized their knowledge as advanced methods of organization
capable of making a centralized and hierarchical planning system work more ef-
ficiently. It thus depended on the politics of expertize if this field was to be mar-
ket-friendly or planning-friendly. In this chapter, my aim was to emphasize how
management studies was not inherently reformist or conservative but produced
its expertize according to the current policies of the state.
The project of connecting management and social planning, which resulted
from the typically modernist conviction of the socialism’s vital dependence on
the growth of industrial production, never succeeded in meeting its ambitious
goals. It follows that social planning lost its significance during the 1980s
when the overall disintegration of late socialist social and economic order pro-
duced significant shifts in the way Czechoslovak experts discussed issues like
planning and management.⁷¹ The economic literature of the late 1980s re-discov-
ered the economic rationality build around the market. The “market forces”
seemed to be universally applicable in different social and economic realms
and were increasingly described as the only organizational logic capable of re-
solving all the problems of a dying socialism – from economic crises to environ-
mental degradation or social pathologies.⁷² Czechoslovak management studies
experts like Stanislav Vácha attempted to open the question of “socialist entre-
preneurship” again. In the 1980s Vácha aimed to promote a new type of manage-
ment which was based on the implementation of capitalist-style entrepreneur-
ship in socialist conditions. In his expert as well as his popular writing Vácha
focused on the then famous Slušovice agricultural cooperative – a new type of
socialist enterprise which developed a specific management framework based
on individual incentives, a market-like decentralized organization of the enter-
prise and a use of highly competitive “human resources” management. Accord-
ing to Vácha, the new socialist entrepreneur was an active, educated, highly mo-
tivated, profit-oriented, and flexible market actor who was fully dedicated to the
 The application of sociology in social planning policies as the so-called “sociotechnique”
(sociotechnika) was critically discussed in the late 1980s by sociologists in Slovakia, see Vladi-
mír Krivý, “Sociotechnika: možnosti a hranice,” Sociológia 20 (1988): 417–425.
 For example, see Valtr Komárek, ed., Vazby vědeckotechnických, ekonomických a sociálních
aspektů dlouhodobého rozvoje ČSSR (Prague: ÚVTEI, 1988), 26–27. For the most important
works written in the late 1980s, see Valtr Komárek, Prognóza a program (Prague: Academia,
1990) and Josef Zieleniec, ed., Československo na rozcestí: zpráva o stavu národního hospodářství
a možnostech jeho nápravy (Prague: Lidové noviny, 1990).
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growth of his or her company. In his writing about Slušovice, which also includ-
ed a didactic novel written as the Bildungsroman of a young engineer, this new
type of manager was an individual more compatible with the market economy
than with a centrally planned system based on the imperative of plans and di-
rectives imposed from above.⁷³ This introduction of market rationality in man-
agement studies opened the way to a slow but inevitable return of the private
entrepreneurship paradigm in Czechoslovak expert and political discourses,
which was fully complete after 1989.
While the reform politics of the second half of the 1980s brought back the
idea of socialist entrepreneurship, the fall of state socialism in 1989 instigated
a transformation towards capitalism. This historical change opened a range of
new opportunities for experts familiar with the contemporary state of Western
research on management. Thus, for the second time since 1968, Czechoslovak
management science succeeded in transitioning to new political conditions
and maintaining a high degree of personal and conceptual continuity. This
time in the transformation from late socialist industrialism to an era character-
ized by extensive privatization and the construction of capitalism in post-social-
ist conditions.
 For the novel about agricultural cooperative, see Stanislav Vácha, Hauři (Prague: Práce,
1987). Vácha analyzed the Slušovice management system in Stanislav Vácha, Jak řídí Slušovice
(Prague: Novinář, 1988).
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Michael Hutter
Ecosystems Research and Policy Planning:
Revisiting the Budworm Project
(1972– 1980) at the IIASA
“As Karl Marx used to say, any beginning is difficult. IIASA has succeeded in overcoming its
initial problems. We are in the ocean of systems analysis and we have no choice but to swim
in this ocean.”¹
Introduction: The rise of Applied
Systems Analysis
In 1972 the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment was held in
Stockholm and received broad media coverage, while in the same year the Limits
to Growth report was published under the auspices of the Club of Rome. Shortly
after these events the contemporary environmental protection imperative provid-
ed a further reason for policymakers to engage in international scientific coop-
eration in order to address and solve a variety of complex environmental prob-
lems facing industrialized societies. With its focus on the exchange of
environmental knowledge for policy making, this chapter underlines the proc-
esses that informed the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis
(hereafter IIASA) as it studied and contributed to the shaping of the environmen-
tal change paradigm. In particular this chapter will analyze ways in which new
forms of knowledge were produced as an interplay between computerized mod-
eling and environmental management in interactions between the East and the
West. By following the beginnings of an early research project at IIASA, the fol-
lowing will expose how IIASA mediated international negotiations on the stand-
ardization of systems analysis which was understood to be a key tool for policy
making and planning processes.²
 Abel G. Aganbegyan, “Future Research Directions,” in IIASA Conference ‘76 (IIASA, Laxen-
burg, Austria: IIASA, May 1976), 208.
 As a center for planning the future, the IIASA provided the space for incorporating and nego-
tiating scenarios related to that future. They framed their models into technocratic solutions,
which is also captured by Jenny Andersson’s analysis of the OECD and the Trilateral Commission
in this volume.
https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110534696-013
IIASA’s research infrastructure was legally consolidated as an Austrian asso-
ciation (“Verein”) located in a former Hapsburg castle in Laxenburg near Vienna,
with the support of 12 national member organizations (NMOs), represented by
the national academies of science for the USA, the USSR, Hungary, Czechoslova-
kia, and the GDR, and by similar national research facilities in the member states
of France, Canada, the FRG, Bulgaria, Japan, the UK, and Italy. During the 1970s,
the scientific academies of Austria, Sweden, the Netherlands and Finland were
accepted as additional contributors.³ Recent historiographical accounts about
IIASA’s impact on international scientific cooperation focused on the institute’s
research strategy as an interface that merged methods from large-scale compu-
terized system simulations and the natural sciences and denoted IIASA as a
prime example of innovatively established practices in environmental and civil
engineering.⁴ Likewise, IIASA was presented as an entity that prepared models
for policymaking to consolidate improvements in ecosystem planning methods.⁵
By following these accounts, IIASA provided an image of an institute that
worked in a coordinated way in relation to environmental knowledge, by “teas-
ing out what was and was not physically possible [to] enable ‘policymakers’ to
feed the world, supply it with energy, keep it watered and so on.”⁶ When looking
into the institutional arrangements in 1972, however, research that concerned
global and international subjects originated primarily from the experience of na-
tional systems analysis. Common methodologies for research priorities were not
yet visible.
Systems analysis at IIASA was conceived as an interface between political
decision making in industrialized societies and the application of scientific ap-
proaches. With the use of systems analysis, policy making processes included
studies of social and environmental impact that measured the risks and benefits
of future decisions and the future behavior of systems. Political debates have
been externalized to involve scientific experts, who were invited to provide “ob-
jective” grounds and a spectrum of possible decisions. IIASA’s main research ob-
 United States Congress House Committee on Science and Technology, European Oversight
Trip: Report of the Committee on Science and Technology, U.S. House of Representatives, Nine-
ty-Fifth Congress, First Session, Serial, 95th Congress (U.S. Government Printing Office, 1977), 11.
 In this respect, see Andersson and Rindzevičiūtė, The Struggle for the Long- Term in Transna-
tional Science and Politics: Forging the Future; Rindzevičiūtė, The Power of Systems: How Policy
Sciences Opened Up the Cold War World. For the influence of social sciences, see also: Pierre Gre-
mion, The role of the social sciences in East–West relations, Technology in Society 23, no. 3 (2001):
427–439.
 See, for example, Michael Thompson, “IIASA’s Take on Policy and Governance,” (IIASA Ar-
chives, unpublished Final Draft, located in the IIASA Library), 1.
 Ibid.
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jective was to inquire about how technological, social, and environmental sys-
tems correlated. In this respect, systems represented an arrangement of factors
in a mathematically deducted boundary, where encompassed factors and their
inter-dependency were elaborated for a specific time range. Systems analyses
created visualized scenarios of potential future behaviors of a system at IIASA,
researchers from various scientific disciplines participated in the evaluation of
each factor. The crafting of systems and its inherent properties has become para-
mount with the emerging calculation power of computers since the 1940s. A
method that once dominated modeling in the life sciences such as cell biology,
and that was later used for military purposes during the Second World War, sub-
sequently expanded to the public policy sector in the United States, the UK, and
France. Twenty years later, the IIASA incorporated the computerized systems
methodology with the aim of solving environmental and globally relevant prob-
lems.
This chapter argues that knowledge exchange of systems analysis at IIASA
was accompanied by considerable amounts of friction; and these differences
in national research traditions and agendas reshaped the transnational systemic
approach during the time of its construction. Guided by a review of IIASA pub-
lications such as research reports and research memoranda, and supported by
historical accounts from primary sources from the IIASA Archives, the Rockefel-
ler Foundation Archives and the Harvard University Archives, this chapter expos-
es the origins of applied systems analysis at IIASA in relation to environmental
and forest policymaking. The specific analysis of the budworm project provides
insights into how the IIASA organized the standardization of methodological
frameworks within East-West cooperation during the first years of its research
venture (1973– 1976), while highlighting the challenges of IIASA’s practice as
an interdisciplinary research hub that was meant to specifically include social
scientific approaches.⁷
 In this respect, Katja Naumann has elaborated on the coordination of social scientific ap-
proaches within an East-West arena since the 1950s in this volume. The IIASA has reshaped
and institutionalized cooperation on social scientific methodologies since the 1970s.
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Part 1. The influence of the budworm on
IIASA’s ecological systems modelling
(1973– 1976)
The starting point or this chapter highlights how a Canadian budworm pest proj-
ect involving the use of systems analysis was transferred from Canada to IIASA.
Research on the budworm and its spread through Canadian forests then consti-
tuted one of IIASA’s most crucial applied projects in the 1970s that were later
transformed into general environmental systems. Budworm systems analysis
was conducted by a research group from Canada that was invited to join
IIASA in spring 1973. The group from the University of British Columbia worked
at the institute for two years. Beside the establishment of computerized systems,
the main objective of the budworm research group was the exploration of a
method to solve perturbations of natural systems with the use of novel computer
power and the experience of previous systems analysis projects.
Budworm research crucially expanded the organization of IIASA’s ecosys-
tems models, which was interpreted by contemporary historiographical accounts
as offering the first blueprint for more complex environmental research.⁸ Never-
theless, the early stages of budworm research and the internationalization of IIA-
SA’s knowledge infrastructure and knowledge exchange between 1973 and 1976
(when the budworm project terminated) have so far not been accurately studied.
The processes of exchange about the daily work, the different use of equipment
by scientists at IIASA, or the effects of the invitation of the Canadian research
group and its integration in IIASA’s territory of international cooperation provide
important elements for understanding the making of a common planning meth-
od. In a nutshell, the input of the Canadian team to the methodological work on
applied systems analysis (ASA) illustrates the afflux of a whole variety of con-
cepts and notions into IIASA’s systems approach that still persist in today’s
thinking about ecological systems, and in practices that are covered under the
widely received umbrella term of “resilience”.⁹
 See, for example, Isabell Schrickel, “Von Schmetterlingen und Atomreaktoren: Medien und
Politiken der Resilienz am IIASA,” BEHEMOTH-A Journal on Civilisation 7, no. 2 (2014): 17.
 The term resilience was used as a starting point to inquire into how systems were able to ab-
sorb catastrophic disturbance and still maintain the primary relationships between populations
within a given environmental setting. (In this respect, see C. S. Holling, “Resilience and stability
of ecological systems,” Annual review of ecology and systematics 4, no. 1 [1973]: 14– 15) The term
was coined by the Canadian research team,with its project leader Crawford Holling,which at the
same time initiated budworm research at the IIASA. Current research that reframed Canadian
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The Canadian ecosystems context in the making of Applied
Systems Analysis (1965– 1973)
Nowadays primarily understood as a diplomatic tool for solving international
scientific and political problems,¹⁰ ASAwas developed at IIASA during an exper-
imental research phase from 1973. At that moment, the institute recruited scien-
tists from IIASA’s NMO’s who had various disciplinary backgrounds. The deci-
sion to include budworm modelers from Canada complemented IIASA’s
prioritization of projects that fulfilled the guidelines of East-West cooperation
for advancing management methodologies.
In Canada, the political dimension of budworm population growth had sig-
nificantly increased after World War II and regained importance in the 1970s. The
budworm pest outbreak received extensive press coverage and sparked public
debate, as it perturbed not only forest systems but also political futures. The
spruce budworm increase was so intense that it was not just an economic threat
to the Canadian forest industry. The drastic increase enticed reporters to title the
budworm North America’s “biological time bomb”¹¹ and compare the danger to a
change from “Mongolian modesty to Shanghai-like extremes.”¹² The convention-
al basic budworm management option was the spraying of aerial insecticide,
mostly using the chemical insecticide DDT. This led at first to great successes
in tackling cyclic defoliation of trees. The goal of spraying was to achieve a bud-
worm-free environment, and the main challenges in reaching their objective of a
stable budworm-free forest system were linked to technological advances in im-
proving aerial spraying and a coherent budworm population statistics. At the
same time, however, the spraying policy induced widespread, long-term negative
effects for broader ecological systems, mammals, and humans alike. Spraying
did not even prevent an unexpected long-term budworm increase. The budworm
Budworm Research can be seen in W Neil Adger, “Resilience implications of policy responses to
climate change,” Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews: Climate Change 2, no. 5 (2011): 757–766; Tho-
mas Tanner, “Livelihood resilience in the face of climate change,” Nature Climate Change 5,
no. 1 (2015): 23; Peter C Perdue, “Ecologies of Empire: From Qing Cosmopolitanism to Modern
Nationalism,” Cross-Currents: East Asian History and Culture Review 2, no. 2 (2013): 399.
 For a nuanced contemporary discussion and US evaluation of East-West scientific exchange,
see: Genevieve J. Knezo, “U.S. Scientists Abroad: An Examination of Major Programs for Nongo-
vernmental Scientific Exchange, Science, Technology, and American Diplomacy Volume 2 (1977):
873– 1035.
 Time Magazine, “Environment: Battling the Budworm,” Time Magazine, no. 80 (April 1975):
15.
 A. Nikiforuk, Empire of the Beetle: How Human Folly and a Tiny Bug Are Killing North Amer-
ica’s Great Forests (Greystone Books, 2011), 197.
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pest and the ecological impact of the traditional management response triggered
widespread public debates between 1950 and 1980, wherein the biologist Rachel
Carson’s 1962 environmental pamphlet “Silent Spring” was becoming its flag-
ship.¹³ Concerning the management options for budworms, she stated that
“wherever there [were] great forests, modern methods of insect control
threaten[ed] the fishes inhabiting the streams in the shelter of trees”.¹⁴ Carson’s
publications on the interdependence of ecosystem’s actors are crucial to the un-
derstanding of changes in forest management in North America.¹⁵ Her ecosys-
tems approach dismantled a too-simplistic approach of forest planners that
were sticking to conventional forms of decision making, such as the above
noted remedy of intensified chemical spraying.¹⁶ For Carson, forest managers ur-
gently needed to re-consider the needs of fishes, mammals, and other natural
predators of the budworm. After a fierce debate about the environmental impact
of spraying, DDT was banned in 1967, while other chemical products continued
to persist as a management option for aerial spraying.¹⁷ Nevertheless, with or
without DDT, the spraying option became extremely expensive. In the 1970s,
the pulp and paper industry desired to move away from spraying as an all-en-
compassing solution.¹⁸ The industry and political authorities of the regions
looked for better and more (cost‐) efficient alternatives. This led, for instance,
to initiatives such as the well-funded budworm research programs in the Cana-
dian research community in the Maritimes Forest Research Center (MFRC) or in
the Institute of Resource Ecology (IRE) at the University of British Columbia.
Both institutes launched initiatives for computerizing environmental simulation
models. They placed parameters and systems into a prognostic calculation tool
that would inform the researcher about the current state of a forest environment
and help her to deduce knowledge of actual and predicted forest system behav-
ior. The Canadian budworm models and the subsequent experience in forest sys-
tems analysis induced the IIASA administration to approach the Canadian group
to provide them with methods and experience from their specific field (they had
 Peter C Perdue, “Ecologies of Empire: From Qing Cosmopolitanism to Modern Nationalism,”
Cross-Currents: East Asian History and Culture Review 2, no. 2 (2013): 400.
 Rachel Carson, Silent spring (Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2002), 136.
 Perdue, “Ecologies of Empire: From Qing Cosmopolitanism to Modern Nationalism”: 400.
 Linda Nash, “Un Siècle Toxique. L’émergence de la ‘santé environnementale” in Histoire des
sciences et des savoirs : Le siècle des technosciences, Dominique Pestre and Christophe Bonneuil,
vol. 3, Science ouverte référence (Paris: Seuil, 2015), 154– 155.




mainly been active in New Brunswick, Canada) for exposure to more diverse real-
world situations within a similar institutional and environmental setting.¹⁹
How a Canadian research group shaped the IIASA
methodology between 1973 and 1976.
During the summer of 1973, staff members of IIASA organized several interna-
tional conferences in Baden, a small village near Vienna to decide upon IIASA’s
methodology of systems analysis and to debate about the selection of relevant
applied projects that matched concerns of its national member organizations.
In preparation for these conferences, the early IIASA members, such as Myron
Fiering, a civil engineer from Harvard University, or IIASA director Howard Raif-
fa, worried about the composition of IIASA researchers and the research plan-
ning that primarily assembled statisticians, computer experts or people with a
systems-theoretic orientation and lacked natural scientists as for example biolo-
gists or chemists.²⁰ Therefore, the research on the budworm proved to be espe-
cially attractive, for as an issue mainly related to the spheres of ecology and bi-
ology it allowed scientists to extend and study the field of policy analysis and
decision theory that gave it the appearance of a non-political endeavor –
“through the focus on a classical ecosystem problem.”²¹ Subsequently, the first
Environment and Ecology group took up its work at IIASA in October 1973, its
aim being to improve the budworm systems model and the development of IIA-
SA’s ASA methodology in general. Crawford Holling from the University of Brit-
ish Columbia was persuaded by IIASA’s director Howard Raiffa to come to IIASA
and improve the tools of IIASA’s applied systems analysis. Holling’s group that
travelled to Laxenburg was composed of Dixon Jones, an engineer and ecosys-
tems simulation expert,William Clark,who was an ecosystems expert with a doc-
torate in ecological epidemic ecosystems, and programmer Zafar Rashid, a
trained biochemist. Holling was formally assigned project leader of what became
 W.C. Clark, D.D. Jones, and C.S. Holling, Lessons for Ecological Policy Design: A Case Study of
Ecosystem Management (RR-80–002), IIASA Research Report (Reprint) (IIASA, Laxenburg, Aus-
tria, 1979): 4.
 Harvard University Archives, “Letter from Myron Fiering to Howard Raiffa (25 April 1973)” in
Papers of Myron B. Fiering (14498) Box 1 of 9, Folder Vienna [1972– 1973] (Harvard University Ar-
chives)
 Harvard University Archives, “Clark’s Summary of Budworm Workshop: Regional Ecosystem
Management,” in Papers of Myron B. Fiering (14498) Box 2 of 9, Clark’s Summaries (Harvard Uni-
versity Archives): 1.
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known as the Resources and Environment Project (REN) at IIASA, where in sub-
sequent years he promoted the budworm methodology and its related resilience
concepts.²²
Holling and the IIASA administration were convinced that the budworm case
could demonstrate an innovative methodology to measure systems and more ef-
ficiently evaluate the factors of systems that trigger the preconditions for plan-
ning and policy-managing frameworks. The input of the Canadian budworm re-
search team implied that IIASA should work with techniques that
accommodated the non-linear dynamic evolution of ecosystems, taking into ac-
count the oscillation and complexity of behaviors of even the smallest organisms
that may harm the entire functioning of an environmental system and its man-
agement.²³ In respect to the interdisciplinary approach by IIASA, REN’s bud-
worm project epitomized a systems analysis with elements from natural and so-
cial sciences, and constituted a bridge between various disciplinary specialists at
IIASA and also between researchers from the East and West. On many occasions,
the spruce budworm model represented or fulgurated IIASA’s and the national
member organizations’ desire to provide optimized and unified approaches of
systems in order to support policymakers with a handbook for coping with issues
of public and economic concern about large industrialized ecosystems, and yet
focus on “preventing unemployment in the forest industry, or in making the in-
dustry more profitable.”²⁴ The budworm served its purpose as a “demonstration
case of broad interest to all countries coping with serious insect pest prob-
lems”,²⁵ and represented one particular approach to ecosystems thinking that
was integrated as a centerpiece of state-of-the-art large-scale optimization tech-
niques.²⁶
The continuation of the budworm project contributed in particular to the in-
terdisciplinary exchange between IIASA’s ecology and methodology projects and
facilitated the testing and discovery of “novel methods for novel systems.”²⁷ The
IIASA recruited researchers to explore how to improve systems analysis results
 Clark, Jones, and Holling, Lessons for Ecological Policy Design: A Case Study of Ecosystem
Management (RR-80–002): 3.
 D.D. Jones, Explorations in Parameter Space, IIASA Working Paper (IIASA, Laxenburg, Aus-
tria, 1973), 1.
 Holling quoted in IIASA, Annual Report 1975: 9.
 C.S. Holling, Program for Ecology and Environment Project, IIASAWorking Paper (IIASA, Lax-
enburg, Austria, 1973), 3.
 Ibid.
 C.S. Holling, “A journey of discovery” (Personal Memoir, December 2006, Final Draft), 19,
last modified March 15, 2018, https://www.resalliance.org/files/Buzz_Holling_Memoir_2006_a_-
journey_of_discovery_buzz_holling.pdf
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for policy-makers and planners. Among them was George Dantzig, who became
an eminent authority in the field of systems analysis and operations research.
Dantzig was widely known for his work in statistics, operations research and
mathematical programming. Since the mid 1940s he elaborated methods for
the optimization of systems, that were used in the military, e.g. by illustratively
calculating the most efficient and cost-effective diets for soldiers, or later, for
public, industrial, and defense planning purposes.²⁸ He worked at IIASA be-
tween 1973 and 1974 with the goal of reducing the complexity of model worlds
used in relation to the Canadian budworm. IIASA’s systems analysis was intend-
ed to bring ecosystems models to realizable political decisions, so that policy-
makers could understand and control the most relevant elements of a system
and plan a decision by knowing its respective impact. In Dantzig’s opinion, a
“curse of dimensionality”²⁹ prevailed in large-scale ecosystems which, on the
contrary, needed a more synthetic approach. As a result of Dantzig’s expertise
members of the ecology group could plausibly argue how the budworm project
led to a simplification and optimization in methodology. REN evolved, as “[…] an
astonishing group of outstanding people gave their all to something as silly as a
budworm […].³⁰ This methodological simplification to an applicable model for
the budworm was still praised forty-one years later. For instance Harvard Busi-
ness School professor Daniel E. Bell lauded Dantzig’s achievements when he en-
dorsed the ecologists’ idea for improving planning and decision making. After
reducing, compressing and formalizing the most pertinent management options,
they were later ranked according to the preferences of the concerned stakehold-
ers and discussed with forest experts in subsequent workshops and training ses-
sions.³¹ The optimized methodology for management models continued to gen-
erate debates in the REN and the Methodology group respectively.
Since 1976, in the aftermath of the budworm project, it seems that IIASA’s
role as a clearing house of systems analysis “[…] influenced the analytic perspec-
tive for IIASA’s research planning, including systems analysis of freshwater and
 The fellow scientist at the IIASA Myron Fiering referred to Dantzig’s “elaboration of the sim-
plex method” that provided elements of linear programming and systems analysis that “nobody
had imagined before.” See in this respect M.B.Fiering, “Why is the new algorithm better than
simplex method and ellipsoid method?” in Papers of Myron B. Fiering (14498) Box 7 of 9, (Har-
vard University Archives).
 Winkler was Dantzig’s PhD student back then. Besides his appointment at IIASA, he worked
for the newly founded Systems Optimization Laboratory (SOL) at Stanford University.
 G.A. Norton and C.S. Holling, Proceedings of a Conference on Pest Management, 25–29 Oc-
tober 1976, IIASA Collaborative Paper (IIASA, Laxenburg, Austria, September 1977): 87.
 IIASA, “Howard Raiffa Session. David E. Bell: Policy, probability and preference,” last modi-
fied March 15, 2018, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=AP4KnjXajfo.
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oceanic fisheries, terrestrial grazing, other insect pest, and tropical and temper-
ate forest ecosystems.”³² Until the beginning of the 1980s, research of single in-
sect management methodology was integrated in different sections within IIASA
projects. IIASA persisted in standardizing and regulating the transfer of models,
concepts or realities³³ from its own international research groups and other na-
tional or international institutes that dealt with the effects and control of ecosys-
tems problems. The result of reduction and compression led to precisely formu-
lated strategies of how to standardize applied systems analysis: since the
evolution from the focus on the budworm, REN proposed crafting simplified eco-
logical “modules” that could be used interchangeably within numerous ecolog-
ical problems. For Holling, smaller modules would significantly facilitate and
simplify policymaking processes. Holling’s approach, which went so far as to es-
tablish an entire library collection of modules, mirrored IIASA’s early research
planning objective for 1975 to craft and communicate usable knowledge, and
also to expand it to “significant economic problems throughout the whole of
the north eastern part of North America, the Pacific region, the USSR, forested
regions of Europe (e.g. Poland) and Japan.”³⁴ The module library symbolized
IIASA’s eagerness to convey “information in forms which are understandable
and controllable by the various role players in the decision process.”³⁵ Regional
problems, pest outbreaks or any other occurring perturbation of complex sys-
tems were condensed and synthesized for more general use due to their “univer-
sal functions for linking these events.”³⁶
The budworm turned into IIASA’s demonstration tool
(1978– 1980)
Subsequently, the budworm experience led to a more general approach of eco-
systems thinking that was illustrated by the publication of the widely known
compendium “Adaptive Environmental Assessment and Management” (here-
after: AEAM) in 1978. AEAM revived Holling’s module idea and provided techni-
 Clark, Jones, and Holling, Lessons for Ecological Policy Design: A Case Study of Ecosystem
Management (RR-80–002): 3.
 Ibid.: 6.
 Harvard University Archives, “A Case Study of Ecosystem Management,” in Papers of Myron
B. Fiering (14498) Box 1 of 9, Folder: NSF [National Science Foundation] Documents, 1975– 1977]
(Harvard University Archives).
 Holling, Development and Use of Ecological Modules in Resource Development Simulation: 7.
 Ibid.: 5.
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ques for a set of systems, composed by “packages of techniques […] available for
broad applicability to any problem of single species management, whether of
pests of crops or of man or of populations of fish or wildlife.”³⁷ As the main ed-
itors, Holling and Clark noted that the budworm model helped to create educa-
tional tools in management and the organization of “model gaming sessions.”³⁸
Therefore, the budworm project gave new directions to the implementation of
“nontraditional communication formats”³⁹ for communication with affected par-
ties, including managers, policymakers and the public. Since then, IIASA has
launched education and training programs and sequences of “participatory
workshops” on a national and international level,⁴⁰ using a bottom-up approach
to educate participants on the key principles of ecosystems modeling for policy-
making. AEAM was used in a broader management context, whereas IIASA
“mix[ed] representatives and customers” and operated as a mediator between di-
verging perceptions within the spectrum of different management options.
AEAM was regarded as an important framework for dealing with problems
using ASA, for instance in 1977, when IIASA invited representatives from the
UK Ministry of the Environment to learn the techniques of AEAM.⁴¹ The strategic
dissemination of budworm systems analysis within quick and cheap group mod-
eling sessions at the IIASAwas intended to equip managers of ecosystems with a
concept they could use to obtain more efficient and controllable feedback, based
on addressing the adaption to future events and unexpected turbulence well in
advance of their occurrence. Since its appearance in the literature of AEAM,
where the budworm model served as an example in slide show presentations,
it was continuously used in the context of turbulence theory in forest ecosystems
in general, and thereafter, in presentations delivered to demonstrate how to
manage complex systems with systems thinking; in regard to forestry with spe-
cific responses deduced from budworm-optimized decision models.⁴²
 Holling, Summary of Budworm Workshop.




 IIASA Archives, “M.W. Holdgate, Annex B: Talk delivered to IIASA senior staff and partici-
pants in workshop adaptive impact assessment on 14 June 1977,” in Resources and Environ. Con-
ferences and Workshops 1976– 1977 (IIASA Archives, June 1977): 2.
 IIASA Archives, “Conference Agenda, 21.5.1977,” in Resources and Environ. Conferences and
Workshops 1976– 1977 (IIASA Archives, June 1977).
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Part 2. The attempts at East-West knowledge
circulation (1975–1980)
In this vein, it is crucial to keep in mind how IIASA’s entire institutional struc-
ture possessed strong links with a national policy-making milieu through the
participating national member organizations and the representatives and invit-
ees from academies of sciences from each nation state. Each of the academies
of sciences sent researchers or policy experts to IIASA conferences that worked
at some stage with governmental agencies and ministries. The planning methods
and debates about how to transfer budworm knowledge to other environmental
problems – and how to orientate applied systems analysis- were occurring in de-
bates held by IIASA members during bi-annual IIASA Council meetings, where
the IIASA director was required to report on the state of IIASA research. The ex-
ample of the USSR’s Academy of Sciences shows the close relationship with pol-
icy making in the environment through the organization of common expert pan-
els for each policy relevant subject.⁴³ The USSR was strongly supportive of
obtaining methods of systems analysis for the nation’s planning processes in
the 1970s via IIASA, notably in the systems sciences and computer sciences de-
partments located in the facilities of the USSR’s Academy of Sciences.⁴⁴
A common interest for Applied Systems Analysis for planning
purposes in the West and East
More than the integration of the budworm model and its contextual origin for
IIASA’s systems analysis, it was the particular East-West infrastructure that mo-
tivated historians to capture the “performativity”⁴⁵ of scientific East-West cooper-
ation. Studies about East-West bridge-building structures discussed the making
of IIASA in the wider context of US President Lyndon Johnson’s “Great Society
programs,”⁴⁶ or a “global New Deal” initiative that would have extended scien-
 Eglė Rindzevičiūtė, The Power of Systems: How Policy Sciences Opened Up the Cold War
World, 17.
 Ibid., 85
 Eglė Rindzevičiūtė, The Power of Systems: How Policy Sciences Opened Up the Cold War
World (New York: Cornell University Press, 2016), 23.
 Agatha C Hughes and Thomas P Hughes, Systems, Experts, and Computers. The Systems Ap-
proach in Management and Engineering, World War II and After (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press,
2000), 7.
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tific, technological, and managerial innovation towards the stabilization of inter-
national problems. IIASA was seen as acting according to US interests in main-
taining global security through the securing of a common standard of science
and environmental sciences in particular.⁴⁷ For commentators on IIASA, its
East-West focus drew on the Johnson administration’s idea that “[…] scientific
collaboration would be the solution of large-scale problems common to ad-
vanced economies.”⁴⁸ From this perspective, supported among others by US
physicist and scientific adviser William Nierenberg, IIASA provided a joint
forum for different societies to “expose their methodologies in dealing with
[common] problems,”⁴⁹ mainly from the viewpoint that knowledge was transfer-
able from one side to another. The content of systems analysis was secondary to
the diplomatic advances made through IIASA, and often,Western narratives do-
minated the historical discourse. This Western perspective on East-West bridge-
building was recently expanded with more integrative Eastern perspectives by
the historian Elke Seefried. Seefried elaborated the ways in which IIASA’s re-
search and its central elements of studies of systems, structures, and feedback
loops, reflected the USSR’s ideological position of Marxism-Leninism, which ad-
vocated the study of causal relations of phenomena. The USSR’s homegrown in-
terest in systems analysis and its support for IIASA was at least as important as
newly introduced Western systems analysis theories⁵⁰ and reinforced the trend of
East-West “governmental elites [to] embrace the same scientific methods […] dur-
ing the Cold War.”⁵¹
 In this respect see Ronald E. Doel and Kristine C. Harper, “Prometheus Unleashed,” Osiris 21,
no. 1 (2006): 83; Hughes and Hughes, Systems, Experts, and Computers. The Systems Approach in
Management and Engineering, World War II and After, 1; David R Jardini, “Out of the blue yonder:
The transfer of systems thinking from the Pentagon to the great society, 1961– 1965,” in Systems,
experts, and computers: the systems approach in Management and Engineering, World War II and
After (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2000), 327; Thomas Schwartz, “Moving Beyond the Cold
War: The Johnson Administration, Bridge-Building and Détente,” in Beyond the Cold War: Lyn-
don Johnson and the New Global Challenges of the 1960s, F.J. Gavin and M.A. Lawrence (New
York: Oxford University Press, 2014).
 Jay Hauben, “Across an Ideological Divide: IIASA and IIASANET,” in Computer Networks, the
Internet and Netizens” Symposium at the 22nd International Congress of History of Science (July
2005).
 William A Nierenberg, “NATO science programs: origins and influence,” Technology in Soci-
ety 23, no. 3 (2001): 372.
 Elke Seefried, Zukünfte: Aufstieg und Krise der Zukunftsforschung 1945– 1980, vol. 106 (Old-
enbourg: De Gruyter, 2015), 191–92; In this respect see also Rindzevičiūtė, The Power of Systems:
How Policy Sciences Opened Up the Cold War World, 143.
 Rindzevičiūtė, The Power of Systems: How Policy Sciences Opened Up the Cold War World, 2.
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What seems evident when following the above noted historical accounts is
that for both the Eastern and the Western member organizations, the standard-
ization of systems analysis became the binding element behind the building of
East-West cooperation. The systems approach to planning correlated with the re-
alpolitik of the member states’ foreign offices during the Cold War.Within IIASA’s
East-West prism, the Canadian budworm research project was undoubtedly at-
tractive: it involved a group that followed the perturbations and future behaviors
of large-scale systems through a small intrusive element, such as the budworm.
The budworm model thus provided an ideal type of how to measure and respond
to perturbation, while it could also figure as a non-political prototype for com-
puter systems models that provided a controllable, testable and dynamic ap-
proach towards future systems behavior. Moreover, as a result, analysts would
provide decision-making bodies with ready-made frameworks that facilitated
the exchange of methods and techniques. Was this a perfect match for science
and policy-making? At least for the participating member organizations and
for the IIASA staff, the budworm set standards regarding how far “[IIASA]
could go in developing a coherent science of ecological management”⁵² and
how to arrange and extend East-West research into energy, water, ecology,
urban, computer science, industry, bio-medicine, decision analysis or large-
scale organizations.⁵³
Difficult beginnings, organizational change and East-West
knowledge exchange
The joint making of systems analysis was not without friction. Two years after the
budworm research was launched at IIASA, Holling presented a brief account of
its successes and pitfalls, noting that cross-cultural and international interac-
tions had not been as effective as he had intended.⁵⁴ Holling remained critical
of the USSR’s participation in the analysis of ecosystems. According to him,
USSR computer models in 1975 still lacked the economic, political and human
behavioral indicators that were necessary to propose optimized policy design.
In addition, he voiced skepticism about the strong Soviet focus on descriptive
 Roger E. Levien, “Systems Analysis in an International Setting,” in Record Group 1.8/Project
Files /Box 164, Folder 7878: International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis, Supplementary
Material 1975– 1977 (The Rockefeller Foundation Archives, 1975): 8.
 IIASA, Annual Report 1973: xi.
 IIASA Archives, “C. S. Holling, Proposed Activities Ecology/Environment at IIASA after 1975,”
in DI- Resources and Environ. Core (‐December 1978) (IIASA, June 1975): 3.
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“biological and optimal control laws that seem rather abstract and impracti-
cal,”⁵⁵ even though he admitted the efficiency of their compromise for ready-
to-use models “in a context appropriate for their country […].”⁵⁶ On the basis
of these criticisms, the budworm modeling at first remained a merely Canadian
endeavor, even though the methodology influenced IIASA’s basic methodologi-
cal premises.
The situation changed significantly in late 1975, when East-West cooperation
was given new impetus by Roger Levien’s debut as the second IIASA director.
Levien had extensively studied the development of systems analysis in the Soviet
Union at the RAND Corporation, where he reviewed a wide range of Russian lit-
erature on systems analysis. RAND was a US-American think tank that worked
with systems analysis in order to solve planning issues for the US-military and
defense operations and later expanded its research program to include modeling
policy scenarios for public policy planning. Based on his experience in frame-
works for systems modelling at RAND, Levien understood the prestige attributed
to studies of systems and computers by the USSR from the mid-1950s on, while
the same amount of enthusiasm was lacking in the United States.⁵⁷ When Levien
was appointed director at IIASA, he introduced a dichotomous research matrix
for IIASA’s long-term planning. He did this by dividing research into global
and universal issues, thus supporting the inclusion of heterogeneous research
interests in applied systems analysis from both the East and West.
The focus on planning options and the focus on management problems in
regional, national and international spheres newly increased the international
recognition of ASA. However, Levien’s matrix required a clear standard of ASA
methodology that was crucial for both universal and global research areas. In
this respect, the general conference on ASA that took place with participants
from both East and West in 1976 focused on the standardization of methodology.
During the conference, the budworm experience once more appeared as an ex-
emplary case of ASA. In his introduction to the purposes of ASA, Levien referred
to the budworm project as an ideal type that proved how the added value of
methodological work of IIASA formalized into applicable management princi-
ples. He repeatedly alluded to Dantzig’s “optimizer” method that condensed
the highest-ranking forest policy options. Levien metaphorically compared the
optimizer to a brain as it was able, as a systems machine, to understand and pri-
 IIASA Archives, “Memorandum from C. S. Holling o W. Bossert, A. Bykov,W. Häfele, H. Raif-
fa,” in DI – Resources and Environ. Core (‐December 1978) (IIASA Archives, June 1975): 3.
 Ibid.: p.s.
 R. Levien and M.E. Maron, Cybernetics and its development in the Soviet Union, RM-4156-PR
(RAND Corporation, 1964): 14
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oritize the values and perceptions of affected humans in the forest system; a cy-
bernetic device that could even compare and determine feasible compromises of
policy options for long-term planning.⁵⁸
Levien’s advocacy of the budworm model’s optimization gained access to an
even wider audience when it reached the science section in the New York Times
that described IIASA’s East-West joint effort against budworms as a new form of
counterintuitive management, where “‘[o]ptimization’ in terms of production,
profit or some such factor [was] partially sacrificed in favor of […] stability.”⁵⁹
At the above noted international conference for ASA in 1976, Holling returned
to IIASA from his Canadian home institution and delivered a speech about the
successes in forest and pest management in Canada by applying IIASA’s meth-
odology. His speech was seconded with a presentation by Wesley K. Foell, who
introduced IIASA’s newly planned East-West centered environmental modelling
projects. Foell indicated how IIASA’s methodological experience from budworm
modelling influenced contemporary national and cross-regional projects in Wis-
consin (USA), in the Rhône-Alpes region (France), or in the GDR, while IIASA de-
veloped novel networks with other international research facilities with experi-
ences in optimization and centralized planning processes.⁶⁰ For example, the
Institut für Energetik in Leipzig. Holling and Foell’s introductions both provided
several theoretical frameworks for subsequent state-of-the-art case studies of IIA-
SA’s staff, large-scale regions which possessed a long tradition of social and en-
vironmental planning such as the Tennessee Valley Project (TVA) in the USA and
the analysis of the Bratsk-Limsk Complex in the USSR.⁶¹
The conference also attracted well-known scientists from the East, including
Leonid Kantorovich from the All-Union Research Institute for Systems Studies in
Moscow, and Yuri Ermoliev from the Institute of Cybernetics in Kiev. Both sat in
IIASA’s auditorium and participated in the debate.⁶² These visits were not coin-
 Levien, “Systems Analysis in an International Setting”: 14–15.
 Walter Sullivan, “A New Systems Analysis Helps to Fight Budworm,” New York Times CXXV,
nos. 43,234 (1976): 36.
 IIASA Archives, “Council Minutes, Tuesday 25 Nov, 9:20 am,” in Council, Fifth Meeting, No-
vember 24–26 1975 (IIASA Archives, June 1975): 11.
 The Rockefeller Foundation Archives, “Program of the IIASA Conference 76’,” in Record
Group 1.3, Projects areas, 103 International Organizations, IIASA Energy Supplementary Material
Drafts, Box 8, Folder 50– 103 (The Rockefeller Foundation Archives, 1976).
 The Rockefeller Foundation Archives, “Strengthening the International Interdisciplinary Ac-
tivities of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences: Support for the IIASA/Appendix B,” in
Record Group 1.3 (FA388), Projects areas, Series 103 International Organizations, Box 1164 Folder
7874, IIASA (The Rockefeller Foundation Archives, 1982): 10.
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cidences but were preceded by complex organizational arrangements. The invi-
tations to Eastern researchers were issued during trips by Geoff Norton from Im-
perial College, London, in early 1976. Norton played a key role via the British
NMO in bringing researchers from the USSR to the IIASA and supported the es-
tablishment of unified knowledge among existing pest management knowledge
circles. He also reported on research and the needs of countries such as Yugosla-
via, Japan, and Poland, and traveled to the USSR with IIASA member Alexandr
Bazykin from the USSR’s Academy of Sciences, seeking East European groups to
hold presentations at the IIASA 1976 conference.⁶³
Among Eastern participation in the conference, Alexandr Bazykin was the
leading figure in improving relations between East-West ecosystems research.
Bazykin was among the first Soviet scientists who directly cooperated with Hol-
ling’s environmental group at IIASA in 1975, providing mathematical improve-
ments of Holling’s systems models and Dantzig’s reduced management models.
Bazykin’s participation established a new focus at REN, striving to measure more
precisely the ecological boundaries of budworm-endangered ecosystems. Bazy-
kin continued to work on principles that originated from mathematical (so-
called bifurcation) theories that were explored in the USSR in the 1950s⁶⁴
which subsequently influenced the work of the REN group. He complemented
IIASA’s forest systems research with precise mathematical formulas, novel indi-
cators of dynamic behaviors of variables in environmental systems, and with an
elaborated, well-received approach to integrating these systems boundary evalu-
ations into existing ecosystems models.⁶⁵ Bazykin represented the most impor-
tant link to the cybernetic research culture from the USSR and the ecological ap-
proach at the IIASA. He had been leading the laboratory of Mathematical
Problems in Biology in the USSR’s Academy of Sciences Computing Center,
and had already organized symposia on mathematical modelling of complex bi-
ological systems in the USSR. Due to his work in areas such as genetics, theory of
 IIASA Archives, “Memorandum from Levien- Conversation with Buzz Holling today (24 May
1976),” in Resources and Environ. Conferences and Workshops 1976– 1977 (IIASA Archives, June
1977).
 Application oriented bifurcation theory was explored at the USSR Academy of Sciences,
among others, by A M. Molchanov, A. E. Bazykin and A.I. Khibnik. See in this respect Yuri Kuz-
netzov, Elements of Applied Bifurcation Theory (New York: Springer, 1995), preface.
 Alexander D Bazykin, Nonlinear dynamics of interacting populations, vol. 11 (World Scientific,
1998), xiv. After working on IIASA’s Ecology project, Bazykin continued to work as a vice chair-
man of the Section of Mathematical Modeling and System Analysis within the USSR’s Academy
of Sciences Council on the Biosphere. The groundwork prepared at IIASA proved even more im-
portant when Bazykin became Deputy Minister in Gorbachev’s government under the Minister of
Natural Research Management and Environmental Protection, Nikolai Vorontsov.
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evolution, ecology, and mathematical modelling of population and ecosystems,
he was considered “one of the founders of that branch of science in Russia”.⁶⁶
Eastern participation at IIASA was further enhanced through a follow-up in-
ternational conference in autumn 1976, where the IIASA launched the “Pest Man-
agement Network”. It was a platform that facilitated debates in member organ-
izations and integrated information for making a state-of-the-art budworm
modeling and programming handbook, which distributed scientific debates
and results within a so-called “IIASA Pest Management Series.”⁶⁷ The annex
of the conference report recorded 70 participants of the Pest Management Net-
work, both from Eastern and Western research institutes.⁶⁸ The increasing num-
ber of workshops and international conferences from 1976 was related to Levien’s
plan to reinforce IIASA’s influence in management knowledge and the establish-
ment of more nuanced decision making, through “IIASA’s potential as a catalytic
agent and clearinghouse”.⁶⁹ From 1976 and with the support of Levien’s input as
IIASA director, IIASA sought to increase the number of Eastern scholars, some-
thing that was visible in the employment of mathematical ecologists from the So-
viet Union who participated in the generalization of applied systems analysis in
the USSR’s academies of sciences. ⁷⁰
From a Canadian endeavor to East-West
water resources research
In 1976, IIASA expanded its budworm research and intensified East-West cooper-
ation, in particular with the USSR, the FRG, the GDR, France, Poland and the
USA.⁷¹ The modeling principles of the budworm model were transferred to
new projects. The Pacific salmon fishery and river management project included
territories in Japan, the USA, and the USSR.⁷² The budworm model was crucial in
framing systems knowledge of how to measure, manage, and control the robust-
 Bazykin, Alexander D. Nonlinear Dynamics of Interacting Populations. (Vol. 11. Singapore,
World Scientific, 1998), xiii.
 Norton and Holling, Proceedings of a Conference on Pest Management, 25–29 October, 1976:
1.
 Ibid.: 345–349.
 Levien, “Systems Analysis in an International Setting”: 17.
 Ibid.
 C.S. Holling, Summary of Budworm Workshop, IIASAWorking Paper (IIASA, Laxenburg, Aus-
tria: IIASA, 1974): 9.
 IIASA, Annual Report 1976 (IIASA, 1977): 5.
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ness of environmental systems endangered by prior human mismanagement.
The desire to control and stabilize oceanic fish exploitation and the experiences
in fishery management displayed parallels with the needs and worries of forest
managers in Canada.⁷³ Between April 1976 and December 1977, IIASA organized
ten international conferences and workshops on how to improve water resources
research.⁷⁴ While the budworm project was analyzed in depth in order to extract
its novel methodology, the applied projects with their new thematic needed new
regionally experienced researchers, who were recruited for IIASA soon after the
Canadian budworm project ended. The new composition of the Resources and
Environment (REN) project at IIASA in 1976 demonstrates how regional forest
ecosystems experts were replaced by water resources research experts from
the East and the West, improving the equilibrium of researchers from both
sides. After the Canadian team left Laxenburg, newly appointed researchers
stayed at IIASA for shorter terms, but at least for six months. At that time, Alex-
andr Bazykin still assisted in the transition of the Resources and Environment
Area, and continued to integrate the development of mathematical modeling
in ecology and resources management. After the experimental phase, in which
Dantzig co-developed Holling’s computerized models, and with Holling and
Dantzig’s respective returns to Canada and the US, IIASA focused on mainte-
nance of outputs and results of its decision-modeling methodology that it was
understood could be easily re-used by regional experts.
The substantive achievement of the budworm experience was to de-contex-
tualize environmental systems knowledge that first concerned forest agencies
and the pulp and paper industry, and transferred the methodology to other en-
vironmental problems such as water or climatic pollution with different systems
boundaries and a different social and political context. Through new thematic
orientation, the approach was maintained whereby every environmental system
could be categorized, systematized, and modelled. Each system could be re-
duced to key variables from which would originate a range of feasible scenarios
for a decision maker. The transfer from forest management based on budworm
perturbation to water resources management was fulfilled as a result of scientists
arriving at the IIASA after 1975. They did not start working from scratch, but
added their experience to pre-existing approaches. The water resources and fish-
ery project and its participating researchers provide an insight into the intercon-
nectedness of the IIASAwithin the national academies of sciences, governmental
 Levien, “Systems Analysis in an International Setting”: 10.
 IIASA Archives, “Listing of Conferences,” in Resources and Environ. Conferences and Work-
shops 1976– 1977 (IIASA Archives, June 1977).
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agencies, and a broader scientific and political elite, either from the East or the
West. Zdzislaw Kaczmarek, for example, was a water resource specialist from Po-
land and had worked as Deputy Minister to the Ministry of Science, Higher Edu-
cation and Technology of the government of Poland before he became a project
leader at IIASA.⁷⁵ Ilya Gouevsky, a well-known Bulgarian cybernetician took over
responsibility for the planning and operating of water demand at IIASA. Roman
Kulikowski, former director of the Computation Center of the Polish Academy of
Sciences, joined IIASA to improve the entangled modeling of social and environ-
mental systems⁷⁶. Further Eastern members of the water resources group includ-
ed Todor Popov, a Bulgarian macroeconomic lecturer and Director General for
International Relations at the State Committee for Science, Technical Progress
and Higher Education in Bulgaria. Popov also participated in IIASA’s state-of-
the-art encyclopedic research to collect the methodological work at IIASA.⁷⁷ Jür-
gen Schmidt participated at IIASA as a water quality management expert from
the Institute of Water Resources in Berlin (GDR). He was the former head of
the Laboratory for Water Biology and Chemistry; he elaborated methodologies
for data processing in the fields of environmental protection and environmental
engineering. András Szöllösi-Nagy, a Hungarian researcher, joined IIASA as an
eminent water resources expert, with a focus on a joint European project for
the application of systems analysis to problems in relation to the Tisza River
Basin.⁷⁸
The above listed researchers indicate IIASA’s prioritization of recruiting ap-
plied regional researchers with policymaking experience that would integrate
IIASA’s early environmental systems thinking. Western scholars in water re-
source management confirm IIASA’s tendency to prioritize regional experience,
even in the organization of new methodological experiments. Wesley Foell from
the USA became the leader of IIASA’s methodology group. He started his career
at Stanford, continued at MIT and later joined the EURATOM where he focused
on the combination of nuclear reactor research and environmental impact of en-
ergy systems. Kirit Parikh, an Indian computer systems expert from the Indian
 After his stay at IIASA, Kaczmarek became Chief of the Polish Governmental Water Resour-
ces Program from 1976–1985.
 Kulikowski came with the experience from a PhD at the Moscow Electrotechnical Institute;
when he left Poland, he had already been pursuing an international career as a visiting profes-
sor at Columbia University, New York, the UCLA Berkley and the University of Minnesota.
 See, for example, IIASA Archives, “Letter from Todor Popov to Ed Quade (5 April 1977),” in
Folder/Directorate-Survey Project (‐1978) (IIASA Archives, 1977).
 András Szöllösi-Nagy also was a member of the American Geophysical Union, until 2014,
and was rector of the UNESCO-IHE Institute for Water Education.
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Statistical Institute in Delhi, participated in modeling research with a focus on
water management and energy policy.⁷⁹ The composition of Eastern and Western
researchers mirrors IIASA’s shift in recruitment priority to obtain a visible sym-
metry of Eastern and Western researchers as well as experts who would apply
REN models to subjects that could be integrated in supporting member coun-
tries. Following the work conducted by Dantzig and Holling, the experimental
methodological work was mostly considered completed. IIASA opted to broaden
ecosystems research geographically as well as thematically, with the internation-
ally relevant fields of water resources and energy systems research at its fore-
front.
Conclusion
The insights acquired through computerized modelling in budworm research not
only led to the recognition (and quantification) of previous mismanagement in
the tackling of the budworm pest in Canada, but through IIASA’s international
framework the continuing use of computerized models for decision-making in
environmental management extended to more nuanced mathematical calcula-
tions and policy recommendations that were distributed internationally by re-
searchers from the East and the West. The example of the moth-like budworm
and its desires and needs saw it surpass human-induced conceptual limits. A
focus on thresholds and the attempt to calculate the complexity of ecosystems
after the budworm’s pest outbreak became a trigger for the reinforcement of cal-
culations of similar threshold levels, in fields and contexts that became relevant
to East-West management sciences of IIASA-affiliated countries. The Canadian
budworm methodology prescribed a consolidated pathway for IIASA and be-
came a vivid example for the dissemination of ecosystems knowledge. 40
years later, when Holling drafted his autobiography in 2006,⁸⁰ he continued to
highlight that the approach he and his team had followed had constituted a
“kind of Kuhnian revolution.”⁸¹ The budworm models implemented a framework
that inspired several IIASA member organizations to become acquainted with
systems thinking and policy options deduced from the application of systems
analysis. The development of formalized computer models (that Levien com-
pared to the functioning of a “brain”), the economic calculation of environmen-
 If not otherwise mentioned, all biographical data was taken from a small booklet about the
IIASA staff published in 1976 by IIASA. See IIASA, Annual Report 1976.
 Holling, “A journey of discovery.”
 Ibid.: Preface.
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tal policy, or the design of policy strategies was developed subsequent to con-
ventional measures such as DDT spraying being proven ineffective for coping
with the reappearance of the budworm pest. The making of forest policies and
the approach to management of the paper and pulp industry in Canada may
have affected current approaches to systematizing environmental problems
and the notion of being capable of governing and controlling ecosystems signif-
icantly.
A second conclusion reflects upon the budworm experience in respect to IIA-
SA’s management theory. The interdependent calculation and testing of forest
systems and its actors, the wider ecological implication of timber production,
or the changes within the paper and pulp industry due to the budworm pest
in particular, posed questions about how to successfully establish coherent man-
agement principles due to the increase of new computerized calculations. The
budworm case study reappeared in Howard Raiffa’s lecture materials at Harvard
Business School, and since the case study referred to the experience gained by a
well-connected research collective that wished to include computerized technol-
ogies, international institutions and East-West diplomacy were considered neces-
sary passage points in order to improve standards in planning and decision mak-
ing. In modern management theory, there are subtle clues regarding which
school of thought this form of management might be associated with. The knowl-
edge gained at IIASA defined decision making within a framework deduced from
an interdisciplinary and international division of labor; with models, workshops
and international scientific and non-scientific conferences at its core. The expe-
rience constituted a shift from a planning focus on mere productivity and the
making of simple machinery towards more flexible, computer-supported, and
dynamic management options. These management options were considerably
nuanced through the modelling of future environmental behavior and measures
of the probability of its societal impact.⁸² In hindsight, IIASA’s approach to en-
vironmental management, its urge to computerize and simulate decision making
of the complex budworm pest and the inclusion of dynamic optimization proc-
esses by Dantzig reflected a significant shift in the role of systems and their effect
on planning and decision-making processes. The crafting of environmental
knowledge systems was guided by a complex formula of international research
of scholars, practitioners and policymakers within a “rapid movement of people
 IIASA’s experience with alternative frameworks for systems management might point to
novel insights in management theory, something that for the last three decades has been dis-
cussed as a shift towards a Post-Fordist conception that favored more flexible specializations
of labor. In this respect, see: Michael J. Piore and Charles F. Sabel, The second industrial divide:
possibilities for prosperity (New York: Basis Books, 1984), 263.
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and resources in space, swiftly changing markets, production, and products”⁸³.
Holling’s budworm approach was counterintuitive and provocative at the time,
which underpinned a significant change in using scientific analysis as a guide-
line for policy making and management in the 1970s.
Finally, IIASA’s activities around budworm research encouraged the contin-
uation of exchanges in the environmental field between the East and the West. In
1985, during a symposium and planning meeting in Moscow, IIASA signed a col-
laboration agreement for monitoring environmental systems and strengthening
international data exchange⁸⁴, just prior to the establishment of the Intergovern-
mental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) in 1988.When IIASA directors Robert H.
Pry and Peter de Janosi laid out IIASA’s main results of 18 years of research be-
fore the US House of Representatives Subcommittee on Science and Technology
in 1990, they noted that some of the most important projects at IIASA were stud-
ies of ecological management.⁸⁵ In the 1990s, IIASA’s highly relevant modeling
projects on inland lake environmental problems in the East and the West, includ-
ing studies of Lake Balaton in Hungary, Lake Como in Italy or Lake Erie in the US
and Canada,⁸⁶ pointed back to methodological origins derived from the study of
the budworm pest. The budworm and the subsequent economic calculations and
computerized models presented the key element for the systematization of com-
mon environmental and economic problems of industrialized countries of the
East and West during the Cold War. According to the late biomathematician
Carol M. Newton, the budworm project at IIASA was “indeed abstract theoretical
work”, but, as she claimed, it was “for the purpose of developing tools that sub-
sequently could be applied to real complex problems”⁸⁷ that interested members
 Emily Martin, “Fluid Bodies, Managed Nature,” in Remaking Realty: Nature at the Millenium,
ed. B. Braun and N. Castree (London and New York: Routledge, 1998), 76.
 W. C. Clark and R. E. Munn, Sustainable development of the biosphere (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press / IIASA, 1986), v; furthermore, see Clark and Munn, Sustainable development of
the biosphere, chapter 13.
 See Robert Pry’s contribution in United States Congress House Committee on Science and
Technology, U.S. participation in the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis
(IIASA): hearing before the Subcommittee on Natural Resources, Agriculture Research, and Envi-
ronment and the Subcommittee on International Scientific Cooperation and the Subcommittee on
Science, Research, and Technology of the Committee on Science, Space, and Technology, U.S.
House of Representatives, One Hundred First Congress, second session, April 18, 1990, 4 (U.S. Gov-
ernment Printing Office, 1990), 10.
 Ibid.
 C.M.Newton in Appendix G, Statements on the IIASA, The United States’ Membership in the
IIASA 1984, Russell Sage Foundation, Series 3 (Grant Files), Subgroup 2, Box 64, Folder 567.
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in both the East and the West that desired to maintain, control and calculate sta-
ble environmental behavior.
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“It is not a Question of rigidly Planning
Trade” UNCTAD and the Regulation of the
International Trade in the 1970s
UNCTAD (United Nations Conference for Trade and Development) was founded
following an international conference convened in Geneva in 1964 and subse-
quently every four years in a different location. In the 1970s it became a focal
point for the discussion of world trade¹ in close connection with the demands
for a New International Economic Order (NIEO) formulated at the UN by the de-
veloping countries with oil exporting countries as leaders. UNCTAD as well as
NIEO aimed to reach a “structural adjustment” between developed and develop-
ing countries that would be more profitable to the latter.² However, once an es-
sential forum where the world economy was hotly debated, UNCTAD has today
lost its importance, to the point where even its past centrality has almost fallen
into oblivion. In the 1980s and the 1990s, interest in UNCTAD declined dramat-
ically, until it fell again within the scope of interest shown by historians in the
2000s, along with the NIEO.³ Renewed interest came on the one hand from re-
search into the origins of what came to be called “globalization” in the 1980s⁴
 Most of the studies on UNCTAD were completed in the 1970s by jurists or political science spe-
cialists, when the organization was at its zenith: see Georges Merloz, La CNUCED. Droit Interna-
tional et Développement (Bruxelles: Bruylant, 1980); Boualia Benamar, La CNUCED et Le Nouvel
Ordre économique International (Paris: Université de droit, d’économie et de sciences sociales,
1984); Autar Krishan Koul,. The legal framework of UNCTAD in world trade (Leyden: A.W. Sijth-
off, 1977) and Robert L. Rothstein, Global Bargaining: UNCTAD and the Quest for a New Interna-
tional Economic Order. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1979. See also the UN internal
publication The History of UNCTAD 1964– 1984 (New York: United Nations Publication, 1985).
 Jagdish N. Bhagwati, The New International Economic Order: The North-South Debate (Cam-
bridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1983); Robert Cox, “Ideologies and the NIEO: Reflections on some re-
cent litterature”. International Organization 33, no. 2 (1979): 257‐302; William Loehr and John P.
Powelson, Threat to development. pitfalls of the NIEO (Boulder, Colo., 1983); Craig Murphy, The
Emergence of the NIEO Ideology (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1984).
 For a more recent account see the special issue Toward a History of the New International Eco-
nomic Order. Humanity: An International Journal of Human Rights, Humanitarianism, and Devel-
opment 6, no. 1 (2015).
 Sönke Kunkel, “Contesting Globalization: The United Nations Conference on Trade and Devel-
opment and the Transnationalization of Sovereignty,” International Organizations and Develop-
ment, 1945– 1990, ed. Sönke Kunkel, Corinna Unger, and Mark Frey (Basingstoke: Palgrave Mac-
millan, 2014), 240–259; see more generally John Toye and Richard Toye. The UN and Global
https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110534696-014
and on the other hand from a historiography critical of the current neoliberal
consensus in economic thought, especially since the 2008 crisis.⁵ Whether the
attempt to build a new world trade order was successful is not the subject of
the present chapter. Drawing mainly on internal sources of UNCTAD and espe-
cially on archival material held by its General Secretariat, it intends instead to
raise the question of planning in the field of international trade, using the
1970s attempt to build new trade relations at the world level as an opportunity
to observe how international trade was debated and how policies were elaborat-
ed in that field.
At first glance trade might seem unlikely to fall within the scope of planning.
Resulting from the mutual consent of two parties, trading activities hardly seems
to be fit to be ‘planned’ by anyone else other than by those parties. This first im-
pression is reinforced by the notion of the market as it was defined by classical
liberal economists. A ‘market’ can be considered as a space where parties ex-
change goods multilaterally according to prices resulting from supply and de-
mand, thus creating its own spontaneous order that seems to exclude any
form of planning. However, at the earliest in the late nineteenth century,
among neo-classical economists, and at the latest in the mid twentieth century
with the Keynesians, it became obvious that markets were not self-regulating in-
stitutions, and this opened the debate on the sort of action that could be taken
toward markets and trade.
Drawing upon the belief that markets had to be regulated to be efficient, UN-
CTAD was founded as a response to the failure of the project of a World Trade
Organization after the Conference of Havana in 1948 analyzed by Francine
McKenzie in her chapter. It aimed at redefining world trade relations multilater-
ally to bring development to every country in the world, especially to the newly
independent countries that appeared in the wake of Decolonization. As a result
of that goal, the member countries sat in groups that were created according to
their perceived level of development. However, UNCTAD also had to take into ac-
count different regional groupings as well as the Cold war divide, accommodat-
ing so-called different “economic and social systems” among its members. As a
result country members did not vote individually but collectively, according to
Political Economy: Trade, Finance, and Development (Bloomington: Indiana University Press,
2004).
 Johanna Bockman, “Socialist Globalization against Capitalist Neocolonialism: The Economic
Ideas behind the New International Economic Order,” Humanity: An International Journal of
Human Rights, Humanitarianism, and Development 6, no. 1 (2015): 109– 128.
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their affiliation to “groups” that had been created to take into account develop-
ment, regional as well as ideological factors (see table 1).⁶
Table 1: Groups at UNCTAD and their number of votes
 
Group A (developing countries)  
Group B (market economy developed countries)  
Group C (Latin America)  
Group D (socialist countries)  
Total  
Thanks to the diversity of ideological and economic models it had to deal with,
UNCTAD offers a stimulating insight into different models of planning it strove to
reconcile in order to reach its own goals as an international organization.
UNCTAD and the notion of “planning”
UNCTAD’s executive organ was the Trade and Development Board, where every
country member basically had a representative. When he made a statement be-
fore the Trade and Development Board in 1970, Secretary General Manuel Perez
Guerrero very clearly set the terms of debate:
It is not a question of rigidly planning trade, but rather of acting within a flexible frame-
work, introducing dynamic incentives and disincentives which favor particular trends
and avoid dangerous disruptions in terms of the International Development Strategy
and, in addition, enable all countries to draw up their plans on more secure and harmo-
nious bases.⁷
In that statement Perez Guerrero rejected any idea of planning international
trade in a narrow sense but he did find it necessary to shape a frame for the mar-
ket in order to steer the trade activity toward a desirable goal.
Michel Christian,”UNCTAD” in Den Kalten Krieg vermessen. Über Reichweite und Alternativen
einer binären Ordnung, ed. Frank Reichherzer, Emmanuel Droit, Jan Hansen (forthcoming in
2018).
 UNCTAD, TDB/A8015/Rev.1: Report of the Trade and Development Board (24 September
1969–13 October 1970), 1971, 234.
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To understand what Perez-Guerrero meant, it must be recalled that UN-
CTAD’s project rested on three principles. First, in contrast to the theory of mod-
ernization popularized by W. Rostow, UNCTAD’s founders saw the many coun-
tries of the world not through their individual path but through their mutual
relations. That perspective mostly reflected the ideas of the first UNCTAD Secre-
tary-General Raul Prebisch (1964– 1969), who had been an high ranking Argen-
tinian economic official and Director of the Central Bank of Argentinia in the
1930s and the Executive Secretary of the UN Economic Commission for Latin
America in the 1950s. Together with the German economist Hans Singer, he de-
veloped the “thesis of the deterioration of the relative prices of primary commod-
ities,” known as the Prebisch-Singer thesis. As a result of that “structural” per-
spective, UNCTAD supported a multilateral and global approach based on the
idea of an economic adjustment that would apply to poor and wealthy countries
alike in order to create a new, fair international division of labor.⁸ That idea of a
“structural adjustment,” which in the 1980s would be imposed unilaterally on
poor countries, had its roots in the studies of the “world economy” that saw
the world as a single economic unit in which disparities of development had
to be reduced progressively as had already begun in national economies.⁹
Secondly, UNCTAD by no means questioned the necessity of the market as
the natural framework for international trade. This is why the terms “trade”
and “development” were linked in the very name of the organization. In fact,
one of the recurring demands of the developing countries, backed by the social-
ist countries, was the “liberalization” of the market in the field of manufactured
products as well as the removal of the “protections” that existed in the devel-
oped countries, in order to foster a new international division of labor. Yet, the
international market needed interventions to be stable, as had been practiced
in national economies since the Great Depression, and those interventions had
to be coordinated.
Thirdly, whether it be to ensure market stability or to implement a mutual
adjustment between developing and developed countries, economic planning
was needed. A shared view within the UNCTAD General Secretariat, such plan-
ning included international measures giving the developing and especially the
“least developed” countries the material possibility – in terms of transportation,
shipping or storage – to produce goods and sell them to every country in the
North as well as in the South. Other non material measures had to be taken to
 Johanna Bockman, “Socialist Globalization against Capitalist Neocolonialism.”
 Johanna Bockman, “Eastern European Economists and the Notion of Development: Socialist
Economists in the UN Conference on Trade and Development,” American Journal of Sociology,
108, no. 2 (September 2002): 310–352..
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create regional monetary institutions or to favor regional economic coopera-
tion.¹⁰ The necessity of framing international trade was very well reflected in
the explanations given by the Indian economist and newly appointed UNCTAD
staff member Surendra Patel in a letter he wrote in 1967 to a friend in his home-
land:¹¹
In theory this is of course quite true [that multilateral trade has advantages] – no more or
less than the validity of the statement that under certain competitive conditions general
equilibrium in an economy is maintained by the changing relationships between the fac-
tors of input and their prices. But as you know, real economic life rarely provides a perfect
example of a general theory. Hence the significance of the changes toward planned eco-
nomic development in post-war years. Nowadays, economists have come a long way in ac-
cepting that planned development is not after all impossible, or even irrational, as com-
pared with unplanned development. The next logical step in my way of thinking is to
extend this experience to the sphere of international trade. In any such extension, bilateral
(or triangular, or multilateral) trade agreements would seem to serve in the field of interna-
tional exchange presumably the same purpose as planning is now serving in the domestic
field.
The consensus on the necessity of some planning in the field of international
trade was congruent with the fact that from the 1960s to the 1980s, the UNCTAD
Secretaries-Generals had prior experience in national economic planning in their
home countries. That was for instance the case with Manuel Pérez-Guerrero, UN-
CTAD Secretary-General from 1969 to 1974, who had been Director of the Office
for Coordination and Planning in Venezuela from 1959 to 1963 and Gamani
Corea, UNCTAD Secretary-General from 1974 to 1984, who had been Head of
the Planning Secretariat in Sri Lanka from 1952 to 1960. On the contrary, the Gha-
naian Kenneth Dadzie who was UNCTAD Secretary-General from 1986 to 1994, at
a time when planning ideas had declined, had led a diplomatic career as an am-
bassador – and not as a planner – in several African and European countries be-
fore joining UNCTAD.
In spite of their respective backgrounds as planners, the successive Secreta-
ries-General did not use the term “planning” to deal with international trade. As
showed by the minutes of the Trade and Development Board, they preferred
other words like “stabilization,” “framework” or “forecast.” They might have
avoided use of the term“planning” because they did not want to take a stand
in the rivalries between the so-called “market economies” and the “centrally
 Proceedings of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, 1964, vol.2, Policy
statements, 60–63.
 UNCTAD, ARR 40/1929, box 547, TD 810: Patel to Rosario, 1 June 1967.
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planned economies”. It is yet more convincing to suppose that, heading an in-
ternational organization, they could hardly have supported economic planning
directly, because international trade was too complex a level to be planned
and because it would have been perceived as an infringement of the sovereign-
ties of the member States. More generally, in the discussions at the Trade and
Development Board, where every member-State had a representative, the term
“planning” was mainly used in two contexts. Either it was used for the national
level referring to “national plans,” “economic plans,” “industry planning” or
“technology planning,” which included the socialist countries (until the 1960s
also called “centrally planned economies”), or it was used for the planning of
development, as in the expression “development plans,” which was often linked
with the national level as in the expression “national development plans.”
In this regard, there was little about the use of the term “planning” that dis-
tinguished UNCTAD from the other UN agencies. In the UN, the term appeared in
the 1940s in the context of “housing and town planning” but from the 1960s on
it became closely associated with the notion of “development”. A “Committee
for Development Planning” – also often referred to during the Trade and Devel-
opment Board session – was created in 1966 as a consultative body of experts
chaired by economist Jan Tinbergen, with the task of “making their experiences
in development planning available to the UN for use in the formulation and ex-
ecution of development plans.”¹² More frequently, the term “planning” was used
to describe planning instances in specific countries. Reflecting this selective use
of the term, Maurice Bertrand – a long-life UN civil servant and respected mem-
ber of the “Joint Inspection Unit” – noted in a comprehensive 1969 evaluation
report on the UN system, that “programming methods” were “more and more ef-
ficient,” yet they remained “in a well defined national scope,” He emphasized
that “all the known methods . . . have been put to the service of the States”
and that “such programming is not possible at the level of the UN.”¹³ As in UN-
CTAD vocabulary, the term “planning” was associated with national sovereignty,
which means that any form of planning in the field of international trade implied
a cooperation between States in the first instance.
 Department of Economic and Social Affairs of the United Nations, Planning and plan imple-
mentation, Publications des Nations unies (New York: United Nations publications, 1967).
 “Les méthodes de programmation restent dans un cadre bien défini qui est le cadre national
. . . Toutes les méthodes connues . . . ont été développées pour être mises au service des Etats.
Une telle programmation n’est pas possible à l’échelle de l’ONU,” UNCTAD, ARR 40/1929, box
543, JIU/REP 69/7 : Projet de rapport sur programmation et budgets dans la famille des Nations
Unies, 20 June1969. I thank Emilie Dairon for her comment on Maurice Bertrand.
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Promoting policies to reshape world trade
in the 1970s
At the beginning of the 1970s, the end of the Bretton Woods fixed exchange rates
regime and the oil embargo that had changed the world’s power balance were
taken as an opportunity by developing countries to have a declaration adopted
in April 1974 by the UN General Assembly “for the Establishment of a New Inter-
national Economic Order,”¹⁴ which was followed in December by a “Charter of
Economic Rights and Duties of the States.”¹⁵ Like UNCTAD, the NIEO aimed at
redefining the world economic order more in favor of developing countries, with-
out questioning the market mechanisms and without taking a position on the
most desirable economic model at the national level. Identifying itself with
the NIEO program, UNCTAD’s General Secretariat became instrumental in pro-
moting policies aimed at building a new framework for international trade.
Yet the General Secretariat, in UNCTAD as in other UN institutions, had no
decision-making power. The main policy orientations were adopted by the Con-
ference while their implementation depended upon the work carried out by com-
missions formed on an intergovernmental basis and upon the decisions of the
Trade and Development Board as UNCTAD’s executive organ. This is why the UN-
CTAD General Secretariat had to use other, softer means to have new policies
adopted and implemented. On the one hand, it tried to craft a common frame-
work that could reconcile the free market with various conceptions of planning.
At the same time, he sought to build coalitions with different actors, avoiding as
well as using the Cold war divide. This concern for planning as well as for East-
West and North-South relations makes UNCTAD a relevant ground for observing
planning models and how they circulated, coexisted or competed.
With its General Secretariat as the main driver, UNCTAD developed a wide
range and a great variety of policies.¹⁶ The core of UNCTAD activity since its
foundation in 1964 had been the elaboration of new trade regulations more fa-
vorable to the developing countries. This included first and foremost commodi-
ties which made up the largest part of the developing countries’ exports. There
had been some international agreements on olive oil as well as on tin previous
to the foundation of UNCTAD. Not only did UNCTAD help to extend those previ-
 UN, A/RES/S-6/3201, see also http://www.un-documents.net/s6r3201.htm (accessed on 15
February 2017).
 UN, A/RES/29/3281, see also http://www.un-documents.net/a29r3281.htm (accessed on 15
February 2017).
 For a detailed presentation of UNCTAD policies, see Merloz, La CNUCED.
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ous agreements but it also negotiated new ones on sugar, wheat and cocoa,
adopting a so-called “commodity by commodity” approach. Initiated in 1974
and officially adopted by UNCTAD IV in Nairobi in 1976, the “Integrated Program
of Commodities” broke new ground in supporting a systematic approach, pro-
moting the establishment of a common fund and of buffer stocks to stabilize ex-
port earnings while at the same time launching a coordinated round of negotia-
tions on 18 commodities.
Another matter of discussion in trade regulations at UNCTAD was the elab-
oration of a Generalized System of Preference (GSP). According to free trade prin-
ciples, every country should offer others the same conditions as it offered the
most favored country (“most favored nation clause”). That principle was ques-
tioned given that reciprocity and non-discrimination could only work between
countries with similar levels of development. As a result, the GSP was launched
at the second convening of UNCTAD in New Dehli in 1968. UNCTAD II adopted
the reverse principle of the “most favored nation clause” by taking into account
the structural asymmetry between developed and developing countries and by
offering them systematic non-reciprocal preferences and compensating discrim-
ination. The principle of a GSP in the field of manufacture was acknowledged by
the GATT in 1971 but it was only progressively implemented, beginning with the
EEC in 1971.
One of the problems the developing countries faced was their trade depend-
ency on the developed countries’ markets, often continuing previous colonial
trade relations. This is why UNCTAD also supported “economic cooperation be-
tween developing countries” by helping them to create regional market organi-
zations, such as the Andean Group in 1969. However, during the course of
1970, mainly as a result of the embargo led by oil exporting countries, economic
cooperation began to be envisioned as a way to help developing countries devel-
op themselves independently of the developed countries, which was termed “self
reliance.”
A last UNCTAD policy in trade regulation was to promote the trade “between
countries having different economic and social systems,” meaning the trade be-
tween socialist countries and developing countries. UNCDAT acknowledged the
existence of state planned economies and popularized their potential advantag-
es for the developing countries. Socialist economic planning was viewed as more
predictable and thus more likely to bring stability to international markets. Trade
with socialist countries took the form of trade agreements between sovereign
states. They were negotiated and often also had a technical aid dimension
which could be attractive to non-industrialized countries, as industrial plants
made up an important part of exports from socialist countries. In a longer-
term view, state-planned economies had another advantage from the perspective
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of a global mutual economic adjustment. Because of their central and hierarch-
ical character, they were regarded as easier to restructure and more likely to con-
tribute to a new international division of labor. The program adopted by the
countries of the Council for Mutual Economic Aid (CMEA) in Bucharest in 1971
explicitly mentioned their efforts to integrate more trade relations in their
plans, although these were external factors.
The UNCTAD General Secretariat did not limit itself to mere trade regula-
tions. According to its global vision of trade and development, it also worked
on the material and practical conditions of trade. Transport was a problem.
Most of the trade was done through liners owned by companies that were
based in the developed countries and decided freight rates on their own at so-
called “liner conferences.” UNCTAD supported the adoption of a “Code of con-
duct on liner conferences” as well as the creation of national fleets. The difficul-
ties were even greater for landlocked or insular countries, for which UNCTAD
elaborated a special aid program. Not only material but also immaterial infra-
structure played a significant role in trade. This is why legislation on patents
and licenses was also a concern from the beginning of UNCTAD, which led to
the elaboration of an International Code of Conduct for Technology Transfer
in the late 1970s. Likewise, the lack of national insurance and reinsurance sys-
tems in the developing countries worsened the dependence upon the developed
countries. UNCTAD helped the former build their own systems.
In the 1970s, in the new context created by the affirmation of the NIEO, UN-
CTAD’s General Secretariat not only became more assertive in the areas where it
had already developed policies, but it also took the initiative in two new areas.
First, it took the opportunity of the crisis surrounding the Bretton Woods system
to attempt taking over the role of a forum for the setting up of a new internation-
al monetary system. In particular, UNCTAD’s General Secretariat advocated for
the inclusion of the developing countries in that process and for the so-called
“link principle” between Special Drawing Rights and the financing of develop-
ment. Second, UNCTAD’s General Secretariat not only made an attempt at rede-
fining regulations but also at bringing direct help in creating and strengthening
the industrial capacities of the developing countries. It did so by researching
how to use subventions and elaborate “national foreign export plans” as well
as national “technology plans.” Those initiatives were taken in collaboration
with the United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO), which
was increasingly influential in the 1970s, as illustrated by the “Program of
Lima” that was adopted at its conference in 1975. This extension from the con-
cern for regulation to the concern for industrialization was accompanied by
the development of “technical aid,” mainly in the form of training, a kind of ac-
tivity that had originally not been envisioned by UNCTAD’s founder and first Sec-
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retary General Raul Prebisch.¹⁷ The concern for the industrialization of develop-
ing countries reflected the long-term project of building a new international di-
vision of labor, which lay at the core of UNCTAD’s endeavors.
Crafting a common intellectual framework
Having those policies adopted was not an easy task. A first means of influence
on member states was upstream work: thanks to its own staff and to numerous
collaborations with external research institutions, UNCTAD’s General Secretariat
was able to demonstrate an expertize capacity that was used to craft an intellec-
tual framework in which the promoted policies would make sense for all parties.
That framework was meant to link planning with free market and was opened to
a wide range of options, from Keynesian market economies to socialist planned
economies.
Regulating the market of commodities
Any proposal that had successfully moved from draft to official policy in fact al-
ready had a long history as a research topic in the various divisions of the General
Secretariat,well before being put on the political agenda. This is well illustrated by
UNCTAD’s attempt at establishing “buffer stocks,” that is, internationally-owned
stocks covering a wide range of commodities in order to stabilize market prices.
The idea was not a new one and had already been formulated – but not adopted
– at the Bretton Woods Conference in 1944.¹⁸ The establishment of buffer stocks
financed by a common fund was set as a goal at UNCTAD’s fourth conference
in Nairobi in 1976.¹⁹ But the topic had been announced and dealt with at the
Trade and Development Board for the first time in 1974²⁰ and UNCTAD’s Commod-
ity Division had been working on it at least since 1969. That year the Commodities
 As stressed by UNCTAD official Paul Berthoud, who described Prebisch in his memoirs as
“rather indifferent to the involvement of UNCTAD in micro-assistance of a technical nature,”
see Berthoud, Paul, A Professional Life Narrative and Some Related Stories: http://www.ed
inter.net/paulberthoud/narrative/ (accessed 14 February 2017).
 Eric Helleiner, “The Development Mandate of International Institutions: Where Did It Come
From?” Studies in Comparative International Development 44, no.6 (2009): 189–211.
 Conference resolution 93(IV) 30 May 1976, section 1, Preamble.
 UNCTAD, TDB/ A/9615/Rev.1: Report of the Trade and Development Board (12 September
1973– 13 September 1974), 1975, 26.
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Division contributed to a study on the “Stabilization of Prices of Primary Products”
initiated by the World Bank,²¹ in which the proposal of buffer stocks was very
clearly articulated.²²
The same year, UNCTAD’s Commodities Division was charged with the task
of working out a framework to prepare the work of an intergovernmental techni-
cal group on buffer stocks. For that purpose, the division commissioned a study
from Sri Lankan economist Lal Jayawardene. That study was to draw on Keynes’
proposals for the establishment of buffer stocks, dating back to 1942 when he
was preparing the Bretton Woods conference. Jayawardene’s study was not sup-
posed to repeat but to adapt Keynes’ proposal to the current situation. In a series
of critical comments written to Jayawardene, UNCTAD researcher Alfred Maizels
underlined that, while Keynesian proposals of buffer stocks were of course rele-
vant, their envisioned implementation was far too limited, Keynes’s view even
being called “extreme laissez-faire.” In Maizels’ mind, buffer stocks should in
fact not only be used for short-term stabilizing purposes, but also for “long-
term action to improve the trend of prices and earnings.”²³ At the same time,
however, Maizel thought that the study should also deal with “supply engage-
ments” in order to respond to the concern of the developed countries that
were affected by the oil embargo. The latter would then be more likely to accept
the principle of buffer stocks.While providing a study to a “technical” group, the
Commodities Division was in fact giving guidelines for the future discussions.
However, that process was not exclusively determined by experts. Each divi-
sion of the General Secretariat was accountable to the Trade and Development
Board where representatives of the member states had a word to say on the ac-
tivity of the divisions, including on their research agendas. This is clearly shown
by the debate over the question of the indexation of the prices of commodities
that polarized the Trade and Development Board in the 1970s. The indexation
was meant to counteract the “deterioration of the terms of trade” between devel-
oping and developed countries. When Secretary General Gamani Corea men-
tioned a study on indexation in 1974,²⁴ he triggered a debate on the very sub-
 UNCTAD, ARR 40/1882, box 409, TD 310/3: Maizels to Macone, 7 August 1969.
 See World Bank, Stabilization of Prices of Primary Products. A Joint Study IMF-IBRD.Washing-
ton: 1969, 69–73 and 93– 103. The report is available on line: http://documents.worldbank.org/
curated/en/903841468780623537/The-problem-of-stabilization-of-prices-of-primary-products (ac-
cessed 15 February 2017).
 UNCTAD, TDB/ A/9615/Rev.1: Report of the Trade and Development Board (12 September
1973– 13 September 1974), 1975, 25–27.
 UNCTAD, TDB/503: The indexation of prices. Report by the Secretary-General of UNCTAD on
the findings of his study, 6 August 1974.
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stance of the subject. Whereas the representatives of developing countries em-
phasized “the critical importance [to them] of earnings from exports of primary
commodities,” the representatives of the developed countries stressed the com-
plexity of such a policy as well as its potential negative consequences for all con-
sumer countries including the developing countries.²⁵ In 1975, hot debates were
rekindled when the Secretary-General presented a report on the work of the Ex-
pert Group on Indexation, one representative stating that “this question raised
insoluble problems and that it was practically impossible to establish a scientific
index or to determine objectively the reference prices on which to base indexa-
tion.”²⁶ The debate had practical consequences for the research project: at stake
was the extended funding of a position to have the study on indexation contin-
ued.²⁷ Thus, the production of knowledge had a political dimension from the
start.
Bringing together socialist state planning
and UNCTAD’s action
This political dimension of knowledge production systematically appears in the
work of the Division “for the commerce between countries with different eco-
nomic and social systems” – also called Division for the Trade with socialist
countries or TRADSOC division. A result of a special demand from the USSR dat-
ing back to 1963, this rather small division of five to ten members consisted in the
majority of citizens from socialist countries (mainly from the USSR and from Bul-
garia), supplemented by citizens from developing countries or neutral European
developed countries. The division had the primary goal of promoting trade be-
tween socialist and developing countries and was accordingly tasked with re-
porting on “trends and policies in trade between countries having different eco-
nomic and social systems,” with popularizing “technical assistance projects in
the sphere of trade relations between socialist and developing countries” and
with documenting the “problems of co-ordinating long-term agreements with de-
 UNCTAD, TDB/ A/9615/Rev.1: Report of the Trade and Development Board (12 September
1973– 13 September1974), 1975, 30–31.
 UNCTAD, TDB/ A/10015/Rev.1: Report of the Trade and Development Board (10 March–2 Oc-
tober 1975), 1976, 150.
 Ibid.
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velopment plans and programs in both socialist and developing countries, in-
cluding possibilities of co-operating in planning.”²⁸
Building a coalition involving different and potentially conflicting views on
planning was not an easy task, because of the tensions not only between the
member states but also inside the various General Secretariats divisions. These
kinds of tension clearly appeared during the preparation of a training seminar
for the “planning of foreign export.” First entrusted to the UNCTAD’s New
York Office, the preparation was then transferred to the Research Division in
Geneva that included trade with the socialist countries in the program “to
make the topic a little more concrete,” as trading with planned economies ap-
peared to be a logical way to plan foreign export.²⁹ Disagreeing with that initia-
tive, the New York office took back the project, focusing exclusively on market
matters like protection, forecast, econometric analysis or capital requirements.³⁰
More fundamentally, the TRADSOC division had to counter negative dis-
courses or representations of socialist countries as being unable to trade effi-
ciently with developing countries. First, it had to refute the idea that planned
economies were autarchic economies. When UNCTAD was founded, there was
no clear conception of the role of foreign trade in the socialist planned econo-
mies. Exports were often said to be first of all a means to gain foreign currencies
necessary to pay imports that were needed for the national economy, as stated by
the Soviet expert M.Gousev himself at a UN-funded training session in 1964.³¹ At
exactly the same time, however, East German experts participating in the CMEA
working group that had been formed for the preparation of the first UNCTAD
stressed the necessity to anticipate a change in the current exports of the devel-
oping countries, from primary commodities to more manufactured or semi-man-
ufactured goods. Although the GDR would experience some “adjustment difficul-
ties, since [it had] important production capacities for those commodities in the
country,” this trend was seen as rational and the GDR should be able to find its
place by delivering machines or turnkey industrial plants, thus contributing to a
new division of labor.³² By the beginning of the 1970s, the latter conception had
 UNCTAD, ARR 40/1929, box 546, TD 802/8: Division for trade with socialist countries. Func-
tions, 1976.
 UNCTAD, ARR 40/2344, Research: El Naggar to Pérez-Guerrero, 3 December 1969.
 UNCTAD, ARR 40/1929, box 558, TD 977/21: Seminar on the Planning of the Foreign Trade Sec-
tor to be held in the course of 1970, 8 December 1969.
 Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Rapport sur le cycle d’études des Nations Unies
sur les techniques de la planification, United Nations Publications, 1964, 22–23.
 SAPMO-BArch, DY 30/IVA 2/6.10/118: Programm zur Gestaltung und weiteren Entwicklung des
Handels der DDR mit den Entwicklungsländern, 8 October 1963.
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become central to the discourse of the TRADSOC division, drawing on the 1971
CMEA Program of Bucharest. The draft statement prepared for the intervention
of the UNCTAD Secretary General at the 1971 session of the Trade and Develop-
ment Board strongly recalled that the “need for rational structural changes in na-
tional economies” appeared “among the priorities in national plans.” As a re-
sult, “the idea of complementing progressively economic structures of the
socialist countries with those of the rest of the world [seemed] to be becoming
more and more part of the planning considerations.”³³
Second, there was the “wrong concept” – as presented in a draft letter to be
sent to the delegates of developing countries in 1970 – that “the import policy in
the socialist countries of Eastern Europe [was] rather a result of arbitrary deci-
sions of the central management without them giving due weight to the existing
demands and preferences of final consumers.” To counter this argument, the di-
vision prepared two studies on the “[d]ecision making process in respect of im-
port in selected socialist countries (the interdependence of central management
and final users)” and on the “[w]ays of introducing new products from develop-
ing countries into selected socialist countries’ markets.”³⁴
A third and final obstacle the division had to deal with was the strong bilat-
eral character of socialist countries’ trade. CMEA integration, which was decided
in the 1971 Bucharest program was supposed to favor multilateral trade, as ex-
plained by the UNCTAD Secretary-General at a session of the Trade and Develop-
ment Board in 1977: “Over the recent past, the bilateral economic relations of so-
cialist countries of Eastern Europe with developing countries are gradually
supplemented by various forms of multilateral co-operation which provide for
greater flexibility in their trade and economic relations.”³⁵ He mentioned the
transferable ruble that enjoyed considerable attention because it was supposed
to be used by socialist countries to pay their trading partners, who in turn could
use that currency to buy products in any other socialist country. The division
even created an ad hoc commission composed of international experts to deal
with the transferable ruble.³⁶ But in the same statement, the UNCTAD Secreta-
 UNCTAD, ARR 40/1929, box 546, TD 804: Opening Statement of Item 7 of the Agenda (11th Ses-
sion of the Board, 26 July 1971), 3.
 UNCTAD, ARR 40/1929, box 549, TD 820/9: Study on marketing with socialist countries (Octo-
ber1968-May 1971).
 UNCTAD, ARR 40/1929, box 546, TD 804: Report by Secretary General of UNCTAD to the 8th
special session of Trade and Development Board, 25 February 1977, 3.
 UNCTAD, ARR 40/1830, box 67, TDO 287/5: Intergovernmental group of experts to study a
multilateral system of payment between the socialist countries of Eastern Europe and develop-
ing countries, October 1977-December 1977.
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ry-General had to recognize that “bilateral links will continue to play a predom-
inant role in the future.”³⁷ In a similar statement the same year, he added that
“the transition to multilateralism was a long process.”³⁸
Along with those efforts to clear up any misunderstanding, the division
avoided any glorification of socialist countries’ type of state-planned economy
as opposed to capitalism. Instead, the line of the division for trade with socialist
countries consisted in highlighting again and again the objective positive effects
of state-planned economies on trade with developing countries. In this way, the
division performed a kind of translation from the usual Marxist-Leninist dis-
course to the UNCTAD’s developmental discourse. As a result, some dividing is-
sues were carefully avoided. Among them was the question of the ownership of
the means of production: the very terms of “capitalism” or “capitalist countries”
were not used in the TRADSOC division. But the same division regularly recalled
that any country that wished to trade with the socialist countries first had to es-
tablish some kind of state organization to deal with them, assuming that states
were the only relevant agents in trade matters. Another core issue at UNCTAD,
the idea of development through trade, was also avoided: while showing a
real interest in trade with developing countries, socialist countries were at
odds with the idea of implementing national development plans primarily on
the basis of export earnings. Their representatives at the Trade and Development
Board, unlike the more cautious staff of the TRADSOC division, instead called for
deeper political and social transformation at the national level, having in mind
their own historical path.³⁹
UNCTAD as an agent in the field of economics
As shown above by their cooperation with researchers of the World Bank, UN-
CTAD researchers did not work alone. That was particularly true in the 1970s
in the matter of commodities. UNCTAD’s researchers had a relationship of
trust with some of their World Bank’s counterparts, contributing to a common
 UNCTAD, ARR 40/1929, box 546, TD 804: Report by Secretary General of UNCTAD to the 8th
special session of Trade and Development Board, 25 February 1977, 3.
 UNCTAD, ARR 40/1929, box 546, TD 804: Secretary General’s report for the 8th Special Session
of the Trade and Development Board, 11 March 1977.
 See for instance the intervention of a representative of a socialist country in 1975: UNCTAD
TDB/ A/10015/Rev.1: Report of the Trade and Development Board (10 March -2 October 1975), 1976,
63.
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mode of thinking and calling them by their first names and vice versa.⁴⁰ World
Bank official Dragoslav Avramovic, in a letter to Director of UNCTAD’s Commod-
ities Division Bernard Chidzero in 1974, referred for instance to their “stimulating
discussion in Geneva” and shared with him some thoughts on the “adequacy of
current stock levels” and on the possibility that the IMF make resources availa-
ble for the acquisition of stocks.⁴¹ Those relationships show that there were hor-
izontal networks between international organizations, which were likely to play a
role in the production of legitimate knowledge.
However, the majority of UNCTAD studies, as in other international organi-
zations, was not produced internally, but via commissions to experts who were
most often scholars in universities and research institutes. Those studies were
then supervised by UNCTAD’s own staff, as in the case of Lal Jayawardene’s
study on bufferstocks mentioned above. Due to UNCTAD’s status as an interna-
tional organization, its staff came from a great variety of countries. On the con-
trary, the cooperation with non-UNCTAD experts involved a majority of US Amer-
ican universities, like the University of Pennsylvania, Georgetown University or
Cornell University, and British universities, like those of Sussex, Bristol or Man-
chester. In some areas like trade with socialist countries, there was also some co-
operation with French institutions, like the Centre d’Economie internationale des
pays socialistes in the Sorbonne, East German and Soviet institutions, not forget-
ting the ties with numerous foreign trade ministries in the socialist countries.
Among the developing countries, UNCTAD only had strong ties in one country,
India, with Bombay University and the Indian Institute of Foreign Trade in
New Dehli.
Not only did UNCTAD employ economics experts from various, mainly devel-
oped countries, but it also tried to influence the research agenda in economics.
In accordance with its project of building new relations in international trade,
the UNCTAD General Secretariat had a strong interest in macroeconomic models.
Buffer stocks for instance made sense only “on the assumption that the neces-
sary prescience [was] shown in anticipating the trends.”⁴² At the beginning of
the 1970s, macroeconomic modeling was flourishing, with models being elabo-
rated on a global scale as analyzed by Jenny Andersson in her chapter. One of
the most significant among them was the so-called “Link project,” that was
launched in 1969. It immediately caught the attention of UNCTAD’s Commodities
Division researchers, who described it as “a new econometric project trying to
 UNCTAD, ARR 40/1882, box 409, TD 310/3: Maizels to Macone, 7 August 1969.
 UNCTAD, ARR 40/1882, box 411, TD 312(1): Avramovic to Chidzero, 27 September 1974.
 See World Bank, Stabilization of Prices of Primary Products, 157–158.
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link models in different countries with a model of network of trade and financial
flows in order to build an econometric world model.”⁴³ As early as December
1969 UNCTAD General Secretary wrote to the leader of the project, Lawrence
Klein from the University of Pennsylvania.⁴⁴ While expressing his support for
the Link project, he also suggested some changes in the orientation of the proj-
ect. First, he emphasized the significance of primary commodities exports for de-
veloping countries, thus asking for a “much finer breakdown of exports than is
contemplated at the present time.” Second, he asked for “longer term projec-
tions,” because it was “important for the long range planning of adjustments
in world trade policies to have some notion of the most important changes to
be expected in the structure of world trade over periods, say, ten years
ahead.” Yet, participants in the Link project seemed to have precisely the oppo-
site interests. They were described by UNCTAD’s researchers as a “relatively ho-
mogenous group with similar interests in short-term projections for developed
countries,” while “the question of international commodity trade” appeared to
them to be “peripheral.” Accordingly, UNCTAD’s researchers saw it as their
task to persuade “them to accept the complication which will inevitably result
for them from introducing commodity trade into the picture.”⁴⁵
On the one hand, their efforts to influence the Link project seemed to be suc-
cessful. In 1977, Secretary General Corea made an announcement to the Trade
and Development Board. By then, the Link project consisted of “72 forecasting
models for developing countries and 36 commodity models of export interest
to developing countries.”⁴⁶ UNCTAD had greatly contributed to the integration
of the developing countries into the model and the same was true for the social-
ist countries that were first mentioned in 1971⁴⁷ and were the subject of a meeting
of experts in Geneva two years later.⁴⁸ Lawrence Klein also referred positively to
UNCTAD participation in his press statements.⁴⁹ In 1976, he saw the future of the
 UNCTAD, ARR 40/1882, box 409, TD 310/5: Viteri de la Huerta to Groby, El Naggar, and Mai-
zels, 13 November 1969.
 UNCTAD, ARR 40/1882, box 409, TD 310/5: Guerrero to Klein, 18 December 1969.
 UNCTAD, ARR 40/1882, box 409, TD 310/5: Dell to Chidzero, 14 July 1970.
 UNCTAD, TDB A/32/15, vol.2: Report of the Trade and Development Board (First part of the
17th session and first part of the 9th special session), 1978, 12.
 UNCTAD, ARR 40/1882, box 409, TD 310/5: Guerrero to Klein, 25 January 1971.
 UNCTAD, ARR 40/1882, box 409, TD 310/5: Report by the UNCTAD secretariat on the Meeting
of Experts on Projections Methods for Socialist Countries Foreign Trade, Vienna, 28 August to 4
September, undated (1973).
 UNCTAD, ARR 40/1882, 409, TD 310/5: Project Link: Entering a New Phase, June 1973; Klein,
Lawrence R., “Project LINK: Linking National Economic Models,”, Challenge 19, no. 5 (1976):
25‐29.
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Link project as an “international development agency” that would work out a
“full global simulation of economic activity.”⁵⁰ On the other side, UNCTAD’s
staff seemed to be completely overwhelmed by the task implied by the project.
As early as 1970, the director of the Commodities Division wrote to the General
Secretary that working out 20 to 25 commodity models in one year would
make a team of 30 necessary, instead of three individuals. In 1973, a member
of the Commodities Division said he doubted whether “we shall have resources
for undertaking studies the usefulness of which would be restricted to the devel-
opment of the LINK model.” While praising the integration of the developing
and socialist countries as well as of the commodities in the Link model, Klein
and his colleagues remained mainly interested in the initial question of the
Link project, as shown by their personal publications.⁵¹ Only a few of his stu-
dents published works on developing countries and intermittently asked the
Commodities Division for help, as economist Kanta Marwah did in 1973.⁵² The
results of UNCTAD’s attempts to influence the research agenda had thus only
been half a success.
Building coalitions
Without the support of a vast majority of member states, it was not possible for
the General Secretariat to have its policies adopted. Thus, while crafting a com-
mon intellectual framework, UNCTAD’s General Secretariat developed an intense
diplomatic activity, maintaining relationships with various countries and organ-
izations in the hope of forming a vast coalition. An initial task of the General Sec-
retariat was of course to maintain unity inside the Group of 77 where very differ-
ent countries coexisted. All were considered as “developing,” but they were at
the same time both large and small, socialist or capitalist, more developed or
less developed. The unity among the Group of 77 became all the more crucial
after the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) decided
on an oil embargo in 1973. With the rebalancing between developing and devel-
 Klein, “Project Link: Linking National Economic Models,” 29.
 Keith Johnson,and Lawrence R. Klein, “Link Model Simulations of International Trade: An
Evaluation of the Effects of Currency Realignment,” The Journal of Finance 29, no. 2 (1974):
617‐630; Lawrence R. Klein, “The Interdependence of National Economies and the Synchroniza-
tion of EconomicFluctuations: Evidence from the LINK Project,” Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv 114,
no. 4 (1978): 642‐708.
 UNCTAD, ARR 40/1882, box 409, TD 310/5: Research Work on Project Link – Progress Report,
10 April 1973.
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oped countries there was hope for an increase in economic cooperation among
developing countries. Soon after the OPEC decision, the term“self-reliance”
began to be used at the sessions of the Trade and Development Board⁵³ and
was central in the “Program for Collective Self-Reliance” adopted in Arusha in
1979. It took a great deal of diplomatic efforts on the part of the General Secre-
tariat to promote that idea of cooperation among developing countries.
However, at no point did the General Secretariat leave aside cooperation
with the developed countries, without which no global agreement on world
trade was to be found. But the acceptance of the new UNCTAD policies by the
latter was variable and fragile, if not impossible. That was the great weakness
of UNCTAD. In particular, the USA expressed an ongoing hostility towards UN-
CTAD’s new policies in the 1970s, as did other European countries like Great Brit-
ain, France or Belgium. That did not prevent individuals from those countries ex-
pressing their support. British citizen and member of the House Commons
Jeremy Bray for instance wrote several letters to the Secretary General to air
his views on the planning of the markets, drawing on the so-called “control theo-
ry.”⁵⁴ But on the whole, the General Secretariat experienced difficulties in finding
allies among developed countries. Yet, there were at least two cases of successful
diplomatic work, with the socialist countries and with the European Economic
Community (EEC). These two very different and even opposed groups of coun-
tries helped to build a coalition around the newly promoted policies.
The socialist countries:
dealing with the forbidden issue of East-West trade
Socialist countries had strongly supported UNCTAD from the beginning but with
their own agenda.⁵⁵ Evidence from the GDR archives shows that the primary con-
cern of the socialist countries in the phase of preparation for the first UNCTAD
conference in 1964 was not the development of poorer countries, but the removal
of the barriers socialist countries of Eastern Europe were facing when trading
with Western Europe. Only when it became clear that UNCTAD would concen-
trate on development exclusively did they shift their position and support the de-
 UNCTAD, TDB/ A/9615/Rev.1: Report of the Trade and Development Board (12 September
1973– 13 September 1974), 1975, 17.
 UNCTAD, ARR 40/1882, box 411, TD 312(1): Bray to Corea, 15 June 1976.
 Marie Lavigne, Économie internationale des pays socialistes (Paris: A. Colin, 1985); Arie
Bloed, The External Relations of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (Utrecht: Martinus
Nijhoff Publishers, 1988).
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mands of the developing countries.⁵⁶ After the foundation of UNCTAD, the social-
ist countries did not give up. They obtained the creation of a division “for the
trade between countries having different economic and social systems,” a convo-
luted wording that left the door open to a possible inclusion of the East-West
trade issue on the agenda. However, that issue was in fact not a priority in the
work program of the division, because UNCTAD was not meant to deal specifi-
cally with trade between countries considered as “developed.”
This is why the socialist countries used their representatives in the Trade and
Development Board sessions to address the matter of East-West trade barriers
and express their demands. Their exchanges with their West European counter-
parts had a quasi-ritual character, Eastern European socialist countries blaming
Western European countries for de facto discrimination, while the latter simply
recalled that East-West trade was already dealt with in the Economic Commis-
sion for Europe, where negotiations were in fact completely deadlocked. As
the very expression of the trade discrimination they allegedly suffered, socialist
countries systematically denounced the EEC. The negative effects of that so-
called “economic grouping of western countries” were regularly discussed on
their initiative as a specific agenda item. For socialist countries it was the occa-
sion to focus on the trade discrimination measures the EEC was supposed to im-
pose not only to them but also to developing countries. They used UNCTAD as a
forum to try to structure the internal power balance around the East-West divide.
The UNCTAD General Secretariat did not counteract that strategy because social-
ist countries regularly backed its proposals.
That diplomatic bargain entered a new phase at the beginning of the 1970s,
with the adoption of the Bucharest Program by the member states of the CMEA
in 1971⁵⁷. The General Secretariat had in fact anticipated that initiative with a
1970 study on the “expansion of trade through the promotion of complementary
economic structures.”⁵⁸ Welcoming that new program in his speech at the 1971
session of the Trade and Development Board, Secretary General Perez-Guerrero
considered that “the idea of co-ordinating progressively the economic structures
of the socialist countries with those of the rest of the world might become more
 See Christian, “UNCTAD.”
 Marie Lavigne, East-South Relations in the World Economy (Boulder, Colo. ; London: West-
view Press, 1988); Robert M Cutler, “East-South Relations at UNCTAD: Global Political Economy
and the CMEA,” International Organization 37, no. 1 (1983): 121‐142; Sara Lorenzini, “COMECON
and the South in the years of Détente: A study on East-south economic relations,” European Re-
view of History 21 (2014): 183– 199.
 UNCTAD, TDB/125: Expansion of trade through the promotion of complementary economic
structures, 27 November 1970.
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and more part of their planning considerations” and drew attention “to the pos-
itive foreign trade impact of the new economic plans which would guide the
economies of the socialist countries of Eastern Europe in the period 1971–
1975.”⁵⁹ As a result of that new interest, the staff of the division for the trade
with the socialist countries grew from five to ten between 1968 and 1983. One
of its tasks now consisted in using the sessions of the Trade and Development
Board to encourage meetings between representatives of the socialist countries
and interested developing countries and enter into talks, which was a first
step towards the conclusion of a trade agreement.⁶⁰ UNCTAD’s General Secretar-
iat also built a new relationship with the CMEA itself, which had not enjoyed a
great deal of interest so far, not even in the TRADSOC division.⁶¹ Secretary Gen-
eral Corea paid the first official visit to the CMEA’s headquarters in Moscow in
1975. As a result of that initial contact, the TRADSOC division soon asked
CMEA for studies on industrialization and leveling of regional development
gaps⁶² as well as on the possibilities of interregional trade.⁶³
That initiative was not without benefit for the socialist countries. Promoting
trade between socialist countries and developing countries was also an opportu-
nity to spread their specific model of state-planned economy. The attractiveness
of that model in UNCTAD reached its zenith in the second half of the 1970s. In a
1976 policy paper prepared by the TRADSOC division from the perspective of UN-
CTAD IV in Nairobi, economic national planning and UNCTAD’s goals were al-
most made identical: “In view of the growing role of planning in developing
countries’ economic management in recent years and the rich experience of
the socialist countries of Eastern Europe in this sphere, multilateral effort in
the field of planning could be of particular importance in the context of UN-
CTAD’s contribution to the establishment of a new international economic
order.”⁶⁴ Likewise, a 1979 study by the same division not only described the pos-
itive effects of the socialist planned economies on trade with developing coun-
 UNCTAD, TDB/8415/Rev.1: Report of the Trade and Development Board (14 October 1970–21
Septmebr 1971), 1972 UNCTAD, TDB/8415/Rev.1: Report of the Trade and Development Board (14
October 1970–21 September 1971), 1972, 152.
 This activity is well documented in UNCTAD, ARR 40/1929, 546, TD 804:Trade with socialist
countries Trade and Development Board, 27 March 1969–22 November 1988.
 See UNCTAD, ARR 40/1929, 547, TD 808/1: Trade with Socialist Countries, CMEA, September
1970-September 1987.
 Ibid., Note verbale to CMEA member countries and letter to CMEA Secretariat, 21 June 1976.
 Ibid., Davydov to Luft, 5 May 1980.
 UNCTAD, ARR 40/1929, box546, TD 803: Multilateral action for expanding the trade and eco-
nomic relations between countries with different economic and social systems, in particular action
which would contribute to the development of developing countries, november 1975, 11.
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tries, but also how those countries had progressively come to adopt some fea-
tures of the socialist planned economies.⁶⁵ The will to spread the socialist
model of economic planning was also congruent with the fact that every trade
agreement with a socialist country involved the state as a contracting party
even in a market economy, thus strengthening its role as an economic actor.
When participating in a seminar with representatives of developing countries,
staff members of the TRADSOC division stressed the necessity of “an appropriate
mechanism at the governmental level, bringing together various organizations
and enterprises of the partner countries.”⁶⁶ The division for trade with socialist
countries also gave a lot of attention to the “mixed commissions” that were cre-
ated between the trading partners and worked as a channel to exert influence on
their economic model.⁶⁷
Another significant benefit for the socialist countries resulted from a revision
of the General Secretariat’s previous policy of not dealing with East-West trade.
As it was not possible to address intra-European matters in UNCTAD, the General
Secretariat chose an indirect strategy by making a case for the so-called “trilat-
eral industrial co-operation.” That co-operation resulted mainly from the context
of the détente. It was intended to associate economic actors (business organiza-
tion as well as governmental agencies) from the socialist countries and from the
capitalist developed countries in a third, developing country⁶⁸. The idea was for-
mulated as early as 1969 in a proposal made by a representative of developing
countries to have those countries participate “as sub-contractors in East-West in-
dustrial co-operation projects.”⁶⁹ In fact, the idea of socialist and capitalist de-
veloped countries cooperating for the benefit of developing countries enjoyed
great support among the Group of 77. In this spirit, the TRADSOC division con-
ducted surveys of such cooperative ventures, analyzed them, and formulated rec-
ommendations to promote the practice. Accordingly, the division held a seminar
 UNCTAD, TD 243 Supp.4: Co-operation in planning between socialist countries of Eastern Eu-
rope and developing countries: the experience of the USSR. Report by the UNCTAD Secretariat, 28
February 1979, 10– 11.
 UNCTAD, ARR 40/1929, box 547, TD 806/3: UNCTAD’s activities in trade between the socialist
countries of Eastern Europe and the developing countries, 10 September 1979, 3.
 UNCTAD, TDB/452: The role of mixed intergovernemental commissions in trade relations
among countries having different economic and social systems, 21 December 1973
 Patrick Gutman and Francis Arkwright, “La coopération industrielle tripartite entre pays à
systèmes économiques et sociaux Différents, de l’Ouest, de l’Est et Du Sud,” Politique étrangère
40, no. 6 (1976): 621–655.
 UNCTAD, TDB/A/7616: Report of the Trade and Development Board (24 September–23 Septem-
ber 1969), 1970, 162.
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on the subject in December 1975.⁷⁰ Division director Mikhail Davydov went on to
participate in a conference organized by the GDR Academy of Sciences in Dres-
den in March 1976⁷¹ that was attended by academics from the United States, the
USSR, Poland, and Great Britain. The division also published two studies on that
topic in 1979 and 1984.⁷² Yet, while officially supporting cooperation for the ben-
efit of the developing countries, socialist countries had their own interest in par-
ticipating. Due to the technological asymmetry between East and West, they
would actually benefit from the transfer of technology that was intended for de-
veloping countries. This is why trilateral industrial cooperation appeared to be
the magic formula that would satisfy everyone.
EEC: the good boy of UNCTAD?
In July 1971, the member states of the EEC became the first developed countries
to implement their “system of preferences” towards developing countries. It
formed the first part of the General System of Preferences, designed by UNCTAD
to favor the exports of manufactures from developing countries. Other European
countries would only follow in 1973, like Hungary and Sweden, while the USA
would wait until 1976. By 1971, the establishment of a common external tariff
was a recognized advantage of the EEC. But that achievement of the EEC system
of preferences was also the result of close work between the EEC and UNCTAD.
In preparing the future system, the Commission worked closely with the UN-
CTAD Manufacture Division. As early as 1966, the Assistant Director of the Man-
ufacture Division, Harry Stordel, mentioned an “informal contact” he wished to
strengthen with Di Martino, from the EEC External Relations General Directorate.
Calling him his “dear friend,” Di Martino sent material about tariff matters to
Stordel the same year. In 1968, Stordel in turn sent documents to Di Martino,
stressing that he should “treat them as having been given to [him] on an infor-
mal basis” and that he should “ensure that they are not at any stage quoted as
an official source.”⁷³ One month later, the Director of the Manufacture Division,
 UNCTAD, TDB 599: Report on the Seminar of Industrial Specialization through Various Forms
of Multilateral Co-operation, held in the Palais des Nations, December 2–5 1975, 23 February 1976.
 UNCTAD, ARR 40/1929, box TD 830: UNCTAD and tripartite industrial co-operation, 25 March
1976.
 UNCTAD, TDB 243/Supp.5: Tripartite industrial co-operation and co-operation in third coun-
tries, 20 April 1979 and UNCTAD, TDB 1000: Recent developments in East-West co-operation in
third countries and in tripartite co-operation, 6 June 1984.
 UNCTAD, ARR 40/1842, TDO 440, box 164: Stordel to Di Martino, 16 June 1968.
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Rangaswami Krishnamurti, forwarded a study on the rule of origin to the EEC
Director-General for External Relations Axel Herbst,⁷⁴ who acknowledged re-
ceipt, saying he was “greatly impressed” by that work.⁷⁵ The same year, Krishna-
murti went to Brussels and after his return to Geneva, wrote to Herbst: “My dis-
cussions in Brussels on the subject of tariff preferences were most helpful and
provided me with the opportunity to establish the necessary contacts with the
officials in the various departments in the Commission.”⁷⁶
In addition to that working relationship, UNCTAD Deputy Secretary General
Stein Rossen also had ties with the European Parliament, as shown by the letter
he wrote to its President in 1970 in thanks for the support the Parliament gave to
the General System of Preferences.⁷⁷ Likewise, the Secretary General of UNCTAD
himself, accompanied by the main division’s directors, paid several official visits
to Brussels, where he met the successive Presidents of the European Commission
– Jean Rey in March 1969,⁷⁸ Franco Malfatti in May 1971⁷⁹ and Sicco Mansholt in
November 1972.⁸⁰ The relationship with Mansholt, which was especially friendly,
seemed to rely on common ideals and when he left the European Commission,
Perez-Guerrero wrote to him personally: “We in UNCTAD have felt always that
you were one of us in this fight for justice in the international economic relations
which at present are so much lacking of it.”⁸¹
For the European Commission, the commitment to the General System of
Preferences was not merely a way of helping the developing countries. Since
the achievement of the customs union in 1968, it in principle had the ability
to set the external common tariff, and working on a system of preferences was
an opportunity for the EEC to assert its new competence in foreign trade simply
by implementing it. However, that involvement was also causing problems be-
cause, like other UN organizations, UNCTAD was based first of all on sovereign
nations, and international organizations like the EEC were not supposed to have
more than an observer status.Yet, in the meetings on manufacture and commod-
ities, the EEC representatives claimed an exclusive right and power in the name
of the member states, which led the Director of the Manufacture Division Krish-
 Ibid., Krishnamurti to Herbst, 20 June 1968.
 Ibid., Herbst to Krishnamurti, 3 July 1968.
 Ibid., Krishnamurti to Herbst, 21 November 1968.
 Ibid., Stein-Rossen to Walter, 26 October 1970.
 Ibid., Perez-Guerrero to Prebisch, 7 March 1969.
 Ibid., Perez-Guererro to Parmentier, 18 March 1971.
 Ibid., Martin to Guerrero, 26 October 1972.
 Ibid., Perez-Guerrero to Mansholt, 5 January 1973
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namurti to ask for internal legal advice.⁸² UNCTAD’s lawyers’ opinion was to
allow only a limited participation of the EEC.⁸³ But UNCTAD’s officials who
worked with EEC representatives expressed a different opinion: in the Manufac-
ture Division, Stordel supported EEC’s participation as such, as was already the
case in the GATT;⁸⁴ in the Commodities Division, Assistant Director Unsworth
suggested the EEC be given a status “somewhat more different from that of a
mere observer.”⁸⁵ Secretary General Perez-Guerrero again asked UNCTAD’s
Legal Counsel about the status of the EEC “as observer or as participating
fully,” stressing the difference between the committees’ meetings on manufac-
ture or commodities and the sessions of the Trade and Development Board,
where only states could sit. The Legal Counsel acknowledged it and suggested
a status as participant without the right to vote, seating them next to represen-
tatives of EEC member states. But it also invited the EEC to “recognize that it
would not be in its interests to process for a more formal status, to the point
of arousing opposition from members of the body concerned,” probably bearing
in mind socialist countries’ hostility towards the EEC.⁸⁶
To link the EEC to UNCTAD’s project of building a new economic order was
an achievement that resulted largely from the personal ties and good working re-
lationships formed at the lower level. Beside that achievement, there was how-
ever a matter of permanent concern in UNCTAD: the EEC led its own trade and
development policy towards African and Asian countries that had been under
colonial rule by the European countries⁸⁷. Until the Treaty of Rome was signed
in 1957, France had negotiated very hard to ensure its colonies the same trade
privileges in the EEC as the metropolitan territory. Those privileges were then
granted in 1963 and renewed in 1969 for the newly independent states that sign-
 Ibid., Krishnamurti to Coidan, 26 February 1969.
 Ibid., Okunribido to Coidan, 11 March 1969.
 Ibid., Stordel to Krishnamurti, 20 March 1969.
 Ibid., Unsworth to Perez-Guererro, 14 March 1969, 4
 Ibid., Stavropoulos to Perez-Guerrero, 10 March 1970.
 Siegfried Schoene, “UNCTAD III: das Problem der besonderen Beziehungen zwischen der
Europäischen Gemeinschaft und Afrika,” Africa Spectrum 7, no. 1 (1972): 27‐43; Vahsen, Urban.
Eurafrikanische Entwicklungskooperation: Die Assoziierungspolitik der EWG gegenüber dem sub-
saharischen Afrika in den 1960er Jahren. Stuttgart: Steiner, 2010; James Mayall, “The shadow
of the Empire: the EU and the former colonial world,” in International relations and the European
Union, ed. Christopher Hill and Michael Smith (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011); see also
Giuliano Garavini, After Empires: European Integration, Decolonization, and the Challenge from
the Global South 1957– 1986 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012).
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ed the Yaoundé Agreement.⁸⁸ The Lomé Convention of 1975 not only extended
trade preferences to new, former British colonial countries, forming the African,
Caribbean and Pacific Group of States (ACP), but it also introduced some new
stabilization mechanisms. The most important among them was the STABEX
(Système de Stabilisation des Recettes d’Exportation), a kind of regional com-
mon stabilization fund that was strikingly similar to the buffer stocks dealt
with at UNCTAD.⁸⁹ On the one hand, the Lomé Convention seemed to be in
line with UNCTAD’s project and even to be ahead of it. On the other hand,
such a regional trade organization ran counter the very principles of UNCTAD
by maintaining and strengthening ties with the former metropolitan countries
and preventing the new independent developing countries from trading with
their neighboring countries, thus hampering economic cooperation between
the developing countries.
The EEC’s policy of “association” was internally criticized in UNCTAD itself.
This is for instance how the Deputy Secretary of the Trade and Development
Board, Moses Adebanjo, understood “association”:
There is a strong international pressure for the removal of barriers to trade and for gaining
freer access to world markets especially for products exported by the developing countries.
Association is incompatible with the the objectives of UNCTAD as it creates artificial eco-
nomic relationships between the metropolitan states and the associated countries and
also restricts through the ingenious contrivance of reverse preferences the developing coun-
tries’ choice of suppliers.⁹⁰
This suspicion of the EEC policy of association was also reflected in the fact that
the Joint Assembly of EEC and ACP countries established by the Lomé Conven-
tion was not recognized before 1990, when Secretary General Dadzie wrote an
official Letter to its then president Leo Tindemans.⁹¹ During the sessions of
the Trade and Development Board, the association policy was regularly under
attack from the socialist countries as well as from some developing countries.
In 1973, as the Convention was discussed, one representative stated for instance
that association “constituted a threat to the principle of non-discrimination and
 Martin Rempe, Entwicklung im Konflikt: die EWG und der Senegal 1957– 1975 (Cologne: Böh-
lau Verlag, 2012).
 Lili Reyels, Die Entstehung Des Ersten Vertrags von Lomé Im Deutsch-Französischen Span-
nungsfeld 1973– 1975 (Baden–Baden: Nomos Verlag, 2008).
 UNCTAD, ARR 40/1842, TDO 440, box 164: Adebanjo to Parmentier, 31 January 1970.
 Ibid., Dadzie to Tindemans, 5 January 1990.
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faced the developing countries with a new form of discriminatory policy.”⁹² An-
other asserted that “compensation for commodities imported from ‘associable’
countries were intended to destroy the unity of developing countries.”⁹³ An
EEC spokesman tried to recall that the EEC “had paid special attention to the in-
terests and the preoccupations of developing countries.”⁹⁴ He especially present-
ed the Lomé Convention as an extension of the General System of Preferences to
the field of commodities.⁹⁵ In 1975, as the Convention had been signed, he went a
step further by calling it “an example of the way in which common problems
could be tackled.”⁹⁶ It must be stressed that not all developing countries were
hostile to that policy, as shown by the statement of by a representative from
one of the beneficiary countries, stating that the Lomé Convention was “a useful
example of the type of treatment that must be accorded to all developing coun-
tries.”⁹⁷ The fact that the developing countries did not share the same views on
the one hand and desired to save the good results obtained with the General Sys-
tem of Preferences on the other hand, might explain why the General Secretariat
did not make a case against the Lomé Convention.
Conclusion: the decline of UNCTAD
In the 1970s, UNCTAD’s strength rested not only on the political consensus
among the developing countries in the Group of 77, but also on its ability to in-
volve developed countries from the West as well as from the East. UNCTAD’s
General Secretariat managed to do that by crafting a common intellectual frame-
work in which Keynesian views on market regulation could coexist with state
planning, while making diplomatic trade-offs with groupings of countries like
the socialist countries or international organizations like the EEC.
However, most of the policies promoted by UNCTAD were implemented very
slowly, if at all, because they were confronted by a strong reluctance from devel-
oped countries. That reluctance culminated in Ronald Reagan’s refusal to go into
 UNCTAD, TDB/ A/9015/Rev.1: Report of the Trade and Development Board (26 October
1972– 11 September 1973),1974, 22.
 Ibid., 19.
 Ibid., 23.
 UNCTAD, TDB/ A/9615/Rev.1: Report of the Trade and Development Board (12 September
1973– 13 September 1974), 1975, 7.
 UNCTAD, TDB/ A/10015/Rev.1: Report of the Trade and Development Board (10 March 1975–2
October 1975), 1976, 138.
 Ibid., 132.
“It is not a Question of rigidly Planning Trade” 311
further into discussions at the Conference of Cancun in 1981, thus putting an end
to the NIEO process. In a lucid report he wrote to the new Secretary General, Ken-
neth Dadzie, in 1986, Commodities Division’s Director Ashiabor gave a negative
assessment of the previous ten years since the NIEO program had been adopt-
ed.⁹⁸ At the same time, differentiation had been increasing among the develop-
ing countries, with the South Asian countries booming, the South American
countries suffering from a deep financial crisis and the majority of the “least de-
veloped” countries remaining in Africa. The basis of consensus was crumbling
among the developing countries, while developed countries were not as ready
as before to collaborate.
At the level of UNCTAD’s divisions, it is possible to document the deteriora-
tion of the coalitions built in the 1970s. For instance, the EEC’s status in Com-
modities or Manufacture Committee was again questioned in a 1982 letter
from the General Secretariat’s Legal Council⁹⁹ and no solution was found in
the following years. At committee sessions, EEC member states were not allowed
to group themselves under a common ‘EEC’ sign. The interdivision tensions
about the socialist countries also rose: the “consultative machinery” that had
been created to facilitate trade contacts between the developing and the socialist
countries was now criticized by the Manufacture Division, whose proposal it was
to integrate it into the Special Committee for the General System of Preferen-
ces.¹⁰⁰ Staff members of the TRADSOC division were increasingly confronted
with the view that the socialist countries had protectionist practices too, and
they struggled in response to present a “correct picture” of those countries.¹⁰¹
Such criticism gave the impression that the TRADSOC was losing ground: in
1986, division director Evgeni Krasnov expressed his feeling to the Secretary Gen-
eral that his division was excluded from preparations for the forthcoming UN-
CTAD.¹⁰²
The very intellectual framework that had made it possible to conceive such
coalitions was under severe strain. The assumption that laid the basis for the
NIEO was national sovereignty, which was congruent with the legitimacy of
 UNCTAD, ARR 40/1882, 411, TD 312: International Policy on Commodities. Some Preliminary
Ideas, 19 March 1986.
 UNCTAD, ARR 40/1842, TDO 440, box 164: Scott to Suy, 18 February 1982.
 UNCTAD, ARR 40/1929, box 546, TD 802/5: Consultative machinery of UNCTAD dealing with
problems in trade and economic relations among countries having different economic and social
systems, 24 February 1978.
 UNCTAD, ARR 40/1929, box 546, TD 802/5: TDB/981 (Part 1): Protectionism and structural
adjustment in the world economy. Part 1: analysis of major issues and policy, 2 March 1984.
 UNCTAD, ARR 40/1929, box 546, TD 804: Krasnov to Dadzie, 17 January 1986.
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state intervention and planning in the economic field. But in the 1980s, as a re-
sult of the rise of neoliberal economic conceptions. Many countries shifted their
policies accordingly, not only in Europe and North America, but also among de-
veloping countries, like India, South Korea or Vietnam. By redefining the role of
the state, the neoliberal ideology also broke the framework that combined
Keynesian regulation and socialist state planning as two forms of economic
planning in a continuum. In that sense, the failure of the NIEO and UNCTAD
was first of all a failure of the state as a political model.
It is true that during the 1980s, UNCTAD’s Secretariat General promoted a
range of policies that relied on state intervention: among others, it supported
the idea of state trading and of “countertrade”¹⁰³ and helped to found the Asso-
ciation for State Trading Organization (ASTRO) in 1984, meant as an expression
of “self-reliance,”¹⁰⁴ by organizing a training seminar to promote it in 1980.¹⁰⁵
However, the initial project of planned world trade resulting from a multilateral
dialogue between equal nations had in fact shrunk to a handful of countries
practicing countertrade due to their lack of currency and levels of indebtedness.
This was very far from the initial project of the New International Economic
Order, which aimed to “correct inequalities and redress existing injustices,
make it possible to eliminate the widening gap between the developed and
the developing countries and ensure steadily accelerating economic and social
development and peace and justice.”¹⁰⁶ Founded in 1994, the World Trade Or-
ganization (WTO) represented a new attempt at establishing a new world trade
order, yet it was based on free trade principles that were completely contrary
to NIEO’s and UNCTAD’s principles and contributed to the marginalization of
those organizations. The WTO experienced few successes and many contesta-
tions. With the ongoing crisis of multilateralism from the failure of the Doha
Round to the present situation, a new fair world trade order is still ahead of us.
 UNCTAD, ARR 40/1929, box 589, TDE 171/3: State trading (January 1984-May 1991).
 See UNCTAD, ARR 40/1929, box 589, TDE 171/3: Association of State Trading Organizations of
Developing Countries (ASTRO), 29 March 1985, as well as ibid., TDE 171/3(1): Cooperation among
State trading enterprises of developing countries (January 1980–December 1986).
 Ibid., TDE 171/3(7): Seminar on the promotion of Trade by Stade tarding organizations
(STOs), 28 August 1980.
 UN A/RES/S-6/3201, see also http://www.un-documents.net/s6r3201.htm (accessed 14 Feb-
ruary 2017).
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Jenny Andersson
Planning the Future of World Markets:
the OECD’s Interfuturs Project
In 1975, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)
launched a research project entitled Interfutures. Research project into the devel-
opment of the advanced industrial societies in harmony with the developing
world.¹ The purpose of the project, initiated by the Japanese government and
funded partly by the Toyota foundation, was to investigate alternative patterns
of development for the Western economies in a new and interconnected
world.What was referred to, in the project, as the advanced industrialized soci-
eties were increasingly addressing what Interfutures described as “structural
challenges.” Interfutures was appointed at the same time as a group led by
the American economist William McCracken. The McCracken report introduced
the idea of structural challenges in Western economies, with the purpose of
bringing home the argument that the long period of growth and welfare statism
was over.² While the McCracken group dealt with the prospect of post-OPEC eco-
nomic policies specifically, Interfutures was charged with reflecting on the need
for a new long term strategy for the West, a strategy that could surpass the ha-
bitual horizon of conjectural planning and deal with the new phenomenon of
uncertainty in a changing world economy. The problem of increasing uncertainty
in the world environment would be met by setting out a “long term vision of the
major problems to which society will be confronted.”³
‘Structural issues,’ ‘interdependence,’ and ‘uncertainties’ were among the
many 1970s neologisms that informed the Interfuturs group but that also posi-
tioned Interfuturs in a new field of emergent planning methods and forms of ex-
pertize from the mid-1970s on. The literature describes the 1970s as marking a
watershed moment and break from the long postwar period: a shock of the glob-
al due to the arrival, center stage, of the developing world as actors in their own
right; a structural nach dem Boommarked by the end of stable industrial growth;
 OECD archives, Interfutures, 1975–1979. The research leading to these results has received
funding from the European Research Council through ERC Grant 283706.
 Paul McCracken, Guido Carli, Herbert Giersch, Attila Karaosmanoglu, Ryutaro Komiya, Assar
Lindbeck, Robert Marjolin and Robin Matthews, Towards Full Employment and Price Stability: A
Report to the OECD by a Group of Independent Experts (Paris: The Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development, 1977).
 Interfutures, “Proposed meeting of senior policy officials, draft of the background paper,” 5
February, FUT (78) 3.
https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110534696-015
a crisis of predictability that shook patterns of national cohesion and social sta-
bility; or, as Matthias Schmelzer has most recently suggested, an ideological cri-
sis of growthmanship – the governmental regime par excellence of the postwar
period. ⁴ Interfutures was a key reflection on all of these issues, and of the way
that they raised a profound challenge to the historical category of the Western
world in an emergent world order that no longer reflected the stability of the
Bretton Woods era. As such, the Interfutures project stands as a key record of
a 1970s reflection on an open-ended process of globalization that challenged
Western notions of hegemony and control. This chapter places the Interfutures
group in the context of other groups of research, planning and policy concern
that emerged in the 1970s and that were, in different ways, reflections on radical
interdependence, such as indeed the McCracken group, the American Trilateral
Commission or the Club of Rome. These groups were central Western sites of cir-
culation and definition of the meaning of globality, in the sense of the correct
interpretation of the challenges to a postwar world order dominated by the in-
dustrial visions of the nineteenth century and by a stable power balance between
East and West. In the context of a wider global struggle over the meaning of in-
terdependence, a struggle in which the developing or so-called Third world had
for the first time its own arguments, Interfutures demonstrates how these spaces
became the sites of a structured Western response to notions of globalization
that seemed to run counter to the socioeconomic interests of the Western
world. This refers in particular to the radical visions of globalization that
emerged from, on the one hand, environmentalism, and, on the other, Third
worldism and the so-called New International Economic Order. In line with an
emerging historiography, this chapter argues that the Interfutures group carried
early versions of neoliberal arguments organized around a dominant notion of
the world market, and that its main purpose was to set out a distinctly Western,
liberal, and defensive strategy of globalization. This strategy had as its purpose
the management of the challenge of interdependence over the long term, so that
Western interests could be assured in the future.
 Matthew Connelly, “Future Shock: The End of the World as They Knew It,” in Shock of the
Global, ed, Niall Ferguson, Charles S. Maier, Erez Manela, Daniel J Sargent (Cambridge, Mass.:
Harvard University Press, 2010), 337–351, 339; Daniel Rodgers, Age of Fracture (Cambridge,
Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2011); Matthias Schmelzer, The Hegemony of Growth: The
OECD and the Making of the Economic Growth Paradigm (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2016); Anselm Doering-Manteuffel and Raphael Lutz, Nach dem Boom: Perspektiven auf
die Zeitgeschichte seit 1970 (Bonn: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2012); Matthias Schmelzer, “The
crisis before the crisis: the ‘problems of modern society’and the OECD, 1968–74,” European Re-
view of History: Revue européenne d’histoire 19, no. 6, (2012): 999– 1020.
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By pointing to the link between such originally defensive reactions to a set of
radical world discourses, and an emergent neoliberal Western world view, the ar-
gument allows us to add nuance to the prevailing understanding of the geneaol-
ogy of neoliberalism in global politics since the 1970s.What we call in shorthand
neoliberalism was never a clear cut paradigm but should be understood as a
gradual outcome of a battle between a set of much larger discourses on the
world’s future in the 1970s.⁵ The OECD, an organization that was first created
in the context of the Marshall Plan in 1948, emerged in the context of the oil cri-
ses in the early 1970s as the “steward of globalisation,” the overseer of a process
of global interconnectedness that seemed to threaten the interests of the Western
world and that required, therefore, new tools of planning, management and con-
trol.⁶ Several studies have pinpointed the role of the OECD as a site for the cir-
culation of early neoliberal ideas. These ideas, carried by the high level expert
reports circulated by the OECD in the 1970s were different in nature than the
first generation of neoliberal thinking that had emerged from the “neoliberal
thought collective” of Hayek’s Mount Pelerin Society in the 1950s.⁷ They were al-
legedly non-ideological and did not take place on the level of doctrine or polit-
ical theory. Rather, they were inscribed in pragmatic and technocratic arguments
concerning planning and policy tools and showcased as forms of problem solv-
ing for welfare capitalist economies. Around such arguments, liberal, neoliberal,
as well as progressive economists and planners could gather.⁸
Meanwhile, the ideas presented by the Interfutures group stood in close con-
nection to other notions of interdependence. The McCracken report, which in-
cluded some of the world’s most famous economists, became a landmark report
not only for its diagnosis of problems hitherto understood as conjectural and
structural, and thus having endemic causes within Western industrial econo-
mies, but also for the remedies that it proposed: liberalization of labour markets
and social systems, a new set of social compromises based on lower expecta-
 Johanna Bockman, “Socialist Globalization against Capitalist Neocolonialism: The Economic
Ideas behind the New International Economic Order,” Humanity: An International Journal of
Human Rights, Humanitarianism, and Development 6, no. 1 (2015): 109– 128.
 Mathieu Leimgruber, “Stewards of globalisation.” Unpublished paper.
 Dieter Plehwe and Philip Mirowski, The Road from Mount Pelerin: The Making of a Neoliberal
Thought Collective (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2010).
 Vincent Gayon. “L’OCDE au travail. Contribution à une sociologie historique de la ‘coopéra-
tion économique internationale’ sur le chômage et l’emploi (1970–2010)” (PhD. Diss, Université
Paris I-Panthéon Sorbonne, 2010) ; Francois Denord, Neoliberalisme version française. Histoire
d’une idéologie politique (Paris: Demopolis, 2007); Laurent Warlouzet, Governing Europe in a
Globalizing World. Neoliberalism and its Alternatives following the 1973 crisis (London: Routledge,
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tions on growth and redistribution, less state intervention and more market
mechanisms, and more openness toward global markets.⁹ As Vincent Gayon
has shown, the publication of the McCracken report settled a central dispute
as both Keynesian and monetarist economists agreed on what was essentially
a turn to monetarism in the organization’s ensuing economic expertize.¹⁰ Rawi
Abdelal has shown how the OECD in a similar manner became the privileged
arena for the creation of a liberalized framework for the financial markets,
and that this framework, designed to foster a global expansion of capital mar-
kets, was in fact pushed through by former socialists such as the French premier
Jacques Delors, with the idea that liberalization would provide a new market ra-
tionality and stability.¹¹ This turn within the OECD to seemingly apolitical forms
of expertize is important because it permits us to add nuance to the historiogra-
phy of neoliberalism as a project of ideological vanguards, the influence of
which was for the most part still very marginal in the 1970s. What it instead
brings out is how specific notions of expertize in themselves became the solution
for settling an intensely contested process of globalization.
It is pertinent to place the notion of the future in this context. Interfutures is
of interest to this volume because of its interest in new future-oriented planning
technologies through which it thought world relationships might be made man-
ageable over the ‘long term,’ in other words, over a new horizon of time stretch-
ing beyond the conventional horizon of planning systems. In addition, as pre-
sented by Interfutures, such tools, which included the much marketed
scenario tool, were thought to have a new and global spatial scope, through
which they could embrace problems of complexity, interdependence and uncer-
tainty in a world system. A central element of the Interfutures project was indeed
that it proposed shifting the gaze of planning from conjectural macro economic
planning, toward the setting of long-term strategic goals and objectives. This in-
cluded an emphasis on shaping shared images of the process of globalization
and the diffusion onto the world level of positive images of the world market.
 Paul McCracken Guido Carli, Herbert Giersch, Attila Karaosmanoglu, Ryutaro Komiya, Assar
Lindbeck, Robert Marjolin, Robin Matthews, . Towards Full Employment and Price Stability: A
Report to the OECD by a Group of Independent Experts (Paris: The Organisation for Economic
Co-operation and Development, 1977). See Charles S. Maier, “‘Malaise’: The Crisis of Capitalism
in the 1970s,” in Shock of the Global, 25–48. Robert Brenner, The Economics of Global Turbu-
lence: The Advanced Capitalist Economies from Long Boom to Long Downturn, 1945–2000 (Lon-
don: Verso, 2006).
 Gayon, L’OCDE au travail.
 Ravi Abdelal, Capital Rules : The Construction of Global Finance (Cambridge Mass.: Harvard
University Press, 2007).
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Interfutures marked a turn here in international organizations as tools, such as
scenarios, forecasts and indicators, in which coping with uncertainty and unpre-
dictability by setting out images, expectations and scenarios of development was
key.
The problem of interdependence
Interdependence was a Western term, used to describe a phenomenon of plane-
tary disorder, a shake-up of global power relations and a threat to the category of
the industrial world. As such, the term interdependence also served to reiterate
Western interests in this potentially messy process. Interdependence as a term
had antecedents in earlier postwar reflections on the impact of an emergent
tiers monde that introduced an element of chaos into world relationships. In
1953, the French demographer Alfred Sauvy, famous for having coined the
term ‘Third World,’ wrote that this new world was defined precisely by its rejec-
tion of Western images of the future, and its ambition to create images of its own.
Sauvy did so in a context that is not without importance for us here, as a member
of the circle of French planners who developed the so-called prospective method
as a form of long term planning.¹² The prospectivemethod would resurface as the
method of choice of the Interfutures project, in direct proximity to scenarios
taken from American forecasting. The emphasis on interdependence as a process
that needed guidance in order to shift from a potentially conflict-ridden state of
affairs, into a question of ‘harmonious’ relationships, was a response to other
1970s discourses on the world economy, which, inspired by dependency and
world system theory, emphasized global structures as reflections of profound im-
balances between a developed and a developing world, or even as a projection of
the Marxist class struggle at the global level. Interdependence could, as Interfu-
tures would suggest, be managed by the active creation of new and “harmonious
relations” between the West and the Third World, if methods for such manage-
ment were found. It was precisely through an emphasis on methods that Inter-
futures set out the elements of what were to become the dominant Western in-
terpretation of globalization, and arguably, it was precisely as the methods of
steering new world relationships appeared that forms of future research found
their relevance on the global level.
 Alfred Sauvy, Le Tiers Monde (Paris: Presse Universitaires de France, 1956).
Jenny Andersson, The Future of the World: Futurists, Futurology and the Struggle for the Post
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Interfutures sat at the same time as the American Trilateral Commission, ap-
pointed to resuture an American worldview broken by the problem of multipo-
larity. “Managing interdependence,” as formulated both in the Trilateral com-
mission and the Interfutures program, was a euphemism for finding the
political technologies and planning tools with which a new confrontational
world situation could be pushed toward forms of strategic cooperation. ¹³ Anoth-
er shared denominator between the Interfutures group and the Trilateral Com-
mission was the theme of ‘ungovernability,’ a definition proposed by the Trilat-
eral Commisson to denote problems of rigidity in Western welfare states and
social systems.¹⁴ Both Interfutures and the Trilateral Commission performed a
central analytical move as they joined together, in the notion of interdepend-
ence, problems of uncertainty in the outside world environment with the idea
of uncertainty within Western societies. The latter were understood as having
been unleashed by forms of social crisis with roots in Western systems of gover-
nance. By joining these two elements of crisis together, both Interfutures and the
Trilateral Commission also came to the conclusion that the capacities of the West
to meet a transformed world order in which the Third World now had a bargain-
ing position hinged on its ability to draw developing countries into an expanding
world market. In addition, Western competitiveness needed to be restored
through the reform of labor markets and welfare states.¹⁵ In this sense, ‘interde-
pendence’ was more than a description of a new phenomenon of globality, it was
term charged with a heavy historical legacy of Western hegemony and a diagno-
sis of a situation in which the colonial relationships inherited from the nine-
teenth century were giving way to a new symmetry in power relations. In this
world situation, the meaning of First, Second and Third World was no longer
clear.
The Interfutures program defined interdependence as a threefold problem:
First, the oil crisis was the final indication that the long period of stability
around industrial society was over. Faltering growth rates and new forms of so-
cial conflict eroded the basis of Fordist societies. Moreover, the volatility that
 Stephen Gill, American Hegemony and the Trilateral Commission (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard
University Press, 2009). Phillip Golub, “From the new international order to the G20,” Third
World Quarterly, 34, no. 6 (2013): 1000–1015.
 Trilateral Commission, Towards a Renovated International System (Washington, 1977). Inter-
futures, Documents concerning the Interfutures program 1977– 1980 MAS 80.9, ED 80– 11, OECD
archives, Paris. Interfuturs, Facing the Future (Paris: The Organisation for Economic Co-opera-
tion and Development, 1977), 179.
 “Resume of the Interfutures conceptual framework regarding the Advanced Industrial Soci-
eties Rigidities.” OECD archives.
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growth rates and price levels had encountered in the 1960s and the first half of
the 1970s seemed to mark the end of conjectural market patterns, and introduced
a concern with fluctuations in commodity markets that defied predictability and
governability. Second, the liberal capitalist economies were increasingly compet-
ing with the socialist planned economies over resources, technological develop-
ment and investment. A relatively stable Cold War relationship was thus chang-
ing as both worlds were entering the post-industrial era and encountered similar
problems of value and labor change, the skills revolution, and new struggles for
energy and raw materials. Third, this process of possible convergence (conver-
gence theory boomed in the decade prior to the Interfutures group) was distur-
bed through the confrontation with the Third World, which forced both Western
societies and the economies of the Eastern bloc to seek new competitive alli-
ances. In the years leading up to OPEC, the Third World had shown that it
was no longer content to be the object of development policies, and was increas-
ingly claiming a fair share of world development. This included access to mar-
kets for advanced industrial goods, an increased share of world industrial
labor, and controls over prices of its raw materials in what to Interfutures was
nothing less than a full shake-up of the postwar world order.¹⁶ In summary,
world hierarchies were in flux. Interfutures gave expression to this flux as the
group proposed a new categorization of the world into the ‘Advanced Industrial
Economies,’ AIS,which included the socialist countries, on the one hand, and on
the other, the LDCs of the developing world. Meanwhile, the Interfutures report,
published in 1979, foresaw important processes of fracture also disintegrating
these new geopolitical categories. The Western world was, in the light of prob-
lems such as price fluctuations, wage drift, expanding public sectors, and stop
and go policies, at the risk of no longer representing a coherent and unified sys-
tem of organized market economies. Some countries (France, the UK) ressembled
developing nations in their reliance on a growing state apparatus and failing
macro economic policies. The incoherence in the use of macro economic plan-
ning was a threat to a united AIS position that might have been able to meet
Third Worldism with a single Western strategy. The core problem with the second
category, the developing countries, was of course its new and menacing role as a
collective agent in an inverted bargaining game. But Interfutures pointed out that
the hope for new and harmonious relations between the Third World and the
OECD countries lay in the fact that Third Worldism was not stable and was al-
 Glenda Sluga, “The transformation of international institutions: Global shock as cultural
shock,” in Shock of the Global, ed. Niall Fergusson, Charles S. Maier, Erez Manela, Daniel J Sar-
gent (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2010), 223–237.
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ready breaking up between oil exporters and importers. A number of countries –
Iran, India, Brezil, South Africa, Mexico, and Algeria – were contenders for in-
dustrialism, while other Third World countries – such as Bangladesh – were ba-
sically only the sites of location for Western industries. Japan (the third node of
the Trilateral Commission) occupied an intermediary place with its hyper indus-
trialization and increasing reliance on raw materials. Highly energy sensitive,
Japan was challenging Europe for oil. With its Western system of governance
after 1945 and the direct links between its planning elites and Western networks,
Japan was an extension of the Western world in Asia. Interdependence was thus
a fundamentally fractious process which posed not one but many problems of
coordination, but also the opportunity for strategic alliances if common interests
over the long-term could be found. Interfutures’ problem was how to reassert the
AIS’ interests over the long-term by possibly making strategic concessions to the
most advanced LDCs for the purpose of protecting long term hegemony.¹⁷
The vision of global challenges put forward by the notion of interdepend-
ence was thus one that reflected a highly Western biased conception of changes
to world order, and a limited take on globality. The Interfutures group also used
the term to refer to a different set of issues that by the mid 1970s were labelled
‘world problems’ or ‘common problems,’ and that went beyond problems of co-
ordination between categories and depicted planning problems that could not be
dealt with within the frame of the nation state and national planning systems
such as those developed during the postwar period. In radical globality discours-
es, so-called ‘world problems’ were understood as problems that necessitated
common solutions, in other words forms of planning and decision-making sur-
passing the national, the bipolar or even the transnational level and that
could only efficiently take place on a new level of world, for instance in the
form of world government, world regulation or indeed world plans. This latter
notion – the idea that the entire world system could be planned – was as we
will see an idea that flourished along with the many different models of the
world economy that marked the first half of the 1970s. In most of these models,
problems in the world economy were perceived as shared, or indeed common.
The Club of Rome, in many ways a twin project to that of Interfutures but guilty
in the eyes of the OECD of the problematic Limits to Growth-report in 1972, spoke
of problems in the world system using the term world problematique, denoting
encompassing problems that concerned the world as a whole.
It is important to note, in this regard, that Interfutures dealt to only a small
extent with such notions of common or world problems, and spoke instead of
 Interfutures, chapter drafts (in particular VI, XI, XIX), OECD archives.
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‘problems of development.’ This was a highly conscious choice. The euphemism
‘problems of development’ hid the fundamental tension between discourses af-
firming globality by arguing that the interests of the whole world required
change on the level of the world system, and discourses that either emphasized
‘common futures’ by pinpointing trans-border problems such as environment or
armament, or reaffirmed, like Interfutures, the stakes of the Western world and
new strategic alliances with the South.¹⁸ Interfutures did not set out to address
development as a common world problem of over vs. under development in a
systemic whole, as did radical planners such as the Dutch Jan Tinbergen or
the Armenian born American systems analyst Hazan Ozbekhan in connection
to NIEO debates at the same time (see below). Rather, it addressed development
as a set of fractures that challenged the dominance of the industrialized world in
a new struggle over an international division of industrial labor. The first of these
fractures was the acute crisis in relationships between AIS and LDCs already de-
scribed. The second fracture was the conflict between resource extraction and
nature, highlighted by the Club of Rome-report and directly in conflict with
the OECD’s prevailing notion of development as economic growth. ¹⁹ The third
fracture was more subtle but the most important, as a large part of Interfutures
would also cater to the issue of reactions to development in terms of ‘changing
socio-cultural values’ and instability within Western nations. The problem of in-
terdependence, in other words, was not a problem of addressing problems com-
mon to the world in the interest of all, but rather, a problem of reigning in an
emergent new world order so that fundamental categories of the developing
and developed world could be restored. By articulating and framing problems
of interdependence as problems that could be solved if the interest of each
was reasserted, the OECD reiterated the liberal capitalist West as a category
under threat of losing its world dominance, but with a historically legitimate in-
terest in maintaining its hegemonic position.
Planning the world: origins of futurology
Interfutures’ mission was in fact a two fold one, as its work not only consisted in
the strategic analysis of a new world situation marked by interdependence, but
 Jenny Andersson and Sibylle Duhautois, “The future of Mankind “ in The Politics of Globality
Since 1945: Assembling the Planet, ed. Casper Sylvest and Rens van Munster (New York: Rout-
ledge, 2015), 106– 125.
 Schmelzer, The Hegemony of Growth.
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also in examining which new methods of planning could permit overseeing and
managing this new situation. Interfutures was thus devoted from the onset to the
question of methods, and to the particular technologies that could transform a
global situation of conflict and struggle for resources into one of “harmonious
development.”²⁰ The program proposed using forms of long-term or long
range planning, including scenarios, prospective and modelling, as its particular
method.
Futurological tools proliferated in planning circles in the period from the
mid 1960s to the mid 1970s. While historians have dealt with the transnational
networks of planners in the interwar and postwar era, much less historical re-
search has been devoted to the circulation of concepts and tools of planning in-
formed by ideas of complexity, interdependence, risk and having as their focus
the long term from the 1970s on.²¹ Meanwhile, as argued here, this second mode
in planning implied a notable expansion of planning rationalities, both with ref-
erence to the ‘long term’ as temporal horizon, and to the global scale. Future re-
search, for instance the scenario method experimented with by Interfutures, or-
iginated in technological forecasting and Cold War strategy. Both focused on the
idea of the ‘long range,’ a category produced by nuclear strategy and ballistic
research. From the mid 1960s on, forms of forecasting began to be considered
as ways of planning change in non-technological systems, including social or-
ganizations and the political system.²² In the Eastern bloc, the proclamation of
the Scientific and Technological Revolution emphasized scientific management,
and rehabilitated forecasting as a key planning technology (it had already been
used as part of Lenin’s NEP in the interwar period). A decision by the central
Party committee for the use of forecasting as part of scientific management in
1967, led to the explosion of sectoral and governmental forecasting activities in
socialist economies, and in 1967 and 1968 there were several transnational meet-
 Interfutures, “Mission statement. Description of the research project”. OECD archives.
 Patricia Clavin, “Defining transnationalism,” Contemporary European History 14 (2005): 421–
439. David Engerman and Corinna Unger, “Introduction: Towards a Global History of Moderni-
zation,” Diplomatic History 33, no. 3 (2009): 375–385. David Engerman, Nils Gilman, Mark H.
Haefele, Michael E. Latham Staging Growth: Modernization, Development, and the Global Cold
War (Boston: University of Massachusetts Press, 2003).
 On the transfer of planning tools from the military to the civilian apparatus, see Jennifer
Light, From Warfare to welfare (Baltimore: John Hopkins Press, 2002); David Jardini, Out of
the Blue Yonder: The RAND Corporation’s Diversification into Social Welfare Research (Baltimore:
Carnegie Mellon University, 1996); Sharon Ghamari Tabrizi, The Intutitive Science of Herman
Kahn (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2005).
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ings of socialist forecasters.²³ On the other side of the Atlantic, a national Science
and Technology policy which included a much more active role for federal gov-
ernment and a turn to new planning tools such as cost benefit analysis and fore-
casting began under the Kennedy and subsequently the Johnson administra-
tions.²⁴ From 1972 on, the debate over future research as a new planning tool
also inspired the creation of ad hoc commissions to national planning systems
in Europe – the Netherlands, Sweden, France, West Germany, UK – and Japan.
These commissions were national spaces but they also functioned as interna-
tional hubs for the circulation of methods, writing, and forms of expertize. The
methods of forecasting, systems analysis, global modelling and scenario analy-
sis laid the basis for new communities of planners, oftentime consultants, who
moved between national planning commissions and transnational sites such
as the Club of Rome, IIASA, or Interfutures.²⁵
Like its more insubordinate twin, the Club of Rome, Interfutures stemmed
from a central gathering of planners organized by the OECD in Bellagio in
1969. The Bellagio conference, the theme of which was “Long range forecasting
and planning” was called by the OECD’s Science Policy Unit around the theme of
‘problems of modern societies.’ ²⁶ As Matthias Schmelzer has shown, problems
of modern societies was a euphemism for the concern within parts of the
OECD with the critique of growth by the late 1960s and the discovery of both
the environmental and social costs of economic development. The OECD’s Sci-
ence Policy Unit was created by Alexander King, the initiator, with Aurelio Pec-
cei, of the Club of Rome, as part of a turn away from the strict postwar focus on
growth within the organization. King used the Science Policy Directorate in order
to criticize the standing of the idea of industrial development, convinced as he
was that the prerequisites for industrial development were exhausted and that
growth based on resource extraction had reached maturity in the Western
world.²⁷ He thought that the Western world had to develop a more nuanced ap-
 See Viteszlav Sommer, “Forecasting the Post-Socialist Future: Prognostika in Late Socialist
Czechoslovakia, 1970– 1989,” in The Struggle for the Long Term in Transnational Science and Pol-
itics, ed. Jenny Andersson and Egle Rindzeviciute (New York: Routledge, 2015), 144– 168. Lukasz
Becht, “From euphoria to frustration. Institutionalising a system of prognostic research in the
people’s republic of Poland, 1971–1976,” forthcoming and with the permission of the author.
 Light, From Warfare to Welfare, 160 on.
 Egle Rindzeviciute, Power of System (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2017).
 Matthias Schmelzer, “Born in the corridors of the OECD: The forgotten origins of the Club of
Rome, transnational networks, and the 1970s in global history,” Journal of Global History 12
(2017): 26–48.
 Schmelzer, “The crisis before the crisis.”
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proach to problems of industrial development if capitalism was to survive. This
included harnessing the forces of science in better ways and picking up the com-
petition over productivity with the socialist world and the US, as well as devel-
oping methods of planning that drew on the so-called policy sciences, the scien-
tific approach to planning that had emerged as part of systems analysis or
Operations Research in the 1950s and 1960s. The Bellagio Declaration expressed
the OECD’s wish to concentrate Western nations’ efforts in planning, and
stressed the need that Western nations develop forms of long-term forecasting
that could help them manage the long-term effects of development in and on
their social structures, deal with possible value conflict, and establish priorities
for policies.²⁸
The Bellagio meeting gathered many of the forecasters and consultants who
had been active in spreading the tools of future research. One of these was the
German-born engineer Eric Jantsch. Jantsch wrote a much read report on plan-
ning and technological forecasting in 1967. It presented the idea that technolog-
ical change could be actively governed and planned for the benefit of welfare so-
cieties and that the unintended consequences and cybernetic feedback loops of
new technologies could be forecasted, so that the system of economic and tech-
nological change was in actual fact a malleable, controllable entity. It introduced
the idea of the long range, to a European public of planners. The report also pro-
posed that human values and value reactions to industrial and technological
processes were among the things that could be planned and foreseen as systemic
feedback functions. This was no small point in the aftermath of 1968 and turbu-
lent years in European societies marked both by anti-nuclear protests and labor
market unrest.²⁹ Jantsch edited the 1969 volume from the Bellagio conference,
and in 1972 published Long range policy and planning which circulated widely
amongst European, American and Japanese planners (and was also translated
into Russian and prefaced by Dzhermen Gvishiani).³⁰ Another participant at Bel-
lagio was the former RAND strategist and software engineer Hasan Ozbekhan.
Ozbekhan designed the first model for the Club of Rome, meant to address a
‘global predicament’ by stressing interdependence in a world system. ³¹ At Bel-
 Eric Jantsch, Perspectives on Planning: Papers from the Bellagio Conference (Paris: The Organ-
isation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 1969).
 Eric Jantsch, Technological Forecasting in Perspective (Paris: The Organisation for Economic
Co-operation and Development, 1967).
 Jantsch, Perspectives on Planning.
 Hasan Ozbekhan, The Predicament of Mankind: A Quest for Structured Responses to Growing
World-wide Complexities and Uncertainties. Original Proposal to the Club of Rome (New York:
Club of Rome, 1970).
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lagio, Ozbekhan presented his ‘general theory of planning,’ which argued that
the world could be considered to be a holistic system, and that this system
could be planned in order to work towards an overarching value, such as for in-
stance human development or environmental balance. The ‘critical problems’ of
the world could be solved, if the world future was not treated as a problem of
prediction, but as a normative problem of setting out an image of what an
ideal world future would be like. To Ozbekhan’s mind, this had to be about
the envisioning of ideal states such as a world without hunger, and an end to
the dichotomy of over and under development.³² Ozbekhan is an example of
the radical use of systems theory in forging radical visions of a better and
more rational world by the late 1960s and 1970s. But Ozbekhan’s model for
the Club of Rome, which explicitly incorporated the variable of Western value
change as a precondition for a new world equilibrium, was never used and
the Limits to Growth report published in 1972 was based instead on Jay Forres-
ter’s World 2 model, initially designed to monitor the flow of goods in commer-
cial warehouses in Boston harbor.³³ The Interfutures report made use of some of
Ozbekhan’s ideas but translated the idea of a world system with an ideal future
objective into a completely different concern with the future interests of the in-
dustrialized nations and the necessity of maintaining the ‘market image.’
From systems analysis to world consultancy:
Jacques Lesourne and the MITRA group
It is clear from this argument that Interfutures did not represent future research
as such, nor an engagement with the more radical attempts to use future re-
search as a way of engaging with globality that existed at the same time. Rather,
Interfutures represented a very specific Western take on the world’s future. This
take needs to be understood in the context of the rationale of the OECD and its
mandate to oversee the process of globalization, but in addition, it was a view
directly influenced by the conditions of material production within the Interfu-
tures group, by the scenario method used, and specifically, by the use of consul-
tancy. As argued, future research represented a widening of the repertoires of
planning, and the extension of the scope of planning rationalities both in
 Hasan Ozbekhan, A General Theory of Planning (Santa Barbara: Systems Development Cor-
poration, 1969).
 Elodie Vieille Blanchard, Les limites à la croissance dans un monde global: modélisations,
prospectives, réfutations (PhD Diss., Paris, EHESS, 2011).
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space and time. To this it might be added that future research also involved new
forms of circulation, in particular of management techniques, between the pub-
lic and the corporate spheres. Future research had origins both in military plan-
ning, and in the planning entities of large multinational, predominantly Ameri-
can, corporations such as IBM, Kodak, Bell laboratories, Lockheed, Kaiser
Aluminum, or the Swiss Battelle Industries. As such, it had direct links to the
idea that market mechanisms in various ways could be used as a method of
steering and as a complement to plans, but that market activities also required
a precision of operational objectives, goals, and processes. In the Eastern bloc,
future research was part of a new reform communist toolkit which included man-
agement science and systematic forecasting.³⁴ In the West, future research con-
tributed to a growing industry in indicators of long-term developments in tech-
nology and prices, but it also reflected a market metaphor in that it drew on
emerging forms of consultancy. Transnational organizations after 1945 put in
place new forms of mobility of expertize, as experts moved from national to in-
ternational planning entities and back again. The growth of the multinational
corporation, in the Cold War era, fostered a new kind of mobile expert which
was that of the consultant in matters of strategy and decision, who facilitated
the interface between corporations and public decision-making bodies on both
the national and transnational levels. The OECD’s modus operandus with expert
groups privileged the use of consultancy, as in many ways the UN-system and
the European Community did. Consultants could be academics, on leave for
shorter missions, but they could also be professional expert-strategists whose
origins were not in academia but in contract-seeking agencies with a mediating
role between corporations and national or transnational organizations. As a
form of expertize, consultancy enabled new forms of circulation between nation-
al and transnational spaces, and forecasting, scenarios, models and forecasts
were all technologies that were, from the mid 1960s on, carried by consultancy.
Consultancy also created a specific mode for the translation between planning
technologies taken from public sectors and decision tools taken from the corpo-
rate world. Interfutures mobilized a number of consultants, including the French
planner Bernard Cazes, the British sociologist Andrew Shonfield, and the Amer-
ican sociologist Daniel Bell, all of whom were prominent within the field of fu-
ture research and forecasting (both Shonfeld and Bell wrote central books on
forecasting and planning in post-industrial society). It was directed by yet anoth-
 See Kott and Sommer in this volume.
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er consultant, the French systems analyst and prospectiviste Jacques Lesourne.³⁵
The method used by Interfutures, the scenario method and prospective analysis,
was a product of consultancy and the circulation of expertize between decision-
making in corporations and forms of public planning. The scenario method had
been invented by the nuclear strategist Herman Kahn, first at RAND and then at
the neoconservative Washington thinktank, the Hudson Institute. From there, the
scenario method was transferred to simulations of domestic developments in the
American context (in particular in the field of value tensions and race relations).
Kahn also sold a package known as ‘Corporate Scenarios’ to leading corpora-
tions, and in the early 1970s, the French systems analyst Pierre Wack brought
the scenario method from the Hudson Institute to Royal Shell, as a means
with which to oversee uncertainty in oil markets and reserves.³⁶ The scenario
method, which aimed to actively invent or script possible futures, was closely re-
lated to another method which influenced the field of future research from the
mid 1960s on, French so-called prospective. Prospective was brought into the In-
terfutures group through Jacques Lesourne and was essentially a form of deci-
sion science that developed in the large French public companies, in particular
the SNCF but also the private Saint Gobain. It was to a large extent a consultancy
activity that began in the so-called Clubs that grouped together business leaders
and politicians, and prospective was a key element in the introduction of eco-
nomic forecasting, business cycle theories, and labor management in France.³⁷
As such prospective is highly indicative of what Francois Denord has described
as French neoliberalism, a strange alliance between French planners, engineers,
and leaders of public and national industries.³⁸ Prospective was integrated into
the French Commissariat au Plan in the mid 1960s. After 1968, its focus became
that of considering the impacts of revolutionary value change on French soci-
ety.³⁹ Both scenarios and prospective, in other words, where methods with an ap-
 Jacques Lesourne specialized in labor market issues and also became the editor of Le Monde.
Biographical note, Interfuturs archives, and Jacques Lesourne, Les mille sentiers de l’avenir,
(Paris, 1981). Jacques Lesourne, “L‘exercice Interfuturs, réflexions méthodologiques,” Futuribles-
no. 26: 20–38.Walter Michalski, “The OECD Interfuturs project revisited twenty years later,” in
Decision, prospective, auto-organisation. Essais en l’honneur de Jacques Lesourne, ed. Walter Mi-
chalski (Paris, 2000), 318–331.
 Timothy Mitchell, Carbon Democracy (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2013).
John R. Williams, “World futures,” Critical Inquiry 42 (2016): 473–546.
 Jenny Andersson and Pauline Prat, “Gouverner le ‘long terme’ La production des futurs bur-
aucratique en France,” Gouvernement et action publique, 3 (2015): 9–29.
 Denord, Néoliberalisme.
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parent focus on the social, on monitoring values and forms of uncertainty result-
ing from value change and potential unrest.
Lesourne was well familiar with prospective. He was an engineer and man-
agement consultant, who as the author of a number of books on business man-
agement and planning had introduced key elements of econometrics and busi-
ness cycle theory in France. In 1958, Lesourne created a consultancy firm
SEMA (Société d’économie et de mathématiques appliqués) which worked in pro-
spective analysis, econometrics and information management.. At the time that
he was recruited to Interfutures, Lesourne was centrally placed in the futurolog-
ical field as assistant director to the International Institute for Applied Systems
Analysis, IIASA, and president of the French Futuribles association.⁴⁰ But in the
1950s Lesourne had also ventured into global consultancy through SEMA’s inter-
national branch, METRA, which worked on exporting systems analysis and man-
agement consultancy to key countries in the south, in particular Morocco, and
which had as its particular market niche the aim of helping French multination-
als maintain relationships with the former colonies after decolonisation. As dem-
onstrated by Christian in this volume, France, Britain and Belgium reacted
against the volatility in commodity markets by the early 1970s by strengthening
their ties with former colonies and setting in place systems for price negotiations
on primary materials. At the same time, the former colonies, and particularly
those on the path of industrial development, became interesting markets for Eu-
ropean technological solutions in communication and finance. SEMA-METRA
continued to work on strategic advice for French investment banks and compa-
nies in North Africa, the Middle East and Iran.⁴¹ In 1975, SEMA became METRA
Iran, specialized in providing systems analytical tools for the management of Ira-
nian oil production. Anglo-Persian Oil had been nationalized by the Mossadegh
regime in 1951. In 1977, SEMA-METRA produced a report for UNIDO analyzing
actor strategies of the Third World and the “future consequences of achieving
the Lima objectives” (the Lima objectives were voted in 1975, see below). The re-
 IIASA was a central site for the development of global modelling from 1972 on in particular
in energy and world resources. Egle Rindzeviciute, “Purification and Hybridisation of Soviet Cy-
bernetics: The Politics of Scientific Governance in an Authoritarian Regime,” Archiv für Sozialge-
schichte, 50 (2010): 289–309.
 Manfred Pohl, Handbook on the History of European Banks (New York: Edward Elgar, 1994),
249. From 1962 on Sema Metra published a periodical on investments and branch structures in
Middle Eastern and African economies, Cahiers Sema. See “Le développement international du
groupe METRA,” in PCM, Révue publiée par l’association professionnelle des ingénieurs des Ponts
et Chaussees et des Mines, Les entreprises françaises a l’étranger 68, no. 10 (1971): 93–99.
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port drew on the prospective method that Lesourne was at the same time exper-
imenting for Interfutures.⁴²
Overcoming limits: reshaping international order
The Interfutures group, and in particular Lesourne, used scenarios as the meth-
od for constructing a vision of interdependence that protected key Western inter-
ests, and with which it could also reject alternative visions of a new world order
and in particular those coming from the Limits to Growth report, published a year
before OPEC sent oil prices searing, and the RIO-report, written by Jan Tinbergen
for UNITAR. RIO codified the theme of a New International Economic Order
(NIEO).
Limits to Growth was based on computer models produced by a team of com-
puter analysts and systems programrs under the direction of Dennis and Dona-
tella Meadows at MIT. Limits sent a shock wave through the industrialized world
with its projection of an “overshoot and collapse” scenario.⁴³ The report was
publically marketed and spread in ways that were strategically oriented at catch-
ing public attention, its models and scenarios also intended to work as triggers
of the global imagination and to raise attention about an ensuing environmental
collapse. As Matthias Schmelzer has shown, the publication of Limits created
profound tensions within the OECD.⁴⁴ The Club of Rome, a group of industrialists
and planners under King and Aurelio Peccei (another world consultant, having
worked for the Olivetti foundation in Abyssinia) was the creation of the OECD
Science Policy Unit as part of its search for a broader idea of planning, capable
of embracing common problems and negative feedback loops. But the final mes-
sage of the report, projecting a future determined by the tension between popu-
lation and finite available resources and prophesying the end to capitalist devel-
opment was a little hard to swallow for an organization devoted to protecting the
economic development of the Western world. Interfutures was, as Schmelzer
shows, a central component in the OECD’s attempt to save a fragilized growth
paradigm from the mid 1970s onward, by accepting the idea that environmental
problems needed to be managed, but by reiterating the importance of growth to
lasting social stability in the Western world and by a new insistence on the role
of market mechanisms. Interfutures was appointed at the same 1975 Ministerial
 “Industrial development in the Third world. Actor’s strategies” (SEMA, METRA International,
1977).
 Vieille Blanchard, Limites a la croissance.
 Schmelzer, “Born in the corridors of the OECD.”
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meeting that launched the McCracken group and its theme of structural adjust-
ment. The meeting “put an end to previous debates about the problems of mod-
ern society by reaffirming without any qualifications the pursuit of growth as the
key responsibility of governments.” The ministerial meeting in 1975 included a
new emphasis on market mechanisms, as planning and welfare statism were
now understood as incapable of overcoming the endemic problem of stagfla-
tion.⁴⁵ The formulation ‘in harmony’ in the description of the Interfutures project
was a core rejection of the idea of physical boundaries to growth: it referred not
only to a reconciliation of interests with the ambitions of development of strate-
gic countries in the Third World, but also to the idea that the physical limits to
development as posited by Limits could be overcome with less than life altering
changes in industrial strategies. In fact there were deemed to be no physical lim-
its to growth. The Interfutures group acknowledged that Mankind was entering a
critical stage in its relationship to the ecosphere. But it rejected (as did the
McCracken group) the idea that there were physical limits to growth: “The ques-
tion of physical limits is not of the form frequently proposed.” Limits to industrial
development were not found in natural resources, but identified instead in a
range of others factors and in particular political phenomena such as the protec-
tionist stances motivated by forms of Third Worldism and nationalism, or, impor-
tantly, the range of ‘socio cultural factors’ standing in the way of industrial
growth in the advanced capitalist economies.⁴⁶ By socio cultural factors was
meant the kind of ‘psychological’ protests against nuclear energy and environ-
mental effects of industrialization that the Western world had witnessed since
the late 1960s. Addressing problems of growth meant addressing these sociocul-
tural factors. This included reigning in social struggles so that competitiveness
could be restored and cycles of wage expectations broken.⁴⁷
It is unfortunate that the existing literature has not made the links between
the environmentalist message of the Club of Rome, the rise of Third Worldism
and NIEO, and the ensuing ideas of interdependence in the Western world.
These three debates were not isolated, but part of a great conflict over the
world’s future that makes little sense considered in isolated pieces. Indeed the
relevance of Interfutures only stands out if we consider it as a set of counterargu-
 OECD Ministerial meeting 1975, “The imperatives of growth and cooperation,” 28 May 1975,
quoted in Schmelzer, 317.
 Interfuturs, FUT (77)S, 9 May 1977. “Midway through Interfutures. A first assessment of world
problems. Intermediary results of the Interfutures research project phase A and B,” Interfutures
Main issue paper 79, 7. OECD archives.
 Ibid,; Manpower unit, Documents concerning the Interfutures program 1977– 1980, MAS (80)
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ments to much more radical visions in a wider debate on the world future. The
Limits to growth-report spawned a global controversy about the uses of model-
ling, which was technical on the surface but in fact concerned the very idea of
world order.⁴⁸ The neo-Malthusian framework of Limits opened the door for a
radicalization of the development debate: if the resources controlling world de-
velopment were finite within fixed planetary boundaries, then the struggle over
the rights of exploitation of these resources was acute.⁴⁹ This problem trans-
posed, in a way, the nineteenth-century problem of the class struggle to the
level of the world, which Interfutures recognized in its own analysis of a postwar
global division of labor.
The Interfutures report has to be understood here as a key building stone in
the monumental rejection of the Limits to Growth report after 1975, and in the
gradual transformation of the apocalyptic arguments of Limits into an emphasis
on management and sustainable development. These rejections came from dif-
ferent camps. The idea that there were physical limits to growth was inacceptable
not only to prevailing Western notions of capitalism, but also to socialist ones.
On the initiative of the Romanian president Nicolae Ceaușescu, an alliance of Ro-
manian and African socialist forecasters challenged Limits by arguing that post-
industrialism and the Scientific Technological Revolution made the resource de-
pendency taken for granted in the model irrelevant by replacing natural resour-
ces with intellectual ones. A world of learning and creativity had no limits. The
Limits report was, they argued, a product of a limited Western capitalist imagi-
nation and a “bourgeois futurology.”⁵⁰ Other models accepted the idea of plan-
etary limits but challenged the way that models partitioned the right to develop-
ment between the developing and the developed world. The most important
intervention here was the so-called Bariloche-Report, written by the Latin Amer-
ican Fondacion Bariloche and deeply influenced by dependency theory. The Bar-
iloche-report argued that Limits was an erroneous representation of events, as
world catastrophe was not an impending scenario but already at hand with
two thirds of global populations living in poverty. Rejecting the idea of a static
equilibrium point in the system, the Bariloche-report proposed using modelling
in order to answer the question of how a dynamic system could be made to meet
what the model referred to as the ‘basic needs’ of human populations. Covering
global needs in the model required a total reorganization of the world economy
and international order, in fact a new system that moved beyond both capitalism
 Andersson, The Future of the World, forthcoming.
 See Elke Seefried, Zukunfte. Aufstieg und Krise der Zukunftsforschung (Munich: de Gruyter,
2016).
 Majdi Elmandjra and Mircai Malitsa, No Limits to Learning (Bucharest: Club of Rome, 1974).
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and socialism and allowed estimates of human needs to determine the rate of
production within environmentally sustainable limits.⁵¹ This would be the mes-
sage of RIO, written by the Nobel Prize Laureate and World Bank economist Jan
Tinbergen for UNITAR.⁵² In 1973, the so-called Group of 77 of the non-aligned
countries met in Algiers to follow up on the Third World forum held during
the 1972 conference for the environment in Stockholm. The Third World was con-
cerned that the problem of the environment would take attention away from
problems of development.⁵³ The Algiers conference launched the New Interna-
tional Economic Order. NIEO was voted by the UN General assembly in 1974.
The following year, the Lima conference of UNIDO set the goal for the developing
countries to obtain a 25 percent share of world manufacturing.⁵⁴ NIEO led to in-
terpretations in the Western world of the UN as the arena of a new and militant
form of Third Worldism that threatened to overthrow the existing economic
order.⁵⁵ The core concern of the NIEO was the right to self reliance, to a choice
of one’s own economic and social model which to most meant a version of so-
cialism, and a share in what was projected as a new global division of industrial
labor (see Christian in this volume). NIEO economists attacked an international
division of labor destined to reproduce a global proletariat. They also rejected so-
called cascading, by which the developing world could not access the high value
added part of production dependent on some of its key minerals.⁵⁶ Some miner-
 See Sam Cole, Jay Gershuny, and Ian Miles, “Scenarios of world development,” Futures 10,
no. 1 (1978): 3–20.
 Jan Tinbergen, Reshaping the International Economic Order: Aa report to the Club of Rome
(New York: Club of Rome, 1976).
 Mahbub Al Huq, The Poverty Curtain: Choices for the Third World (New York: Columbia Uni-
versity Press, 1976).
 UNITAR, A New International Economic Order: Selected Documents 1945– 1975 (New York:
United Nations Institute for Training and Research, 1976). See also UNESCO, International Social
Science Journal 4, 1976, devoted to the NIEO; Mark T. Berger, “After the Third world? History, des-
tiny and the fate of Third worldism,” Third World Quarterly 25, no. 1 (2012): 9–39; Arif Dirlik,
“Spectres of the Third world: global modernity and the end of the three worlds,” Third World
Quarterly, 25, no. 1 (2012): 131– 145; Nils Gilman, “The new international economic order: A re-
introduction,” Humanity: An International Journal of Human Rights, Humanitarianism, and Devel-
opment 6, no. 1 (2015): 1– 16; Sibylle Duhautois, “Un destin commun? Etudes sur le futur et for-
mation d’une conscience globale 1945– 1989,” (PhD Diss., Centre d’histoire de Sciences Po,
2017), chapter 4.
 UN Charter of the economic rights and duties of states, and Declaration of the principles of
international law concerning friendly relations and cooperation among states in accordance
with the charter of the United Nations, 1974. GA resolution 3201, 1974.
 Samir Amin, “Self reliance and the New International Economic Order,” Monthly Review 29,
no. 3 (1977): 1–21; see Christian in this volume.
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als – aluminium, bauxite, iron – were singled out in particular as targets of cas-
cading (these were also at the center of attention in the Interfutures report). In
1974, following the NIEO and the incorporation of principles such as ‘unjust en-
richment’ in the UN Declaration on International Law, Jamaica shocked world
markets by nationalizing bauxite. European countries reacted through the so-
called Lome convention, giving former African, Caribbean and Pacific colonies
privileged access to European markets in the hope of preventing collective pro-
tectionist stances.⁵⁷
The RIO report followed the conceptions of the world as a systemic whole
put forward by planners such as Tinbergen or Ozbekhan, and rejected the dis-
tinction between developed and developing world in favor of a perspective on
the world as a whole. This was reflected in the production of the report which
brought in two experts for each chapter, one from the developed and the other
from the developing world. The report argued for the need for an entirely new
international architecture aimed at promoting peace and development and pro-
viding for basic human needs. This included giving Third World countries control
of their own resources, pooling the world’s material wealth including capital and
technology, and developing an overarching notion of the common heritage of
Mankind. RIO also gave OPEC an increased role in new global financial institu-
tions and foresaw equal representation of all nations in something called the
World Treasury. UNCTAD would be transformed into a World Development and
Trade Organisation dominated by the Third World, and complemented by a
World Bank and a World Technological Development Authority which would
aim to close the technological gap by lowering the prices for Third would coun-
tries’ access to knowhow.⁵⁸
Historians and development scholars have shown how the NIEO gradually
failed, after 1976, as a Third Worldist attempt to collectively challenge the
rules of the postwar economic order. Faced with Western resistance and in par-
ticular by American monetary extortions by the late 1970s, the attempts at mo-
bilization demonstrated by OPEC broke down. Third Worldism in the UN system
prompted the US in particular to create an alternative structure of international
organization in the G7.⁵⁹ Interfuture was as much a part of this rejection of NIEO
as it was part of the mounting rejection of the Limits report, and the value of the
 Golub, “From the new international order to the G20”: 1005.
 In 1974 the World Bank was given a new target to work for the eradication of basic needs.
Corinna Unger, International Organizations and Development, 1945– 1990 (Amsterdam: Springer,
2016).
 See in particular the special issue in Humanity, Humanity: An International Journal of Human
Rights, Humanitarianism, and Development 6, no. 1 (2015).
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Interfuture group’s work lay in the way that it presented a different image of the
world’s future, in which the core elements of a global division of labor between
commodity producing nations and industrial actors was preserved. The final re-
port, published in 1976 as Facing the Future, was a mirror image of RIO’s descrip-
tion of a fundamentally transformed world economic order, and the report also
directly regrouped the themes introduced by the NIEO (which developed from a
set of statements in 1973 and 1974 to a set of actual negotiations between the de-
veloping countries and the Western world): commodity prices, in particular min-
erals and oil, technology and technology transfer, the monetary order of the Bret-
ton Woods system including debt and currency prices, and the international
division of labor between commodity producing and industrialized countries.⁶⁰
In Interfutures’ own narrative of a new economic world order, only the Western
world maintained an advantage as the main manufacturer of industrial products,
and what the report referred to as new and ‘harmonious’ relationships with the
Third World depended not on a reconfiguration of this system but on integrating
the industrializing nations of the third world – India, Algeria, Iran – into a
‘shared’ vision of a growing world market. Such an emphasis on a growing
world market can be put in the perspective of the Limits-report, which of course
foresaw a firm limit to capitalist accumulation. Interfutures also dismissed RIO’s
conception of shared world interests – arguing that RIO did not take into consid-
eration the needs of the Northern countries and that its conception of the world
was therefore biased. The idea of a World Plan was understood as an unaccept-
ably bureaucratic (socialist) conception that neglected market mechanisms. Mar-
ket mechanisms, Interfutures proposed, would instead need to be given a larger
space in Western economies in the coming decades.⁶¹ This rejection of planning
often returned in the Interfutures report, which was concerned with how market
mechanisms could be protected for the long term, and with how they could be
used in order to solve possible conflicts between short and long-term issues in
policy planning. As Christian shows in this volume, in the years 1971– 1976, fore-
casting became a key tool of UNCTAD in order to plan the development of com-
modity prices; from the mid 1970s, the socialist countries also attempted to con-
solidate relationships with the Third World by forecasting trade relationships
and prices; and from the mid 1970s the EEC also engaged in forecasting as a
way of stabilizing commodity prices. These forms of forecast were different in
kind than the idea of a World Plan that informed RIO, but they were also differ-
ent from the argument that would be put forward by Interfutures and that fa-
 Interfutures, “Searching for a new order of the world economy,” draft. OECD archives.
 Interfutures, Newsletter, summary of the RIO report, July 1977. OECD archives.
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vored the use of scenarios as a way of creating ‘shared’ and ‘harmonious’ images
of the world economic future.
Scenarios: a method for managing
world relationships
The actual scenarios proposed by Interfutures followed directly on the recom-
mendations of the McCracken group. The main issues paper produced by Le-
sourne in 1978 focused on two scenarios, one in which there was growth in
the Western world that went through a process of rapid structural adaptation,
and one in which this world encountered an enduring stagflation scenario fol-
lowed by an escalation of social conflicts. A conflict-ridden Western world
would not be able to put up a united front toward the Third World.⁶² It was how-
ever not only the message of these scenarios, but also the use of the scenarios as
method for shaping forms of opinion and decision-making that was important in
Lesourne’s work for Interfutures. While Limits and RIO were circulated widely,
intended for global publics, the scenarios created by Interfutures were written
by expert consultants, and also included the creation of a specialized public
of targeted decision-makers and experts of the world community. Interfutures
worked with a motley crew of consultants strategically recruited to inform the
group of developments in the developing nations,⁶³ but also to spread the mes-
sage of the Interfutures report of the necessity of a long-term harmonious strat-
egy to decision-makers in these nations. In other words, consultancy was a form
of expertize chosen not only in terms of its input, but also to form the basis of a
form of circulation which was part of the notion of shaping a positive image of
the future. The importance of actively shaping this positive image led to the
choice of scenarios as method, and to the rejection of computer modelling,
which was accused of leading to deterministic representations of static trends.
Interfutures (in fact Jacques Lesourne) argued that scenarios contained a dynam-
ic and normative element. Through this dynamic element, they could be used to
actively influence social relationships within Western societies as well as be-
tween the advanced industrialised world and the developing nations. To Le-
sourne, scenarios were, like systems analysis, a way of managing Third world re-
 Main issues paper for the meeting of senior officials, Paris, 2 February 1979.
 I have not been able to find a complete list of these in the remaining archives.
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lations.⁶⁴ Prospective, he argued, was a method that allowed for the evolution of
dynamic situations and focused on actors and governments as actively creating
strategies of cooperation or conflict that shaped the future of the ‘system.’⁶⁵ A
normative vision of the future could be chosen, and communicated through pro-
spective analysis and scenarios to decision-makers in this system.
The methodological pertinence of prospective analysis and scenarios had
also been indicated by the conclusions of the McCracken group, in which it
was suggested that a shift from the conjectural developments that had hitherto
been the focus of economic planning to structural and long-term issues that
could not as such be planned had to be accompanied by a new concern with
the analysis of fundamental ‘trends and developments.’⁶⁶ The McCracken
group came to the conclusion that the instabilities in Western economies due
to price fluctuations had rendered the macro economic models that had been
used through the postwar period of Keynesian management inefficient. The
idea of the Interfutures project was therefore to move beyond conventional mod-
elling and economic planning to examine ‘numerous trends’ and in particular
those driving up inflationary prices. This provided scenarios with yet another
purpose, because preeminent among the trends driving up prices were, as ar-
gued both by McCracken and Interfutures, value revolutions and ‘unsatisfied as-
pirations’ in the developing world as well as within the West.⁶⁷ Fluctuations in
commodity prices, raw materials and currencies were understood as based on
irrational sentiments and psychological reactions in the developing world, add-
ing to social tensions in the West by pushing prices up and in their effect on pro-
tectionist modes by governments, organizations and interest groups in Western
societies.⁶⁸ Among the major obstacles targeted by the McCracken group were
thus competing social claims and expectations, as well as a lack of preferences
for economic growth in terms of the critique of growth that Western societies had
witnessed since the late 1960s.⁶⁹ Echoing contemporary developments in eco-
 Jacques Lesourne, “L’exercice Interfuturs, réflexions méthodologiques,” Futuribles, no. 26:
20–38.
 Interfuturs, chapter II, draft, world models. OECD archives. Facing the future. Mastering the
probable and managing the unpredictable (Paris: The Organisation for Economic Co-operation
and Development), 4–5.
 Letter to Paul McCracken from Emile van Lennep, 15 April 1976. Summary of discussions at
the 4th meeting of the steering committee 20–21 October 1977, FUT M (77)3. OECD archives.
 Facing the Future, 7.
 Draft to the McCracken report by Assar Lindbeck. Undated, OECD archives, McCracken fold-
ers.
 Memorandum, second meeting of the McCracken group, 22–23 January 1976. OECD archives,
McCracken folders.
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nomic theory toward the idea of rational expectations, rising prices were defined
as “a psychological problem which depends on expectations.” This was, to the
McCracken group as well as to Interfutures, a deeply problematic situation
that forced the need for governments to deal with such rigidities by opening
up to more flexible relationships with the developing world.⁷⁰ Managing such
value problems, defined as the real challenges to growth, hinged on a new ele-
ment in planning: the capacity to set a positive image of the future that would
help ease conflict and induce cooperation. “The more the OECD governments
can lead the public to share a constructive vision of the future, the greater
will be the ability of these governments to implement sets of consistent long
term policies.”⁷¹ Decision-making needed a ‘positive’ message that brought
home the message that possible physical limits in natural resources over the
long term could be overcome by political, social, and institutional adaptation.
The “method should include economic, social and political elements and pro-
vide the basis for the scenarios.”⁷² Through scenarios, psychological aspects of
structural challenges could thus be dealt with.
The final report of the Interfutures project proposed five different possible
scenarios for the OECD world until 2000, based on the different factors (derived
from the NIEO structure) that had been considered.⁷³ But the main issues paper
produced by the group to a high level meeting of senior officials at Chateau de la
Muette in Paris in 1978 only focused on two central scenarios. The first was a new
growth scenario, in which the rigidities of Western nations were handled through
a rapid adaptation of values and a ‘conscious drive’ towards new patterns of out-
put and consumption. Scenario two was that of enduring stagflation, with a dual
fragmentation of advanced societies, and prevailing conflicts about the distribu-
tion of national income that also rendered the Western world incapable of put-
ting up a united front toward the Third World.⁷⁴ In order to push the situation
from scenario two to scenario one, Interfutures emphasized the role of govern-
ments in “attacking the psychological basis of present problems” and “replacing
the prevailing negative attitude toward the future by a positive one.” Education
and other forms of public opinion should be used as ways to shape long-term
preferences that avoided competing social claims, and also explained to Western
 Interfutures, Meeting of senior policy officials, draft of the background paper, 5 February
1978, Fut (78)3. OECD archives.
 Facing the future, 195.
 Ibid.
 Interfutures, chapter draft, ixx, “Scenarios of world development”. OECD archives.
 “Main issues paper for the meeting of senior officials,” Paris, 2 February 1979 FUT (78)7.
OECD archives.
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populations that the interdependent relationship with the Third World set limits
on consumption and redistribution. Scenarios, it was suggested, was a key meth-
od for enlightening both national policy makers and their electorates about
structural challenges and the need to address them through a coherent long-
term strategy. This idea of scenarios as a new form of planning that not only
set objectives of development, but created positive images of development,
also came from the McCracken report, which ascribed a new role to governments
in terms of constructing positive images of the future that might wear down neg-
ative feelings and influence “creative and energetic people grasping opportuni-
ties.” Such positive images would increase the “social willingness to accept the
continuing adjustment of economic structures.”⁷⁵ “Instead of the real danger of
introducing rigidities in dealing with crisis, AIS have potentially enormous capa-
bilities of influencing their futures if they develop forward looking activities and
sustained efforts to influence the future in positive ways.”⁷⁶ While the McCracken
report had the interior workings of the Western nations in focus; Interfutures ap-
plied the same logic to relationships with the developing world. By creating pos-
itive images of the benefits of a long-term integration in world markets through
cooperation with the AIS, the protectionist stances of OPEC could be averted,
and the Third World divided into those nations remaining in a basic needs ap-
proach, and those who might through industrialization become eventual mem-
bers of the AIS.⁷⁷ As full members of an expanding global market, the latter
could be expected to take an increased responsibility for the functioning of
this, as well as for carrying the ‘burdens of development.’ It was therefore essen-
tial to create positive images of development that could be shared by popula-
tions in the West and strategic parts of the Third World alike and “consolidate
areas of common interest.”⁷⁸ The scenarios were a communicative tool for this,
as was the use of consultants and strategic communication meetings set up by
Interfutures with policy makers both in the West and in the developing world,
through which the scenarios could be spread.
The emphasis on ‘sociocultural factors’ came from the original Japanese pro-
posal to create the Interfutures project.⁷⁹ The Japanese delegation, led by Saburo
Okita, head of the Japanese Overseas Fund, was concerned with the value reac-
 Ibid; McCracken report, “The origins of the present problems.”
 Interfutures, “Mid Term meeting, Summary of Conclusions.” OECD archives.
 See Rudiger Graf, “Making Use of the Oil Weapon. Western Industrial Countries and Arab
PetroPolitics in 1973– 1974, Diplomatic History, 36, 1 (2012): 185–208.
 Chapter 3 draft “The evolution of international relations”; Summary of conclusions of the
4th meeting of the steering committee, 20–21 October 1977. OECD archives.
 Letter by the Japanese government to the Secretary General, 9 May 1975. OECD archives.
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tions to the high postwar growth rates that could be observed in the Western
world. They drew the conclusion that Japan, with its extreme levels of industri-
alization in the postwar decades and anticipations of a leap into a post-industrial
economy, ran a high risk of similar developments. Saburo Okita had a back-
ground in futures research as the former chair of the Japanese futurological so-
ciety (several members of the Japanese OECD delegation had emerged from the
futurological society, including Yoshihiro Kogune and Yoneji Masuda). The fu-
turological society was directly associated to the Japanese Office of Technologi-
cal Planning and a central overseer of Japan’s industrialization process, and it
also seems to have had a link to the Institute for Information Society,which plan-
ned the transition into post-industrialism.⁸⁰ As a correspondent of, in particular,
Daniel Bell and Betrand Cazes, Okita was very familiar with futurological tools.
The specific focus on socio-cultural factors as something that could be system-
atically analyzed and anticipated and thus planned was outsourced within the
Interfutures group to a particular project draft written by the Toyota foundation
and referred to as the ‘Japanese project.’⁸¹ The Toyota proposal was tightly fo-
cused on the relationship between quick economic and technological change,
and value reactions, which were linked to the problems of stagflation in the
Western world, through changes in demand and a new governmental impossibil-
ity of satisfying expectations. The proposal identified a failure to realize a welfare
society as the source of a new structural contradiction between economic and
technological development, on the one hand, and human satisfaction, on the
other. The aim of the Toyota proposal was thus the ‘systematic identification
of the main factors of socio cultural background to be introduced into the anal-
ysis of future consumption and production patterns’ and the integration of
changing motivations of individuals and groups. The final report to Toyota
was entitled “Changing value patterns and their impact on economic structure”
and listed excesses of the welfare state and new, conflicting social demands as
‘structural challenges’ and ‘ridigidities’ in Western market societies that could be
anticipated and managed through scenarios.⁸² These themes of the Toyota proj-
 Interfutures, “Note by the secretariat. New elements and their policy implication in AIS.” 16
May 1978. OECD archives.
 Folder 212779, letter from Oshima to Lees, 24 December 1975, and Memorandum, 12 Decem-
ber 1979, signed Oshima.”Proposed financial contribution from a private foundation to the Inter-
futures project, note by the General secretary,” 24 May 1977, C (77) 89. OECD press release, 28
January 1976. OECD archives.
 “Proposed financial contribution from a private foundation to the Interfutures project. Note
by the secretary general,” 24 May 1977, Annex A, “Changing value patterns and their impact on
the economic structure, a report to the Toyota foundation,” 8 January 1979.
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ect had also gained in significance within the Interfutures project as a whole, as
a summary of discussions in 1977 decided to focus more on values as the main
problem of the ‘manageability’ of AIS economies.⁸³
Conclusion
The Interfutures program, lost in the dust of the less than transparent OECD ar-
chives, was a strategic reflection on how to close a future window opened by the
emergence of a set of alternative discourses on globalization. It was a key carrier
of the proto-neoliberal worldview – emphasizing the need for structural adjust-
ments of welfare statist structures in the West, an image of a growing world mar-
ket as a shared strategic interest of the Western and the developing worlds, the
existence of sociocultural reactions and values as the main obstacles for growth
– that by the mid 1970s was taking over within the organization. A few years
later the OECD became an active diffuser of such ideas into the global environ-
ment.
The idea of the long term played a key role in these proto neoliberal dis-
courses. As shown here, Interfutures stemmed from a desire within the OCED
to find a new method of world management, which allowed for an active influ-
ence on world relationships and also permitted the organization to fend off at
least two of the organization’s disastrious images of the world’s future, presented
in Limits and the RIO report. Scenarios were such a method, and offered both the
possibility to put forward partisan responses to alternative images of globaliza-
tion. As such they represented a hope for a new governmental mechanism that
could shift from the national to the global focus and allow OECD nations to act
as global players.
This chapter has pointed to another key aspect of this Western resistance,
namely, the way that the reaction to the alternative visions of globalization push-
ed by the Third World led to responses in the West. These contained two ele-
ments: the willingness to accept certain countries in the Third World within
an extended category of Advanced Industrial Societies, and the conclusion
that meeting the challenges from these in a new international division of
labor would require significant changes in the social structures of Western
economies. In this narrative, the link created both by Interfutures and the Trilat-
eral Commission between forms of upheaval in the world environment and forms
of social crisis within Western societies is crucial. Restoring competitiveness de-
 “Summary of discussions,” 13–14 October 1977. OECD archives.
342 Jenny Andersson
manded, both in Western countries and in the surrounding world, re-establish-
ing positive images of development and in particular, of a creative and flexible
world market. It might be argued that the role of tools such as scenarios and
long-term forecasts was exactly to stabilize expectations around this world mar-
ket, and entrench them in national governments and publics.
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Uvalić, Milica and Vojmir Franicević. Introduction: Branko Horvat – Beyond the Mainstream.
In Equality, Participation, Transition: Essays in Honour of Branko Horvat, eds. Vojmir
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